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ABSTRACT
In 2002, the Pacific Island State of Tuvalu made international news when its Prime
Minister announced that Tuvalu intended to sue Australia and the United States in the
International Court of Justice. To date, Tuvalu has never brought the threatened
litigation. Tuvalu is one of a number of small island developing States that could
eventually become uninhabitable due to the effects of climate change. This thesis aims
to test to what extent legal responsibility for climate change damage may arise under
international law. It also seeks to determine what level of exposure to legal risk
Australia may face for such damage. The study finds that there is a low level of
exposure under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) which contains vague commitments that would be difficult to enforce. The
specific targets for mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions under the Kyoto Protocol
provide potentially high exposure to legal risk for States that fail to meet their targets.
Australia does not face such risk because it is on track to meet its target. Application
of the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) offers a creative avenue for
litigation. However, it presents limited exposure due to difficulties around extending
its provisions to climate change and problems with establishing jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the rules of State responsibility are poorly suited to a problem as complex
as climate change damage. However, there are some opportunities for creative
application of these rules to respond to the problem of climate change damage. The
thesis recommends the seeking of an advisory opinion from the International Court of
Justice to clarify the rules of State responsibility, particularly in regard to attribution,
causation and apportionment of responsibility. Finally, additional instruments
concluded through the international climate negotiations could provide new
opportunities for international litigation.

i

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This doctrinal thesis would not have been possible without the support and help of the
many generous people around me. I wish to particularly thank the following people.

I am grateful for the invaluable assistance and guidance that my supervisors Associate
Professor Greg Rose and Professor Warwick Gullett have provided. I am thankful to
the University of Wollongong, and the Faculty of Law in particular, for offering me
an ideal environment to pursue this project. I wish to express my gratitude to my
employers, the Climate Justice Programme and the University of Technology, Sydney,
and all of my colleagues at these organisations for providing me with part-time
employment that has been the perfect complement to my studies.

Deepest gratitude to my partner Matty for his incredible support and patience for the
time and energy I have invested in this project. Special thanks to all of my friends and
family, especially my Mum, Dad and my brothers Josh, James and Nic. I am thankful
for comments on this thesis from my Dad and Josh, my ‘legal eagle’ family members.

Finally, I am grateful for the blessing of my pregnancy and unborn child, who is
coming at just the right time and reminding me of our responsibility to protect the
Earth for future generations.

For any errors or inadequacies that remain in this work, of course, the responsibility is
entirely my own.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................. i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................... ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................ iii
LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................. viii
LIST OF TABLES ...................................................................................................... ix
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................................... xi
TABLE OF CASES .................................................................................................. xiii
LIST OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ........................................................ xx
Introduction and Overview ................................................................................ 24
A.

The nature of the problem .............................................................................. 26

B.

The state of climate science ........................................................................... 28

C.

Literature review ............................................................................................ 34

D.

Research questions ......................................................................................... 40

E.

Definition of climate change damage ............................................................ 41

F.

Methodology .................................................................................................. 43

G.

Structure of the thesis ..................................................................................... 46

H.

Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 48
International Climate Change Regime ............................................................... 49

A.

Overview ........................................................................................................ 49

B.

Legal status of the atmosphere and climate ................................................... 50

C.

History ............................................................................................................ 51
1.

D.

Intergovernmental Negotiation Committee (INC) ..................................... 53
Key instruments and decisions ....................................................................... 63

1.

Introduction ................................................................................................ 63

2.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change .................... 64

3.

Kyoto Protocol ........................................................................................... 67

4.

Decisions of the Conference of Parties/Meeting of the Parties.................. 67

E.

Object and purpose of the UNFCCC ............................................................. 72
1.

Article 2 as the object and purpose of the UNFCCC ................................. 72

2.

The ordinary meaning of Article 2 ............................................................. 74

3.

Supplementary means of interpretation ..................................................... 78

4.

Further context: subsequent agreement ...................................................... 80
iii

5.

An additional objective .............................................................................. 84

6.

Conclusion .................................................................................................. 85

F.

Article 2 as an obligation ............................................................................... 86

G.

Principles ........................................................................................................ 88
1.

History and preparatory work of the principles in the UNFCCC .............. 89

2.

Common but differentiated responsibility (Article 3.1) ............................. 90

3.

Precautionary principle (Article 3.3) .......................................................... 94

4.

Sustainable development (Article 3.4) ....................................................... 96

5.

Conclusion .................................................................................................. 98

H.

Preamble ......................................................................................................... 99

I.

Conclusion .................................................................................................... 101
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Mitigation and

Adaptation ................................................................................................................ 104
A.

Overview ...................................................................................................... 104

B.

Mitigation and adaptation obligations .......................................................... 105
1.

Mitigation obligations .............................................................................. 107

2.

Adaptation obligations ............................................................................. 121

C.

Dispute settlement in the UNFCCC ............................................................. 137

D.

Conclusions .................................................................................................. 143
Kyoto Protocol ................................................................................................. 145

A.

Overview ...................................................................................................... 145

B.

Commitments under the Kyoto Protocol ...................................................... 146
1.

Quantitative Emission Limitation and Reduction Obligations (QELROs)
146

2.

Demonstrable progress ............................................................................. 150

3.

Adaptation Fund ....................................................................................... 150

4.

Reporting obligations ............................................................................... 152

C.

D.

Compliance and Enforcement ...................................................................... 153
1.

Enforcement Branch ................................................................................. 155

2.

Legal status of the compliance system ..................................................... 159

3.

Non-compliance and enforcement consequences .................................... 160

4.

Potential for legal disputes ....................................................................... 162
Conclusion .................................................................................................... 173
iv

Law of the Sea Convention .............................................................................. 175
A.

Overview ...................................................................................................... 175

B.

Law of the Sea Convention .......................................................................... 176

C.

Due regard provisions .................................................................................. 179

D.

Pollution of the marine environment............................................................ 182

E.

Commitments under the Law of the Sea Convention .................................. 186
1.

General obligations .................................................................................. 186

2.

Marine pollution from land-based sources ............................................... 192

3.

Marine pollution from atmospheric sources ............................................ 195

4.

Obligations relating to enforcement ......................................................... 196

5.

Other commitments .................................................................................. 197

F.

Compliance and enforcement ....................................................................... 198
1.

Choices of forum ...................................................................................... 199

2.

Process and procedures ............................................................................ 203

3.

Preliminary or provisional measures ........................................................ 204

4.

Jurisdiction ............................................................................................... 208

G.

Conclusion ................................................................................................... 225
State Responsibility.......................................................................................... 227

A.

Overview ...................................................................................................... 227

B.

State responsibility ....................................................................................... 229

C.

Standing ....................................................................................................... 233

D.

Attribution and imputability in international law......................................... 236
1.

Attribution of the acts of private corporations and individuals to States . 237

2.

Attribution to individual States with responsibility for a collective failure
246

E.

Causation ...................................................................................................... 251
1.

Deterministic approach ............................................................................ 253

2.

Probabilistic approach .............................................................................. 255

3.

Legal causation......................................................................................... 257

F.

Standard of proof.......................................................................................... 262

G.

Apportionment of responsibility .................................................................. 265
1.

Sole responsibility .................................................................................... 265

2.

Joint and several liability ......................................................................... 268
v

3.

Market share liability ............................................................................... 271

4.

Common but differentiated responsibility................................................ 273

H.

Defences ....................................................................................................... 276
1.

Consent ..................................................................................................... 276

2.

Necessity .................................................................................................. 277

I.

Remedies ...................................................................................................... 280
1.

Cessation .................................................................................................. 281

2.

Reparation ................................................................................................ 282

3.

Satisfaction ............................................................................................... 289

4.

Counter measures ..................................................................................... 290

J.

Conclusion .................................................................................................... 293
Tuvalu v Australia ............................................................................................ 299

A.

Tuvalu v Australia ........................................................................................ 300

B.

UNFCCC ...................................................................................................... 302
1.

Standing .................................................................................................... 304

2.

Jurisdiction ............................................................................................... 306

3.

Attribution ................................................................................................ 312

4.

Breach....................................................................................................... 314

5.

Causation .................................................................................................. 315

6.

Apportionment of responsibility .............................................................. 321

7.

Defences ................................................................................................... 324

8.

Remedies .................................................................................................. 325

9.

Conclusion ................................................................................................ 326

C.

Kyoto Protocol ............................................................................................. 327

D.

LOSC ............................................................................................................ 328
1.

Standing .................................................................................................... 330

2.

Jurisdiction ............................................................................................... 331

3.

Attribution ................................................................................................ 334

4.

Breach....................................................................................................... 336

5.

Causation .................................................................................................. 337

6.

Apportionment of responsibility .............................................................. 341

7.

Defences ................................................................................................... 342

8.

Remedies .................................................................................................. 342
vi

9.
E.

Conclusion ............................................................................................... 343
Conclusion ................................................................................................... 344

Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 347
A.

Exposure to legal risk for climate change damage under the climate regime
348
1.

UNFCCC .................................................................................................. 348

2.

Kyoto Protocol ......................................................................................... 351

B.

Exposure to legal risk for climate change damage under the LOSC ........... 352

C.

Exposure to legal risk for climate change damage under the rules of state

responsibility ........................................................................................................ 353
D.

The way forward .......................................................................................... 356

GLOSSARY............................................................................................................. 360
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................... 368
A.

Articles/Books/Reports ................................................................................ 368

B.

Legislation .................................................................................................... 416

C.

UN and other international material ............................................................. 417

D.

Other............................................................................................................. 426

APPENDIX A: UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE CHANGE .............................................................................................. 433
APPENDIX B: KYOTO PROTOCOL TO THE UNITED NATIONS
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE ................................. 458
APPENDIX C: UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
.................................................................................................................................. 481

vii

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1-1: Comparison between modeled and observed temperature rise from 1860
to 2000 ................................................................................................................ 30
Figure 6-1: Causation flow chart for climate change damage in international litigation
.......................................................................................................................... 262
Figure 7-1: Freshwater lens ...................................................................................... 317

viii

LIST OF TABLES
Table 2-1: Timeline of climate negotiations 1983-1989 ............................................ 51
Table 2-2 Key instruments in the international climate change regime..................... 64
Table 2-3 Meetings and key decisions of the COP/MOP .......................................... 68
Table 2-4 Proposed numerical values of ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference’ .... 83
Table 3-1 Obligations in the UNFCCC that may provide legal exposure ............... 106
Table 3-2 Sources of exposure to legal risk from mitigation obligations in the
UNFCCC .......................................................................................................... 121
Table 3-3 Sources of exposure to legal risk from the obligations to assist in adaptation
in the UNFCCC ................................................................................................ 137
Table 3-4 Summary of declarations and reservations accepting ICJ compulsory
jurisdiction under the optional clause .............................................................. 140
Table 3-5 Exposure to legal risk from dispute settlement procedures for the UNFCCC
.......................................................................................................................... 143
Table 4-1 Obligations in the Kyoto Protocol that may provide legal exposure ....... 146
Table 5-1 Obligations in the LOSC that may provide exposure to legal risk .......... 178
Table 5-2 Sources of legal risk from due regard obligations in the LOSC .............. 181
Table 5-3 Sources of legal exposure from general obligations in the LOSC........... 192
Table 5-4 Sources of exposure to legal risk from LOSC obligations on marine pollution
from land-based sources ................................................................................... 195
Table 5-5 Sources of exposure to legal risk from LOSC obligations on marine pollution
from atmospheric sources ................................................................................ 196
Table 5-6 Preference(s) for method of dispute settlement under LOSC processes . 201
Table 5-7 Declarations under Article 298 of the LOSC in relation to Security Council
matters .............................................................................................................. 203
Table 5-8 Exposure to legal risk from dispute settlement procedures for the LOSC
.......................................................................................................................... 225
Table 6-1 Key questions to determine legal exposure under the rules of attribution and
responsibility .................................................................................................... 229
Table 6-2 A brief history of climate change science................................................ 260
Table 6-3 Key findings regarding legal exposure under the rules of attribution and
responsibility .................................................................................................... 297
Table 7-1 Categories of standing under international law ....................................... 304
ix

Table 7-2 Summary of findings: Australia’s exposure to legal risk under the UNFCCC
.......................................................................................................................... 326
Table 7-3 Summary of findings: Australia’s exposure to legal risk under the Kyoto
Protocol ............................................................................................................ 328
Table 7-4 Summary of findings: Australia’s exposure to legal risk under the LOSC
.......................................................................................................................... 343

x

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAU

Assigned Amount Units

AG13

Ad hoc Group on Article 13

Annex B Parties

Parties listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change

Annex I Parties

Parties listed in Annex I of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change

Annex II Parties

Parties listed in Annex II of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change

AOSIS

Alliance of Small Island States

CANZ

Canada, Australia, and New Zealand

CCSBT

Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna

CDM

Clean Development Mechanism

CMP

Conference of the Parties serving as Meeting of the Parties to the
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change

CO2

Carbon dioxide

COP

Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change

ECJ

European Court of Justice

ENSO

El Niño Southern Oscillation

ERT

Expert Review Team

EU

European Union

GDP

Gross Domestic Product

GEF

Global Environment Facility

ICJ

International Court of Justice

IMO

International Maritime Organisation

INC

Intergovernmental Negotiation Committee

IPCC

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

IPCC-WGI

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working Group I

IPCC-WGII

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working Group II

IPCC-WGIII

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working Group III

ISA

International Seabed Authority

JI

Joint Implementation

xi

Kyoto Protocol

Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change

LDCF

Least Developed Countries Fund

LEG

Least Developed Countries Expert Group

LOSC

United Nations Law of the Sea Convention

LULUCF

Land use, land-use change and forestry

MOP

Meeting of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change

NAPAs

National Adaptation Programs of Action

ODA

Official Development Assistance

OECD

Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development

PCIJ

Permanent Court of International Justice

QELRO

Quantitative Emission Limitation and Reduction Obligations

SBI

Subsidiary Body for Implementation

SBT

Southern Bluefin tuna

SCCF

Special Climate Change Fund

SIDS

Small island developing States

SPA

Strategic Priority on Adaptation

SWCC

Second World Climate Conference

UK

United Kingdom

UN

United Nations

UNCC

United Nations Compensation Commission

UNCED

United Nations Conference on Environment and Development

UNDP

United Nations Development Programme

UNEP

United Nations Environment Programme

UNFCCC

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

UNGA

United Nations General Assembly

US

United States

WGI

Intergovernmental Negotiation Committee Working Group I

WGII

Intergovernmental Negotiation Committee Working Group II

WMO

World Meteorological Organization

WTO

World Trade Organization

xii

TABLE OF CASES

A
Aerial Incident of 10 Aug 1999 (Pakistan v India) [2000] ICJ Rep 1038
Al-Jedda v United Kingdom [2011] ECHR 1092 (7 July 2011)
Al-Skeini & Ors v United Kingdom [2011] ECHR 1093 (7 July 2011)
Anglo-Chinese Shipping Co Ltd v United States, 130 Ct. Cl 361, 127 F. Supp. 553,
cert. Den. 349 US 938, 986 (1955)
Antippa (The Spyros) Case (Greece v Germany) (1926) 7 TAM 23
Antonio Gramsci (No 2) and Patmos Cases, IOPC Fund, Annual Report (1990) 23
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) [2007] ICJ Rep 91
Arrest Warrant (Congo v Belgium) (2002) 41 ILM 536

B
Beavis v Apthorpe (1962) 80 WN (NSW) 852
Behrami and Behrami v France and Saramati v France, Germany and Norway (dec)
nos 71412/01 and 78166/01 Eur. Ct. HR 2007 (joint admissibility decision)
Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] UKHL 1; [1956] AC 613
Brown v Superior Court 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988)

C
Case concerning Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v
Honduras) [1990] ICJ 3
Case concerning the Barcelona Traction Case, Light and Power Company (Belgium v
Spain) [1970] ICJ Rep 4, 33
Case concerning the factory at Chorzów (Germany v Poland) (Jurisdiction) [1927]
PCIJ (ser A) No 9, 21 and (Merits) [1928] PCIJ (ser A) No 17
Case of the Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft of United States of America (United
States v Hungary) (United States v USSR) [1954] ICJ 99
Certain Expenses of the UN (Advisory Opinion) [1962] ICJ Rep. 151
Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v Australia) [1992] ICJ Rep 240
xiii

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v SS Zoe Colocotroni 456 F Supp 1327 (1978) and
628F 2d 652 (1980)
Continental Shelf (Libya v Malta) [1984] ICJ 3
Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v Albania) [1949] ICJ 4

D
Dickson Car Wheel Co. Case (1931). Op. of Com. 1931
Dix Case (US v Venezuela) [1903] 9 R.I.A.A. 119

E
East Timor Case (Portugal v Australia) [1995] ICJ 90
East Timor Case (Portugal v Australia) [1995] ICJ Rep 139
ECJ Case C-459/03, Commission v Ireland, ECR I-4635 (2006)
EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WTO Doc.
WT/DS26/AB/R (16 January 1998)
Effect of Awards of Compensation made by the UN Administrative Tribunal (Advisory
Opinion) [1954] ICJ Rep. 47
Electricity Co of Sofia and Bulgaria (Belgium v Bulgaria) [1939] PCIJ (ser A/B) No
77
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Decision No 7, Guidance Regarding Jus ad
Bellum Liability
Estai Case (Canada v Spain) [1998] ICJ Rep 431
Eurotunnel Arbitration (The Channel Tunnel Group Ltd and France –Machne S.A. v
United Kingdom and France) [2007] 132 ILR 1

F
Fairchild v Glenhaven (2002) [2002] UKHL 22
Federated States of Micronesia v Prunerov www.pohodacez.cz/press/englishsummary-of-the-prunerov-case-53
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom and Ireland) [1974] ICJ Reports 1
Frances Irene Roberts Case (US v Venezuela) (1903) Ven.Arb., 142
Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v Mali) [1986] ICJ 554

xiv

G
Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) [1997] ICJ Rep 7
Garrido and Baigorria case, Inter-Am. Ct. HR (Ser. C) No. 39 (1998)

H
Haileybury College v Emanuelli [1983] VR 323
Havenaar v Havenaar [1982] 1 NSWLR 626
HN v Netherlands (Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs), First
Instances Judgment of 10 December 2008, District Court of the Hague, ILDC 1092
(NL 2008)
Heckman v. Federal Press Co., 587 F.2d 612, 617 (3d Cir. 1978)
Home Insurance Co Case (United States v Mexico) (1926) 4 RIAA 48
Hussein v Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine and the United Kingdom (dec), no.
23276/04. ECHR 2006
Hymowitz v. Ely Lilly & Co., 539 N.E. 2d 1069, 1076 (N.Y. 1989)

I
ICAO Council Case (India v Pakistan) [1972] ICJ Rep 67
Icelandic Fisheries Cases (UK v Iceland) [1974] ICJ 3
Iloilo Claims (United Kingdom v United States) (1925) 6 RIAA 158

J
James A. Beha, Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York, as Liquidator
of Norske Lloyd Insurance Company Ltd, for American Policymakers (US v Germany)
[1928] VIII RIAA 55
Janes Claim (US v Mexico) [1926] IV RIAA 82

K
Korea-Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products AB-19998, WT/D598/AB/R p 24, paras 80-81 (1999)

xv

L
La Grand, Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon and Nigeria) [1998] ICJ Rep 275
Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v Honduras, Nicaragua
intervening) [1992] ICJ 351
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ 226
Lighthouses Arbitration (France/Greece) [1956] XII RIAA 155
LOSC Arbitral Tribunal, MOX Plant, Suspension of Proceedings on Jurisdiction and
Merits and Request for further Provisional Measures, Order No. 3 of 24 June 2003

M
M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece [GC] no. 30696/09, ECHR2011
Maffezini Award on Merits (Maffezini v Spain) [2000] ICSID Case No ARB/97/7
Maninat Case (France v Venezuela) (1905) 10 RIAA 55
Massachussets v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 521 (2007)
Massey Claim (US v Mexico) [1927] IV RIAA 155
McGee v National Coal Board [1972] 3 All ER 1008; [1973] 1 WLR 1
Mecham Case (United States v Mexico) (1929) 4 RIAA 440
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v United States) 1986 ICJ 14
Minquiers and Ecrehos (France v. United Kingdom) [1953] ICJ 47
Mitchie v Great Lakes Steel, 496 F.2D 213 (Sixth Circuit 1974)
Mount Isa Mines v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383; (1971) ALR 253
MOX Plant Case (Provisional Measures) ITLOS NO 10 (2001)
Mulcahy v Eli Lilly & Co 386 N.W. 2d 67, 75 (Iowa, 1986)

N
Namibia (Advisory Opinion) [1971] ICJ Rep 16
Naulilaa Case (Portugal v Germany) [1928] 2 RIAA 1011
Neer Case (United States v Mexico) (1926) 4 RIAA 60
North Sea Continental Shelf (Germany v Netherlands) [1969] ICJ 3
Nuclear Tests Cases (Australia v France) [1974] ICJ 253; (New Zealand v. France)
[1974] ICJ 457
Nuhanović v Netherlands, Gerechtshof, 5 July 2011, LJN BR 0133

xvi

O
Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States) [2003] ICJ Rep 324
Oil Platforms Case – Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v
United States of America) (Preliminary Objection) [1996] ICJ Reports 803
Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co Ltd (The Wagon Mound
No 1) [1961] AC 388

P
Phosphates in Morocco Case (Prel. Obj.) (1938), A/B/ 74
Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic Case No IT-94-1-A, ICTY App. Ch. 15 July 1999
Provident Mutual Life Insurance Company and Others (United States v Germany)
[1924] VII RIAA 91
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) [2010] ICJ Rep 14
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) [2010] ICJ Rep 225

R
R v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport ex parte European Roma Rights Centre
[2004] UKHL 55, at paras 62-63
Rainbow Warrior Case (New Zealand v France) (1990) 20 RIAA 217
Reparation for Injuries (Advisory Opinion) [1949] ICJ Rep 174
Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with
Respect to Activities in the Area (Advisory Opinion) [2011] ITLOS 17
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Mexico v US) (Report of the GATT Panel) [1991] 30
ILM 1594
Roberts Case (United States v Venezuela) [1903-1905] IX RIAA 204

S
Sambiaggio Case (Italy v Veneuzuela) (1903) 10 RIAA 499
Samoan Claims (Germany, Great Britain, United States) [1902] RIAA 23
Samoan Claims Case (Germany v Great Britain and US) [1902] IX RIAA 1963
Sindell v Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980)
Smith v Leech Brain & Co Ltd [1962] 2 QB 405; [1961] 3 All ER 1159

xvii

South West Africa Case (Second Phase) (Ethiopia v South Africa; Liberia v South
Africa) [1966] ICJ 32-33
South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v South Africa; Liberia v South Africa) [1966] ICJ
6
Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (Australia and New Zealand v Japan) (Jurisdiction and
Admissibility) (Arbitral Panel constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations
Convention of the Law of the Sea) (Award of 4 August 2000)
Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v Japan; Australia v Japan) (Provisional
Measures) (1999) 38 ILM 1624 (Order of 27 August 1999)
Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land (Belgium v. Netherlands) 1959 ICJ 209
Spanish Zone of Morocco Claims (United Kingdom v Spain) (1925) 2 RIAA 615
Spanish Zone of Morocco Claims (United Kingdom v Spain) (1925) 2 RIAA 615
Strong v Woolworths Ltd [2012] HCA 5

T
Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v Thailand) (Merits) ICJ Reports 1962
Territorial Dispute (Libya v Chad) [1994] ICJ 6; Grabčikovo-Nagymaros Project
(Hungary v Slovakia), [1997] ICJ 90
The Home Frontier and Foreign Ministry Society Case (United States v United
Kingdom) (1920) 6 RIAA 42
The Kummerow, Redler and Co, Fulda, Fishbach, and Friedericky Cases (Germany v
Venezuela) (1903) 10 RIAA 369
Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v Canada) [1949] 3 RIAA 1938

U
UNFCCC, Enforcement Branch of the Compliance Committee, Decision on
Preliminary Examination. Party concerned: Croatia (CC-2009-1-2/Croatia/EB, 8
September 2009), [4], [5].
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v Iran) [1980]
ICJ 3
USA, Federal Reserve Bank v Iran, Bank Markazi Case A28 (2000-02) 36 Iran-US
Claims Tribunal Reports 5 at 22, para 58

xviii

W
Wallaby Grip (BAE) Pty Ltd v Macleay Area Health Service (1998) 17 NSWCCR 355
Wallaby Grip (BAE) Pty Ltd v Macleay Area Health Service (1998) 17 NSWCCR 355
Woodyear v. Schaeffer, 57 MD 1, 9 (Md. 1881)

Y
Youmans Claim (US v Mexico) [1926] IV RIAA 110

Z
Zafft v Eli Lilly & Co 676 S.W. 2d 241, 246 (Mo. 1984)

xix

LIST OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
Agreement Between the Government of Australia, the Government of New Zealand
and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to
Terminate the Nauru Island Agreement of 2 July 1919, Australia-New Zealand-United
Kingdom, opened for signature 9 February 1987, PITSE 8 (entered into force 9
February 1987)

Agreement on Air Quality, US-Canada, signed 13 March 1991, 30 ILM 676, 679

Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
opened for signature 27 December 1945, 2 UNTS 134 (entered into force 27 December
1945)

Bonn Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, opened
for signature 23 June 1979, 19 ILM 15, 18 (entered into force 1 November 1983)

Cartagena Protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature
29 January 2000, 2226 UNTS 208 (entered into force 11 September 2003)

Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature 7 December
1944, 15 UNTS 295 (entered into force 4 April 1947)

Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, opened for signature 10
May 1993, ATS 1994 No 16 (entered into force 20 May 1994)

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened
for signature 4 November 1950, ETS No 5, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3
September 1953)

Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic,
opened for signature 22 September 1992, 32 ILM (entered into force 25 March 1998)

xx

Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, opened for
signature 16 November 1972, 1037 UNTS 151 (entered into force 17 December 1975)

Convention of the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other
Matter, opened for signature 29 December, 1972, 1046 UNTS 120 (entered into force
30 August 1975)

Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79
(entered into force 29 December 1993)

Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
opened for signature 3 March 1973, 995 UNTS 243 (entered into force 1 July 1975)

Convention on the International Liability for Damages caused by Space Objects
(opened for signature 29 March 1972) UNTS 961 (entered into force 1 September
1972)

Convention to Combat Desertification, opened for signature 14 October 1994 1954
UNTS 3 (entered into force 26 December 1996)

Geneva Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, opened for
signature 13 November 1979, 18 ILM 1442 (entered into force 16 March 1983)

Geneva Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature 29 April 1958, 450 UNTS
82 (entered into force 30 September 1962)

Helsinki Protocol on the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or Their Transboundary
Fluxes by at Least 30 Percent, opened for signature 8 July 1985, 27 ILM 707 (entered
into force 2 September 1987)

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16
December 1966, 99 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976)

xxi

Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change, opened for
signature 15 March 1998, 37 ILM 22 (entered into force 16 February 2005)

Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, opened for signature
16 September 1987, 1522 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1989)

Protocol Concerning the Control of Emissions of Volatile Organic Compounds or
Their Transboundary Fluxes, opened for signature 18 November 1991, 31 ILM 568
(entered into force 29 September 1997)

Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, opened for signature 4
October 1991, 30 ILM 1460 (entered into force 14 January 1998)

Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of
Wastes and Other Matter of 29 December 1972, opened for signature 7 November
1996, ATS 11 (entered into force 24 March 2006)

Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I) (14 June 1992)

Sofia Protocol Concerning the Control of Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides or Their
Transboundary Fluxes, opened for signature 31 October 1988, 28 ILM 214 (entered
into force 2 February 1991)

Statute of the International Court of Justice, opened for signature 26 June 1945, 59
Stat 1055 (entered into force 24 October 1945)

Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, opened for signature 24 May
2001, 2256 UNTS 119 (entered into force 17 May 2004)

Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights between the United States
of America and Iran, opened for signature 15 August 1995, US–Iran, 8 UST 899
(entered into force 16 June 1957)
xxii

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 9
May 1992, 1771 UNTS 107, 165 (entered into force 21 March 1994)

United Nations Law of the Sea Convention, opened for signature 10 December 1982,
1833 UNTS 397 (entered into force 16 November 1994)

Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, opened for signature 22
March 1985, 1513 UNTS 324 (entered into force 22 September 1988)

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155
UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980)

xxiii

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
In 2002, the Pacific Island State of Tuvalu made international news when its Prime
Minister announced that Tuvalu intended to sue Australia and the United States (US)
in the International Court of Justice over climate change.1 To date, Tuvalu has not
brought the threatened litigation; however, it remains a possibility. For instance, in
2011 Palau announced that it planned to seek an advisory opinion from the
International Court of Justice on whether States have a legal responsibility to ensure
that any activities on their territory that emit greenhouse gases do not harm other
States.2
Tuvalu is one of a number of small island developing States (SIDS) in the South
Pacific that are comprised of coral atolls.3 Like many SIDS, Tuvalu could eventually
become uninhabitable due to the effects of climate change. 4 This threat has immense
ramifications for the cultural, sovereign and physical integrity of Pacific Islanders,
most of whom are indigenous peoples.5 Its 10,000 citizens primarily engage in
subsistence farming and fishing.6 They have contributed little to the problem of climate

‘Tiny Pacific nation takes on Australia’, 4 March 2002, BBC News < http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/1854118.stm>. Tuvalu’s announcement may have inspired Michael Crichton, State of Fear
(London: HarperCollins, 2004) (a novel about a fictional international climate case).
2
UN News Centre, ‘Palau seeks UN World Court opinion on damage caused by greenhouse gases’, 22
September
2011,
<
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39710&Cr=pacific+island&Cr1#.UbWmPSFApy0>
accessed 28 September 2011.
3
William R Dickinson, ‘Holocene Sea-Level Record on Funafuti and Potential Impact of Global
Warming on Central Pacific Atolls’ (1999) 51(2) Quarternary Research 124.
4
N Mimura, ‘Vulnerability of South Pacific Island Nations to Sea-level Rise’ Journal of Coastal
Research, Special Issue 24; Françiose Hampson, ‘Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Indigenous Peoples: Expanded working paper by Françiose Hampson on the human rights situation of
indigenous peoples in States and other territories threatened with extinction for environmental reasons’,
UN Expanded Working Paper, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/28, 3.
5
See generally, A Chambers and K Chambers, ‘Five Takes on Climate & Cultural Change in Tuvalu’
(2007) 19 Contemporary Pacific 294; J. Connell, ‘Environmental Change, Economic Development &
Emigration in Tuvalu’ (1999) 22 Pacific Studies 1; J Connell, ‘Losing Ground? Tuvalu, The Greenhouse
Effect and The Garbage Can’ (2003) 44 Asia Pacific Viewpoint 89.
6
Central
Intelligence
Agency,
The
World
Factbook:
Tuvalu
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tv.html> accessed 20 May 2012.
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change because Tuvaluans do not have any major sources of greenhouse gas
emissions.7
The topic of this thesis, ‘Exposure to Legal Risk for Climate Change Damage under
the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and LOSC: A Case Study of Tuvalu v Australia’, is
based upon the assumption that international law will eventually be faced with the
problem of climate change damage in the context of a legal dispute between States.
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)8 and the
Kyoto Protocol9 are the two key legal instruments which have been agreed to by States
in response to climate change. The United Nations Law of the Sea Convention
(LOSC)10 is an international legal instrument agreed to by States to conserve, preserve
and protect the marine environment (among other purposes). Although many treaties
are relevant to climate change, the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and LOSC have been
selected on the basis that they are particularly relevant to questions relating to damage
and liability.
It is possible that a dispute under these instruments will never eventuate. However,
given the dire future Tuvalu and other SIDS face, it appears likely that this type of
international litigation is on the horizon. This thesis aims to test to what extent legal
responsibility for climate change may arise under international law. The aim of this

Tafue Lusama, ‘Tuvalu Plight Must be Heard by UNFCCC’, ABC: The Drum Opinion, 29 November
2011, at <http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/3701422.html> accessed 12 May 2012.
7
See generally, A Parker, et al., Climate Change and Pacific Rim Indigenous Nations (2006); Rebecca
Tsosie, ‘Indigenous Peoples & Environmental Justice: The Impact of Climate Change’ (2007) 78
University of Colorado Law Review 1625; Elizabeth Kronk, ‘Effective Access to Justice: Applying
Parens Patriae Standing Doctrine to Climate Change-related Claims Brought by Native Nations’ (2011)
32 Public Land and Resources Law Review 1.
8
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 9 May 1992, 1771
UNTS 107, 165 (entered into force 21 March 1994) [hereinafter ‘UNFCCC’].
9
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 15 March
1998, 37 ILM 22 (entered into force 16 February 2005) [hereinafter ‘Kyoto Protocol’].
10
United Nations Law of the Sea Convention, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 397
(entered into force 16 November 1994) [herein ‘LOSC’].
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chapter is to introduce the reader to the area of research including the objectives of the
study, to provide a literature review, explanation of the approach and methodology and
an overview of the thesis. A definition of climate change damage is offered in this
chapter, with further definitions provided in the Glossary.
A. The nature of the problem
Climate change damage in the South Pacific is a problem for SIDS,11 including
Tuvalu,12 because they may become uninhabitable within the foreseeable future. 13
While the vulnerability to climate change damage of SIDS14 is influenced by a range
of factors, including their economic base, population size, and population growth
rate,15 the height of the land is an important determinant of the seriousness of potential
climate change damage.16 The average height of Tuvalu is 1m and its highest point is
4.5m.17 Tuvalu is attempting to adapt to the impacts of climate change and ocean

William C G Burns, ‘Potential Implications of Climate Change for Coastal Resources of Pacific Island
Developing Countries & Potential Legal & Policy Responses’ (2005) 8 Harvard Asia Pacific Review
1.
12
V Markovich and D Annandale, ‘Sinking Without a Life Jacket? Sea Level Rise & the Position of
Small Island States in International Law’ (2000) 5 Asia Pacific Journal of Environmental Law 135;
Colette Mortreux and Jon Barnett, ‘Climate Change, Migration & Adaptation in Funafuti, Tuvalu’
(2009) 19 Global Environmental Change 105; Jon Barnett, ‘Adapting to Climate Change in Pacific
Island Countries: the Problem of Uncertainty’ (2001) 29 World Development 977; Jon Barnett, ‘Titanic
States? Impacts & Responses to Climate Change in the Pacific Islands’ (2005) 59 Journal of
International Affairs 203; J Barnett and N Adger, ‘Climate Dangers & Atoll Countries’ (2003) 61
Climatic Change 321.
13
P Nunn and N Mimura, ‘Vulnerability of South Pacific Island Nations to Sea-level Rise’ (1997)
Journal of Coastal Research (Special Issue 24) 133; Hampson, above n 4.
14
See generally, William C G Burns, ‘Global Warming – The United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change and the Future of Small Island States’ (1997) 6 Dickinson Journal of Environmental
Law & Policy 147, 169; Jon Barnett and W Neil Adger, ‘Climate Dangers & Atoll Countries’ (2003)
61 Climatic Change 321.
15
See, IPCC Working Group II, The Regional Impacts of Climate Change: An Assessment of
Vulnerability, Summary for Policymakers, Special Report, 6.8 (1997).
16
UN GA Res. 206, UN Doc. A/RES/44/206 (Dec. 22, 1989).
17
Genevieve Sheehan, ‘Tuvalu Little, Tuvalu Late: A Country Goes Under’ (2002) 24 Harvard
International Review 11, 11.
11
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acidification; however, its prospects of success depend heavily upon the extent of
global mitigation action.18
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has estimated that for the 21st
Century, sea level will rise by about 5mm per year in the Pacific region.19 For the 20th
Century, mean sea level rose by about 2mm per year. The IPCC has concluded that the
Pacific is at high risk from the impacts of this level of sea level rise. The IPCC has
concluded with very high confidence that sea level rise is expected to threaten ‘vital
infrastructure, settlements and facilities that support the livelihood of island
communities.’20
Sea level rise threatens fresh water supplies because many islanders rely upon
freshwater lenses for their water supplies. These freshwater lenses ‘float’ on seawater,
providing drinking water and contributing to the agricultural productivity of overlying
land.21 The IPCC has also determined that there is strong evidence that ‘under most
climate change scenarios, water resources in small islands are likely to be seriously
compromised.’22
Ocean acidification, which is another ocean effect of climate change, refers to the
continuing reduction in the pH and corresponding rise in acidity of the world’s oceans

Government of Tuvalu, Tuvalu’s National Adaptation Programme of Action, Ministry of Natural
Resources, Environment, Agriculture and Lands, Department of Environment, Tuvalu (2007).
19
See, N Mimura, et al., ‘Small Islands, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability’
in M. L. Parry, et al. (eds), IPCC Working Group II, Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (2007), 690.
20
Ibid, 689. See also, N Adger and J Barnett, ‘Compensation for Climate Change Must Meet Needs’
(2005) 435 Nature 328.
21
A freshwater lens refers to ‘a layer of fresh water that floats on the saline groundwater, resulting
from the natural process of rainwater infiltrating into the ground and aquifer.’ Government of Hawaii,
Wai’anae Ecological Characterization,
<http://hawaii.gov/dbedt/czm/initiative/wec/html/reference/glossary.htm#f> accessed 20 June 2012.
22
Mimura, et al, above n 19, 16.
18
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caused by the absorption of carbon dioxide (CO2).23 From 1751 to 1994, surface ocean
pH levels changed from approximately 8.25 to 8.14.24 Although such a change appears
small, it threatens to cause reduced calcification or enhanced dissolution for corals25
and other marine life.26 It is predicted that ocean acidification will occur in Tuvalu’s
waters in the 21st Century with change being primarily due to the increasing uptake of
CO2 by oceans.27
B. The state of climate science
The IPCC, which represents the consensus view of the world’s leading climate
scientists,28 released its Fourth Assessment Report in 2007. The report stated that
‘warming of the climate system is unequivocal’, as evident from observations of
increases in global air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice
and rising global average sea level.29 The IPCC stated that most of the observed
increase in global average temperatures since the mid 20th century is very likely (i.e.

James Orr et al, ‘Anthropogenic Ocean Acidification Over the Twenty-first Century & Its Impact on
Calcifying Organisms’ (2005) 437 Nature 681; Scott Doney, et al, ‘Ocean Acidification: the Other CO2
Problem’ (2009) 1 Annual Reivew of Marine Science 169.
24
Mark Jacobson, ‘Studying Ocean Acidification with Conservative, Stable Numerical Schemes for
Nonequilibrium air-ocean Exchange & Ocean Equilibrium Chemistry’ (2005) 110 Journal of
Geophysical Resources.
25
See e.g., J P Gattuso, et al, ‘Effect of Calcium Carbonate Saturation of Seawater on Coral
Calcification’ (1998) 18 Global & Planetary Change 37.
26
John Guinotte and Victoria Fabry, ‘Ocean Acidification & Its Potential Effects on Marine
Ecosystems’ (2008) 1134 Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 320.
27
Australian Bureau of Metereology and CSIRO, Climate Change in the Pacific: Scientific Assessment
and New Research. Volume I: Regional Overview. Volume II: Country Reports (2011), 235.
28
The IPCC is the leading international body for the assessment of climate change. It reviews and
assesses scientific, technical and socio-economic information. From these reviews, the IPCC
produces comprehensive assessment reports which, according to the Australian Department of
Climate Change, provide the “authoritative, consensus account of global climate change.”
(Department of Climate Change, Climate Change Science Frequently Asked Questions, 22, available
at <http://climatechange.gov.au/~/media/publications/science/science-faq.pdf> accessed 5 March
2012).
29
IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, 30.
23
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greater than 90% probability) due to the observed increase in anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions.30
The amount of CO2 in the atmosphere has increased by 35% in the industrial era31 and
has continued to rise. Carbon dioxide emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels
and from cement manufacture are responsible for approximately 75% of that
increase.32 As a result, the concentration of CO2 has risen over the past century from
about 280 ppm (parts per million) to 389 ppm in September 2011. In contrast, a natural
increase of 80 ppm after the last ice age took about 5,000 years. 33Anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions are directly impacting climate change, with an increase of
average temperature of 0.76 ˚C from 1899 to 2005.34 The decade from 2000-2009 was
the hottest on record.35 Recent scientific evidence suggests that climate change is
occurring more rapidly than the IPCC forecasts.36
In its 2001 report, the IPCC included the following illustration (Figure 1-1) to portray
the findings of simulations to determine the causes of observed temperature changes.

30

Ibid, 39.
IPCC, 2007: FAQ 1.1, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working
Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007).
32
IPCC, 2007: FAQ 7.1, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working
Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
33
IPCC, 2007: FAQ 6.2, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working
Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
34
IPCC, 2007 Summary for Policy Makers, 5.
35
NASA, 2009: Second warmest year on record; End of warmest decade,
<http://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/features/temp-analysis-2009.html> accessed 1 June 2012.
36
S Rahmstorf et al, ‘Recent Climate Observations Compared to Projections’ (2007) 316(5825)
Science 709.
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Figure 1-1: Comparison between modeled and observed temperature rise from 1860
to 2000
The climate model in Figure 1-1 simulates the Earth’s temperature variations and
compares the results with the measured changes. In graph (a) (top left), the band
represents only natural forcings (solar variation and volcanic activity). In graph (b)
(top right), the band represents anthropogenic forcings (greenhouse gases and an
estimate of sulfate aerosols). In graph (c) (bottom), the band represents both natural
and anthropogenic forcings.37
The simulation in graph (b) demonstrates that anthropogenic forcings provide ‘a
plausible explanation for a substantial part of the observed temperature changes over

37

IPCC, Third Assessment Report WG I, Summary for Policymakers, question 2
<http://www.grida.no/publications/other/ipcc_tar/ > accessed 1 June 2012.
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the past century’.38 However, the ‘best match’ is found in graph (c) demonstrating that
observed increase of temperature over the past century is due to both natural and
anthropogenic influence.39 Although these results are sufficient to explain the observed
temperature changes, they ‘do not exclude the possibility that other forcings may also
have contributed.’40
The Australian Academy of Science released a report in 2010 entitled ‘The Science of
Climate Change: Questions and Answers’.41 The report was prepared by a Working
Group and Oversight Committee consisting of Academy Fellows and other Australians
scientists with internationally recognised expertise in climate science. In answer to the
question, ‘Why are CO2 emissions from human activities regarded as so significant?’
the report stated that:
Large amounts of CO2 are continually transferred to and from the atmosphere, which
exchanges carbon with the oceans and vegetation on land. Until 200 years ago, these natural
exchanges were in rough balance, shown by the nearly constant concentrations of atmospheric
CO2 for most of the last two thousand years. The importance of the human-caused CO2
emissions is that they are disturbing this balance, adding carbon to the atmosphere faster than
it can be removed by vegetation, the slow mixing of CO 2 into the deep oceans, or even the
slower weathering processes that control the carbon balance on geological timescales. 42

There are further indications that most of the rise in temperature has been caused by
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. The atmospheric concentration of CO2 is at
the highest level it has been at for at least the last 800,000 years, including ice ages

38

Ibid.
Ibid.
40
Ibid.
41
Australian Academy of Science, Climate Change: Questions and Answers (2010)
<http://www.science.org.au/policy/climatechange.html> accessed 1 May 2012.
42
Ibid, 10.
39
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and earlier interglacial periods.43 This indicates that natural sources of CO2 have not
caused the recent rise in the atmospheric concentration of CO2.
One possible natural source for the large increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide is the
global oceans. If the global oceans were a source for the large increase in atmospheric
carbon dioxide, then this would be accompanied by a carbon decrease in this reservoir.
However, there has been no observation of the carbon decreasing in the global oceans.
On the contrary, there have been more than 20 published studies observing that carbon
has increased in the global oceans.44 All of these studies show that the carbon content
of the global oceans is rising by about 2±1 petagrams of carbon (PgC) annually. 45 By
way of contrast, fossil fuels contribute about 7 PgC to the atmosphere annually. This
means that the oceans cannot be a source of the increase in carbon in the atmosphere.
Instead, the scientific evidence indicates that the global oceans have absorbed
increased levels of carbon dioxide.
Another possible natural source for the large increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide
is the land biosphere. Once again, if the land biosphere was a source for the large

43

Ibid, 2.
Scientists have used 6 independent methods to measure the increase of carbon in the global oceans.
These are: (1) direct observations of the partial pressure of carbon dioxide at the ocean surface: Taro
Takashashi et al, ‘Global Sea-Air CO2 Flux Based on Climatological Surface Ocean pCO2, and
Seasonal Biological and Temperature Effects’ (2002) 49 Deep-Sea Research II 1601; (2) observations
of the spatial distribution of atmospheric CO2 which shows how much carbon goes in and out of the
different oceanic regions: P Bousquet et al. ‘Regional Changes of CO 2 Fluxes Over Land and Oceans
Since 1980’ (2000) 290 Science 1342; (3) observations of carbon, oxygen, nutrients and CFCs
combines to remove the mean imprint of biological processes: Christopher Sabine et al, ‘The Oceanic
Sink for Anthropogenic CO2’ (2004) 305 Science 367; (4) observations of alkalinity and carbon for
two time-periods combined with an estimate of water age based on CFCs: B I McNeil et al.
‘Anthropogenic CO2 Uptake by the Ocean Based on the Global Chlorofluorocarbon Data Set’ (2003)
299 Science 235; (5) along with simultaneous observations of atmospheric carbon dioxide increase
and the decrease in oxygen: R F Keeling, S C Piper and M Heimann, ‘Global and Hemispheric CO 2
Sinks Deduced From Changes in Atmospheric O2 Concentration’ (1996) 381 Nature 218; and (6)
along with the simultaneous observations of atmospheric carbon dioxide increase and carbon 13: P
Ciais et al., ‘A Large Northern Hemisphere Terrestrial CO2 Sink Indicated by the 13C/12C Ratio of
atmospheric CO2’ (1995) 269 Science 1098.
45
1 PgC equates to 1015 grams of carbon. Although there is some uncertainty about the scale of
uptake by the global oceans, it is clear that this uptake is occurring.
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increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide, this would be accompanied by a decrease in
the carbon in this reservoir. The land biosphere has taken up 15±9 PgC in the period
1980 to 1999.46 Although the land biosphere took up 39±18 PgC, the figure of 15±9
PgC includes a reduction in the land biosphere of 24±12 PgC due to deforestation and
other land-use changes.47 It is evident that after deforestation and other land use
changes, the land biosphere acts as a carbon sink and does not provide a natural source
for the increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide.
Other possible natural sources for the increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide are
volcanoes and other geological reservoirs. However, the combined annual carbon
emissions from volcanoes both on land and under the sea, averaged over several
decades, ‘are less than 1% of CO2 emissions in 2009 from fossil fuels, industrial
processes and deforestation.’48 This indicates that volcanoes and other geological
reservoirs could provide only a very small contribution to the increase in atmospheric
carbon dioxide.
Climate scientists have measured carbon isotopes as a separate independent means of
determining sources of atmospheric carbon dioxide.49 Carbon (C) is comprised of three
different isotopes,

14

C,

13

C and

12

C. The ratio of

13

C/12C in tree rings provides an

indicator of the source of carbon dioxide because carbon dioxide produced from fossil
fuels or deforestation has a lower 13C/12C ratio than that of atmospheric carbon dioxide.
Studies by isotope geochemists have shown that the current

13

C/12C ratios in the

atmosphere are the lowest that have existed in the last 10,000 years. Furthermore, the

Christopher Sabine et al, ‘The Oceanic Sink for Anthropogenic CO2’ (2004) 305 Science 367.
Ibid.
48
Australian Academy of Science , above n 41,11.
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Isotopes are different atoms with the same chemical behaviour but different masses.
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C/12C ratios started to significantly decline around 1850 AD – the same time that

13

human activities begun contributing higher levels of carbon dioxide.50
Based upon all of these factors, it is reasonable to reach a preliminary conclusion that
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions are responsible for virtually all of the rise in
atmospheric greenhouse gas emissions and the associated climate change. However,
whether this science will translate into causation in the context of international
climate litigation requires consideration and application of a number of tests that are
explored in this thesis.
C. Literature review
The aim of this section is to review the existing literature on the issue of the research
and to establish that this research will fill a gap in current knowledge about potential
legal responsibility for climate change damage under international law. Climate
change is a unique problem that transcends State boundaries. It also crosses over into
multiple areas of law at the international, regional and national levels.51
There is a growing interest in international environmental litigation generally52 and
specifically in relation to climate change. However, some argue that there is little value

M Stuiver, R L Burk and P D Quay, ‘13C/12C ratios and the transfer of biospheric carbon to the
atmosphere’ (1984) 89 Journal of Geophysical Research 11; R J Francey, et al, ‘A 1000-year High
Precision Record of d13Cin Atmospheric CO2’ (1999) 51B Tellus 170; P D Quay, B Tilbrook and C
S Wong, ‘Oceanic Uptake of Fossil Fuel CO2: Carbon-13 Evidence’ (1992) 256 Science 74.
51
On the complexity of international environmental law see generally Rudolf Dolzer, ‘Global
Environmental Issues: The Genuine Area of Globalization’ (1998) 7 Journal of Transnational Law and
Policy 157, 159; Edith Brown Weiss, ‘International Environmental Law Contemporary Issues and the
Emergence of a New World Order’ (1993) 81 Georgetown Law Journal 675, 702-3.
52
See Cesare Romano, ‘International Dispute Settlement’ in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Ellen
Hey (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2007) 1036, 1037. There have also been calls for an international environmental court. See e.g.
Amedeo Postiglione, The Global Environmental Crisis: The Need for an International Court of the
Environment (Florence: Giunti, 1996); Alfred Rest, ‘The Indispensability of an International
Environmental Court’ (1998) 7 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law
50
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in international environmental litigation and instead emphasise the need for
cooperation.53 Enforcement of international environmental law remains a difficult
issue.54 There is a broader body of work on international environmental governance
including the manner in which rules of international environmental law are developed,
applied and enforced.55
The proposed research field is part of the broader study of climate change law.56
Considerable literature has been devoted to responsibility for climate change in terms
of the distribution of moral responsibility within the international community.57
Climate change raises critical issues of equity across developed and developing States
and across generations.58 More recently, an increasing number of authors have

63; Jutta Brunnée, ‘The Responsibility of States for Environmental Harm in a Multinational Context –
Problems and Trends’ (1993) 34 Les Cahiers de Droit 827.
During the early history of international environmental law, international cases were rare but are now
much more common: Ben Boer, Ross Ramsay and Donald Rothwell, International Environmental Law
in the Asia Pacific (London: Kluwer Law International, 1998), 1-2.
53
See e.g. Abram Chayes, Antonia Handler Chayes and Ronald B Mithcell, ‘Managing Compliance: A
Comparative Perspective’ in Edith Brown Weiss and Harold K Jacobson (eds), Engaging Countries:
Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998),
39.
54
Benedict Kingsbury, ‘The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of
International Law’(1997-8) 19 Michigan Journal of Internatioanl Law 345.
55
See generally Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Law, Politics and International Governance’
in Christian Reus-Smit (ed), The Politics of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004); Daniel Bodanksy, ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for
International Environmental Law?’(1999) 93 The American Journal of International Law 596, 597;
Philippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law (2nd ed, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003).
56
See e.g. Philippe Sands, ‘International Environmental Litigation and its Future’ (1999) 32 University
of Richmond Law Review 1619; Kevin Healy and Jeffrey Tapick, ‘Climate Change: It’s Not Just an
Issue for Corporate Counsel – It’s a Legal Problem’ (2004) 29 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law
89;
57
See e.g. Matthew D Adler, ‘Commentaries: Corrective Justice and Liability for Global Warming’
(2006-2007) 155 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1859; Tim Hayward, ‘Human Rights Versus
Emissions Rights: Climate Justice and the Equitable Distribution of Ecological Space’ (2007) 21(4)
Ethics & International Affairs 431; Sara Aminzadeh, ‘A moral imperative: the human rights
implications of climate change’ (2007) 30 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 231;
Ruth Gordon, ‘Climate Change and the Poorest Nations: Further Reflections on Global Inequality’
(2007) 78 University of Colorado Law Review 1559; David Freestone, ‘International Law and Sea Level
Rise’ in Robin Churchill and David Freestone (eds), International Law and Global Climate Change
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assessed the economic dimensions of climate change.59 However, literature that
explores legal responsibility through international legal frameworks is in its early
development.
The application of the international law doctrine of State responsibility to climate
change damage has been written upon, with a leading work being ‘Climate change
damage and international law: Prevention Duties and State Responsibility’ by Roda
Verheyen.60 Verheyen considers climate change damage under the international
climate regime, as well as other international law including the LOSC. Verheyen
provides case studies including a hypothetical claim by the Cook Islands against
Australia based upon injury due to expected sea level rise and relying upon the ‘no
harm’ rule of customary international law.61 Based upon this case study, Verheyen
concludes that it is possible to seek redress for damages based upon the fact that current
(and past) greenhouse gas emissions contribute to the phenomenon of climate change
and therefore to the risk of future sea level rise with its diverse consequences.62
This thesis offers a critique of Verheyen’s conclusions, which appear to overstate the
case for exposure to legal risk for climate change damage. For instance, Verheyen
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argued that Article 2 of the UNFCCC provides a legally enforceable commitment.63
However, upon closer inspection there is little to support such a conclusion. Rather,
Article 2 is the objective of the climate regime and does not provide a commitment to
mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. Similarly, Verheyen concluded that Article 4.2 of
the UNFCCC could be relied upon by a claimant State,64 whereas this thesis finds that
there are a number of reasons to doubt such a view particularly due to the vague
language used in Article 4.2.
Furthermore, the thesis can be distinguished from Verheyen’s work by its
consideration of recent international case law (e.g. Behrami and Behrami Case65) and
other material (e.g. the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on
Responsibility of International Organisations66) which inform issues of multiple
attribution and responsibility. It also considers new science on ocean acidification and
sea level rise which influence questions of causation. With the first commitment period
of the Kyoto Protocol ending in December 2012 it is also now possible to make an
assessment about the relative levels of compliance by Parties with their commitments
under the Kyoto Protocol.
Finally, the thesis considers other aspects that are not addressed by Verheyen. These
include the possible application of the defence of consent, greater consideration of the
LOSC (including the decisions in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case67 and the MOX
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Plant Case68) and the potential of using the principle of common but differentiated
responsibility as a basis for allocating responsibility for climate change damage.
Potential claims under the climate change regime have received some attention in other
literature. Most authors have focused upon the UNFCCC, specifically the objective
contained in Article 2, the mitigation obligation found in Article 4.2 and the
obligations to assist in adaptation found in Articles 4.3 and 4.4.69 For example, Sands
argued that Article 4.4 has the potential to be the most costly obligation in the
UNFCCC.70 Again, this thesis offers a critique of these conclusions and identifies
weaknesses within these previous assessments of exposure to legal risk for climate
change damage. There are dimensions to the issue that have yet to be explored by these
other authors. This is especially the case in terms of the relationship between the treaty
obligations and the rules of State responsibility.
Potential claims under international marine law, including for SIDS, has been explored
by some authors.71 This literature is in early development and offers room for further
analysis. In particular, little attention has been provided to the question of whether the
climate regime excludes the LOSC dispute settlement processes72 and how the lex
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specialis rule should be applied. These jurisdictional issues are likely to pose a
significant issue for claimant States but have not been examined in depth by other
authors. Other issues that have not been fully examined include whether the
obligations that deal with specific types of sources for marine pollution (land-based
sources and atmospheric sources) could encompass greenhouse gas emissions.
Finally, there has been relatively scant research undertaken on questions relating to
establishing attribution and responsibility for climate change. There are innovative
legal elements associated with the unique phenomenon of global climate change that
have not been examined in the literature. As mentioned above, the principle of
common but differentiated responsibility is a new factor in the attribution of
responsibility that introduces a new possible formula for the attribution of cumulative
damage by several Parties.73 The principle of common but differentiated responsibility
is assessed in this thesis for its influence in relation to other considerations, such as the
choice of joint or several responsibility and application of the sine qua non formula.74
Therefore, it is submitted that the research provides a contribution to the existing
knowledge in five respects. First, it offers a critique of the conclusions previously
reached by other authors by identifying areas of weakness within these arguments and
areas where exposure to legal risk may be overstated. Second, the thesis addresses
issues that have either been overlooked or given insufficient attention by other authors.
Third, the thesis considers more recent sources of international law, including

73

The principle of common but differentiated responsibility refers to the concept that countries should
have differing responsibilities and rights depending upon distinguishing characteristics such as wealth
and level of development. For more on common but differentiate responsibility, see Malgosia
Fitzmaurice, ‘Liability for Environmental Damage Caused to the Global Commons’ (1996) 5(4) Review
of European Community and International Law 305; Christopher D Stone, ‘Common but Differentiated
Responsibilities under International Law’ (2004) 98 American Journal of International Law 276.
74
Faure and Nollkaemper, above n 60.

39

international case law. Fourth, it examines the impact of recent science on exposure to
legal risk for climate change damage not previously considered by other authors.
Finally, the thesis considers exposure within the context of recent developments in
factual circumstances that would impact on the question of whether breaches of the
law have occurred.
D. Research questions
This thesis aims to answer two research questions. The first of these is ‘What exposure
is there to legal risk for climate change damage under the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol
and LOSC?’ The secondary research question is ‘Would Tuvalu succeed in a claim
regarding climate change damage against Australia under the UNFCCC, Kyoto
Protocol and LOSC?’
The first research question is a general legal enquiry as to the current state of the law.
This enquiry requires an assessment of the phenomenon of climate change, a survey
and analysis of the literature and of the applicable international law. In this way, the
first research question is a classic doctrinal legal research question in which a study is
undertaken to determine what the law is in this particular area.75 The aim here is to
describe the relevant body of international law and how it applies to the problem of
climate change damage. This research question is focused upon the interpretation of
the applicable law.
The second research question aims to thoroughly investigate the application of the
law, which can often be the most contentious element in doctrinal research.76 The aim

I Dobinson and F Johns, ‘Qualitative Legal Research’ in McConville M and Chui WH (eds), Research
Methods for Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 18.
76
Ibid, 19.
75

40

here is to use a plausible case study in order to illuminate the realities of this type of
litigation, particularly with regard to procedural and jurisdictional obstacles facing the
different avenues of legal claim.
Although part of the paradigm of legal doctrinal research is that the law may be
objectively determined,77 interpretation and application of this area of law provides
ample room for divergent views amongst legal scholars. For this reason, the thesis
delves into difficult issues, acknowledges other potential perspectives and provides
justification for why particular conclusions have been reached.
E. Definition of climate change damage
Climate climate damage is a form of environmental damage and transboundary
pollution. Environmental damage refers to all of the adverse effects on human beings,
property and the environment caused by human activities.78 Transboundary pollution
refers to situations where two or more States are affected by pollution across borders.79
Climate change damage is not defined in any legal instruments. However, Article 1.1
of the UNFCCC defines the adverse effects of climate change as:
changes in the physical environment or biota resulting from climate change which
have significant deleterious effects on the composition, resilience, or productivity of
natural or managed ecosystems or on the operation of socio-economic systems or on
human health and welfare.

This definition largely adopts the language employed in other international legal
instruments to refer to pollution or adverse effects. However, the definition adopted in
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the UNFCCC contains a threshold (‘significant deleterious effects’) that is not found
in some other instruments, such as the 1979 Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution.80 Nonetheless, such a threshold is found in the 1987
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer.81
Although the definition found in the UNFCCC could be adopted, the LOSC’s
definition of ‘pollution of the marine environment’ contains a lower threshold element
by simply referring to ‘deleterious effects’.82 Thus, there are climate change impacts
that may be captured by the LOSC but not the UNFCCC. Furthermore, the definition
contained in the LOSC includes both actual damage and the risk of damage (‘results
or is likely to result’).
Therefore, a broad approach is taken in this thesis and climate change damage is
defined as encompassing any deleterious effect or risk of deleterious effect to the
environment caused by anthropogenic climate change. This definition of climate
change damage must be distinguished from compensable damage, which refers to
economic losses or harms expressed in economic terms that is found in schemes of
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liability and reparation.83 Whether a specific type of climate change damage is
compensable damage is a separate matter which is discussed through this thesis.
F. Methodology
The doctrinal methodology used in law is ‘under-theorised’ and often given little
attention by scholars.84 As observed by Richard Posner, ‘law is not a field with a
distinct methodology, but an amalgam of applied logic, rhetoric, economics and
familiarity with a specialised vocabulary and a particular body of texts, practices and
institutions.’85 Much of the literature that examines doctrinal methodology compares
law to other types of research, including discourse analysis.86
Some commentators draw a distinction between the ‘internal method’ used in doctrinal
legal research and the ‘external method’ used by extra-legal disciplines that study the
law in practice.87 The internal method refers to the study of law ‘using reason, logic
and argument’ and in this method there is a ‘primary of critical reasoning based around
authoritative texts.’88 In essence, the internal method involves the ‘analysis of a
number of legal rules and principles taking the perspective of an insider in the
system.’89
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Doctrinal research involves forms of reasoning including induction, deduction and
analogy.90 It is a form of qualitative research because it is a ‘process of selecting and
weighing materials taking into account hierarchy and authority as well as
understanding social context and interpretation.’91 In many ways, doctrinal research is
similar to a social science literature review; however it goes beyond a literature review
by providing interpretation and analysis of documents and texts.92 The first step
requires an objective task of finding the law but the second step is a subjective process
personal to the individual researcher.93
The task of researching international law requires an examination of the sources of
international law that are stipulated in Article 38 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice.94 The sources are conventions, custom95 and general principles.
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Judicial decisions and writings provide subsidiary means for determining the law.
Thus, doctrinal research in the context of international law is essentially a ‘matter of
treaty interpretation, and of construing applicable customary rules and general legal
principles.’96
The research questions of this thesis focus particularly upon the law contained in
treaties, namely the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC),97 the Kyoto Protocol98 and the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention
(LOSC).99 Guidance on how treaties are to be interpreted is provided in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).100 The general rule of interpretation is that
a treaty is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning of
the terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 101 Supplementary
means of interpretation may be utilised in order to confirm the meaning, or to
determine the meaning when the interpretation leaves the meaning ambiguous or
obscure, or leads to a result which is ‘manifestly absurd or unreasonable.’102
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G. Structure of the thesis
Chapter 2 introduces the international climate change regime, which includes the
UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and other instruments. It provides a history of the
international negotiations and an overview of the key instruments, decisions,
institutions and mechanisms. It examines the objective contained in Article 2 of the
UNFCCC and identifies its meaning. Chapter 2 also considers an alternative objective
which emerges from the text of the UNFCCC. This chapter provides a general
overview of the principles contained in Article 3 of the UNFCCC, focusing especially
upon common but differentiated responsibility (Article 3.1); the precautionary
principle (Article 3.3); and sustainable development (Article 3.4). It also considers the
content of the preamble of the UNFCCC and its role as an interpretive aid.
Chapter 3 examines the commitments contained in the UNFCCC and the extent to
which these may provide an avenue of redress for victim States. In particular, the
chapter examines whether (developed) States are legally bound to mitigate greenhouse
gas emissions and whether these States are legally bound to assist victim States in
adaptation to climate change impacts. This chapter describes and analyses the content
and scope of these commitments with a view to concluding what level of exposure
there is to legal risk for climate change damage under the UNFCCC. In addition, this
chapter considers the dispute settlement procedures contained in the UNFCCC and the
ability of States to litigate contentious cases.
Chapter 4 describes and interprets the commitments contained in the Kyoto Protocol
within the context of climate change damage, focusing particularly upon the
Quantitative Emission Limitation and Reduction Obligations (QELROs). This chapter
examines the emergence of the Kyoto Protocol compliance system and its key
46

components, including the Enforcement Branch. It also considers the legal status of
the compliance system. Finally, Chapter 4 assesses the potential for legal disputes both
within and outside of the Kyoto Protocol compliance system around the Kyoto
Protocol obligations.
Chapter 5 shifts the focus of the thesis to a separate area of international law, namely
the LOSC. This chapter assesses a number of obligations contained in the LOSC which
could provide sources of legal exposure. These obligations include the due regard
provision, general obligations to prevent, reduce and control marine pollution, and
obligations relating to specific types of sources of marine pollution. These specific
sources include land-based sources and atmospheric sources. Chapter 5 also examines
the compliance and enforcement mechanisms of the LOSC. Particular attention is
given to the question of whether claimant States would be able to establish jurisdiction,
given that there may be overlap and even conflicts between the LOSC and the climate
regime.
Chapter 6 examines the rules of State responsbility and their possible application to
climate damage. This chapter assesses the rules of attribution and imputability in
international law. It examines causation and considers how factual causation and legal
causation could be applied. The chapter assessed the various approaches to allocating
responsibility when there are multiple wrongdoers, as is the case with climate change.
Finally, Chapter 6 examines possible defences and the available remedies.
Chapter 7 seeks to answer the second research question through the use of a
hypothetical case study of Tuvalu v Australia. The chapter seeks to test the preliminary
conclusions of the thesis in relation to the obligations contained in the UNFCCC,
Kyoto Protocol and LOSC and under the rules of State responsibility.
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Chapter 8 is the conclusion of the thesis. It brings together the findings of the thesis
across the chapters in relation to both of the research questions. This chapter also
provides recommendations for responding to climate damage in light of the findings
of the thesis.
H. Conclusion
This chapter has introduced the area of research by providing an overview of the
problem of climate change damage. The objectives of the research have been explained
through the description of the two research questions which the thesis aims to answer.
The first of these is ‘What exposure is there to legal risk for climate change damage
under the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and UNCLOS?’ The secondary research question
is ‘Would Tuvalu succeed in a claim regarding climate change damage against
Australia under the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and UNCLOS?’ The topic has been
introduced as a classic doctrinal legal research project into the interpretation and
application of a particular area of law. Thus, the thesis has adopted the approach of
legal positivism. A basic introduction to the terminology that is used in the thesis has
been provided. The literature review introduced the area of study identifying relevant
gaps in knowledge and an explanation of how the thesis has been designed to address
these gaps. Finally, the structure of the thesis has been explained.
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INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME
A. Overview
This chapter aims to introduce the international climate change regime, including the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),1 the Kyoto
Protocol2 and other instruments. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce thoroughly
the collective response of the international community to the issue of climate change.
This understanding provides background to the following chapters which examine the
most relevant obligations in depth. Key points identified in this chapter are featured in
tables for ease of reference. This background provides insight into the level of
exposure to legal risk that may arise under the international climate change regime,
which is further examined in the following chapters.
Section B explores the legal status of the atmosphere, which is not clearly defined in
international law. Section C examines the history and preparatory work of the
UNFCCC, focusing upon how countries approached the issue of climate change and
how they considered the issues of liability and compensation for climate change
damage. Section D describes the key instruments and decisions found in the climate
regime. It provides an introduction to both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol,
which are more fully examined in Chapters 3 and 4.
Section E considers the object and purpose of the UNFCCC. This section aims to
interpret Article 2, which is generally noted for its ambiguity. Section E also considers
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United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 9 May 1992, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107, 165 (entered into force 21 March 1994) [hereinafter ‘UNFCCC’].
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1998, 37 ILM 22 (entered into force 16 February 2005) [hereinafter ‘Kyoto Protocol’].
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an alternative objective which emerges from the text of the UNFCCC. Section F
considers the argument that Article 2 may be a legally binding obligation. Section G
provides a general overview of the principles contained in Article 3 of the UNFCCC,
focusing especially upon common but differentiated responsibility (Article 3.1); the
precautionary principle (Article 3.3); and sustainable development (Article 3.4).
Section H examines the preamble of the UNFCCC and its role as an interpretative aid.
Finally, Section I summarises the findings of this chapter.
A regime refers to a body of international law that deals with a specific problem or
area. It may be structured by a framework convention which is accompanied by various
other instruments. The international climate change regime adopts this structure and is
made up of two key conventions: the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. 3 There are a
number of other important instruments found within the regime which are also
described in this chapter.
B. Legal status of the atmosphere and climate
The atmosphere is not a distinct category in international law. The ‘air space’ has been
defined under other international law as the ‘spatial dimension subject to the
sovereignty of the subjacent States.’4 However, the atmosphere encompasses more
than just the air space and therefore refers to more than just the air that is subject to
State sovereignty. Although the atmosphere is beyond State jurisdiction this in itself
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does not necessarily mean that it is common property.5 In the context of climate
change, the atmosphere has been treated as the ‘common concern of mankind’.6 This
means that States share the burden and responsibilities of protecting the atmosphere
from harm.7
C. History
This section examines the history and preparatory work of the UNFCCC. The history
presented here begins in the early 1980s, when climate change was first raised in the
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). The early history of negotiations, leading
up to the Intergovernmental Negotiation Committee (INC), is presented in Table 2-1.
Further attention is given to the history of the INC which was given the task of drafting
the framework convention on climate change. The focus of this analysis is upon
determining how countries approached the issue of climate change and how they
considered the issues of liability and compensation for climate change damage.

1983

Table 2-1: Timeline of climate negotiations 1983-1989
UNGA mandated World Commission on
Environment and Development (WCED) to
examine climate change.

5
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6
UN G.A. Resolution 43/53; Noordwijk Declaration of the Conference on Atmospheric Pollution and
Climate Change; UNFCCC, pmbl; UNEP/GC 15/36 (1989).
See also the legal status of the ozone layer in the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone
Layer, opened for signature 22 March 1985, 1513 UNTS 324 (entered into force 22 September 1988)
[herein ‘Ozone Convention’] sec 3.2: (‘the layer of atmospheric ozone above the planetary boundary
layer’). This definition indicates that the entire stratospheric layer is one global unity, without
mentioning sovereignty, shared resources or common property.
CF the legal status of the atmosphere as a shared resource within the context of transboundary air
pollution. 1979 Geneva Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, opened for signature
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Concern’ in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Ellen Hey (eds), The Oxford Handbook of
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1987

WCED produced a report which called for
‘discussions leading to a convention’ to halt
global warming.8
UNGA
supported
United
Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) in making
the research of climate change a key priority.9
Malta proposed a declaration that would
provide that the climate system is the
‘common heritage of mankind’. The UNGA
passed a declaration that recognised that
‘climate change is a common concern of mankind’10 and urged ‘Governments … to treat
climate change as a priority issue’ and to
make ‘every effort to prevent detrimental
effects on the climate and activities which
affect the ecological balance’.11
UNGA calls for preparation of negotiations
for a framework convention on climate
change under the auspices of the UN. 12
The UNGA passed a resolution in response to
the initiative of several island States. The
resolution
recommended
that
‘the
vulnerability of affected countries and their
marine ecosystems to sea level rise be
considered during discussions of a draft
framework convention on climate and within
the framework of the UN Conference on
Environment and Development…’.13
UNGA
recognised
that
the
main
responsibility for mitigation of climate
change rested with the developed countries
because ‘the largest part of the current
emission of pollution into the environment’
originated in those countries.14 UNGA also
stated that within the context of climate
change, countries have the responsibility ‘to
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction
or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or areas beyond

1987

1988

1989

1989

1989

8

World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1987), 28.
9
International Co-operation in the Field of the Environment, UNGA Res 42/184, UN GAOR, 42nd sess,
96th plen mtg, UN Doc. A/42/90211 (December 1987).
10
Protection of Global Environment for Present and Future Generations of Mankind, UNGA Res.
43/53, UN GAOR, 43rd sess, 70th plen mtg, UN Doc A/43/905 (6 December 1988), para. 1. See generally
on this concept F Biermann, ‘Common Concern of Mankind – The Emergence of a New Concept in
International Environmental Law’ (1996) 34 Archiv des Völkerrechts 426; J Brunée, ‘Common Interest
– Echoes from an Empty Shell?’ (1989) Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht
791.
11
Protection of Global Environment for Present and Future Generations of Mankind, UNGA Res.
43/53, UN GAOR, 43rd sess, 70th plen mtg, UN Doc A/43/905 (6 December 1988), paras. 6 and 9.
12
See for the general call for negotiations Protection of Global Environment for Present and Future
Generations of Mankind, UNGA Res. 44/207, UN GAOR, 44th sess, 85th plen mtg, UN Doc.A/44/862
(22 December 1989), para. 10.
13
Protection of Global Environment for Present and Future Generations of Mankind, UNGA Res.
44/207, UN GAOR, 44th sess, 85th plen mtg, UN Doc.A/44/862 (22 December 1989), para. 4.
14
Protection of Global Environment for Present and Future Generations of Mankind, UNGA Res.
44/207, UN GAOR, 44th sess, 85th plen mtg, UN Doc.A/44/862 (22 December 1989), Preamble para. 8.
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national jurisdiction and … need to play their
due role in preserving and protecting the
global and regional environment in
accordance with their capacities and specific
responsibilities.’15

As can be seen from this brief timeline, the international community first began
responding to the issue of climate change in 1983. Gradually, this response grew
resulting in the UNGA calling for a framework convention on climate change in 1989.
This was the task given to the INC.
1. Intergovernmental Negotiation Committee (INC)
(a) Introduction
The INC met in five sessions prior to the adoption of the UNFCCC from February
1991 to May 1992. The UNGA resolution which established the INC specified that
each negotiating session could last only two weeks,16 and the INC was expected to
complete the work in time for the UNFCCC to be signed at the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED).17 The INC continued to
meet after May 1992 (INC 6-11) in order to discuss the implementation of UNFCCC
until it entered force.18

15

Protection of Global Environment for Present and Future Generations of Mankind, UNGA Res.
44/207, UN GAOR, 44th sess, 85th plen mtg, UN Doc.A/44/862 (22 December 1989), para. 4.
16
Protection of the Global Environment for Present and Future Generations of Mankind, UNGA Res.
45/212, UN GAOR, 45th Session, 71st plen. mtg., Supp. No. 49, UN Doc. A/45/49 (21 December 1990),
148.
17
Protection of the Global Environment for Present and Future Generations of Mankind, UNGA Res.
45/212, UN GAOR, 45th Session, 71st plen. mtg., Supp. No. 49, UN Doc. A/45/49 (21 December 1990),
149.
18
See for a summary of proceedings Sebastion Oberthür and Hermann Ott, The Kyoto Protocol:
International Climate Policy for the 21st Century (Berlin: Springer, 1999), 43 ff.
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(b) Framework vs. Substantive Approach
The UNGA gave the INC the task of drafting ‘an effective framework convention on
climate change, containing appropriate commitments.’19 The ambiguity in this
mandate left open a fundamental question that was present throughout the INC
negotiations:
[W]as the INC’s task to draft a framework convention – that is, a largely procedural
convention, establishing a basis for future action – or a substantive convention committing
States to specific measures and policies?20

Early in the negotiations, proposals focused on the framework convention/protocol
approach, through which countries agree to a framework convention, which
establishes preliminary and general obligations on matters such as exchange of
information and scientific research.21 Once a framework convention was established,
countries would develop protocols setting out specific pollution control measures
(including emissions reduction targets) and more detailed implementation
mechanisms.22

19

Protection of the Global Environment for Present and Future Generations of Mankind, UNGA Res.
45/212, UN GAOR, 45th Session, 71st plen. mtg., Supp. No. 49, UN Doc. A/45/49 (21 December 1990),
para 1.
20
Daniel Bodansky, ‘The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary’
(1993) 18 Yale Journal of International Law 451, 493.
21
Other examples of framework conventions include: the Convention on Transboundary Air Pollution
and Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, opened for signature 22 March 1985,
1513 UNTS 324 (entered into force 22 September 1988). In both cases these conventions were initially
‘empty frameworks’ but later became two leading examples of international environmental law. See
Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle and Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the Environmental (New
York: 3rd edition, Oxford University Press, 2009), 342ff.
22
Bodansky, ‘The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’, above n 20, 494. This
approach had been used with the problems of acid rain and depletion of the ozone layer. Convention on
Transboundary Air Pollution. Three protocols to this convention have been adopted: (1) Helsinki
Protocol on the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or Their Transboundary Fluxes by at Least 30 Percent,
opened for signature 8 July 1985, 27 I.L.M. 707 (entered into force 2 September 1987), (2) Sofia
Protocol Concerning the Control of Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides or Their Transboundary Fluxes,
opened for signature 31 October 1988, 28 I.L.M. 214 (entered into force 2 February 1991), and (3)
Protocol Concerning the Control of Emissions of Volatile Organic Compounds or Their Transboundary
Fluxes, opened for signature 18 November 1991, 31 I.L.M. 568 (entered into force 29 September 1997).
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However, many States wanted the INC to produce more than a framework convention
due to the perceived urgency of climate change and the extensive preparatory work
already done by the IPCC.23 Disagreement over this issue was present in both working
groups. In Working Group I (WGI), some countries proposed that the INC should set
specific targets and timetables for limiting greenhouse gas emissions, potentially in
protocols concluded at the same time as the framework convention. 24 In Working
Group II (WGII), countries debated whether the convention should establish just a
skeletal structure with room for further development or establish more developed
implementation mechanisms.25
Specifically, some oil-exporting countries argued for a ‘barebones’ convention that
established general principles and did not include specific commitments. These
countries argued against the establishment of subsidiary bodies to the COP and binding
dispute settlement procedures.26
The US called for a ‘process-oriented convention’ which would contain little in terms
of commitments, but would establish ambitious implementation mechanisms; flexible

Also see Ozone Convention. The Montreal Protocol was adopted less than 3 years later, which required
50% cuts in specified ozone-depleting substances from 1986 levels by 1993-94. Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, opened for signature 16 September 1987, 1522 UNTS 3
(entered into force 1 January 1989).
23
Bodansky, ‘The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’, above n 20, 495. See
Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Government Representatives to Prepare for Negotiations on a
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Geneva, Sept. 24-26, 1990, UNEP/WMO Doc.
Prep./FCCC/L.1/REPORT, 6; David A Wirth and Daniel A Lashof, ‘Beyond Vienna and Montreal –
Multilateral Agreements on Greenhouse Gases’ in Jessica T Mathews (ed), Greenhouse Warming:
Negotiating a Global Regime (Washington: World Resources Institute, 1990), 13, 18-19.
24
For example, Germany initially proposed the negotiation of protocols on the reduction of greenhouse
gas emissions, the conservation and creation of CO 2 reservoirs and sinks, and adaptation to climate
change. Set of informal Papers Provided by Delegations, INC/FCCC. 2nd Session, Provisional Agenda
Item 2, at 21, UN Doc. A/AC.237/Misc.1/Add.1 (1991).
25
Bodansky, ‘The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’, above n 20, 495.
26
Initially, China objected to including the heading ‘Commitments’ in the outline of the convention, on
the basis that the convention should be a framework only. See Bodansky, ‘The United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change’, above n 20, 495-496.
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non-compliance procedures; and detailed provisions on scientific research,
information exchange, and education.27 Many developing States argued for specific
commitments (applying primarily to developed States) but were opposed to the more
detailed procedural proposals.28
The European Community, Alliance of Small Island States (‘AOSIS’), and the CANZ
group (Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) called for detailed provisions on both
procedural mechanisms and substantive commitments. These countries proposed that
binding dispute settlement procedures be established and that developed countries
make a specific commitment to stabilise CO2 emissions at 1990 levels by the year
2000.29 This debate over the framework/substantive nature of the convention was
present up until INC 5, when the INC considered whether the title should be the ‘UN
Convention on Climate Change’ or, as was finally agreed by States Parties, the ‘UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change’.30
This negotiation history sheds light on the ongoing debate amongst commentators on
whether or not the UNFCCC contains substantive commitments. Generally, the
UNFCCC has been described as a ‘law-making’ treaty31 and, at the other end of the
spectrum, devoid of legal rights and obligations.32 For instance, Sands argued that the
title ‘Framework’ is something of a misnomer on the basis that the UNFCCC
established

Bodansky, ‘The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’, above n 20, 496.
Ibid.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid.
31
Philippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law (2nd edition, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003), 127.
32
Akiko Okamatsu, ‘Problems and Prospects of International Legal Disputes on Climate Change’
(Berlin Conference on the Human Rights Dimensions of Global Environmental Change, 2005), 5.
27
28

56

commitments to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a safe level, over
the long term, and to limit emissions of greenhouse gases by developed countries in accordance
with soft targets and timetables; a financial mechanism and a commitment by certain developed
country Parties to provide financial resources for meeting certain incremental costs and
adaptation measures; … and potentially innovative implementation and dispute settlement
mechanisms.33

Okamatsu argued that, as a framework convention, the UNFCCC does not provide
specific rights and obligations.34 Bodansky said that the UNFCCC ‘lies somewhere
between a framework and a substantive convention’.35 He argued that while the
UNFCCC does not contain the type of specific emissions control measures as are
contained in protocols, it establishes more extensive commitments than other
framework conventions.36
Indeed, it does appear that the UNFCCC is a mix of a framework and a substantive
convention.37 Substantive commitments and procedural mechanisms are included in
the UNFCCC, contrary to standard practice with framework conventions.
Furthermore, it must be noted that the title of a treaty is an interpretive tool but not
conclusive.38 The negotiation history indicates that the title’s use of the term
‘framework’ should not be heavily relied upon. Rather, the substance of the obligations
contained in the text to determine whether these indeed are legally binding substantive
obligations.

33

Sands, above n 31, 359. Sands also notes that the UNFCCC established two subsidiary bodies to the
conference of Parties and a number of important guiding ‘Principles’.
34
Okamatsu, above n 32, 5.
35
Bodansky, ‘The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’, above n 20, 496.
36
Bodansky also argues that the UNFCCC contains ‘only the vaguest of commitments regarding
stabilisation and no commitment at all on reductions.’ Ibid, 451.
37
This compares to the Convention on Transboundary Air Pollution and the Ozone Convention. These
two instruments were initially both empty frameworks but have since evolved into two of the leading
examples of international environmental law. See Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 21, 335.
38
Richard Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 180.
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(c) Compensation and Liability
The following discussion explains how Parties approached the issues of compensation
and liability during the INC negotiations.39 This discussion begins with an overview
of general approaches, and then deals more specifically with the idea of a ‘Climate
Fund’ and a proposed ‘International Insurance Pool’. This analysis of the negotiation
history is important for the purposes of this thesis because it sheds light upon the
options that were considered by Parties and the level of recognition that Parties made
of potential liability (both as claimant and respondent countries).
General
The INC negotiations contained very limited discussion of compensation and liability
for climate change damage, and instead focused upon mitigation and adaptation.40
However, at the first INC meeting (INC 1), the UNEP representative emphasised that
the negotiators needed to address issues of damage prevention through adaptation,
liability and compensation, and several States referred to the polluter pays principle
for this purpose.41
In response to the lack of discussion of compensation and liability, AOSIS suggested
that the following phrase be included in the convention:
This convention … is without prejudice to the existing rights under international law, including
rules governing international liability for damage to people, property and the environment. 42

See Netherlands Government’s Framework to Assess International Regimes (FAIR)
<http://www.rivm.nl/fair> accessed 17 January 2012.
40
See Guidelines for the Negotiations, as decided by the first INC meeting, in: Report of the first INC
session, UN Doc. A/AC.237/6, 23.
41
Roda Verheyen, Climate Change Damage and International Law: Prevention Duties and State
Responsibility (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005), 48. See Report of the INC, 1 st Session 4-14 February
1991, UN Doc. A/AC.237/6, 6 f.
42
See submission of Vanuatu on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), Elements for a
Framework Convention on Climate Change, in: Set of informal papers provided by delegations, related
39
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Germany, in its first country submission, called for a protocol to be developed under
the future convention on ‘the adjustment to climate changes and the prevention and
containment of climate-related damage’.43 Although this approach was not adopted by
other developed countries, the developing countries proposed a range of measures to
deal with climate change damage. Clearly, the issue of climate change damage was
present in the minds of many States even in the early stages of the negotiations.
The Climate Fund
The idea of a Climate Fund was initially put forward in UNGA Resolution 44/207 and
then later developed by negotiators. The Fund was meant to ‘meet … on a grant basis
… the costs for developing countries to adapt to and mitigate the adverse effects of
climate change’ and was to be financed by contributions from developed States in the
form of ‘new and additional financial resources’.44 The Climate Fund would require
developed State Parties to meet the ‘full incremental costs’ necessary for all
developing State Parties to ‘adapt to and mitigate the adverse effects of climate
change.’45
Although the proposal did not expressly provide for compensation and liability, the
Group of 77 and China46 asserted that ‘these funds from the developed countries will
be to a great extent of a compensatory nature’.47 This provides evidence that the

to the preparation of a framework convention on climate change, UN Doc. A/AC.237/Misc.1/Add.3,
22.
43
Non-Paper by Germany, in: Set of informal papers provided by delegations, related to the preparation
of a framework convention on climate change, UN Doc. A/AC.237/Misc.1/Add.1, 21.
44
Arts 2 and 5 of the Draft Framework Convention of Climate Change, submitted by India, in: Set of
informal papers provided by delegations, related to the preparation of a framework convention on
climate change, UN Doc. A/AC.237/Misc.1/Add.3, 7.
45
See Report of the 4th INC Session, UN Doc. A/AC.237/15, 42; 76 ff., and Report of the 5th INC
Session, Part I, UN Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Part I), 37 (para. 4.2.2), 59 ff (Article 12).
46
The Group of 77 serves as a negotiation platform for developing States on climate change and other
issues.
47
Set of informal papers, Submission by Ghana on behalf of the States members of the Group of 77,
UN Doc. A/AC.237/Misc.1/Add.15 (submitted at INC 4), 5.
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developing States perceived the issues of climate change damage and damage
prevention as an issue of liability for past emissions.48
However, perceived inadequacies in the proposed Climate Fund led AOSIS to suggest
a fund with substantive financial obligations for developed countries to ‘compensate
developing countries (i) in situations where selecting the least climate sensitive
development option involves incurring additional expense; and (ii) where insurance is
not available for damage resulting from climate change.’49 This proposal by AOSIS
was made along with a proposed ‘International Insurance Pool’ to complement the
Climate Fund.50
The International Insurance Pool – AOSIS proposal
AOSIS’s proposed International Insurance Pool was designed to provide insurance
against sea level rise (as a form of climate change damage) through what has been
described by Verheyen as a ‘compensation fund’.51 Under this scheme, developed
countries would compensate Small Island and low-lying developing States for
economic loss, human loss and ecological damage resulting from sea level rise.
Existing assets and interests would be valued and registered, as well as the ‘option
values’ of assets, meaning the potential value of an asset in the context of future
development. Thus, damage was to be calculated ex ante rather than ex post, contrary
to national tort law and the international law of State responsibility.52
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Verheyen, above n 41, 50.
Vanuatu on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), Elements for a Framework
Convention on Climate Change, in: Set of informal papers provided by delegations, related to the
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The proposal by Vanuatu on behalf of AOSIS is contained in A/AC.237/WG.II/CRP.8 and reprinted
in Report of the 4th INC Session, UN Doc. A/AC.237/15, 126 ff. See also J Linneroth-Bayer, M J Mace
and R Verheyen, Insurance-Related Actions and Risk Assessment in the Context of the UNFCCC
(Background Paper, May 2003) <http://www.unfccc.int>.
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Claims could only arise once the rate of global mean sea level rise and the absolute
level of global mean sea level rise had reached previously-agreed figures, and the
relative mean sea level rise for an insured area in a vulnerable State had reached an
agreed level above base level.53 The scheme was to be administered by an
administrating authority. In assessing claims, the administrating authority was to
determine whether and to what extent the loss or damage could have been avoided by
‘measures which might reasonably have been taken at an earlier stage.’54 Contributions
were not to be calculated according to historic emissions, but rather on the basis of (i)
the ratio between the GNP of each developed State contributor and the total GNP of
the group of contributors, and (ii) the ratio of individual State CO2 emissions of the
total CO2 emissions of the group of contributing States.55
The last draft texts
At INC 4 in December 1991, the consolidated draft text of the convention was issued
and discussed. This draft included the Climate Fund and paragraphs on compensation
and liability in the ‘Principles’ section which provided that:
The developed countries responsible for causing damage to the environment through inducing
climate change should bear the primary responsibility for rectifying that damage and the costs
of prevention measures and should compensate for environmental damage suffered by other
countries or individuals in other countries.

Or, alternatively:
Those countries directly responsible for causing damage to the environment through inducing
climate change should bear the responsibility for rectifying the damage. By openly
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Ibid.
Negotiation of a Framework Convention on Climate Change: Elements Relating to Mechanisms,
Vanuatu: Draft annex relating to article 23 (insurance) for inclusion in the revised single text on
elements relating to mechanisms (A/AC.237/WG.II/Misc.13) submitted by the Co-chairmen of
Working Group II, A/AC.237/WG.II/CRP.8 (17 December 1991), para 6.
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Verheyen, above n 41, 51.
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demonstrating their direct responsibility or negligence, those countries shall compensate for
environmental damage suffered by other countries or individuals in other countries. 56

Those paragraphs were heavily disputed but reappeared in the draft text at INC 5.57
One of the final INC consolidated draft texts still included a paragraph that provided
that the convention would be ‘without prejudice to the application of the rules of
international law governing the liability of States’.58 In the final version of the text, the
section on Principles does not provide for a principle on liability. However, the history
of the negotiations clearly demonstrates that liability and compensation for climate
change damage were heavily debated issues that were not fully resolved.59
The text on the Climate Fund was included in the INC 4 and INC 5 draft texts.
However, the final version of this text which is found in Articles 4.3, 4.4 and 11 of the
UNFCCC made no reference to a compensatory dimension. Verheyen stated that this
was due to ‘successful negotiations by a unified group of industrialised countries.’60
Finally, the AOSIS insurance scheme was included in the draft texts at INC 4 and INC
5, but not included in the final text again due to the strong resistance of developed
States.61
Conclusion
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This overview of the negotiations concerning liability and compensation demonstrates
that these were issues that were contemplated by Parties. The Group of 77 and China
perceived the Climate Fund as a compensation mechanism with funds coming from
developed States to developing States. Strong efforts were made by AOSIS for the
inclusion of the Climate Fund and the International Insurance Pool, which again was
of a compensatory nature. The bases of liability included past emissions, GNP and
current CO2 emissions. The issue of climate change damage was well understood as a
serious and costly threat for developed countries.
However, there was also a strong reluctance by the developed countries to accept
liability for that damage. The fact that the developing countries failed to have
compensation and liability principles or obligations included in the final text
demonstrates that there was no agreement on these issues. It shows that the negotiating
countries decided to focus upon mitigation and adaptation generally, rather than
focusing specifically upon liability or compensation. This history supports a general
conclusion that the UNFCCC was not designed to deal with climate change damage as
far as liability is concerned. This may undermine any future inter-country claims
seeking compensation for climate change damage on the basis of obligations under the
UNFCCC.
D. Key instruments and decisions
1. Introduction
The two key instruments in the international climate change regime are the UNFCCC
and the Kyoto Protocol. The UNFCCC provides the framework for the entire regime
and is of principal importance. It provides an objective, principles, obligations, dispute
resolution mechanisms and divides countries up according to responsibilities and
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rights. The Kyoto Protocol sets out quantitative obligations for mitigating greenhouse
gas emissions by country. These obligations encompass the period 2008-2012 and
further protocols are required to cover future periods. These two instruments are
examined in greater depth here and a brief overview is provided in the following table
(Table 2-2). The full text of these two agreements is contained in the Appendix.

Table 2-2 Key instruments in the international climate change regime
UNFCCC (1992)
 Multilateral treaty with 192 Parties.
 Entered into force on 21 March 1994.
 Defines the ‘ultimate objective’ of the UNFCCC and related legal instruments as ‘to
achieve … stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level
that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.’
 Contains key principles: common but differentiated responsibility; the precautionary
principle and the principle of sustainable development.
 Divides Parties into:
o Annex I (OECD countries and countries with economies in transition)
o Annex II (OECD countries only); and
o Non-Annex I (mostly developing countries).
 All Parties: general commitments, including reporting obligations.
 Annex I Parties: specific ‘aim’ to return emissions to 1990 levels by 2000.
 Annex II Parties: must provide financial assistance to developing countries, and also
promote technology transfer to EITs.
Kyoto Protocol (1997)
 Multilateral treaty with 192 Parties.
 Entered into force on 16 February 2005.
 All Parties: general commitments.
 Annex I Parties: Individual emission targets, adding up to a total cut of 5%. Targets
range from -8% (most countries) to +10%, and are listed in Annex B.
 Emission targets:
o Cover CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs, SF6, counted together as a basket.
o Also cover certain carbon sequestration activities in the land use, land-use
change and forestry (LULUCF) sector, based on specific rules.
o In most cases, use 1990 as a baseline.
o Must be met by the ‘commitment period’ 2008-2012.
 Flexibility mechanisms – joint implementation, clean development mechanism
(CDM) and emissions trading – can be used to help meet targets. Groups of countries
can also meet targets jointly (so far, only invoked by the EU).
 Stricter reporting and review procedures for Annex I Parties.
 Compliance system to address cases of non-compliance with the Protocol.
 Regular reviews of commitments.

2. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
The UNFCCC is a multilateral treaty that was adopted on 9 May 1992 by the INC and
agreed to by countries in June 1992. It was adopted in response to the challenge of
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climate change62 and a series of UNGA resolutions on the issue (described above in
Table 2-1). The UNFCCC was developed and adopted in conjunction with the
UNCED.63 The UNFCCC entered into force on 21 March 1994 and now has almost
universal membership amongst the international community.64
The articles of the UNFCCC may be divided into four structural categories. These are
(1) definitions, objectives and principles;65 (2) obligations (substantive, monitoring
and financial);66 (3) establishing institutions and procedures;67 and (4) concluding or
formal provisions dealing with matters such as protocols, annexes, amendment,
ratification and entry into force.68

In the preamble of the UNFCCC, it says ‘Acknowledging that change in the Earth’s climate and its
adverse effects are a common concern of humankind’ and ‘Concerned that human activities have been
substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, that these increases
enhance the natural greenhouse effect, and that this will result on average in an additional warming of
the Earth’s surface and atmosphere and may adversely effect natural ecosystems and humankind’.
UNFCCC, preamble paras 1 and 2.
63
The UNFCCC may be referred to as a ‘Rio agreement’. A ‘Rio agreement’ refers to the international
documents developed and adopted in conjunction with the UN Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED) in 1992. The other main Rio agreements are: the Convention on Biological
Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79 (entered into force 29 December 1993);
Convention to Combat Desertification, opened for signature 14 October 1994 1954 UNTS 3 (entered
into force 26 December 1996); the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I) (14 June 1992); NonLegally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management,
Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests, United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. III); Agenda 21: Programme of Action
for Sustainable Development, United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, U.N.
GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 21, UN Doc A/Conf.151/26 (1992). See for an overview P Sand,
‘UNCED and the Development of International Environmental Law’ (1992) 3 Yearbook of
International Environmental Law 3.
64
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68
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Under the UNFCCC, Parties fall into different categories. The primary categorisation
used in the UNFCCC is of ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ States. Further categories are
‘countries with economies in transition’ and ‘least developed States’.69 The INC
decided to use lists rather than definitions to determine which States fell under these
categories. The list of countries under ‘Annex I’ of the UNFCCC includes members
of the OECD and ‘countries with economies in transition’. Countries with economies
in transition are indicated by an asterisk in Annex I.70 The list of countries under
‘Annex II’ includes members of the OECD but not ‘countries with economies in
transition’. These lists provide the basis for the allocation of commitments under the
UNFCCC.71
As with other international agreements, interpretation of the UNFCCC is a
complicated process. Words were debated and selected for the UNFCCC on the basis
of both their political and legal significance.72 Further, as the UNFCCC represents a
compromise between countries, many of its provisions do not resolve differences but
‘paper them over’ through formulations that preserved the positions of all sides73 or
formulations that were deliberately ambiguous.74 Alternatively, States simply deferred

‘Least developed states’ is not defined in the Convention and there is no list included specifying
which States fall into this category. This term is likely to be interpreted by reference to the definition of
‘least developed countries’ given in the UN General Assembly. Least developed states are to receive
special consideration for funding and technology transfer.
70
This was to allow these countries with economies in transition to avoid being designated as developed
countries. Thus the Convention refers to ‘developed country Parties and other Parties included in annex
I’ (UNFCCC, art 4(2)).
71
For e.g., the specific commitments on sources and sinks of greenhouse gases apply only to States
listed in Annex I, whereas the specific commitments on financial resources and technology transfer
apply to parties listed in Annex II.
72
Bodansky provides the example that developing and developed Stated ‘argued for hours over whether
economic development should be characterised as ‘essential’ or a ‘prerequisite’ for developing
countries’ response measures.’ He further argued that ‘Delegations often sought to introduce identical
language in different parts of the Convention or to move language from one part of the Convention to
another, not to effect particular legal consequences, but to highlight certain provisions for political
reasons.’ Bodansky, ‘The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’, above n 20, 493.
73
See e.g., UNFCCC, art 11 (financial mechanism).
74
See e.g. UNFCCC, art 4(2).
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issues until the first meeting of the COP.75 As shall be seen in Chapter 3, many of the
key commitments of the UNFCCC are marked by ambiguity.
3. Kyoto Protocol
The Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC was adopted by the third Conference of the
Parties to the UNFCCC (COP) in December 1997. It entered into force on 16 February
2005. Under the Kyoto Protocol, the Annex I Parties accepted quantitative emission
limitation and reduction obligations (‘QUELROs’). These commitments are meant to
provide a 5% reduction in aggregate greenhouse gas emissions compared to 1990
levels in the period 2008-2012 (the ‘first commitment period’). Annex B of the Kyoto
Protocol provides differentiated targets for the individual countries and regional
economic organisations.
The Kyoto Protocol is supported by a complex and thoroughly regulated compliance
system which has been described as ‘unprecedented’ in international law. 76 The
potential for the commitments in Kyoto Protocol to provide a source of legal exposure
for climate change damage, both within and outside of this compliance system, is
considered in Chapter 4.
4. Decisions of the Conference of Parties/Meeting of the Parties
The COP and Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (MOP) have regularly met
since 1995 and produced a number of decisions which form part of the international

75

See e.g. UNFCCC, art 13 (directing COP to consider establishing multilateral non-compliance
procedure).
76
Verheyen, above n 41, 117; Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘The Kyoto Protocol Compliance Regime and
Treaty Law’ (2004) 8 Singapore Yearbook of International Law 23; Meinhard Doelle, ‘From Kyoto to
Marrakech; Long Walk through the Desert: Mirage or Oasis?’ (2002) 25 Dalhousie Law Journal 113;
Uloma Onuma, ‘Suspension of Eligibility to Use the Kyoto Flexible Mechanisms: A Review of
Substantive Issues’ (2009) Carbon and Climate Law Review 357.
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climate change regime. These meetings and some key outcomes are summarised in the
Table 2-3 below. As has been noted by many commentators, the climate negotiations
have been particularly difficult due to a range of reasons, including the economic
implications of mitigation commitments and the principle of common but
differentiated responsibility.77
Table 2-3 Meetings and key decisions of the COP/MOP
Year
1995

COP/MOP
COP1

Location
Berlin, Germany

1996

COP2

1997
1998

COP3
COP4

Geneva,
Switzerland
Kyoto, Japan
Buenos Aires,
Argentina

Outcome
‘The Berlin Mandate’: Decision 1/CP.1.
The COP declared that the specific
commitments for Annex I Parties under
Article 4, paragraph 2(a) and (b) of the
UNFCCC were ‘not adequate’. The COP
agreed to ‘begin a process to enable it to
take appropriate action for the period
beyond 2000, including the strengthening of
the commitments of the Parties included in
Annex I to the Convention (Annex I Parties)
in Article 4, paragraph 2(a) and (b), through
the adoption of a protocol or another legal
instrument’.78 These negotiations were to be
concluded by COP3. The COP agreed to not
introduce any new commitments for nonAnnex I Parties.

The Kyoto Protocol
The Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA):
Decision 1/CP.4 (as well as decisions 28/CP.4).

See e.g. Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 19, 356; Michael Grubb, ‘The Greenhouse Effect:
Negotiating Targets’ (1990) 66(1) International Affairs 67; Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Emerging Climate
Change Regime’ (1995) 20 Annual Review of Energy and the Environment 425; Steven Freeland, ‘The
Kyoto Protocol: An Agreement Without a Future?’ (2001) 24(2) UNSW Law Journal 532; Matthew
Coghlan, ‘Prospects and Pitfalls of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Convention on Climate
Change’ (2002) 3 Melbourne Journal of International Law 165; Kirsten Sheeran, ‘Beyond Kyoto:
North-South Implications of Emissions Trading and Taxes’ (2006-2007) 5 Seattle Journal of Social
Justice 697; Camilla Bausch and Michael Mehling, ‘Tracking Down the Future Climate Regime – An
Assessment of Current Negotiations under the U.N.’ (2007) Carbon and Climate Law Review 4.
78
The COP decided that the process would ‘aim, as the priority in the process of strengthening the
commitments in Article 4.2(a) and (b) of the Convention, for developed country/other Parties included
in Annex I, both
– to elaborate policies and measures, as well as
– to set quantified limitation and reduction objectives within specific time-frames, such as
2005, 2010 and 2020, for their anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of
greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol’.
77
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The COP adopted the BAPA to address
issues under the UNFCCC and Kyoto
Protocol.79
1999
2000

COP5
COP6 Part I

Bonn, Germany
The Hague, The
Netherlands
Bonn, Germany

2001

COP6 Part II

2001

COP7

Marrakesh,
Morocco

2002

COP8

New Delhi, India

2003
2004

COP9
COP10

2005

COP11/MOP1

Milan, Italy
Buenos
Aires,
Argentina
Montreal, Canada

2006
2007

COP12/MOP2
COP13/MOP3

Nairobi, Kenya
Bali, Indonesia

2008

COP14/MOP4

Poznan, Poland

The Bonn Agreements: Decision 5/CP.6
The COP agreed to a political deal on the
key issues in the BAPA negotiations. The
COP established the penalties for noncompliance with emission targets, the
individual limits for Parties’ use of carbon
sink credits, and established new funds to
assist developing countries.
The Marrakesh Accords: Decisions 224/CP.7
The Marrakesh Accords incorporated and
built upon the Bonn Agreements by setting
out detailed rules, procedures, technical
guidelines and work programmes. While the
Marrakesh Accords concluded many of the
issues set out in BAPA, others were
unresolved. These included certain
technical questions relating to reporting and
review, and rules for sink projects under the
CDM.

Bali Action Plan: Decision 1/CP.13
Launched a "new, comprehensive process to
enable the full, effective and sustained
implementation of the Convention through
long-term cooperative action, now, up to
and beyond 2012", with the aim of reaching
an agreed outcome and adopting a decision
at COP15 in Copenhagen.

79

The BAPA covered the financial mechanism (2 and 3/CP.4), technology transfer (4/CP.4), adverse
effects of climate change/implementation of response measures (5/CP.4), activities implemented jointly
(6/CP.4), the flexibility mechanisms (7/CP.4), and preparations for COP/MOP (including reporting and
review, policies and measures, compliance and LULUCF) (8/CP.4).
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2009

COP15/MOP5

Copenhagen,
Denmark

Copenhagen Accord: Decision 2/CP.15
The COP took note of the Copenhagen
Accord. The total number of Parties listed as
agreeing to the Accord is 141. The Accord
recognises that in order to prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with
the climate system “the scientific view that
the increase in global temperature should be
below 2 degrees Celsius”. The Accord
provides that developed countries (Annex I
Parties) would “commit to economy-wide
emissions targets for 2020” to be submitted
by 31 January 2010 and that developing
nations (non-Annex I Parties) would
“implement mitigation actions” to be
submitted by 31 January 2010.

2010

COP16/MOP6

Cancun, Mexico

Cancun Agreements
A number of agreements were made at
Cancun, including the Cancun Adaptation
Framework, an agreement for the
submission of annual inventories and other
reports, and for the establishment of a Green
Climate Fund.

2011

COP17/MOP7

Durban,
Africa

Durban Platform: Decision 1/CP.17
Launched the Ad-Hoc Working Group on
the Durban Platform (‘a process to develop
a protocol, another legal instrument or an
agreed outcome with legal force under the
Convention applicable to all Parties’). The
Durban Platform was to commence work in
2012 and complete it by 2015, with the
agreement to come into force from 2020.
Extended the Ad-Hoc Working Group on
Long-Term Cooperative Action under the
Convention for one year to allow it to reach
the Bali ‘agreed outcome’ through COP
decisions.
Durban Agreement on the Kyoto
Protocol: Decision 1/CP.7
Extended the Kyoto Protocol for a second
commitment period, with details to be
decided at the next COP in Qatar.

2012

COP18/MOP8

Doha, Qatar

South

At Durban in 2011, the COP launched the Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Durban
Platform to develop a ‘protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with
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legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties.’80 The negotiations are to be
completed by 201581 and the new agreement is to be implemented from 2020.82
Also at Durban, the MOP extended the Kyoto Protocol for a second commitment
period beginning on 1 January 2013.83 However, a number of matters remained
undecided including: the length of the commitment period (either 31 December 2017
or 31 December 2020);84 the scale or ambitions of individual QELROs;85 and the
implications of the ‘carry over’ of Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) from the first
commitment period.86 All of these matters are to be decided at the next COP/MOP in
Qatar however there is no set termination date for the negotiations.87 The Parties likely
to participate in the second commitment period are the EU, Australia, New Zealand,
Norway, Switzerland and the Ukraine.88 In contrast, Japan and Russia have announced
that they will not participate in the second commitment period and Canada has

80

Establishment of an Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, COP,
Decision 1/CP.17, FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (15 March 2012), para 2.
81
Establishment of an Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, COP,
Decision 1/CP.17, FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (15 March 2012), para 3.
82
Establishment of an Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, COP,
Decision 1/CP.17, FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (15 March 2012), para 4.
83
Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties
under the Kyoto Protocol at its sixteenth session, COP/MOP, Decision 1/CMP.7,
FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/10/Add.1 (15 March 2012), para 1.
84
Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties
under the Kyoto Protocol at its sixteenth session, COP/MOP, Decision 1/CMP.7,
FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/10/Add.1 (15 March 2012), para 1.
85
Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties
under the Kyoto Protocol at its sixteenth session, COP/MOP, Decision 1/CMP.7,
FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/10/Add.1 (15 March 2012), para 5.
86
Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties
under the Kyoto Protocol at its sixteenth session, COP/MOP, Decision 1/CMP.7,
FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/10/Add.1 (15 March 2012), para 7.
87
Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties
under the Kyoto Protocol at its sixteenth session, COP/MOP, Decision 1/CMP.7,
FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/10/Add.1 (15 March 2012), para 10. See Lavanya Rajamani, ‘The Durban
Platform for Enhanced Action and the Future of the Climate Regime’ (2012) 61(2) International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 501, 513.
88
Daniel Bodansky, The Durban Platform Negotiations: Goals and Options (Viewpoints, Harvard
Project on Climate Agreements, July 2012), 9.
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withdrawn from the Kyoto Protocol.89 It appears that if the outstanding matters
concerning the second commitment period are not resolved then such a situation may
risk unravelling the Durban Platform.90
E. Object and purpose of the UNFCCC
1. Article 2 as the object and purpose of the UNFCCC
The general rule of interpretation contained in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties (VCLT) provides that a treaty shall be interpreted in light of its
object and purpose.91 As a tool of interpretation, the object and purpose acts as a
modifier of the ordinary meaning but cannot override the treaty text.92 In English, it is
difficult to distinguish the terms ‘object’ and ‘purpose’.93 The Macquarie Dictionary
provides that ‘object’ means ‘the end towards which effort is directed’.94 Similarly, the
Macquarie Dictionary defines ‘purpose’ as ‘the object for which anything exists or is
done, made, used, etc.’ or ‘the intended or desired result; end or aim’.95 The words
‘object and purpose’ are generally used synonymously in international law and an
abundance of other variants are also used, such as: aim, objective, function, target, and
end.96 Therefore, it is appropriate to apply the phrase ‘object and purpose’ as a single
concept that refers to the reasons for why the treaty exists.

‘Kyoto Deal Loses Four Big Nations’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 29 May 2011, at <
http://www.smh.com.au/environment/climate-change/kyoto-deal-loses-four-big-nations-201105281f9dk.html> accessed 15 July 2012.
90
Rajamani, ‘The Durban Platform for Enhanced Action’ above n 87, 513.
91
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS
331(entered in force 27 January 1980) [hereinafter ‘VCLT’], art 31.
92
Gardiner, above n 38, 190.
93
Ibid, 191.
94
Macquarie Australian Encyclopedic Dictionary (Sydney: Macquarie University, 2006) [herein
‘Macquarie Dictionary’], 836
95
Ibid, 976.
96
International case law that supports this approach includes Oil Platforms Case – Case Concerning
Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) (Preliminary Objection) [1996] ICJ
Reports 803. In this case the ICJ refers to objects and purposes together, but also refers to ‘object’
89
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The UNFCCC contains an objective in Article 2 which is of relevance to the entire
international climate change regime.97 Article 2 provides that it is the ‘ultimate
objective’ of the UNFCCC,98 stating that:
The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference
of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the
Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level
should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to
climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic
development to proceed in a sustainable manner.

The term ‘objective’ may be used interchangeably with the phrase ‘object and
purpose’. Bodansky questioned whether Article 2 falls under the category of ‘object
and purpose’ on the basis that the term ‘ultimate’ is used as a qualification. He viewed
this as ‘an attempt to prevent “objective” from being equated with ‘object and
purpose’.99 However, there is little to support such an interpretation and instead the
use of the term ‘ultimate’100 tends to indicate that this is the overarching and long-term
reason for why the UNFCCC and its related instruments exist.

separately, ‘objective’, ‘spirit’ and what the ‘whole of these provisions is aimed at’ at paras 27; 28, 31
and 52; 52; and 36, respectively.
97
The inclusion of this objective and the UNFCCC principles are key distinguishing features of the
UNFCCC when compared to the Ozone Convention. See Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 19, 357.
98
UNFCCC, art 2: ‘The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the
Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the
Convention, stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved
within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that
food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable
manner.’
99
Bodansky, ‘The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’, above n 20, 500.
100
The Macquarie Dictionary provides a series of definitions for the term ‘ultimate’: ‘1. Forming the
final aim or object. 2. Coming at the end, as of a course of action, a process, etc.; final; decisive. 3.
Beyond which it is impossible to proceed, as by investigation or analysis; fundamental; elemental. 4.
Impossible to exceed or override. 5. Last, as in a series. 6. The final point; final result. 7. A fundamental
fact or principle.’ Macquarie Dictionary, above n 94, 1295.
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2. The ordinary meaning of Article 2
Article 2 provides that the objective is to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations in
the atmosphere ‘at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference
with the climate system’. The climate system is defined in Article 1 to refer to ‘the
totality of the atmosphere, hydrosphere, biosphere and geosphere and their
interactions.’101 Importantly, the objective is not to reverse greenhouse gas
concentrations but instead to stabilise concentrations. This suggests that the Parties
accepted that some degree of climate change would occur.102
While initially the ordinary meaning of Article 2 is clear, it becomes less clear when
turning to the term ‘dangerous’. This term is left undefined. The Macquarie Dictionary
defines ‘dangerous’ as ‘full of danger or risk; causing danger; perilous; hazardous;
unsafe’ and ‘danger’ as ‘liability or exposure to harm or injury; risk; peril’.103 This
indicates that the ordinary meaning of the term ‘dangerous’ is the exposure to risk of
harm. A similar approach to the ordinary meaning of the term ‘dangerous’ is present
in national legal systems.104 Therefore, a basic definition of dangerous is that this term
refers to risk of harm and that Article 2 seeks to prevent such risk. However, it remains
unclear exactly what this means.
The second sentence of Article 2 refers to what may be described as three key elements
of a safe climate. In particular, Article 2 provides that the stabilisation of greenhouse

101

UNFCCC, art 1.
See Michael Oppenheimer and Annie Petsonk, ‘Article 2 of the UNFCCC: Historical Origins, Recent
Interpretations’ (2005) 73 Climatic Change 195.
103
Macquarie Dictionary, above n 94, 303.
104
For e.g., under Australian law, ‘dangerous premises’ refers to real property which creates a risk of
harm to individuals on or near it: Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna (1987) 162 CLR 479; 69
ALR 615.
102
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gas concentrations ‘should’ be achieved in a time-frame sufficient to allow these
elements to be met. These three elements are to:
1. allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change;
2. ensure that food production is not threatened; and
3. enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.

Thus, one interpretation of the wording ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference with
the climate system’ is that it refers to a level of climate change that interferes with any
of these elements. However, the first thing to note about this second sentence is that
the term ‘should’ is used. This may be compared with a mandatory provision, for
example ‘Such a level shall be achieved…’ Thus, the text chosen to link the second
sentence of Article 2 to the first does not indicate that these elements must be achieved.
Interpretation of the phrase ‘allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change’ is
complicated by what appears to be an internal contradiction. Article 1.2 of the
UNFCCC defines climate change as ‘a change of climate which is attributed directly
or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere
and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time
periods.’105 To ‘naturally adapt’ to something would indicate that the adjustment being
made is in itself a natural one. However, given the definition provided in Article 1.2,
an ordinary interpretation of ‘climate change’ would indicate that this is a process to
which ecosystems are unable to ‘naturally adapt’. Furthermore, the term ‘allow’ is not
particularly strong (compared with ‘ensure’ or ‘guarantee’). This means that it is
difficult to give meaning to the first listed element.

105

Emphasis added.
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The phrase ‘to ensure that food production is not threatened’ may refer broadly to food
security or more narrowly to stability of food supply. The Food and Agriculture
Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) defined ‘food security’ as food availability,
access to food, stability of food supply and utilisation of food. 106 It appears that the
expectation of States with regard to food production may be particularly high through
the use of the term ‘threatened’. The Macquarie Dictionary defines ‘threaten’ as ‘to be
a menace or source of danger’.107 Thus, the second element in Article 2 can be given
meaning to ensure that climate change does not reach such a level that it threatens food
security.
The third phrase ‘to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner’
may be rephrased as to enable sustainable development. The most frequently cited
definition of sustainable development is the one found in Our Common Future, also
known as the Brundtland Report: ‘Sustainable development is development that meets
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
their own needs.’108 The term ‘enable’ does not suggest that sustainable development
must be achieved, but simply that climate change should not interfere with the potential
for it to occur.
These three indicators of a safe climate help clarify what must be avoided to achieve
the objective of preventing dangerous anthropogenic interference of the climate
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High-Level Conference on World Food Security: The Challenges of Climate Change and Bioenergy,
Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation: Challenges and Opportunities for Food Security, 2, UN
Doc HLC/08/INF/2, Rome, 3-5 June 2008.
107
Macquarie Dictionary, above n 94, 1247.
108
World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), Our Common Future (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1987), 43.

76

system. However, this list is not definitive and still leaves ambiguity around what the
Parties seek to achieve.
Article 31.2 of the VCLT provides that the context of the treaty includes its text,
preamble and annexes. In considering the meaning of this term ‘dangerous’ it is useful
to consider contents of the preamble that indicate what impacts attracted the concern
of the Parties, which includes numerous references to ‘adverse effects’ and the
vulnerability of many States.109 The preambular text and the numerous mentions of
‘adverse effects’ in the substantive provisions of the UNFCCC indicate that the Parties
had a general concern about the ‘adverse effects’ of climate change. As discussed in
Chapter 1, Article 1 provides a definition of the ‘adverse effects of climate change’
which refers to ‘significant deleterious effects’ in the environment or biota.110
Using this context, the phrase ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system’ means if and when the ‘adverse effects of climate change’ occur. This
interpretation is supported by the fact that the definition in Article 1 contains a
threshold element with its reference to ‘significant deleterious effects’. Based upon
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UNFCCC, pmbl:
‘Concerned that … [climate change] may adversely affect natural ecosystems and humankind,
Recalling also the provisions of General Assembly resolution 44/206 of 22 December 1989 on the
possible adverse effects of sea-level rise on islands and coastal areas, particularly low-lying coastal
areas and the pertinent provisions of General Assembly resolution 44/172 of 19 December 1989 on the
implementation of the Plan of Action to Combat Desertification,
Recognising further that low-lying and other small island countries, countries with low-lying coastal,
arid and semi-arid areas or areas liable to floods, drought and desertification, and developing countries
with fragile mountainous ecosystems are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate
change,
Affirming that responses to climate change should be coordinated with social and economic
development in an integrated manner with a view to avoiding adverse impacts on the latter, taking into
account the legitimate priority needs of developing countries for the achievement of sustained economic
growth and the eradication of poverty,’
110
UNFCCC, art 1:
‘“Adverse effects of climate change” means changes in the physical environment or biota resulting from
climate change which have significant deleterious effects on the composition, resilience or productivity
of natural and managed ecosystems or on the operation of socio-economic systems or on human health
and welfare.’ (emphasis added).
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this reasoning, it is reasonable to conclude that the context of the UNFCCC provides
evidence that ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’ refers to
any occurrence of ‘adverse effects of climate change’, noting that this is restricted to
those impacts which have significant deleterious effects on the composition, resilience
or productivity of natural and managed ecosystems or on the operation of socioeconomic systems or on human health and welfare.
3. Supplementary means of interpretation
The VCLT provides that supplementary means of interpretation may be utilised in
order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of the general rule in
Article 31.111 This step allows the interpreter to consider the preparatory work of the
treaty.
At a 1989 ministerial conference in Noordwijk, the Netherlands, the Dutch
government proposed that greenhouse gas concentrations should be stabilised at levels
that would maintain climate change within ‘tolerable limits’, and that the IPCC, which
had been established in 1988 by UNEP and WMO, should report on options for
achieving this standard.112 This history indicates that the IPCC reports were considered
critical in determining what level of greenhouse gas concentrations would prevent
climate change from becoming dangerous. The use of the term ‘tolerable limits’
appears to be akin to ‘safe limits’ and is thus consistent with the language used in
Article 2.

111
112

VCLT, art 32.
Oppenheimer and Petsonk, above n 102, 200.
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At Noordwijk, the Dutch government’s formulation was generally accepted. However,
an additional element was added, namely that economies should not suffer.113 The
Noordwijk Declaration provides an important early version of the objective contained
in Article 2. It contains the three elements of a safe climate and refers to the
stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations as an ‘imperative goal’ (similar to
‘ultimate objective’). Furthermore, it contained the phrase ‘tolerable limits’, which
acted as an early precursor to the term ‘dangerous’.
In November 1990, at the Second World Climate Conference (SWCC, 1990), a
declaration was issued that ‘the ultimate global objective should be to stabilize
greenhouse-gas concentrations at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with climate’ and that ‘as a first step’ greenhouse gas emissions needed
to be stabilised.114 The phrase ‘ultimate global objective’ appears to have originated
from the Austrian government which used the phrase ‘long-term global objective’.115
Article 2 therefore can be understood as building upon the Austrian proposal,
combining elements of the Noordwijk Declaration and the SWCC statement.
However, there are two important elements to be drawn out of the final stage of the

113

The Noordwijk Declaration 1989 provided:
‘For the long-term safeguarding of our planet and maintaining its ecological balance, joint effort and
action should aim at limiting or reducing emissions and increasing sinks for greenhouse gases to a level
consistent with the natural capacity of the planet. Such a level should be reached within a time frame
sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not
threatened and permit economic activity to develop in a sustainable and environmentally sound manner.
Stabilizing the atmospheric concentrations for greenhouse gases is an imperative goal. The IPCC will
need to report on the best scientific knowledge as to the options for containing climate change within
tolerable limits. Some currently available estimates indicate that this could require a reduction of global
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions by more than 50 per cent.’
114
Second World Climate Conference (SWCC, 1990).
115
Austrian Government, 1991; Austria/Switzerland Governments, 1991:
‘The long-term global objective must be the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere at a level which minimizes risk to ecosystems, ecological processes, and climatic conditions
essential for the functioning of the biosphere and which will ensure sustainable development.’
See Oppenheimer and Petsonk, above n 102, 203.
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preparatory work. The first is that the Austrian government’s proposed text suggests
that the term ‘ultimate’ is a reference to the notion that this objective is a ‘long-term’
one. The second point is that interpreting the term ‘ultimate’ as meaning ‘long-term’
is supported by the SWCC statement which described the ‘ultimate objective’ but also
referred to the stabilisation of greenhouse gases as a ‘first step’.
Thus, this preparatory material supports the conclusion that use of the term ‘ultimate’
was not an attempt by Parties to prevent Article 2 being interpreted as the object and
purpose (discussed above). Instead, the term ‘ultimate’ was chosen to indicate that the
objective is a long-term or overarching one. This preparatory work raises the
possibility that the objective in Article 2 should be viewed as comprising two parts.
Firstly, the immediate objective is to stabilise greenhouse gas emissions and secondly,
the long-term objective is to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
climate system. Dividing the objective into these two parts does not change the
meaning of Article 2. Therefore, while this history is insightful it does not necessitate
a different conclusion to that reached in section E.2 above on the ordinary meaning of
Article 2.
4. Further context: subsequent agreement
In determining the ordinary meaning of a treaty, the VCLT also provides that any
subsequent agreement between the Parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or
the application of the provisions shall be taken into account. 116 One possible view is
that the reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) fall within
the ambit of this rule. Reports of the IPCC are endorsed by governments as decisions
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VCLT, art 31.3(a).

80

of the COP of the UNFCCC.117 This process of endorsement may mean that the IPCC
Reports are appropriately viewed as a ‘subsequent agreement between the Parties
regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions’ as
provided in Article 31.3(a) of the VCLT. However, the decisions made by the COP do
not incorporate the entire text of the IPCC reports but instead provide
acknowledgement and appreciation for the work completed by the IPCC. Therefore, it
would appear that the IPCC reports do not constitute subsequent agreement by the
Parties. Nonetheless, they provide an authoritative source of scientific information
endorsed by the COP.
The IPCC was established in 1988 by the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) to review the science on
climate change and the potential environmental and socio-economic consequences of
climate change.118 The IPCC is made up of three working groups (IPCC-WG): IPCCWGI assesses the physical basis for climate change; IPCC-WGII assesses impacts,
adaptation and vulnerability; and IPCC-WGIII assesses mitigation of climate
change.119 The IPCC is open to all UNEP and WMO Member States.120 The Panel
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Plenary takes important decisions, using ‘all best endeavours to reach consensus’.121
A double-layering review process is used to ensure that all views (including those of
governments) are considered.
The IPCC has stated that defining ‘dangerous’ is beyond its legal ambit. However, in
its Third Assessment Report the IPCC organised the vulnerabilities of individuals and
socio-economic and ecological systems into five categories entitled ‘reasons for
concern’.122 These categories include the relationship between global mean
temperature increase and the following:
1. Damage to or irreparable loss of unique and threatened systems (e.g. coral
reefs);
2. The probability of extreme events (e.g. droughts and floods);
3. The distribution of impacts (e.g. increased crop yield in some areas but
decreases in others);
4. Global aggregate damages; and
5. The probability of large-scale singular events (e.g. disintegration of the West
Antarctic ice sheet and shutdown of the thermohaline circulation).123

The IPCC defined vulnerability within the context of climate change to mean ‘the
extent to which climate change may damage or harm a system; it is a function of both
the “sensitivity” of a system or structure to climate and the opportunities for
“adaptation” to new conditions.’124 In essence, this definition of ‘vulnerability’
encapsulates an enhanced risk of being negatively impacted. Table 2-4 below lists
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particular vulnerabilities that the IPCC has discussed in the context of Article 2 where
a specific concentration or temperature increase has been proposed corresponding to
the criteria of Article 2.125
Table 2-4 Proposed numerical values of ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference’
Vulnerability
Shutdown of thermohaline circulation126

Global mean limit
3˚C in 100 years
700ppm CO2
2˚C, 450ppm CO2
2-4˚C, <550ppm CO2
1˚C

Disintegration of West Antarctic ice sheet
Disintegration of Greenland ice sheet
Widespread bleaching of coral reefs
Broad ecosystem impacts with limited adaptive capacity (many
examples)

>1˚C
1-2˚C

Large increase of persons- at-risk of water shortage in vulnerable
regions

450-650ppm CO2

Increasingly adverse impacts, most economic sectors

>3-4˚C

The IPCC Reports provide two indicators as to how the objective contained in Article
2 should be interpreted. The first is that categories of vulnerabilities may be used to
determine if a particular harm or risk of harm is a form of dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system. The five categories identified by the IPCC are
useful in this regard. Secondly, the specific vulnerabilities identified by the IPCC
provide examples of what may be regarded as dangerous anthropogenic interference
with the climate system.
The IPCC has identified specific limits for both greenhouse gas concentrations and
rises in temperature. The limits that the IPCC has identified for greenhouse gas
concentrations are particularly important due to the specific reference to ‘stabilization
of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent
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dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’127 in Article 2. Thus,
the IPCC Reports on the disintegration of the West Antarctic ice sheet may be used to
argue that prevention of dangerous climate change would require stabilisation of
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at 450ppm CO2 or alternatively less
that 550ppm CO2.
The lowest temperature rise described in these IPCC Reports is that of 1˚C which is
associated with the disintegration of the Greenland ice sheet. Given that vulnerabilities
increase as the greenhouse gas concentrations increase, it is the lowest stabilisation
level that is most relevant as a tool for interpreting Article 2. Therefore, it may be
argued that the objective requires stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere at a level that would result in a temperature rise of less than 1˚C.
5. An additional objective
Further examination of the UNFCCC reveals that a second objective appears to emerge
from its provisions. The UNFCCC’s substantive provisions include a mixture of
obligations relating to both mitigation of greenhouse gases and adaptation to the
adverse effects of climate change. The UNFCCC refers to the ‘effects’ and ‘adverse
effects’ of climate change twenty-two times, and refers to ‘vulnerability’ and ‘impacts’
seven times. Within the context of the obligations the UNFCCC places upon Annex I
Parties to assist in adaptation (see Chapter 3), it appears that there is an additional and
unstated objective within the UNFCCC to establish an instrument to address the
adverse effects of climate change and to ensure that States (especially the most
vulnerable ones) are able to adequately prepare for those effects.128
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It is possible, and indeed common, for a treaty to have multiple objects and purposes.
The Appellate Body at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) has stated that ‘most
treaties have no single, undiluted object and purpose but rather a variety of different,
and possibly conflicting, objects and purposes.’129
Therefore, there is a secondary objective contained in the UNFCCC which is to ensure
that mechanisms are in place for adaptation funding to be provided from developed
States to developing State Parties. While the primary objective is to prevent the adverse
effects of climate change, the text of the UNFCCC reveals that the Parties also agreed
that the UNFCCC and its related instruments should provide for adaptation funding in
the event that adverse effects occur.
6. Conclusion
According to Article 2, the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC is to stabilise
greenhouse gas concentrations at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system. Reading the UNFCCC as a whole, ‘dangerous’
may be equated with the occurrence of ‘adverse effects of climate change’ as defined
in Article 1. This article defines ‘adverse effects of climate change’ as ‘changes in the
physical environment or biota resulting from climate change which have significant
deleterious effects on the composition, resilience or productivity of natural and
managed ecosystems or on the operation of socio-economic systems or on human
health and welfare’.130 The second sentence of Article 2 provides three elements of a
safe climate: to allow ecosystems to naturally adapt to climate change; to ensure that
food production is not threatened; and to enable economic development to proceed in
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a sustainable manner. The inclusion of these elements demonstrates that to prevent
dangerous climate change requires the protection of these three elements.
Reports of the IPCC, which are endorsed as decisions of the COP, have not defined
‘dangerous’ but instead provide categories of vulnerabilities that may be used to
determine if a particular harm or risk of harm is a form of dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system. The specific vulnerabilities identified by the
IPCC provide examples of what may be regarded as dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system. The lowest of these is a temperature rise of 1˚C
which is associated with the disintegration of the Greenland ice sheet.
Finally, there is an additional objective contained in the UNFCC which is to ensure
that mechanisms are in place to ensure that adaptation funding is provided from
developed States to developing States Parties. This objective may become increasingly
important in the event that climate change damage occurs.
F. Article 2 as an obligation
The placing of the objective in Article 2 of the UNFCCC was one of the first times
that States agreed to include a treaty objective as a legally binding part of an
international agreement. Previously, the objectives of treaties were generally located
in preambles or may not have been explicitly stated at all.131 The objective of a treaty
is provided to enunciate the Parties’ overarching purpose and to assist in the
acknowledgement and legitimisation of a problem as a matter of international
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concern.132 Arguably, the objective in Article 2 has greater legal status than if it had
been simply included in the preamble of the UNFCCC. The inclusion of the objective
as an article also opens the possibility that it creates a commitment.
Verheyen argued that Article 2 is operative and provides a classic example of an
environmental quality standard by setting a threshold for the UNFCCC and all future
legal instruments.133 According to Verheyen, a normative threshold is provided by the
term ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’ and that the
‘indicators’ of the second sentence provide a time-element for this threshold.134
However, international case law indicates that a legal claim based upon an objective
as a source of obligation would be unlikely to be successful. The Oil Platforms Case135
dealt with this issue. Article I of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular
Rights between the United States of America and Iran136 provided that ‘there shall be
firm and enduring peace and sincere friendship between the [US]… and Iran’. The ICJ
found that this article amounted to an objective rather than a specific obligation. In
relation to the possibility of Article I providing the basis for a legal claim, the ICJ held:
[T]he court considers that the objective of peace and friendship proclaimed in Article I of the
Treaty of 1955 is such as to throw light on the interpretation of the other Treaty provisions,
and in particular of Articles IV and X. Article I is thus not without legal significance for such
an interpretation, but cannot, taken in isolation, be a basis for the jurisdiction of the Court.’ 137
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Other cases have reached a similar conclusion.138 The principle of good faith cannot
be used to fill gaps in a manner which would impose additional obligations.139 Even
an ‘evolutive’ interpretation of the article cannot justify imposing a commitment where
one is not plainly provided.140
Therefore, the objective contained in Article 2 cannot be relied upon as an obligation.
This conclusion is reached on the basis that international case law reveals that the
objective of a treaty cannot be relied upon as an obligation and to interpret Article 2
as an obligation would be contrary to the principle of good faith.
G. Principles
Some authors have argued that the distinction between norms and principles in
international law is a theoretical one.141 Indeed, international case law has not
determined what consequences flow from the characterisation of a legal obligation as
a legal principle rather than a legal rule.142 Principles provide general statements of
law that must be taken into account and guide the processes of interpretation and
application of rules of law. Article 3 of the UNFCCC provides that the principles
contained in it ‘shall’ guide the Parties, meaning that the principles are binding.
The following discussion provides a general overview of the history and preparatory
work on Article 3, and then analyses the three principles most relevant to legal risk for
climate change damage. These principles are: common but differentiated

138

See e.g. USA, Federal Reserve Bank v Iran, Bank Markazi Case A28 (2000-02) 36 Iran-US Claims
Tribunal Reports 5, 22, para 58; R v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport ex parte European Roma
Rights Centre [2004] UKHL 55, paras 62-63.
139
Gardiner, above n 38, 155.
140
Joint dissenting opinion, paras 23-24, Gardiner, above n 38, 243.
141
Verheyen, above n 41, 67.
142
Sands, above n 31, 232.

88

responsibility (Article 3.1); the precautionary principle (Article 3.3); and sustainable
development (Article 3.4).
1. History and preparatory work of the principles in the UNFCCC
Most developing States were supportive of an article on principles. 143 In comparison,
developed States were generally opposed to the inclusion of an article on principles.144
The US argued that including an article on principles would create confusion over their
legal status.145 The US argument rested on the premise that principles should simply
provide a context for interpretation (and be placed in the preamble) or should be
designated as actual commitments. However, this approach failed to take account of
the possibility that principles provide general legal standards.146
Despite the fact that Article 3 was ultimately included, the US successfully negotiated
for a number of changes to the article to reduce its legal significance. Firstly, a chapeau
was added that the Parties are to be ‘guided’ by the principles. Secondly, the term
‘States’ was replaced by ‘Parties.’ Thirdly, the term ‘inter alia’ was added to the
chapeau to indicate that other principles may be taken into account beyond those listed
in Article 3. It appears that these changes were intended to undermine the view that
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the principles in Article 3 are part of customary international law. 147 Indeed, the final
wording indicates that the principles only apply with regard to the UNFCCC and its
Parties.
Developing States compromised on the substance of Article 3, with some proposed
principles being transferred to the preamble,148 and others not being included at all.149
However, three key principles were included: common but differentiated
responsibility; the precautionary principle; and sustainable development.
2. Common but differentiated responsibility (Article 3.1)
The principle of common but differentiated responsibility is a concept unique to
international law and thus has no equivalent in domestic legal systems. 150 Differential
treatment of States recognises that there are real differences between States, in terms
of history, economics, politics and other factors,151 and seeks to correct inequality.
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proceeding under Article 14.
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Although the principle of common but differentiated responsibility may not be
customary international law it is ‘legally relevant and enforceable’. 152 The principle
‘has become a cornerstone of burden-sharing structures adopted in international
environmental treaties.’153
The commitments contained in the UNFCCC are largely based upon the principle of
common but differentiated responsibility as provided in Article 3.1. 154 It is upon the
basis of this principle that developed States accepted commitments to limit their
greenhouse gas emissions under the Kyoto Protocol. Whilst this principle is founded
upon the notion that developed States have greater responsibility for climate change
and greater capacity to mitigate, it is possible that this principle may mean that the full
extent of urgent mitigation action is not taken.155
The ‘core content of the CBDR principle … is deeply contested … and there are at
least two incompatible views on its content.’156 This conflict centres upon what
Rajamani conceptualises as the culpability/entitlement and consideration/capacity
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debate.157 The view of developed States is generally that the differentiation is based
upon different levels of economic capacity not on different contributions to climate
change (and other global environmental problems). Whereas the perspective of
developing States is that the differentiation is based upon different contributions to
climate change and not on different levels of economic development. The rationale
behind the culpability/entitlement perspective is that developed countries have
externalised the environmental costs of development.158
More recently, it appears that the Parties to the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol are
moving away from the principle of common but differentiated responsibility. 159 For
example, the Durban Platform does not refer to the principle of common but
differentiated responsibility or to developed States and developing States.160
Nonetheless, the principle could play a vital role in any international climate litigation
(see discussion in Chapters 6 and 7).
The principle of common but differentiated responsibility is accompanied by other
concepts that are also found in the preamble. These are the principle that the climate
should be protected for the benefit of present and future generations and the principle
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of equity.161 The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities is also found in the preamble of the UNFCCC.162
The developed and developing States provided different reasons for supporting the
second sentence in Article 3.1 (‘…the developed country Parties should take the lead
in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.’). The developing States
supported this sentence on the basis that developed States bear the ‘main
responsibility’ for climate change,163 whereas developed States opposed this reasoning
and instead supported the sentence because of their greater financial and technical
capabilities. The actual wording of Article 3.1 indicates that the Parties agreed to both
of these lines of reasoning (‘in accordance with their common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities’).164 Rajamani argued that ‘common
responsibility’ is rooted in the principle of co-operation and the need for States to
cooperate in preventing transboundary pollution.165 Rajamani noted that the Parties
recognised in the preamble that ‘change in the Earth’s climate and its adverse effects
are a common concern of humankind’ and argued that this recognition is linked to the
concept of common responsibility.166
There are numerous examples of the principle shaping aspects of the climate regime.
For example, the technology transfer obligations are an example of additional
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responsibility allocated to developed States on the basis of this principle. 167 Further
examples are found in the provisions around financial assistance to be provided from
developed States to developing States.168
The implications of the principle of common but differentiated responsibility for legal
claims regarding climate change damage may be most important when considering
how legal responsibility may be disaggregated. In particular, the elements of
responsibility for climate change and financial and technical capabilities may provide
a basis for determining an appropriate method of awarding reparation for climate
change damage (see Chapters 6 and 7).
3. Precautionary principle (Article 3.3)
The precautionary principle contained in Article 3.3 calls upon the Parties to take
precautionary measures even where there is lack of full scientific certainty. 169 This is
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significant given the common reference to scientific uncertainty as a reason to not take
action on climate change. However, a careful reading of Article 3.3 reveals a number
of limitations contained in the principle. Firstly, the precautionary measures may be to
anticipate, prevent or minimise. This is a lighter standard than if the text said Parties
should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent and minimise the causes of
climate change and mitigate its adverse effects.
Secondly, the text of Article 3.3 provides that policies and measures should be ‘costeffective.’ In the INC, the issue of whether the precautionary principle should include
a reference to ‘cost-effectiveness’ provided a key area of disagreement. This term
introduces an economic factor to what had traditionally been a purely environmental
standard. The SWCC Ministerial Declaration had included ‘cost-effective’
precautionary measures,170 as had the G-77 proposal on principles.171 During INC 5,
use of the term ‘cost-effective’ in Article 3.3 was dropped but ultimately reintroduced
and accepted.172
The two issues highlighted here indicate that while the principle contained in Article
3.3 provides an interpretive tool that supports precautionary measures, the limitations
contained in the actual text indicate that the principle could also be used to justify not
taking precautionary measures. For example, a Party may argue that precautionary
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measures to prevent the adverse effects of climate change were not taken due to those
measures not being cost-effective. Furthermore, application of the precautionary
principle is limited in the sense that it does not determine what measures are necessary
and who must take those measures.173
4. Sustainable development (Article 3.4)
The first sentence in Article 3.4 indicates that the principle of sustainable development
embraces both a right to, and duty to promote, sustainable development.174 This dual
nature emerged from significant differences in approach to the concept of sustainable
development in the negotiations. Early in the negotiations, developing States called for
the inclusion of a principle recognising that ‘the right to development is an inalienable
human right’ and that ‘[a]ll peoples have an equal right in matters relating to
reasonable living standards.’175 Some developed States called for the inclusion of a
principle that countries have a duty to aim at sustainable development. The US had
strongly opposed the ‘right to development’ due to concern that it may be used by
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Burnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 19, 377.
UNFCCC, art 3.4:
‘The Parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainable development. Policies and measures to
protect the climate system against human-induced change should be appropriate for the specific
conditions of each Party and should be integrated with national development programmes, taking into
account that economic development is essential for adopting measures to address climate change.’
(emphasis added).
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Consolidated Working Document, above n 148, art II.1; Joint Statement of the Group of 77, UN
GAOR INC/FCCC, 4th Session, Working Group I, at 2, UN Doc. A/AC.237/WG.I/L.8 (1992).
On the right to development, see e.g. Ian Brownlie, The Human Right to Development (Human Rights
Unit Occasional Paper, London, Commonwealth Secretariat, 1989); Anne Orford, ‘Globalisation and
the Right to Development’ in Philip Alston (ed), Peoples’ Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2001); Bonny Ibhawoh, ‘The Right to Development: The Politics and Polemics of Power and
Resistance’ (2011) 33(1) Human Rights Quarterly 76; Leon E Irish, ‘The Right to Development versus
a Rights-Based Approach to Development’ (2005) 3(3) International Journal of Civil Society Law 6;
Koen De Feyter, ‘Human Rights and Development Revisited’ (2008) 2(1) Human Rights and
International Legal Discourse 117; Shawkat Alam and Md Saifal Karim, ‘Linkages of Development
and Environment: In Search of an Integrated Approach through Sustainable Development’ (2011) 23(3)
Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 345; Alain Pellet, ‘The Functions to the Right to
Development: A Right to Self-Realisation’ (1984) Third World Legal Studies 129; Roland Y Rich, ‘The
Right to Development as an Emerging Human Right’ (1983) 23(2) Virginia Journal of International
Law 287.
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developing States to demand financial assistance from developed States.176
Developing States have expressed concerns about the concept of ‘sustainable
development’ on the basis that it may become a new conditionality on financial
assistance.
Article 3.4 arguably ‘finesses both issues’ through its careful use of language: 177 ‘the
Parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainable development’. The term ‘right’
was used to placate developing States, however this is less than a ‘right to
development’ because the Article provides that States have a ‘right to … promote
sustainable development’.178 Further, rather than creating a duty to develop
sustainably, the Article provides that Parties ‘should, promote sustainable
development’.179
The second sentence contained in Article 3.4 provides an important aid for interpreting
the objective contained in Article 2. The second sentence of Article 3.4 indicates that
Parties agreed that the principle of sustainable development primarily acts as a caveat
to what should be expected of developing Parties in adopting policies and measures to
protect against climate change. In fact, developing States had initially sought a
formulation of the principle that provided that economic development was a
‘prerequisite’ for adopting climate change measures.180 Relating this back to the
objective contained in Article 2,181 this principle may provide reason to argue that the
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In 1986, the US voted against the UN Declaration on the Right to Development, GA Res. 128, UN
GAOR, 41st Session, 7th plen. Mtg., Supp. No. 53, at 186, UN Doc. A/41/53 (1986).
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Bodansky, ‘The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’, above n 20, 504.
178
Cf Rio Declaration, principle 3 (‘The right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet
developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations.’).
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Bodansky, ‘The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’, above n 20, 504.
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G-77 Statement, at 2; Consolidated Working Document, above n 148, Article II(1).
181
UNFCCC, art 2. The second sentence provides: ‘Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame
sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not
threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.’
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reference to sustainable development in that article is not as an indicator of dangerous
climate change but instead is provided as a caveat for what may be expected of
developing State Parties. However, application of the principle of sustainable
development does not resolve conflict between economic growth and the protection of
the environment.182
5. Conclusion
This discussion shows that the article on principles in the UNFCCC provides an
important source of general statements of law that would guide the interpretation of
obligations in the event of a State seeking compensation under the UNFCCC or Kyoto
Protocol. The key principles are: common but differentiated responsibility (Article
3.1); the precautionary principle (Article 3.3); and sustainable development (Article
3.4). The principle of common but differentiated responsibility indicates that the
developed States Parties should take the lead in mitigation and adaptation due to their
responsibility for climate change and their greater financial and technical capabilities.
This principle may provide a basis for determining an appropriate method of
disaggregating legal responsibility for climate change damage (discussed further in
Chapters 6 and 7). The precautionary principle contained in Article 3.3 calls for
precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimise the causes of climate change
and its adverse effects. However, Article 3.3 provides that these measures should be
‘cost-effective’. This would provide support to a Party that has not taken precautionary
measures to prevent the adverse effects of climate change on the basis that those

Todd B Adams, ‘Is there a Legal Future for Sustainable Development in Global Warming? Justice,
Economics, and Protecting the Environment’ (2003-2004) 16 The Georgetown International
Environmental Law Review 77, 111. Also see Alan Boyle and David Freestone, International Law and
Sustainable Development: Past Achievements and Future Challenges (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1999).
182
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measures were not cost-effective. Finally, the principle of sustainable development in
Article 3.4 embraces both a right to, and a duty to promote, sustainable development.
This article indicates that the principle of sustainable development primarily acts as a
caveat to what should be expected of developing Parties in adopting policies and
measures to protect against climate change.
H. Preamble
Preambles to international agreements generally state the background, purposes, and
context of the agreement.183 Much of the preamble of the UNFCCC is made up of
items that were proposed to be included as principles in Article 3 but did not gain
sufficient support from the Parties. The content of the preamble was in many ways
evolutionary. For example, this was the first time that Principle 21 of the Stockholm
Declaration had been included in a treaty (in the slightly modified form also adopted
as Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration).184 The preamble also characterises change in
the Earth’s climate and its adverse effects as the ‘common concern of humankind’185
(rather than ‘mankind’) and refers to the principle of inter-generational equity. Both of
these are emerging concepts of international law.186
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VCLT, art 31(2).
UNFCCC, pmbl, para 8:
‘Recalling also that States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles
of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their
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See e.g. F Biermann, ‘Common Concern of Humankind: The Emergence of a New Concept of
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Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind in International Law (Dordrecht: Kluwer Law
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and the Evolving Concept of Common Concern of Mankind’ in Thomas Cottier, Olga Nartova and
Sadeq Z Bigdeli (eds), International Trade and the Mitigation of Climate Change (Cambridge:
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In terms of legal risk for climate change damage, the part of greatest significance in
the preamble is paragraph 3.187 Developing States had sought to include the ‘main
responsibility’ principle or ‘polluter pays’ principle that would hold developed States
as primarily responsible for combating climate change due to their historic
contribution to the problem.188 The text adopted in paragraph 3 provides recognition
of the historic contribution of developed States, but does not link this with the concept
that primary responsibility for combating climate change rests with developed States.
The reference to ‘per capita emissions’ in paragraph 3 is all that remains of an objective
proposed by the Indian government that was based upon per capita emissions.189
Nonetheless, paragraph 3 may provide an important interpretive aid because it
provides both recognition by the Parties of the historic contribution of developed States
to the problem, and provides a link between historic contributions and the notion of
per capita emissions. Thus, paragraph 3 may lend support to the argument that historic
contributions may be assessed by reference to per capita emissions. This is potentially
significant in considering legal responsibility for climate change damage.
The preamble of the UNFCCC provides important interpretive aids in considering the
viability of legal claims related to climate change damage. Paragraph 8 of the preamble
recognises that States have the ‘responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of
other areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction’. Paragraph 3 notes that the largest
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UNFCCC, pmbl, para 3:
‘[t]hat the largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in
developed countries, that per capita emissions in developing countries are still relatively low and that
the share of global emissions originating in developing countries will grow to meet their social and
development needs.’
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Bodansky, ‘The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’, above n 20, 497.
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share of historical and current greenhouse gases originate in developed States,
although this historical contribution is not linked with responsibility for combating
climate change. This paragraph also provides recognition of the notion of per capita
emissions. All of these principles may provide important interpretive aids in assessing
the viability of legal claims under the UNFCCC for climate change damage.
I. Conclusion
The history of the climate negotiations provides a number of important insights into
the climate regime relevant to the research questions of this thesis. Firstly, the
UNFCCC is a mix of a framework and substantive convention. Substantive
commitments and procedural mechanisms are included in the UNFCCC, contrary to
other framework conventions. Thus, it is clear that the obligations contained in the text
must be examined to determine whether they provide legally binding obligations (see
Chapter 3). Secondly, it is evident that many Parties were considering the issues of
liability and compensation and sought to have these issues dealt with in the UNFCCC.
However, the developed States strongly opposed such efforts and there are no
principles of obligations in the UNFCCC concerning compensation or liability.
Third, although the Parties have created the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol,
negotiations have stagnated and there was no outcome for a legally binding agreement
at COP15 in Copenhagen. The Durban Platform of 2011 has established a process for
Parties to commit to a new legally binding agreement by 2015 and to take effect from
2010. This means that there will be a gap between the Kyoto Protocol commitment
period (2008-2012) and any subsequent agreement.
Fourth, the object and purpose of the climate regime is to stabilise greenhouse gas
concentrations at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with
101

the climate system. The term ‘dangerous’ appears to mean the occurrence of adverse
effects of climate change which refer to significant deleterious effects on the physical
environment or biota resulting from climate change. Reports of the IPCC, endorsed as
decisions of the COP, provide categories of vulnerabilities that may be used to
determine if a particular harm or risk of harm is a form of dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system. The specific vulnerabilities identified by the
IPCC provide examples of what may be regarded as dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system. The lowest of these is a temperature rise of 1˚C
which is associated with the disintegration of the Greenland ice sheet.
Fifth, there is an additional objective contained in the UNFCC which is to ensure that
mechanisms are in place to ensure that adaptation funding is provided from Annex II
States to developing State Parties. This objective may become increasingly important
in the event that climate change damage occurs.
Finally, the principles contained in the UNFCCC would guide the interpretation of
obligations of the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol. The principle of common but
differentiated responsibility may provide a basis for determining an appropriate
method of disaggregating legal responsibility for climate change damage. The
precautionary principle contained in Article 3.3 and its requirement that measures be
‘cost-effective’ would provide support to a Party that has not taken precautionary
measures to prevent the adverse effects of climate change on the basis that those
measures were not cost-effective. The principle of sustainable development in Article
3.4 embraces both a right to, and a duty to promote, sustainable development. It is
within this context that we turn now to the question of whether there are obligations in
the UNFCCC that could provide exposure to legal risk for climate change damage.
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UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE CHANGE: MITIGATION AND ADAPTATION
A. Overview
In this chapter, obligations contained in the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC)1 are analysed to determine if any of these could provide
the basis for a legal claim. The aim of this chapter is to identify the potential exposure
to legal risk for climate change damage of greennhouse gas emitting States under the
UNFCCC, in terms of the primary rules as well as any associated dispute resolution
mechanisms.
Section B provides an assessment of the obligations on Parties to mitigate greenhouse
gas emissions and obligations to assist in adaptation. The first part of this section
considers the mitigation obligations, beginning with a history of the negotiations that
led to their adoption. Three mitigation obligations are examined; to return emissions
to 1990 levels by the year 2000 (Article 4.2); to modify long-term trends of greenhouse
gas emissions (Article 4.2); and to formulate and implement national or regional
mitigation programs (Article 4.1(b)).
The second part of Section B considers the obligations to assist in adaptation that are
contained in the UNFCCC. Again, this part begins with the history of negotiations that
led to these obligations being adopted. The three adaptation obligations assessed are:
to provide financial resources to meet the agreed full incremental costs of preparing

1

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 9 May 1992, 1771
UNTS 107, 165 (entered into force 21 March 1994) [hereinafter ‘UNFCCC’].
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for adaptation (Article 4.3); to assist in adaptation to the adverse effects of climate
change (Article 4.4); and to give full consideration to necessary actions (Article 4.8).
Section C turns to the dispute settlement procedures contained in the UNFCCC and
the ability of States to bring contentious cases. This section examines the two
approaches of the UNFCCC to the resolution of disputes. The first approach is a
multilateral, non-adversarial form of dispute resolution. The second approach provides
for the resolution of disputes through bilateral dispute resolution. This section
considers whether the International Court of Justice (ICJ) could have jurisdiction over
disputes concerning the UNFCCC obligations. Finally, Section D provides a summary
of the key findings from this chapter in relation to exposure to legal risk for climate
change damage.
B. Mitigation and adaptation obligations
In the UNFCCC, Parties agreed to a series of commitments that are set out in Article
4. The commitments in Article 4 are based on the principle of common but
differentiated responsibility.2 All Parties to the UNFCCC are bound by Article 4.1.
However, this obligation is subject to ‘specific national and regional development
priorities, objectives and circumstances’. Thus, Article 4.1 is an example of a
contextual norm, or a norm that implicitly allows the differential treatment of States.3
In contrast, Article 4.2 contains more onerous commitments that apply only to Annex
I Parties, which include the developed States and the ‘economies in transition’ of
Eastern Europe. These commitments are differential norms, which explicitly provide
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Lavanya Rajamani, Differential Treatment in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2006).
3
See Daniel Barstow Magraw, ‘Legal Treatment of Developing Countries: Differential, Contextual and
Absolute Norms’ (1989) 1 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 69, 75.
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for application of different standards for one group of States compared with another
group.4

The obligations contained in Article 4 cover a range of areas but there are two
categories that are most relevant for the purposes of this thesis (see Table 3-1 below).
The first category is made up of obligations to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. The
second category concerns obligations to assist in adaptation to the adverse effects of
climate change. These two categories of obligations were both intensely debated
during the INC, and have continued to be sources of controversy in the ongoing climate
change negotiations.
Table 3-1 Obligations in the UNFCCC that may provide legal exposure
Article
Mitigation obligations
Article 4.2(a)-(b)
Article 4.2(a)
Article 4.1(b)
Adaptation obligations
Article 4.3

Article 4.4
Article 4.8

Description
Obligation to return emissions to 1990 levels by
the year 2000
Obligation to modify long-term trends of
greenhouse gas emissions
Obligation to formulate and implement national
or regional mitigation programs
Obligation to provide financial resources to meet
the agreed full incremental costs of preparing for
adaptation
Obligation to assist in adaptation to the adverse
effects of climate change
Obligation to give full consideration to necessary
actions

It should be noted that there are commitments in Article 4 of the UNFCCC which may
be used to defend a State Party in response to a legal claim relating to climate change
damage. The clearest example of this is provided in Article 4.10.5 This article, which
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Ibid, 73.
UNFCCC, art 4.10:
‘The Parties shall, in accordance with Article 10, take into consideration in the implementation of the
commitments of the Convention the situation of Parties, particularly developing country Parties, with
economies that are vulnerable to the adverse effects of implementation measures to respond to climate
change. This applies notably to Parties with economies that are highly dependent on income generated
5
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was included at the insistence of Australia, appears to provide a significant concession
to States that are highly dependent upon fossil fuels.6 Indeed, it is likely that Article
4.10 would be cited by such States to qualify their obligations to mitigate greenhouse
gases.7 In particular, Article 4.10 provides that in the process of implementing their
commitments under the UNFCCC, Parties shall give ‘consideration’ to Parties that are
vulnerable to the ‘adverse effects of implementation measures’ (i.e. mitigation
measures). The article goes on to specifically mention that this concession applies to
Parties with economies that are highly dependent upon the production, processing,
export, consumption or use of fossil fuels. Thus, Article 4.10 acts as a qualification to
the mitigation commitments of the UNFCCC as they apply to such Parties. Article
4.10 is not limited to economies in transition and would be available to developed
Parties that are highly dependent on fossil fuels (for example, the United States and
Australia). Article 4.6 provides a concession to Parties included in Annex I undergoing
transition to a market economy.8
1. Mitigation obligations
This section examines obligations in the UNFCCC which concern mitigation of
greenhouse gas emissions and may provide the basis for a legal claim relating to
climate change damage. Each of these obligations is analysed primarily through

from the production, processing and export, and/or consumption of fossil fuels and associated energyintensive products and/or the use of fossil fuels for which such Parties have serious difficulties in
switching to alternatives.’
6
Daniel Bodansky, ‘The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary’
(1993) 18 Yale Journal of International Law 451, 531.
7
Ibid. Article 4.10 may be compared with Article 4.8 which again provides for States which are
dependent on fossil fuels, but is limited to developing States Parties.
8
UNFCCC, art 4.6: ‘In the implementation of their commitments under paragraph 2 above, a certain
degree of flexibility shall be allowed by the Conference of Parties to the Parties included in Annex I
undergoing the process of transition to a market economy, in order to enhance the ability of these Parties
to address climate change, including with regard to the historical level of anthropogenic emissions of
greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol chosen as a reference.’
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determining the appropriate interpretation of the text, and how this interpretation
would apply to climate change damage.

The legal obligations examined are to:
(1) return emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000 (Article 4.2);
(2) modify long-term trends of greenhouse gas emissions (Article 4.2); and
(3) formulate and implement national or regional mitigation programs (Article
4.1(b)).
However, before analysing these specific obligations, the following section briefly
examines the history of negotiations that led to their adoption. A more general history
of the negotiations was provided in Chapter 2. This section aims to more specifically
focus upon the State positions on mitigation and the emergence of the commitments
now found in Article 4.
(a) Negotiation History of Mitigation Obligations
Some of the most controversial issues during the negotiations were targets and
timetables for the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions. The Macquarie Dictionary
definition of ‘target’ is ‘a goal to be reached’.9 However, under international
environmental law the phrase ‘targets and timetables’ refers to quantitative limitations,
which are legally binding.10 Such targets allow States to determine the methods
employed to achieve these commitments.

9

Macquarie Australian Encyclopedic Dictionary (Sydney: The Macquarie Library, 2006) [herein
‘Macquarie Dictionary’], 1225.
10
Generally, framework conventions are used to establish general commitments whereas protocols or
subsequent legal agreements are used to subsequently to specify definitive targets and timelines.
Examples of framework conventions and protocols include: Convention on Biological Diversity, opened
for signature 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79 (entered into force 29 December 1993); Cartagena Protocol
to the Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 29 January 2000, 2226 UNTS 208
(entered into force 11 September 2003); Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer,
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There were a number of approaches to targets that were considered by States during
the negotiations. Two approaches were the ‘per capita approach’ and the ‘GDP
approach’. Under the per capita approach, targets would be set based upon per capita
emissions. The per capita approach can be justified upon the equitable principle that
‘every human has an equal right to use the atmospheric resource.’11 Such an approach
was attractive to States with high population relative to their overall emissions
(particularly developing States e.g. China).12 In contrast, the GDP or Gross Domestic
Product approach would allow targets to be based upon emissions per unit of GDP.
The GDP approach can be justified on the basis that it promotes economic efficiency
in mitigation action through incentivising the reduction of emissions relative to
economic activity. This approach was particularly appealing to States that use
relatively little energy per unit of output (mostly developed States).13

opened for signature 22 March 1985, 1513 UNTS 324 (entered into force 22 September 1988); Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, opened for signature 16 September 1987, 1522
UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1989). In contrast, self-contained treaties work through
appendices or annexes, which are revised from time to time by the parties. Examples of self-contained
treaties include the Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, opened
for signature 16 November 1972, 1037 UNTS 151 (entered into force 17 December 1975); Convention
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, opened for signature 3 March
1973, 995 UNTS 243 (entered into force 1 July 1975). Also see discussion in Chapter 2 on the UNFCCC
as a framework convention.
11
Michael Grubb, ‘The Greenhouse Effect: Negotiating Targets’ (1990) 66 International Affairs 67, 83.
12
Bodansky, above n 6, 512. Many authors have argued for the adoption of a per capita approach to
greenhouse gas mitigation. See, e.g. Peter Singer, One World (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2002), 35; Herman E. Ott and Wolfgang Sachs, ‘The Ethics of International Emissions Trading’ in Luiz
Pinguelli-Rosa and Mohan Munasinghe (eds), Ethics, Equity and International Negotiations
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2002); Ambuj D Sagar, ‘Wealth, Responsibility, and Equity: Exploring an
Allocation Framework for Global GHG Emissions’ (2000) 45 Climatic Change 511; Steve
Vanderheiden, Atmospheric Justice: A Political Theory of Climate Change (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2008); Malik Amin Aslam, ‘Equal Per Capita Entitlements: A Key to Global
Participation on Climate Change?’ in Kevin A Baumert (ed), Building on the Kyoto Protocol: Options
for Protecting the Climate (Washington: World Resources Institute, 2002), 175.
13
Bodansky, above n 6. For a more recent analysis of the balancing of equity and economics in the
international negotiations, see Jason Scott Johnston, ‘Problems of Equity and Efficiency in the Design
of International Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade Schemes’ (2009) 33 Harvard Environmental Law
Review 405.
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Ultimately, the per capita approach was politically infeasible within the US and several
other developed States because it would require them to reduce their emissions by
substantial levels.14 By comparison, the GDP approach would allow developing States
to increase their emissions substantially, making any real outcome in reducing global
emissions impossible. As a result of these issues, States in the INC adopted the
‘grandfathered emissions’ approach which refers to uniform targets that are based
upon historical or current emissions levels.15
Before and during the INC, most developed States called for the adoption of an
international stabilisation target and timetable to stabilise greenhouse gas emissions.16
The European Community argued for an ‘immediate commitment by developed States
to stabilize carbon dioxide emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000.’17 However, the
US opposed this suggestion and ‘derided the targets and timetables adopted by most
other [States] as political in nature, not backed by concrete measures designed to
achieve them.’18

14

Bodansky, above n 6, 513.
Ibid.
16
Cf EC Council Conclusions on Climate Change Policy, Council of the European Communities Press
Release 9482/90 (29 October 1990). Before the INC, it was widely believed that developed States would
eventually have to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions in order to stabilise atmospheric
concentrations at a safe level while giving developing States ‘environmental space’ to grow. See e.g.
Proceedings of the World Conference on the Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security,
Toronto, June 27-30, 1988, WMO & UN Environment Program (UNEP), WMO/OMM Doc. 710
(1989), 521 (recommending 20% reduction in global carbon dioxide emissions); IPCC, Climate
Change: The IPCC Scientific Assessment, xi. Thus, early in the negotiations, delegations submitted
proposals to establish reduction targets.
17
See Consolidated Working Document in Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for
a Framework Convention on the Work of its Fourth Session, UN GAOR INC/FCCC, 4 th Session, UN
Doc A/AC.237/15 (1992), Article IV(2)(1)(b), alternative A (‘developed country Parties … shall …
commit themselves to stabilization’). This proposal surpassed the European Community’s own
unilateral policy adopted in Luxembourg in October 1990 to take actions ‘aiming at reaching
stabilization.’ EC Council Conclusions on Climate Change Policy, Council of the European
Communities Press Release 9482/90 (29 October 1990), at 267 (emphasis added).
18
See Europe ‘Only Political’ – US, EDO, 12 December 1991, 4 (quoting US negotiator Robert
Reinstein characterising European targets as ‘political commitments’). According to an OECD report,
the targets and timetables adopted by States have varying status: some are conditioned on what others
do, some are political rather than legal in nature, and some limit greenhouse gases generally, not carbon
dioxide in particular. IEA, Climate Change Policy Initiatives: Update (9 March 1992), 17-18.
15
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The CANZ group (Canada Australia and New Zealand) and Finland called for a
stabilisation target that covered all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal
Protocol. Japan opposed firm commitments to limit greenhouse gas emissions and
instead argued for a ‘best efforts’ approach. In June 1991, Japan provided a degree of
mediation between the US and the European Community by proposing a ‘pledge and
review’ formula.19 The United Kingdom played a mediator role by proposing a
‘phased, comprehensive approach’,20 by supporting ‘pledge and review’,21 and by
finally gaining agreement in May 1992 on the ‘quasi-target’ and ‘quasi-timetable’.22
This history provides a contextual background to the mitigation obligations that are
examined here, and may be important in interpreting these obligations. Generally, the
history shows that the language agreed to represents a compromise between the State
Parties. Although some Parties sought to establish actual targets and timelines for
mitigation of greenhouse gases, this was ultimately unfeasible and instead a quasitarget and quasi-timeline emerged.
(b) Obligation to return emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000 (Article 4.2(a)(b))
Article 4.2 is a differential norm that only applies to developed States. During the INC,
the European Community, AOSIS (Alliance of Small Island States), and the CANZ
group called for a specific commitment by developed States to stabilise carbon dioxide

19

Set of Informal Papers Provided by Delegations, Addendum 7, INC/FCCC, 2 nd Session, Provisional
Agenda Item 2, 3, UN Doc A/AC.237/Misc.1/Add.7 (1991) (submission of Japan).
20
See John Hunt, ‘UK to Offer Deal over Greenhouse Gases to US’, Financial Times, 6 March 1991,
18.
21
Set of Informal Papers Provided by Delegations, INC/FCCC, 2 nd Session, Provisional Agenda Item
2, UN Doc A/AC.237/Misc.1/Add.1 (1991), 54; Set of Informal Papers Provided by Delegations,
Addendum 2, INC/FCCC, 2nd Session, Provisional Agenda Item 2, UN Doc A/AC.237/Misc.1/Add.2
(1991), 3.
22
Rose Gutfeld, ‘How Bush Achieved Global Warming Pact with No Timetables’, Wall Street Journal,
27 May 1992, A1; John Vidal, ‘Britain “Weakens” Climate Treaty’, Guardian, 11 May 1992, 3.
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emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000.23 This was opposed by the US and
ultimately Article 4.2 was agreed to,24 which has been described as containing a ‘quasitarget’ and ‘quasi-timetable’.25
A liberal interpretation of Article 4.2 would read the two sub-paragraphs together to
find that it requires Annex I Parties to return emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000.
Such an interpretation involves combining the phrases ‘by the end of the present
decade’ (Article 4.2(a)) and ‘returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels’
(Article 4.2(b)). However, linking the timetable in subparagraph (a) to the target in
subparagraph (b) would amount to an inappropriate interpretation of the text. Although
subparagraph (b) does refer to the timetable (‘for the period referred to in subparagraph

23

See Consolidated Working Document in Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for
a Framework Convention on the work of its Fourth Session, U.N. GAOR INC/FCCC, 4th Sess. UN Doc.
A/AC.237/15 (1992), Annex II, Article IV(2)(1)(b), alternative A (‘developed country Parties … shall
.. .commit themselves to stabilization’). This proposal surpassed the European Community’s own
unilateral policy adopted in Luxembourg in October 1990 to take actions ‘aiming at reaching
stabilization.’ EC Council Conclusions on Climate Change Policy, Council of the European
Communities Press Release 9482/90 (29 October 1990), 267 (emphasis added).
24
Article 4.2 provides: ‘The developed country Parties and other Parties included in Annex I commit
themselves specifically as provided for in the following:
(a) Each of these Parties shall adopt national policies and take corresponding measures on the
mitigation of climate change, by limiting its anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and
protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs. These policies and measures will
demonstrate that developed countries are taking the lead in modifying longer-term trends in
anthropogenic emissions consistent with the objective of the Convention, recognizing that the return by
the end of the present decade to earlier levels of anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol would contribute to such modification, and
taking into account the differences in these Parties’ starting points and approaches, economic structures
and resource bases, the need to maintain strong and sustainable economic growth, available technologies
and other individual circumstances, as well as the need for equitable and appropriate contributions by
each of these Parties to the global effort regarding that objective. These Parties may implement such
policies and measures jointly with other Parties and may assist other Parties in contributing to the
achievement of the objective of the Convention and, in particular, that of this subparagraph;
(b) In order to promote progress to this end, each of these Parties shall communicate, within six months
of the entry into force of the Convention for it and periodically thereafter, and in accordance with Article
12, detailed information on its policies and measures referred to in subparagraph (a) above, as well as
on its resulting projected anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse
gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol for the period referred to in subparagraph (a), with the
aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels these anthropogenic emissions of carbon
dioxide and other greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol. This information will be
reviewed by the Conference of the Parties, at its first session and periodically thereafter, in accordance
with Article 7.’ (emphasis added)
25
Bodansky, above n 6, 516.
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(a)’), the language chosen does not clearly provide that these two elements should be
read together.26
Further, the language expresses the target as an ‘aim’ and ‘the verbs used to
characterise the timetable are all descriptive rather than imperative.’ 27 An additional
issue is that Article 4.2 uses the term ‘return’ rather than ‘stabilise’ which suggests that
the commitment is not of an ongoing temporal nature.28 Thus, a State Party could argue
that once it had returned its emissions to 1990 levels, it would be permitted to increase
its emissions.
Interpretative declarations provide an important means to determine the intentions of
the Parties particularly when there is ambiguity in the text.29 For the purposes of
interpreting Article 4.2 the interpretative declarations of Annex I Parties are more
relevant than non-Annex I. Interpretive declarations made by Annex I Parties both
support and deny the existence of a commitment in Article 4.2. For example,
contrasting perspectives were taken by the UK and the US. Following the adoption of
the UNFCCC, the chief British negotiator said that the provisions were
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See Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle and Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the Environmental
(3rd edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 360 (Article 4.2 provides ‘neither a strong nor
clear commitment’).
27
Bodansky, above n 6, 516. UNFCCC, art 4.2(a) (required policies and measures ‘will demonstrate
that developed countries are taking the lead in modifying longer-term trends in anthropogenic emissions
consistent with the objective of the Convention, recognizing that the return by the end of the present
decade to earlier levels of anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases would
contribute to such modification’) (emphasis added).
28
Bodansky, above n 6, 515.
29
Interpretative declarations are not defined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened
for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331(entered in force 27 January 1980) [hereinafter ‘VCLT’].
The ILC has offered the following definition:
‘‘Interpretative declaration’ means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State
or by an international organization whereby that State or that organization purports to specify or clarify
the meaning or scope attributed by the declarant to a treaty or to certain or its provisions.’
Report of the ILC, Fifty-ninth session (7 May-5 June and 9 July-10 August 2007), General Assembly
Official Records, Sixty-second Session, Supplement No 10 (A/62/10), Chapter IV, 48, draft guideline
1.2.
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‘indistinguishable’ from an absolute guarantee.30 However, President George H W
Bush’s domestic policy advisor declared that ‘there is nothing in any of the language
which constitutes a commitment to any specific level of emissions at any time.’31 This
interpretative declaration was consistent with the Bush administration’s approach to
the UNFCCC and its view that any binding mitigation commitments would require a
subsequent protocol.
Thus, the interpretative declarations of the UK and US do not resolve the ambiguity
around Article 4.2. There has been no conclusion reached among commentators
concerning the effects of interpretative declarations.32 Although interpretative
declarations may provide evidence of intention,33 or form part of the context of the
treaty,34 the effects of such statements remain open.35 Generally, the weight of an
interpretive declaration will be influenced by the reactions of other States. McRae
noted:
A State making an interpretative declaration, therefore, is taking the opportunity in advance to
influence any subsequent interpretation of the treaty, the extent of that influence in part being
affected by the reaction of other States to the declaration. 36
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Bodansky, above n 6, 516-517. Portugal issued a statement on behalf of the European Community,
offering another interpretation. It characterised the Convention as establishing a ‘commitment to
introduce measures aiming at the return of anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol to their 1990 levels by the end of the present
decade.’ Statement by Anibal Cavaco Silva, Prime Minister of the Portuguese Republic on behalf of the
European Community and Its Member States on the Occasion of the Signature by the Community of
the Convention (June 1992).
31
Letter from Mr. Clayton Yeutter to Representative John Dingell, Chair of the House Energy and
Commerce Committee, quoted in Rose Gutfield, ‘How Bush Achieved Global Warming Pact with
Modest Goals’, Wall Street Journal, 27 May 1992, A1.
32
Richard Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 94ff.
33
D M McRae, ‘The Legal Effect of Interpretative Declarations’ (1978) 49 The British Yearbook of
International Law 155, 169.
34
[1965] Yearbook of the ILC, vol II, 49.
35
Gardiner, above n 32, 98.
36
Ibid, 169-70. Citation and footnotes omitted.
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Given that the interpretive declarations made by Parties to the UNFCCC both support
and deny that it contains an obligation to mitigate emissions, it is unlikely that they
would have much influence in the interpretation of Article 4.2. Instead, they arguably
support the view that the Parties did not have any clear consensus about Article 4.2
and its implications.
To some extent, Article 4.2 can be compared with Article 2 of the 1979 Geneva
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution. Article 2 provides that
Parties were ‘to endeavour to limit’ and ‘as far as possible, gradually reduce and
prevent’ air pollution. Article 6 further provides that States are to use best policies,
strategies and control measures compatible with ‘balanced development’ and that they
are to use the ‘best available technology’ which is ‘economically feasible’.37 These
articles do not establish any concrete commitments to specific reductions in air
pollution.38 One commentator stated that the Geneva Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution was no more than a ‘symbolic victory’ intended to
provide reassurance to the victims and the polluters.39
A similar comment was made by Christian Reus-Smit about Article 4.2 of the
UNFCCC, who stated that:
At the Earth Summit in 1992, many environmental organisations (NGOs) were highly critical
of the “soft” legal form in which the commitments were expressed. The notable absence of any
binding timetable or targets for greenhouse gas emissions reductions in the 1992 document …
was widely seen as a failure of commitment.40

37

This is particularly directed at new or rebuilt installations.
Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 26, 345.
39
G Wetstone and A Rosencranz, Acid Rain in Europe and North America (Washington: ELI Press,
1983), 145. See also C Flinterman, B Kwiatkowska and J Lammers (eds), Transboundary Air Pollution
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986), 21-3.
40
Christian Reus-Smit, The Politics of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2004), 83.
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In terms of long-range air pollution, the ‘elastic obligation’ found in Article 2 enabled
the US to continue causing serious air pollution in Canada without violating the
Geneva Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution.41 The latitude
provided to polluters in Article 2 to determine their level of effort is very similar to
that found in Article 4.2 of the UNFCCC. Although both Article 2 and Article 4.2 fail
to establish any clear concrete commitments for the polluting States, the substance of
the whole treaty is to act as a framework for cooperation and the development of
further concrete commitments.
Furthermore, the history of the negotiations around the mitigation obligations provided
above highlighted that although some Parties sought to establish specific targets and
timelines for mitigation, they were unsuccessful in these efforts. The negotiation
history does not lend support for reading the quasi-target and quasi-timeline together.
Finally, almost all Parties to the UNFCCC are also Parties to the Kyoto Protocol,42
including Tuvalu and Australia. This situation suggests that the latter has superseded
the former.43 The Kyoto Protocol establishes clear obligations for Annex I Parties to
meet targets for limiting GHG emissions in the period 2008 to 2012, inconsistent with
Article 4.2(a)-(b) of the UNFCCC. Thus, the current status of Article 4.2 in generating
a binding obligation is weaker now than it was prior to when the Parties agreed to the
Kyoto Protocol.
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Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 26, 345. But now see the 1991 US-Canada Air Quality
Agreement, opened for signature 13 March 1991, 30 ILM 676 (entered into force 13 March 1991).
42
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 15 March
1998, 37 ILM 22 (entered into force 16 February 2005) [hereinafter ‘Kyoto Protocol’].
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VCLT, art 30.
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In conclusion, Article 4.2 does not provide a concrete commitment for Annex I Parties
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Although a timeline is provided in Article 4.2(a)
and a target is provided in Article 4.2(b), there is no justification now for reading these
two elements together to create a commitment. Article 4.2 is ambiguous and the
interpretative declaration of the US confirms the view that it does not provide a firm
commitment. Although some States Parties clearly hoped that Article 4.2 would
provide a concrete commitment for mitigation action, the text ultimately agreed failed
to do so. On the whole, the case for establishing a binding obligation for mitigation
under Article 4.2 is unconvincing.
(c) Obligation to demonstrate that they are taking the lead in modifying longerterm trends of greenhouse gas emissions (Article 4.2(a))
The text of Article 4.2(a) also provides that Annex I Parties shall ‘demonstrate that
they are taking the lead in modifying longer term trends’ of greenhouse gas emissions.
Article 4.2(a) is one of the clear examples of an obligation founded on the principle of
common but differentiated responsibility.44 While Article 4.2 does not contain an
obligation to return emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000, an alternative possible
interpretation proposed by Verheyen is that it requires Annex I Parties to modify their
long-term trends of greenhouse gas emissions.45 Verheyen adopted this view and
proposed three arguments to support her interpretation. These are 1) all Parties are
bound by the objective in Article 2; 2) Annex I Parties are committed under Article

Rachel Boyte, ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibilities: Adjusting the “Developing”/
“Developed” Dichotomy in International Environmental Law (2010) 14 New Zealand Journal of
Environmental Law 63, 73.
45
Roda Verheyen, Climate Change Damage and International Law: Prevention Duties and State
Responsibility (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005), 82. Also see Philippe Sands, Principles of
International Environmental Law (2nd edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 365.
44
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4.2 to take the lead in mitigation action; and 3) Annex I Parties accept under 4.2 that a
modification of greenhouse gas trends is consistent with the objective in Article 2.46
She argued that although the Parties did not intend to be bound by a target or
timeframe, they did not want to exclude an obligation to mitigate. 47
Yet, it is unclear how the notion that Annex I Parties need to take the lead in mitigation
action can be relied upon as a concrete commitment. Verheyen suggested that in
proving that a breach has occurred, a claimant State may refer to the inadequacy of the
respondent nation’s climate action plans.48 However, it is uncertain how the analysis
of one State’s climate action plans could determine whether it is taking the lead
globally to modify longer-term emissions trends.
Verheyen’s analysis appears to rely upon the principle of effectiveness, which requires
adoption of an interpretation that gives meaning and effect to all terms of a treaty.49
For example, where a term of a treaty is open to two possible interpretations, only one
of which provides the term with meaning, then the interpretator must adopt that
interpretation.50 However, in the case of Article 4.2, a more reasonable interpretation
is that it provides a flexible commitment that does not require any particular action by
Annex I Parties. While it provides that Annex I Parties must take the lead in modifying
long term trends, this does not actually mean that they must modify their own longer
term trends. Rather, Article 4.2 appears to refer to global long term trends of
greenhouse gas emissions. The broader language adopted in Article 4.2(a) reflects the
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Verheyen, above n 45, 82.
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Korea-Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products AB-1999-8,
WT/D598/AB/R, 24, paras 80-81 (1999). Also see R v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport ex parte
European Roma Rights Centre [2004] UKHL 55, para 19- and CF Cox v Canada (1994) UN Human
Rights Committee 114 ILR 347, 372-73.
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movement towards cross-border emission reductions, such as through CDM and JI
projects. This interpretation of Article 4.2(a) does not mean that it is devoid of
meaning; rather it fails to mean that Annex I Parties must modify their own emission
trends or take any specific measures. Therefore, the principle of effectiveness does not
require the adoption of Verheyen’s interpretation of Article 4.2. Furthermore, it must
be remembered that the principle of good faith, of which the principle of effectiveness
is an element, cannot be used to fill gaps in a manner which would impose additional
obligations.51 This interpretation is consistent with the negotiation history provided
above. Despite some Parties’ intentions to create a concrete obligation to mitigation,
others opposed such an approach.
(d) Obligation to formulate and implement national or regional mitigation
programs (Article 4.1(b))
The final obligation within the UNFCCC which could be interpreted as a commitment
to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions is found in Article 4.1(b).52 Verheyen and Davis
both argued that Article 4.1(b) provides a substantive commitment to reduce
emissions.53 Indeed, Article 4.1(b) does provide that all Parties shall ‘[f]ormulate …
programmes containing measures to mitigate’ greenhouse gas emissions.
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Gardiner, above n 32, 155.
UNFCCC, art 4.1(b):
‘1. All Parties, taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and their specific
national and regional development priorities, objectives and circumstances, shall: Formulate,
implement, publish and regularly update national and, where appropriate, regional programmes
containing measures to mitigate climate change by addressing anthropogenic emissions by sources and
removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, and measures to
facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change’ (emphasis added).
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However, Article 4.1(b) does not contain any targets or timetables for the formulation
of such programs. It is also heavily qualified in the chapeau which provides that the
obligation is subject to each Parties’ ‘specific national and regional development
priorities, objectives and circumstances’. This wording provides for differential
treatment in implementation, creating ambiguity and indeterminacy.54 The differential
treatment provided for in this article is very broad, and coupled with the absence of a
target or timetable, means that it establishes a flexible mitigation commitment that
would be difficult to enforce.
(e) Conclusions on mitigation
This section has examined the UNFCCC in terms of the commitments it places upon
Annex I Parties to mitigate GHG emissions. The focus has been upon Articles 4.2 and
4.1(b). Other commentators have suggested that there are two possible interpretations
of Article 4.2 that would provide an enforceable mitigation commitment. Firstly, that
Article 4.2 requires Annex I Parties to return emissions to 1990 levels by the year
2000. Secondly, that Article 4.2 requires Annex I Parties to modify their long-term
trends of greenhouse gas emissions. However, upon examination it was revealed that
neither of these approaches are convincing. Rather, Article 4.2 provides an elastic
commitment for Annex I Parties to take mitigation action in accordance with their
differential circumstances.
It has also been suggested that Article 4.1(b) may provide a substantive commitment
to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. However, examination of this article also
reveals that the language adopted is flexible and falls far short of a concrete
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Rajamani, above n 2, 101.
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commitment to mitigate. Therefore, the UNFCCC does not provide any commitments
by Annex I Parties that could be persuasively relied upon by a claimant State. A
summary of these conclusions is provided in Table 3-2 below.
Table 3-2 Sources of exposure to legal risk from mitigation obligations in the
UNFCCC
Obligation
Obligation to return emissions to
1990 levels by the year 2000

Article
Article 4.2

Obligation to modify long-term
trends of greenhouse gas emissions

Article 4.2

Obligation to formulate and
implement national or regional
mitigation programmes

Article 4.1(b)

Conclusion
No exposure. The quasi-timetable
and quasi-target are not sufficiently
linked.
No exposure. Simply requires
Annex I Parties to take the lead in
modifying long term trends.
No exposure. Contains no targets or
timetables.

2. Adaptation obligations
(a) Introduction
The following section examines a series of obligations to assist in adaptation contained
in the UNFCCC which may provide the basis for a legal claim relating to climate
change damage. The emergence of these obligations reflects the fact that many of the
poorest States that have contributed least to the problem of climate change are those
that will be affected the most. As a result, Parties to the UNFCCC have sought to find
ways to assist these States to adapt to the impacts of climate change.
This section analyses the obligations concerning adaptation assistance in the
UNFCCC. It considers how these obligations should be interpreted, and the possible
hurdles that may arise for Parties seeking to rely upon these obligations in the context
of a legal dispute. Regard is given to issues raised by commentators in previous studies,
such as the relationship between Articles 4.3 and 4.4, the role of the Global
Environment Facility (GEF), and criteria used to provide assistance. Additional issues
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have been identified and considered, including the fact that the Parties have not
implemented Article 4.4.

The legal obligations examined are the obligation to:
1. provide financial resources to meet the agreed full incremental costs of
preparing for adaptation (Article 4.3);
2. assist in adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change (Article 4.4); and
3. give full consideration to necessary actions (Article 4.8).
However, before analysing these specific obligations, the following section briefly
examines the history of negotiations that led to their adoption. Again, this history
builds upon that provided in Chapter 2, focusing upon the emergence of the adaptation
obligations. The purpose of this short history is to shed light on the Parties’ intentions,
which is important in the event of any ambiguity.55
(b) History of Negotiations of Adaptation Obligations
The INC negotiations around technology transfer and financial resources were marked
by controversy. Within the context of the UNFCCC, developing States sought the
transfer of financial resources both to assist in their implementation of obligations and
to assist in their adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change if they were to
occur.56 The negotiations tended to focus upon financial resources to implement
mitigation obligations because the developing States most interested in these were

‘Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation including the preparatory work of
the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the
application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or
unreasonable.’ VCLT, art 32.
56
Bodansky, above n 6, 526.
55
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more influential than those developing States most concerned with financial resources
to assist in the adaptation to climate change impacts.57
The negotiations that dealt with adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change
were

primarily

initiated

by

AOSIS.

As

discussed

in

Chapter 2, an International Insurance Pool was proposed by AOSIS to provide
insurance against sea level rise.58 The last remaining trace of this proposal may be
found in Article 4.8 which refers to insurance as a measure that may be used to meet
the specific needs and concerns of developing States. Bodansky reported that ‘[i]n the
closing days of the negotiations, however, AOSIS did succeed in adding Article 4.4 to
the Convention’ to assist in adaptation and viewed this as a major success.59 This
perspective was probably because of the broad commitment Article 4.4 contains, as
will be discussed below.
(c) Obligation to provide financial resources to meet the agreed full incremental
costs of preparing for adaptation (Article 4.3)
Article 4.3 obliges the developed State Parties and other developed Parties included in
Annex II to provide financial resources needed by the developing State Parties to meet
the agreed full incremental costs of implementing measures covered by paragraph 1 of
the article.60 It is through this link to Article 4.1 that Article 4.3 provides a binding
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Bodansky, above n 6, 528. India also proposed that Decision 1/1 refer to the need for ‘new and
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financial obligation on Annex II States to support developing States in adaptation. In
particular, Article 4.1(b) requires all States to implement measures to facilitate
adequate adaptation to climate change. Article 4.1(e) commits Parties to cooperate in
preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change. Together, these provisions
require Annex II States to support developing States prepare and implement adaptation
measures.
Article 4.3 provides that Annex II Parties will transfer financial resources for the
‘agreed full incremental costs’ of measures to implement Article 4.1 and requires that
the developing State Party and the international entity are to agree on these costs.
Article 4.3 has been implemented by the Parties through the GEF as the international
entity pursuant to Article 21.3.61 The GEF was initially appointed as the ad interim
financial mechanism but it has continued in this role for over 15 years.62 Until recently,

developing country Parties in complying with their obligations under Article 12, paragraph 1. They shall
also provide such financial resources, including for the transfer of technology, needed by the developing
country Parties to meet the agreed full incremental costs of implementing measures that are covered by
paragraph 1 of this Article and that are agreed between a developing country Party and the international
entity or entities referred to in Article 11, in accordance with that Article. The implementation of these
commitments shall take into account the need for adequacy and predictability in the flow of funds and
the importance of appropriate burden sharing among the developed country Parties.’ (emphasis added).
Article 4.3 provides: ‘All Parties, taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities
and their specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and circumstances, shall:
…
(b) Formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national and, where appropriate, regional
programmes containing measures to mitigate climate change by addressing anthropogenic emissions
by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, and
measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change;
…
(e) Cooperate in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change; develop and elaborate
appropriate and integrated plans for coastal zone management, water resources and agriculture, and
for the protection and rehabilitation of areas, particularly in Africa, affected by drought and
desertification, as well as floods; …’ (emphasis added).
61
The GEF also serves as the financial mechanism for the Convention to Combat Desertification,
opened for signature 14 October 1994, 1954 UNTS 3 (entered into force 26 December 1996); the
Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79 (entered into
force 29 December 1993); and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, opened for
signature 24 May 2001, 2256 UNTS 119 (entered into force 17 May 2004). Global Environment
Facility, What is the GEF < http://www.thegef.org/gef/whatisgef> accessed 16 May 2012.
62
See Thomas Hale and David Held, Handbook of Transnational Governance (Cambridge: Polity,
2011), 379.
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the GEF was the only operating entity of the UNFCCC financial mechanism. At the
Bali meeting of the COP in December 2007 the Parties decided to establish the
Adaptation Fund Board as the operating entity to supervise and manage the Adaptation
Fund.63 The GEF provides secretariat services to the Adaptation Fund Board, and
manages three trust funds for adaptation funding. These trust funds are the Least
Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) and the
Strategic Priority on Adaptation (SPA) (under the GEF Trust Fund).
The SPA was established by the COP to support pilot and demonstration adaptation
projects on the basis of State needs. The GEF has provided an initial US$50 million to
the SPA. The LDCF was set up to support least developed States in the development
of National Adaptation Programs of Action (NAPAs) and receives funding through
voluntary contributions. LDCF resources total US$537 million and as of December
2011 the LDCF had approved US$217 million in projects. 64 Fifty-three percent of
these funds are dedicated to increase resilience of LDCs in Africa; 23% in Asia; 21%
in SIDS; and 3% in the Latin American and Caribbean region.65
At COP16 in Cancun, Mexico, the COP adopted a decision providing further guidance
for the operation of the LDCF.66 As a result, the Subsidiary Body for Implementation
(SBI) requested that the Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG) discuss with
the GEF and its agencies a number of matters at its first meeting in 2011. These matters
were methods to further improve access to funds from the LDCF, the disbursement of
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funds, the design of implementation strategies for NAPAs using a programmatic
approach, ways to best communicate co-financing requirements under the LDCF, and
remaining challenges faced by least developed State Parties in working with GEF
agencies. In response, the GEF Secretariat, among other things, developed a guide on
how to access LDCF resources.67
Verheyen argued that implementation of Article 4.3 is made difficult because of its
linkage to the GEF.68 A double majority is required for all decisions of the GEF (60%
of all member States and 60% of funds weighted by donors). However, Article 11 of
the UNFCCC provides that the financial mechanism will function under the ‘guidance’
of the COP with regard to ‘policies, programme priorities and eligibility criteria’ and
will be accountable to the COP. This guidance does not include specific funding
decisions.
Verheyen argued that the GEF does not appear to meet the definition of an
international entity and it may not have the legal capacity to enter into agreements.69
However, this argument is unconvincing because the GEF is a part of the World Bank70
which is an international entity.71 Furthermore, the GEF Instrument72 (which is
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accepted but not ratified by States) arguably gives the GEF implied powers to enter
agreements.73
The GEF’s mandate guides the work of the SPA. Adaptation funding is provided for
development-related adaptation and adaptation projects of global environmental
benefit. Verheyen argued in 2005 that the global environmental benefit criterion would
be impossible to apply to adaptation.74 However, since then the full US$50 million
SPA portfolio has been allocated.75 The GEF took the view that this criteria was easily
met when the projects were implemented in vulnerable ecosystems (e.g. projects to
reduce the vulnerability of coral reefs).76
Nonetheless, the amount of SPA funding provided for adaptation to climate change
has been modest.77 There is considerable disagreement about the level of adaptation
funding required by developing States because of differences in measurement and
views on what level of adaptation is appropriate. However, most recent estimates show
that the level of funding may equal or even exceed recent global Official Development
Assistance (ODA) flows.78 The UNDP’s 2007 Human Development Report estimated
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that the annual adaptation costs were US$90 billion.79 The World Bank estimated the
costs at US$10 billion80 and Oxfam estimated US$50 billion.81 These estimates do not
include the costs of responding to the actual impacts of climate change on peoples’
health, livelihoods and human rights.82 Clearly, the current level of adaptation funding
provided falls far short of what developing States need.
The key issue for the purposes of this thesis is whether the obligation contained in
Article 4.3 could provide an avenue for these developing States. To bring such a claim,
a State would need to demonstrate that the costs it seeks to cover are ‘incremental
costs’. The phrase is not defined in the UNFCCC and is only found in Article 4.3. It
appears that incremental costs refer to the additional costs associated with more costly
environmental projects.83 Therefore, a determination whether these costs have been
additional would require proof of causation. The claimant would need to demonstrate
that it has incurred additional costs in the design and execution of an environmental
project because of the need to adapt to climate change.84 However, it may be
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impossible to prove causation because there are no recognised baselines from which
to measure incremental costs.85
The GEF’s Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel (STAP) noted the problems
associated with the concept of incremental costs86 and as a result a new strategic
priority on adaptation was adopted by the GEF.87 It appears that the GEF Adaptation
Approach goes around the issue of incremental costs by assuming that many adaptation
measures under the ‘enabling activities’ are provided with funding under the first
sentence of Article 4.3, that is, the ‘agreed full costs’ rather than the ‘agreed full
incremental costs’.88 While there is no certainty that an international court or tribunal
would take the same approach, a claimant State should be able to demonstrate and
quantify the additional costs incurred by a project.
In conclusion, Annex II Parties are obliged to provide financial resources to
developing States under Article 4.3 to meet the agreed full incremental costs of
preparing and implementing adaptation measures. Article 4.3 provides some scope for
a developing State to bring a case to recover funds for adaptation costs. The
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establishment of ‘incremental costs’ associated with a project would be a challenging
but not insurmountable hurdle.
(d) Obligation to assist in adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change
(Article 4.4)
Alongside Article 4.3, Article 4.4 provides the other key obligation for Annex II
Parties to assist in the costs of adaptation. Under Article 4.4, developed State Parties
and other developed Parties included in Annex II commit to assist the developing State
Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in
meeting the costs of adaptation.89 Sands described Article 4.4 as potentially ‘one of
the more unusual, contentious, and perhaps costly, commitments in the Convention’
and that it ‘amounts to an implicit acceptance by developed State Parties of
responsibility for causing climate change’.90
A legal claim under Article 4.4 must be based on the premise that the claimant State
is ‘particularly vulnerable’ to the adverse effects of climate change. The preamble
provides that the Parties recognise that ‘low-lying and other small island countries,
countries with low-lying coastal, arid and semi-arid areas or areas liable to floods,
drought and desertification, and developing countries with fragile mountainous
ecosystems are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change’. The
preamble is not operative and can only be used as an interpretive aid. 91 However, as
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an interpretive aid, this description may support a claimant State that falls within the
prescribed categories. Further guidance may be sought from Article 4.8, which
provides categories of States that Parties shall give full consideration in the
implementation of commitments under the Article 4.92
The Parties have agreed that in order to implement the article, it is necessary to identify
particularly vulnerable Parties.93 Without further clarification by the Parties, the term
‘particularly vulnerable’ may be difficult to resolve in the context of a legal claim.
Yamin suggests that a list of particularly vulnerable States should be negotiated. She
further argues that the international community has accepted SIDS as particularly
vulnerable.94 Both of these are reasonable arguments. Further guidance from the COP
through a list of particularly vulnerable States would greatly aid the implementation
of Article 4.4. Further, it is clear that SIDS are universally regarded as particularly
vulnerable to the effects of climate change.
The fact that the Parties have not created a list of particularly vulnerable States may
indicate that the Parties have agreed not to implement Article 4.4. The potential
claimant States are all a part of the COP. Although the COP has recognised that a list
of particularly vulnerable States is required to implement Article 4.4, the COP has
declined to do so. It may be argued that although Article 4.4 establishes a financial
obligation, the practice of the Parties indicates that they have moved away from the
plain meaning of the article. On the other hand, the climate change negotiations around
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adaptation have been ongoing and particularly vexed. A more likely reason that Article
4.4 has not been implemented is that the Parties have struggled to reach consensus on
how or when to implement it.
As described in Chapters 1 and 2, the phrase ‘adverse effects of climate change’ is
defined in Article 1 of the UNFCCC.95 Importantly, this definition contains a threshold
(‘significant deleterious effects’). Thus, a claimant State would need to establish that
the damage that is the subject of its claim is ‘significant’. As was described in Chapter
2, reports by the IPCC on vulnerabilities could be used to clarify what types of effects
are significant. A potential claim under Article 4.4 would be strengthened by relying
upon one of these vulnerabilities (e.g. widespread bleaching of coral reefs, broad
ecosystem impacts with limited adaptive capacity and an increase of persons- at-risk
of water shortage in vulnerable regions).
An interesting feature of Article 4.4 is that it is not linked to the GEF. As a result, the
commitment to provide financial support under Article 4.4 has not been implemented
through the GEF or any other method. This raises the issue of whether Annex II Parties
can rely upon the GEF to fulfil their financial obligations set out under the UNFCCC.
It may be argued that the implementation of Article 4.3 under the GEF cannot be relied
upon to satisfy the financial obligation contained in Article 4.4. Article 4.3 and Article
4.4 establish two clearly distinct financial obligations relating to adaptation. Yet, a
respondent State could persuasively argue that the Parties have utilised the GEF to
fund adaptation activities and that this is sufficient to meet the obligation in Article
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UNFCCC, art 1:
‘changes in the physical environment or biota resulting from climate change which have significant
deleterious effects on the composition, resilience, or productivity of natural or managed ecosystems or
on the operation of socio-economic systems or on human health and welfare.’
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4.4. Furthermore, some States have provided funding for adaptation to the costs of
climate change outside of the GEF funding mechanisms through bilateral and other
multilateral avenues. For instance, Article 12.8 of the Kyoto Protocol establishes
adaptation funding and partly mirrors the language used in Article 4.4 (see Chapter 4).
This may be sufficient to meet the obligation contained in Article 4.4.
A claimant State would face the added difficulty of ambiguity in the term ‘assist’. The
article does not specify if ‘assist’ refers to financial assistance/costs or if it may
encompass other forms of assistance. Furthermore, it does not provide that the
developed State Parties commit to provide full assistance rather than some partial form
of assistance. Verheyen suggested that the wording of Article 4.4 implies that not all
the costs of adaptation would need to be met, and instead ‘assist’ may constitute any
support provided, even if it is small compared with the overall costs.96 In contrast,
Larson argued that this ambiguity may assist a claimant State because it does not place
a cap upon contributions required under the article.97 However, it is unlikely that an
international tribunal would interpret the term ‘assist’ so broadly. It is far more
reasonable to assume that a tribunal would find that some level of assistance is
required, thus aiding the case of respondent States that have provided some assistance.
It is also important to note that Article 4.4 uses indefinite wording (‘meeting costs of
adaptation’) rather than definite (e.g. ‘meeting the costs of adaptation’). Since Article
4.4 lacks specificity in identifying the appropriate level of assistance required,
ultimately it may be found that a breach of the obligation only occurs where no
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assistance has been rendered.98 Moreover, States seeking assistance for adaptation
under Article 4.4 would likely face difficulties in proving causation.99 Overlap
between other drivers and the need to adapt to climate change is likely to make it
difficult to prove that a particular cost incurred by a State is due to climate change
adaptation.
In conclusion, Article 4.4 sets out an obligation for Annex II Parties to assist
particularly vulnerable developing State Parties in adapting to the adverse effects of
climate change. While some developing States would fairly easily fall within the
category of ‘particularly vulnerable’, the wording of this article suggests that a breach
would only occur where no assistance has been rendered. The article vaguely provides
that Annex II Parties must ‘assist’ those particularly vulnerable Parties, and only for
‘meeting costs of adaptation’. Therefore, Article 4.4 provides little scope for potential
claimant States seeking recourse for climate change damage.
(e) Obligation to give full consideration to necessary actions (Article 4.8)
Finally, Article 4.8 requires the Parties to give full consideration to necessary actions
under the UNFCCC to meet the specific needs and concerns of developing States
arising from the adverse effects of climate change and/or the impact of the
implementation of response measures.100 In Article 1.1 of the UNFCCC, ‘adverse
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‘In the implementation of the commitments in this Article, the Parties shall give full consideration to
what actions are necessary under the Convention, including actions related to funding, insurance and
the transfer of technology, to meet the specific needs and concerns of developing country Parties arising
from the adverse effects of climate change and/or the impact of the implementation of response
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effects’ are defined as any changes which have significant deleterious effects on
human and natural systems, human health or welfare. Theoretically, a State may claim
that a respondent State has failed to meet its obligation under this article by failing to
give full consideration to the adverse effects of climate change.
The immediate challenge for claimant States is the question of what ‘full
consideration’ means. The Macquarie Dictionary defines ‘consideration’ as, among
other things, ‘thoughtful or sympathetic regard or respect’.101 Thus, ‘full
consideration’ likely refers to a degree of thoughtful or sympathetic regard of the needs
of developing States that is comprehensive. In practice, such an obligation appears to
require no more of the Parties beyond such contemplation. There is no requirement for
specific conduct or for the achievement of any particular result. As observed by
Durrant, such ambiguity can provide ‘a significant barrier to cohesive implementation,
exacerbating transaction costs associated with compliance and making allegations of
violation more difficult to prove.’102
One issue is whether this is a collective obligation. The article initially refers to ‘the
Parties’ and the final sentence refers to the ‘Conference of the Parties’. This choice of
wording indicates that the obligation contained in Article 4.8 is imposed upon the COP

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)

Small island countries;
Countries with low-lying coastal areas;
Countries with arid and semi-arid areas, forested areas and areas liable to forest decay;
Countries with areas prone to natural disasters;
Countries with areas liable to drought and desertification;
Countries with areas of high urban atmospheric pollution;
Countries with areas with fragile ecosystems, including mountainous ecosystems;
Countries whose economies are highly dependent on income generated from the production,
processing and export, and/or consumption of fossil fuels and associated energy-intensive
products; and
(i) Landlocked and transit countries.
Further, the Conference of the Parties may take actions, as appropriate, with respect to this
paragraph.’ (emphasis added)
101
Macquarie Dictionary, above n 9, 257.
102
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as a whole rather than any individual Party. Therefore, an argument alleging breach of
Article 4.8 would probably need to be directed at decisions of the COP rather than the
acts or omissions of any particular Party. Such an argument would need to show that
the COP has failed to consider actions necessary to meet the specific needs and
concerns of developing States from the impacts of climate change in the making of
some decision.
Therefore, Article 4.8 creates an obligation for the COP to give full consideration to
actions that are necessary under the UNFCCC to meet the concerns of developing State
Parties. The article does not provide scope for a claimant State suffering climate
change damage principally because it only requires that the COP give ‘full
consideration’ (or thoughtful regard) to its concerns. Such an obligation would be easy
to meet making it difficult to prove a breach.
(f) Conclusions on adaptation
The UNFCCC contains three obligations relating to adaptation assistance. The analysis
in this section has found that none of these obligations provide a viable avenue for
claimant States over climate change damage (see Table 3-3 below). Article 4.3 creates
an obligation for Annex II Parties to provide financial resources to developing States
to meet the agreed full incremental costs of preparing for adaptation. Article 4.3
provides some scope for a claimant State that would need to show that it has incurred
additional costs in an environmental project due to adaptation.
Under Article 4.4, Annex II Parties are obliged to assist particularly vulnerable
developing State Parties in adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change.
Although some developing States, such as SIDS, would easily meet the category of
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‘particularly vulnerable’, the wording of Article 4.4 suggests that a breach would only
occur where no assistance has been provided. All developing State Parties have
received some assistance for adapting to climate change and the fact that such
assistance has not been specifically provided through an implementation of Article 4.4
is unlikely to prevent a developed state from relying upon such assistance in its
defence.
Finally, the COP is obliged under Article 4.8 to give full consideration to actions
necessary under the UNFCCC to meet the concerns of developing State Parties. Yet,
this article only requires that the COP provide ‘full consideration’ (or thoughtful
regard) to the concerns of these Parties. This obligation does not provide any scope for
a claimant.
Table 3-3 Sources of exposure to legal risk from the obligations to assist in
adaptation in the UNFCCC
Obligation
Obligation to provide financial
resources to meet the agreed full
incremental cost of preparing for
adaptation
Obligation to assist in adaptation to
the adverse effects of climate change

Article
Article 4.3

Conclusion
Some exposure. Depends upon
proof of ‘incremental costs’.

Article 4.4

Obligation to give full consideration
to necessary actions

Article 4.8

Very low exposure. A breach would
only occur where no assistance has
been provided.
No exposure. Only requires the
COP to provide ‘full consideration’
to the concerns of developing State
Parties.

C. Dispute settlement in the UNFCCC
This section now turns to the dispute settlement procedures provided in the UNFCCC.
The UNFCCC contains two approaches to the resolution of disputes. The first
approach is provided in Article 13, in which the COP is directed to ‘consider the
establishment of a multilateral consultative process … for the resolution of questions
regarding the implementation of the Convention’. The COP was directed to consider
the establishment of this process at its first session. COP-1 established an Ad Hoc
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Group on Article 13 (AG13) to establish this process. However, the effort was
unsuccessful and a multilateral consultative process has not been established under
Article 13.103 Although this process has not been established, the proposal reflected an
interest by the Parties in multilateral, non-adversarial dispute resolution. This approach
is reflective of the global nature of climate change and the reality that non-compliance
would be an issue of collective, rather than bilateral, concern.
The second approach in relation to disputes under the UNFCCC is set out in Article
14. This approach is more reflective of traditional bilateral dispute resolution. Article
14 provides a number of methods for the resolution of disputes through this bilateral
approach. These are (1) negotiation and other peaceful means of dispute settlement
(Article 14.1); (2) submission of the dispute to the ICJ (Article 14.2); (3) arbitration in
accordance with procedures to be adopted by the COP (Article 14.2) and (4)
submission of the dispute to conciliation (Article 14.5). Referral to the ICJ or to
arbitration may be done unilaterally; however, this is provided that each of the Parties
concerned has made a prospective declaration accepting that particular forum. After
12 months, if the Parties have been unable to resolve the dispute using these methods,
then any of the Parties involved may submit the dispute to conciliation in accordance
with Article 14.5.104 Article 14.7 provides that additional procedures relating to
conciliation shall be adopted by the COP and Article 14.2 calls upon the COP to adopt
procedures relating to arbitration.
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Despite the inclusion of these dispute resolution measures in the UNFCCC, no States
have made declarations accepting binding jurisdiction of the ICJ under Article 14.105
In addition, the COP has not established arbitration or conciliation procedures.106 Thus,
the dispute settlement procedures set out in the UNFCCC do not provide appropriate
forums for making a claim regarding climate change damage. This raises the issue of
whether the ICJ could still have jurisdiction over disputes concerning the UNFCCC.
The ICJ Statute provides that jurisdiction by the ICJ can be established by mutual
agreement (Article 36.1); where the States have accepted jurisdiction under the
optional clause (Article 36.2); and finally where the treaty concerned specifically
provides for ICJ jurisdiction (Article 36.1). As discussed above, this final method does
not apply to the UNFCCC. The first method, mutual agreement, is unlikely to apply
as a respondent State would have little interest in agreeing to referral to the ICJ.
However, it is possible that the second method could apply to a dispute under the
UNFCCC. This would apply where the States concerned have consented to the
jurisdiction of the ICJ under the optional clause jurisdiction or under other acceptance
arrangements.
As of 7 July 2012, 67 States had made declarations accepting the ICJ jurisdiction under
the optional clause. However, many of these States have entered reservations with their
declaration of acceptance (see Table 3-4 below).107 Eighteen States have entered a
reservation that provides the declaration will not apply if the other Party has only

Andrew Strauss, ‘Climate Change Litigation: Opening the Door to the ICJ’ in William C G Burns
and Hari M Osofsky (eds), Adjudicating Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2009), 343.
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<http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3&code=JP> accessed 7 July 2012.
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accepted the ICJ jurisdiction under the optional clause within 12 months of the dispute,
which could apply if the claimant State has not yet accepted the ICJ jurisdiction.
Thirty-nine States have entered reservations that their acceptance does not encompass
disputes which the Parties have agreed to settle by other means of peaceful settlement.
These reservations are potentially a barrier to establishing the jurisdiction of the ICJ
in an international climate case.
Table 3-4 Summary of declarations and reservations accepting ICJ compulsory
jurisdiction under the optional clause
State

Australia
Austria
Barbados
Belgium
Botswana
Bulgaria
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Costa Rica
Cote d’Ivoire
Cyprus
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Denmark
Djibouti
Dominica, Republic of
Dominican Republic
Egypt
Estonia
Finland
Gambia
Georgia
Germany
Greece
Guinea, Republic of
Guinea-Bissau
Haiti
Honduras
Hungary
India
Ireland
Japan
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia

Not if the Parties have
agreed to another
means of dispute
settlement
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Reservations
Not less than 12
months
from
acceptance by the
other Party
Yes

Other

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
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Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Liechtenstein
Luxembourg
Madagascar
Malawi
Malta
Mauritius
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Norway
Pakistan
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Senegal
Slovakia
Somalia
Spain
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Togo
Uganda
United Kingdom
Uruguay

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes

Strauss argued that:
While the system envisaged in Article 14 would seem to constitute other means of peaceful
settlement, the fact that no Party has opted into Article 14 ICJ jurisdiction, and that neither the
procedures for arbitration nor conciliation called for by Article 14 have ever been adopted by
the Parties, could be interpreted to mean there is, in fact, no final or implementable agreement
providing for an other means of peaceful settlement under the Parties’ reservations. 108

Strauss, ‘Climate Change Litigation’, above n 105, 343. Supporting such a restrictive reading of a
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Support for Strauss’ interpretation may be found in the negotiation history concerning
Article 14 of the UNFCCC. In particular, the Working Group II Co-Chairs ‘suggested
the possibility of compulsory arbitration if Parties that have not accepted the
jurisdiction of the … [ICJ] are unable to resolve a dispute through negotiation or
conciliation.109 This history shows that the conciliation and arbitration procedures
proposed in Article 14 were envisaged to provide a means of peaceful settlement, but
that the opportunity to accept ICJ jurisdiction under Article 14.2 was directed at States
that had not already accepted ICJ jurisdiction under the optional clause. On the other
hand, it could be contended that the fact that Article 14.1 also provides for negotiation
and other peaceful means of dispute resolution is sufficient to trigger this category of
reservation.
In addition, some of the other reservations made by States accepting the ICJ’s
compulsory jurisdiction could act to prevent a case. For example, Pakistan has entered
a reservation that its acceptance will not apply to disputes arising under a multilateral
treaty process unless all Parties to the treaty are also Party to the dispute or Pakistan
specially agrees to the ICJ’s jurisdiction.110 Slovakia’s acceptance does not apply to
any disputes with regard to the protection of the environment 111 and the United
Kingdom’s acceptance does not apply to any dispute with the government of any other
State ‘which is or has been a Member of the Commonwealth’.112
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In conclusion, there is little scope to bring a case under the UNFCCC dispute
resolution procedures. No States have made declarations accepting binding
jurisdiction of the ICJ under Article 14. The COP has not established any arbitration
or conciliation procedures. The only scope for a case to be heard is through Article 36
of the ICJ Statute, which is through mutual agreement; acceptance of jurisdiction under
the optional clause; or where the treaty provides for ICJ jurisdiction. The greatest
potential is where the Parties have accepted the ICJ jurisdiction under the optional
clause or other agreement, although reservations may act as barriers. The findings of
this section in relation to legal exposure from the dispute settlement procedures for the
UNFCCC are summarised in Table 3-5 below.
Table 3-5 Exposure to legal risk from dispute settlement procedures for the
UNFCCC
Avenue
Multilateral
consultative
process
Negotiation and other peaceful
means of dispute settlement
Submission of the dispute to the
ICJ

Authority
Article 13

Conclusion
No exposure. Process has not been established.

Article 14.1

No exposure. Negotiations are not binding.

Article 14.2

Arbitration in accordance with
procedures adopted by the COP
Submission of the dispute to
conciliation
Submission to the ICJ by
mutual agreement
Submission to the ICJ where
States
have
accepted
jurisdiction under the optional
clause
Submission to the ICJ where
the
treaty
concerned
specifically provides for ICJ
jurisdiction

Article 14.2

No exposure. No Parties have made
declarations accepting binding jurisdiction of
the ICJ under Article 14.2.
No exposure. The COP has not established
arbitration procedures.
No exposure. The COP has not established
conciliation procedures.
No exposure. It is unlikely that a respondent
State would agree to referral.
Some exposure. Reservations could prevent
jurisdiction (e.g. disputes to which the Parties
have agreed to settle by other means of
peaceful settlement).
Some exposure. The Parties may have accepted
the jurisdiction of the ICJ through some other
arrangement.

Article 14.5
Article 36.1, ICJ
Statute
Article 36.2, ICJ
Statute

Article 36.1, ICJ
Statute

D. Conclusions
In conclusion, the obligations held by Annex I Parties to mitigate greenhouse gas
emissions and assist developing State Parties adapt to the effects of climate change
provide little to no exposure to international climate litigation. Article 4.2 provides an
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elastic commitment for Annex I Parties to take mitigation action in accordance with
their differential circumstances. It does not require Annex I Parties to return emissions
to 1990 levels by the year 2000 or for Annex I Parties to modify their long-term trends
of greenhouse gas emissions because the language does not provide for such
obligations. Its flexible language only requires Annex I Parties to take the lead in
modifying long term trends of GHG emissions. Article 4.1(b) is similarly flexible and
contains no targets or timetables for mitigation action.
The adaptation obligations found in Articles 4.3 and 4.4 provide very low exposure to
legal risk for climate change damage. Article 4.3 establishes an obligation for Annex
II Parties to provide financial resources to meet the agreed full incremental cost of
preparing for adaptation. Article 4.3 provides some scope for a developing State to
bring a case to recover funds for adaptation costs. Article 4.4 requires Annex II Parties
to assist in adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change yet a breach would only
occur where no assistance has been provided. Finally, the vague commitment in Article
4.8 simply requires the COP to provide ‘full consideration’ to the concerns of
developing State Parties.
Furthermore, the UNFCCC’s dispute settlement procedures offer little recourse for
potential claimant States. No States have made declarations accepting the binding
jurisdiction of the ICJ under Article 14 and the COP has not established any arbitration
or conciliation procedures. There is some scope for a matter to be heard by the ICJ if
jurisdiction can be established under Article 36 of the ICJ Statute where the Parties
have accepted the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction under the optional clause. However,
a respondent State’s reservation to its acceptance may act to prevent jurisdiction.
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KYOTO PROTOCOL
A. Overview
In this chapter, the Kyoto Protocol is examined as a possible source of legal risk for
climate change damage.1 The purpose of this chapter is to assess whether the
commitments contained in the Kyoto Protocol and its associated dispute resolution
mechanisms provide a realistic avenue for international climate litigation. Particular
focus is given to the Quantitative Emission Limitation and Reduction Obligations
(QELROs) which provide each Annex I Party with a greenhouse gas emission
allowance that they must meet in the first commitment period 2008-2012. Collectively,
the emission limitations and reductions are meant to add up to a 5% reduction in
aggregate greenhouse gas emissions compared with 1990 levels in the first
commitment period (2008-2012). Furthermore, the Kyoto Protocol compliance system
presents unique issues as both a possible forum for disputes but also as a potential
barrier to claimant States seeking to bring interstate disputes.
Section B examines the commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, focusing upon the
QELROs, as a possible source of exposure to legal risk for climate change damage
(see Table 4-1 below). This section also examines the reporting obligations contained
in the Kyoto Protocol. Section C assesses issues of compliance and enforcement. This
section examines the emergence of the Kyoto Protocol compliance system and its key
components, including the Enforcement Branch. It also considers the legal status of
the compliance system. This section assesses the potential for legal disputes both

1

Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 15 March
1998, 37 ILM 22 (entered into force 16 February 2005) [hereinafter ‘Kyoto Protocol’].
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within and outside of the Kyoto Protocol compliance system around the Kyoto
Protocol obligations. Finally, Section D summarises the key findings of the chapter.
Table 4-1 Obligations in the Kyoto Protocol that may provide legal exposure
Article

Description

Article 3.1

The Parties shall, individually or jointly, ensure that their greenhouse gas
emissions listed in Annex A do not exceed their assigned amounts provided
in Annex B in the period 2008 to 2012.

Article 3.2

The Parties will have made demonstrable progress in achieving their
commitments.

Article 12.8

The MOP is required to ensure that a share of proceeds from certified project
activities is used to assist developing States Parties that are particularly
vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change meet the costs of
adaptation.

B. Commitments under the Kyoto Protocol
1. Quantitative Emission Limitation and Reduction Obligations (QELROs)
The commitments under the Kyoto Protocol provide a broad range of mitigation
options along with a firm mitigation commitment. The mitigation commitment
contained in the QELROs is designed to strengthen the general mitigation duties found
in the UNFCCC.2 Article 3.1 of the Kyoto Protocol provides this mitigation obligation
and states that the QELROs are meant to add up to an aggregate reduction of 5%
compared with 1990 levels in the first commitment period 2008-2012.3
The individual State targets are contained in Annex B. Some Parties have committed
to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions (e.g. the European Community agreed to a

2

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 9 May 1992, 1771
UNTS 107, 165 (entered into force 21 March 1994) [hereinafter ‘UNFCCC’].
3
Article 3.1: ‘The Parties included in Annex I shall, individually or jointly, ensure that their
aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex
A do not exceed their assigned amounts, calculated pursuant to their quantified emission limitation and
reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B and in accordance with the provisions of this Article, with
a view to reducing their overall emissions of such gases by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels in the
commitment period 2008 to 2012.’
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QELRO of 92%); whereas other Parties are allowed to increase their emissions but
only to a certain level (e.g. Australia’s QELRO target is 108%). These QELRO targets
present a high level of exposure to legal risk for any Parties that breach their
commitment. The combination of a specific individual target and a definite time period
make this obligation amenable to interstate disputes.
Parties may meet their QELRO through domestic mitigation activities and/or through
mitigation activities that occur elsewhere through the flexible mechanisms which are
comprised of: international emissions trading (Article 17), Joint Implementation
(Article 6) (‘JI’) and the Clean Development Mechanism (Article 12) (‘CDM’).
Each Annex I Party was assigned a quantity of Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) at the
beginning of the first commitment period. The AAUs were calculated in accordance
with each Party’s permitted level of emissions. One AAU equals one tonne of carbon
dioxide equivalent. Annex I Parties are able to sell or buy AAUs through the
international emissions trading mechanism4 or create additional allowances through
the CDM or JI mechanism. Under the CDM, Annex I Parties may fund emission
reduction projects in developed States that are Parties to the Kyoto Protocol.5 In
contrast, the JI mechanism provides a means for Annex I Parties to fund emission
reduction projects in developed States that are Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, such as
States with economies in transition.6 Thus, the CDM relates to developed-todeveloping State projects whereas the JI mechanism relates to developed-to-developed
State projects.

4

Kyoto Protocol, art 17.
Kyoto Protocol, art 12.
6
Kyoto Protocol, art 6.
5
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In meeting their QELROs, Annex I Parties may rely upon the flexibility mechanisms
provided that this reliance is supplemental to domestic emissions reductions.7 The
COP has declared that domestic emission reductions must constitute a ‘significant
element’ of the reductions achieved by Parties in meeting their QELROs. However,
the meaning of ‘significant element’ has not been clarified.8 The term ‘significant’ is
defined in the Macquarie Dictionary as referring to ‘important; of consequence.’9
Thus, it appears that domestic emission reductions must play an important role in a
Party’s emissions cuts.
While the QELRO targets are enforceable, they are not necessarily adequate to meet
the challenge of climate change. Research by the World Resource Institute found that
the COP6bis and COP7 decisions which allowed Parties to count a higher amount of
sinks towards their QELROs led to the overall mitigation target being 1.9%.10 The
term ‘sink’ is defined in the UNFCCC to mean ‘any process, activity or mechanism
which removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from
the atmosphere.’11 Common examples include afforestation, reforestation and the

Kyoto Protocol, arts 6, 17. Article 17 provides that ‘Any such trading shall be supplemental to domestic
actions for the purpose of meeting quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under that
Article.’ Article 6.1(d) provides that ‘The acquisition of emission reduction units shall be supplemental
to domestic actions for the purposes of meeting commitments under Article 3.’
8
COP, Decision 15/CP.7 Marrakesh Accords: Principles, Nature and Scope of the Mechanisms
Pursuant to Articles 6, 12 and 17 of the Kyoto Protocol (FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2).
9
Macquarie Australian Encyclopedic Dictionary (Sydney: Macquarie University, 2006) [herein
‘Macquarie Dictionary’], 1113.
10
World Resource Institute, How much will the Kyoto Protocol reduce emissions?, graph based on data
by the US Department of Energy, International Energy Outlook 1998 and 1999, <http//www.wri.org>
accessed 21 January 2012.
11
UNFCCC, art 1.8 (Definitions).
7
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tackling of deforestation.12 In addition, other research shows that with full compliance
the Kyoto Protocol will only give a 1% reduction in GHG emissions.13
Even if the aggregate target of 5% were fulfilled, this would have little or no impact
on climate change damage in the medium to long-term. Verheyen argued that if applied
to all Annex I States, the Kyoto Protocol QELROs represent a stabilisation of
greenhouse gas emissions at 1996 levels by 2012.14 The inadequacy of the QELROS
in stabilising greenhouse gas concentrations has also been recognised by vulnerable
Parties, such as SIDS. For example, the Governments of the Cook Islands, Nuie and
Nauru have declared that:
…in light of the best available scientific information and assessment on climate change
impacts, [they] consider the emissions reduction obligation in Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol
to be inadequate to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. 15

On the other hand, Article 3.9 makes clear that the Kyoto Protocol has been designed
to develop and bring about greater emission reductions beyond the first commitment
period.16 The Kyoto Protocol was never intended to resolve the problem of climate
change, but rather provide the first binding emissions reduction obligations upon

12

UNFCCC, Issues in the Negotiating Process: Land use, land-use change and forestry under the Kyoto
Protocol: Carbon “sinks”, <http://unfccc.int/cop6/issues/111.html> accessed 27 May 2012.
13
David G Victor, ‘Toward effective international cooperation on climate change: numbers, interests
and institutions’ (2006) 6 Global Environmental Politics 90, 91; David G Victor, Joshua C House and
Sarah Joy, ‘A Madisonian approach to climate policy’ (2005) 309 Science 1820, 1821. See also George
Monbiot, Heat: How to stop the planet burning (London: Allen Lane, 2006), 16.
14
Roda Verheyen, Climate Change Damage and International Law: Prevention Duties and State
Responsibility (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005), 111.
15
Declarations by the Governments of the Cook Islands, Niue, Nauru. See Kyoto Protocol, status of
ratification <http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/5424.php> accessed 2 March
2011.
16
Kyoto Protocol, art 3.9: ‘9. Commitments for subsequent periods for Parties included in Annex I shall
be established in amendments to Annex B to this Protocol, which shall be adopted in accordance with
the provisions of Article 21, paragraph 7. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the
Parties to this Protocol shall initiate the consideration of such commitments at least seven years before
the end of the first commitment period referred to in paragraph 1 above.’
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which additional obligation could be built. Although the Parties began negotiations for
this purpose in 2005, there have been no agreements under the Kyoto Protocol for
subsequent commitment periods. Overall, QELROs present the strongest source of
exposure to legal risk for climate change damage within the climate regime.
2. Demonstrable progress
Article 3.2 further provides that by 2005, Annex I Parties will have made
‘demonstrable progress’ in achieving their commitments under the Kyoto Protocol.17
This commitment was not enforced.18 However, it is unclear what this means and it
would be difficult to show a breach of this obligation. This commitment may be
difficult to enforce except in the most extreme of examples.
3. Adaptation Fund
Article 12.8 of the Kyoto Protocol provides for the establishment of adaptation funding
derived from ‘a share of proceeds’ from certified project activities.19 The adaptation
funding is to be provided to States that are ‘particularly vulnerable to the adverse
effects of climate change’. This is the same language used in Article 4.4 of the
UNFCCC and may mean that the obligation contained in Article 4.4 has been
implemented through the Kyoto Protocol.
The Bonn Agreement, which was reached at COP6bis, provides that ‘2% of the
certified emissions reductions issued’ shall be the share of proceeds ‘to assist

Kyoto Protocol, art 3.2 provides that ‘Each Party included in Annex I shall, by 2005, have made
demonstrable progress in achieving its commitments under this Protocol.’
18
Nicola Durrant, Legal Responses to Climate Change (Sydney: The Federation Press, 2010), 42.
19
Kyoto Protocol, art 12(8): ‘The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this
Protocol shall ensure that a share of the proceeds from certified project activities is used to cover
administrative expenses as well as to assist developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable
to the adverse effects of climate change to meet the costs of adaptation.’
17
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developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable.’20 CDM projects in least
developed States Parties are exempt from this levy. The Kyoto Protocol Adaptation
Fund has been established to receive the share of proceeds and voluntary contributions
by Parties in order to finance projects and programs to help developing States adapt to
the negative effects of climate change.21 As mentioned in Chapter 3, the Adaptation
Fund is administered by the GEF but supervised and managed by the Adaptation Fund
Board.22
In total, US$115 million have been pledged to the Adaptation Fund with US$16.9
million disbursed.23 Most of the funding has come from Spain, Sweden, the UK and
Germany.24 It is expected that available funding will grow to US$353 million by the
end of December 2012 as a result of the Certified Emission Reduction Certificate
Pool.25 The Adaptation Fund is currently under review which will be concluded at
CMP 8 (November – December 2012).26
It is unlikely that Article 12.8 could be used as the basis of an interstate dispute. The
obligation is placed upon the MOP and only requires that a ‘share of proceeds’ from
certified project activities is used to assist developing States Parties that are
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change meet the costs of

20

Implementation of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action, FCCC/CP/2001/L.7.
Adaptation Fund, <http://www.adaptation-fund.org/> accessed 27 May 2012.
22
Adaptation Fund, About the Adaptation Fund, <http://www.adaptation-fund.org/about> accessed 27
May 2012.
23
Climate Funds Update, Adaptation Fund < http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/listing/adaptationfund/> accessed 20 June 2012.
24
Ibid.
25
COP/MOP, Report of the Adaptation Fund Board: Addendum: Review of the Interim
Arrangements of the Adaptation Fund, FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/6/Add.1, 22 November 2011, 5.
26
UNFCCC,
Adaptation
Fund
<
http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/adaptation_fund/items/3659.php>
accessed 20 June 2012.
21
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adaptation. In fact, it appears that the Bonn Agreement and its implementation are
sufficient to ensure that this obligation is met.
4. Reporting obligations
Articles 5 and 7 of the Kyoto Protocol impose upon Parties commitments to establish
national systems for estimating their greenhouse gas emissions and removals by sinks
and to submit regular National Communications detailing those estimates. Submitting
those National Communications is a requirement for trading in the international
climate market. The information provided is used to monitor the progress of Parties in
achieving implementation of the QELROs and other commitments. Under Article 7.1,
the Annex I Parties are required to submit an annual inventory that incorporates the
‘necessary supplemental information’ to determine compliance with Article 3. Article
7.2 provides that the Annex I Parties must submit their national communications every
5 years and include the ‘supplementary information necessary to demonstrate
compliance’ with commitments under the Kyoto Protocol.
The plenary of the Compliance Committee has highlighted that a number of Parties
had not submitted their National Communications in a timely manner, with some
Parties being more than 20 months late with their submissions.27 However, it is
unlikely that these reporting requirements would be the focus of an interstate dispute
because the obligation does not directly relate to mitigation or adaptation. This would
make it difficult to link the obligations to climate change damage.

27

UNFCCC, Compliance Committee Facilitative Branch: Fifth Meeting: Report on the Meeting
(CC/FB/5/2007/2, 6 September 2007, Bonn), ‘Other Matters’. COP/MOP, CMP.3: Annual Report of
the Compliance Committee to the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the
Kyoto Protocol (FCCC/KP/CMP/2007/6, 26 September 2007) at III, [22]. See also COP/MOP, Decision
5/CMP.3: Compliance under the Kyoto Protocol (FCCC/KP/CMP/9/Add.1).
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The findings in relation to exposure from the Kyoto Protocol obligations are
summarised in Table 4-2 below.
Table 4-2: Sources of exposure to legal risk from obligations in the Kyoto Protocol
Obligation
The Annex I Parties shall,
individually or jointly, ensure
that their greenhouse gas
emissions listed in Annex A do
not exceed their assigned
amounts provided in Annex B
in the period 2008 to 2012.
The Parties will have made
demonstrable
progress
in
achieving their commitments
by 2005.
The MOP is required to ensure
that a share of proceeds from
certified project activities is
used to assist developing States
Parties that are particularly
vulnerable to the adverse
effects of climate change meet
the costs of adaptation

Article
Article 3.1

Conclusion
High exposure. This commitment provides a
specific target for each Annex I Party to be
achieved in the period 2008 to 2012.

Article 3.2

Low exposure. Lacks specifity.

Article 12.8

Low exposure. The Bonn Agreement
provides that 2% of certified emissions
reductions issues shall be the share of
proceeds. Funding is expected to grow to
US$353 million by the end of 2012 as a result
of these proceeds.

C. Compliance and Enforcement
The second dimension to determine exposure to legal risk under the Kyoto Protocol is
to consider its dispute resolution mechanisms and the potential for interstate disputes
both within and outside of these mechanisms. The compliance regime was one of the
last aspects of the Kyoto Protocol framework to be negotiated by States Parties.28 The
Kyoto Protocol compliance system originates with Article 18.29 This article was

Jacob Werksman, ‘The Negotiation of a Kyoto Compliance System’ in Jon Hovi, Olav Stokke and
Geir Ulfstein (eds), Implementing the Climate Regime: International Compliance (London: Earthscan,
2005), 17.
29
Kyoto Protocol, Decision 27/CMP.1: Procedures and Mechanisms Relating to Compliance, 1 st MOP,
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add 3 (2006); René Lefeber, ‘From the Hague to Bonn to Marrakesh and
Beyond: A Negotiating History of the Compliance Regime under the Kyoto Protocol’ (2001) Hague
Yearbook of International Law 25; Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘The Kyoto Protocol Compliance Regime
and Treaty Law’ (2004) 8 Singapore Yearbook of International Law 23; Jon Hovi, Olav Stokke and
Geir Ulfstein (eds), Implementing the Climate Regime: International Compliance (London: Earthscan,
2005), 39ff.
Kyoto Protocol, art 18: ‘The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this
Protocol shall, at its first session, approve appropriate and effective procedures and mechanisms to
determine and to address cases of non-compliance with the provisions of this Protocol, including
through the development of an indicative list of consequences, taking into account the cause, type,
28
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included in the Kyoto Protocol in recognition that a strong compliance system was
required, despite the fact that the Parties had not yet agreed on what shape that
compliance system would take. The phrase ‘compliance system’ refers to a set of rules,
institutions and procedures to facilitate, enhance and promote enforcement with
commitments.30
As described in Chapter 2, the Buenos Aires Programme of Action (BAPA)31 was
adopted at COP-4 and set an agenda for the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol
including the compliance system. The Bonn Agreement was reached at COP-6 which
set out the political agreement of Parties as to what should be included in the
compliance system

including

its

objectives, principles,

consequences

for

noncompliance and avenues for appeals. The task of negotiators at COP-7 was to
transform the political agreement represented in the Bonn Agreement into procedures,
institutions and mechanisms with legal consequences.
Most of the Annex I States supported the establishment of a strong and effective
compliance system that included an enforcement action. However, there were key
differences between the US and the EU. The US wanted clearly defined penalties
enforced against emitters in an automatic and predictable manner whereas the EU
favoured a case-by-case approach that included hearings and judgments rather than an
automatic application of consequences for non-compliance.32 The US approach was
primarily motivated by the need for a compliance system that would support the
market through providing clear and predictable outcomes for non-compliance,

degree and frequency of non-compliance. Any procedures and mechanisms under this Article entailing
binding consequences shall be adopted by means of an amendment to this Protocol.’
30
Werksman, above n 28, 17.
31
For a full history of the negotiations regarding the compliance regime, see ibid.
32
Werksman, above n 28.
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whereas the EU desired more flexibility. In contrast, Australia joined Japan and the
Russian Federation on the ‘fringe’ of the negotiations and rejected the need for an
intrusive enforcement system and called for non-binding consequences.33
Non-Annex I States sought two key elements in the compliance system. They sought
geographic representation upon all the institutions of the compliance system (including
the Enforcement Branch) and they wanted financial penalties to be included as a
consequence of non-compliance.34 Ultimately, the non-Annex I States dropped the
concept of financial penalties in exchange for regional geographic representation on
the Compliance Committee and Enforcement Branch.35 The Marrakesh Accords
established the Compliance Committee, made up of the Facilitative Branch and
Enforcement Branch, to deal with compliance matters under the guidance of set
procedures that are quasi-judicial.36
1. Enforcement Branch
Matters of non-compliance may be referred to the Enforcement Branch by a Party or
any other Party, or by the Expert Review Teams (ERTs). The Enforcement Branch has
the power to determine whether a Party is in non-compliance with the Kyoto Protocol
commitments and enforcement consequences. The mandate of the Enforcement
Branch is set out in Table 4-3 below.

33

Ibid.
The concept of financial penalties was strongly resisted by the Umbrella Group. The Umbrella Group
is a loose coalition of States, usually consisting of Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the
Russian
Federation,
Ukraine
and
the
US.
UNFCCC,
Party
Groupings
<
http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/negotiating_groups/items/2714.php> accessed 5 July
2012.
35
This occurred at COP-6 Part 2.
36
Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, Part Two: Action Taken by the
Conference of Parties (herein the Marrakesh Accords), Vol. III, Decision 24/CP.7, at 65, section II. See
Tim Stephens, International Courts and Environmental Protection (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2009), 85.
34
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Table 4-3: Mandate of the Enforcement Branch
1.

2.

The Enforcement Branch shall determine whether a Party is in non-compliance with:
a. Its qualified emission limitation or reduction commitment under Article 3,
paragraph 1, of the Protocol, at the end of the first commitment period.
b. The methodological and reporting requirements under Article 5, paragraphs 1 and
2, and Article 7, paragraphs 1 and 4, of the Protocol, after the beginning of the
first commitment period.
c. The eligibility requirements for participation in the flexibility mechanisms under
Articles 6, 12 and 17 of the Protocol, after the beginning of the first commitment
period.
The Enforcement Branch shall also resolve disagreements between an ERT and the Party
concerned with respect to:
a. Adjustments to that Party’s national inventory, under Article 5, paragraph 2, of
the Protocol that have been proposed by the ERT.
b. Corrections to a Party’s compilation and accounting database concerning the
validity of a transaction under the Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms, which have
been proposed by the ERT.

The MOP elects the members of the Enforcement Branch and must be satisfied that
the members have ‘legal experience’.37 Parties accused of non-compliance have a right
to be represented before a hearing of the Enforcement Branch and a right to have access
to and respond to other information supplied to the Enforcement Branch.38 The
Enforcement Branch is to reach its decision by consensus. However, if this does not
occur, it may decide by a three-quarters majority, provided that there is a double
majority of both Annex I and non-Annex I Parties.39

The Enforcement Branch’s membership must include one member from each of the five regional
groups of the UN, one member from the small island developing States, two developed State members
(Annex I) and two developing State members (non-Annex I): COP/MOP, Decision 27/CMP.1,
Procedures and Mechanisms Relating to Compliance under the Kyoto Protocol. Annex: Procedures
and Mechanisms Relating to Compliance under the Kyoto Protocol (FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add 3),
section 5[1].
38
COP/MOP, Decision 27/CMP.1, Procedures and Mechanisms Relating to Compliance under the
Kyoto Protocol. Annex: Procedures and Mechanisms Relating to Compliance under the Kyoto Protocol
(FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add 3), 134, section 9; COP/MOP, Decision 4/CMP.1: Guidance to the
Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism. Annex 2: Procedures for Review as Referred
to in Paragraph 41 of the Clean Development Mechanism Modalities and Procedures
(FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add 1), section 10.
39
COP/MOP, Decision 27/CMP.1, Procedures and Mechanisms Relating to Compliance under the
Kyoto Protocol. Annex: Procedures and Mechanisms Relating to Compliance under the Kyoto Protocol
(FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add 3), section 2[9].
37
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The compliance system includes a set of procedures designed to provide Parties with
assurance of due process in matters of non-compliance.40 The compliance procedures
under the Marrakesh Accords are set out in Sections VII, VIII and IX of Decision
24/CP.7, which include:
1. setting time limits for decisions;
2. requiring a preliminary examination of the question of implementation;
3. requiring preliminary findings to be communicated to the Party concerned for
comment;
4. requiring notification to the Party at the different stages of the process;
5. making information available to the Party;
6. allowing the Party to designate persons to represent it;
7. allowing comments from the Party;
8. allowing the concerned Party to request a hearing; and
9. requiring decisions to include conclusions and reasons.
Section X provides restrictive time limits on procedures in cases of suspension of
eligibility to use the flexibility mechanisms in Articles 6, 12 and 17. These time limits
are designed to ensure that Parties can re-enter the market as soon as possible. The
preliminary examination of the Enforcement Branch is designed to provide an
opportunity for the body to determine whether there matter is supported by sufficient

Jon Hovi, Olav Stokke and Geir Ulfstein, ‘Introduction and Main Findings’ in Jon Hovi, Olav Stokke
and Geir Ulfstein (eds), Implementing the Climate Regime: International Compliance (London:
Earthscan, 2005).
40
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information, has a solid foundation and is based upon the provisions of the Kyoto
Protocol.41
Appeals of Enforcement Branch final decisions may be made to the COP/MOP, but
only in relation to decisions that relate to Article 3.1 of the Kyoto Protocol (i.e.
QELROs) and only on due process grounds.42 A three-quarters majority of the
COP/MOP is required to overturn a decision of the Enforcement Branch. In such a
case the matter is referred back to the Enforcement Branch to be re-decided. However,
it does not appear that the members of the Enforcement Branch at the second instance
need to be different from those who were members at the first instance.
Many parts of this system are judicial in nature.43 However, it is clear that the emphasis
of the Kyoto Protocol compliance system is upon encouraging compliance rather than
punishing non-compliance.44 This compliance system has been criticised on the basis
that ‘soft’ forms of enforcement may eventually undermine environmental law
regimes.45 On the other hand, such a regime may encourage States to agree to more

Geir Ulfstein and Jacob Werksman, ‘The Kyoto Compliance System: Towards Hard Enforcement’ in
Jon Hovi, Olav Stokke and Geir Ulfstein (eds), Implementing the Climate Regime: International
Compliance (London: Earthscan, 2005), 53.
42
Decision 24/CP.7, Annex, Section XI, para 1.
43
Stephens, above n 36, 85.
44
Marcel T A Brus, Third Party Settlement in an Interdependent World: Developing a Theoretical
Framework (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), 40: ‘a form of conciliation between a state and the
international community in which a non-compliant state is, initially, not condemned, but given a helping
hand.’
45
Martii Koskenniemi, ‘Comment on the paper by Antonia Handler Chayes, Abram Chayes and Ronald
B Mitchell’ in Winfried Lang (ed), Sustainable Development and International Law
(London/Dordrecht/Boston: Graham Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1995) 91, 94; Jan Klabbers,
‘Compliance procedures’ in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Ellen Hey (eds), The Oxford
Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 999:
(‘anything seems negotiable … including compliance’ and it is only ‘a small step to suggest that the
binding force of law is negotiable’).
41
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extensive obligations and provide a more feasible option for responding to noncompliance.46
2. Legal status of the compliance system
Article 18 of the Kyoto Protocol provides that any procedures and mechanisms under
it that entail binding consequences must be adopted by means of an amendment to the
Kyoto Protocol. The legal status of the compliance system was not resolved in the
Marrakesh Accords but instead left to the COP/MOP. Rather than being adopted as an
amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, the compliance system was simply adopted as a
decision of the Parties. This raises the question of what legal status the compliance
system holds.
A preliminary question is whether all the sanctions prescribed under the compliance
system are binding. In particular, a declaration of non-compliance does not establish
new obligations on a Party but instead operates as a means of ‘naming and shaming’
Parties that are in non-compliance. In contrast, the requirement to develop a
compliance plan and to submit progress reports would have the legal effect of
imposing new obligations upon a Party.47 This indicates that only parts of the
compliance system would fall under Article 18 and require amendment to the Kyoto
Protocol.

Stephens, above n 36, 88 (‘… the critique falsely presupposes that formal processes of dispute
settlement are necessarily ‘harder’. In practice there is a great reluctance by international courts to
conclude that a state has breached international law.’)
47
Ulfstein and Werksman, above n 41, 56.
46
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However, it is reasonable to conclude that this issue may arise as a barrier in efforts by
the Enforcement Branch to enforce the compliance provisions.48 It is clear that the
compliance system is contrary to Article 18 of the Kyoto Protocol because it has not
been adopted by an amendment to the Kyoto Protocol. Theoretically, the components
of the compliance system that entail binding consequences are not legally binding upon
the Parties due to this deficiency.
3. Non-compliance and enforcement consequences
The period of assessment for the first commitment period extends beyond 2012
because the Parties are allowed a ‘grace period’ when they are provided the
opportunity to acquire and transfer emission quotas in order to fulfil their QELRO
target.49 However, in the period 2012-2014, the Enforcement Branch will be able to
begin assessing compliance with QELRO targets. Table 4-4 sets out the method for
calculating non-compliance with the QELRO targets.
Table 4-4: Calculating non-compliance with the QELRO targets
Non-compliance =

Assigned amount

<

Total reported emissions of greenhouse gases
+/- any transactions in ERUs, AAUs, CERs
and RMUs

Compliance with the QELRO targets is not assessable until the end of the commitment
period. Thus, compliance with 2008-2012 commitments will not be determinable until
2015. However, compliance with other commitments in the Kyoto Protocol is
determinable at earlier dates. This is particularly the case with the reporting
requirements. The Enforcement Branch is empowered to apply a range of enforcement
consequences depending upon which commitment with which the relevant Party has

48

Durrant, above n 18, 74; Farhana Yamin and Joanna Depledge, The International Climate Change
Regime: A Guide to Rules, Institutions and Procedures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2004); Hovi, Stokke and Ulfstein, above n 29, 5.
49
Decision 24/CP.7, Annex, Section XIII.
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failed to comply. These commitments and associated enforcement consequences are
set out in Table 4-5 below.
Table 4-5: Enforcement consequences under the Kyoto Protocol compliance system
If the Enforcement Branch
has determined that a Party is
not in compliance with…
Its
quantified
emission
limitation
or
reduction
commitment under Article 3.1
of the Kyoto Protocol

The
methodological
and
reporting requirements under
Articles 5.1, 5.2, 7.1 and 7.4 of
the Kyoto Protocol
The eligibility requirements for
participation in the flexibility
mechanisms under Articles 6,
12 and 17 of the Kyoto Protocol.

…the Enforcement Branch shall
apply the following consequence(s)
to that Party:
1. Deduction from the Party’s
assigned amount for the
second commitment period
of a number of tonnes equal
to 1.3 times the amount in
tonnes of excess emissions;
2. Development of a
Compliance Action Plan
within three months; and
3. Suspension of the eligibility
to make transfers under the
emissions trading provisions
of the Protocol, until the
eligibility is reinstated.
1. Declaration of noncompliance; and
2. Development of a
compliance plan.
1. Suspension of eligibility
under relevant mechanisms,
until eligibility is reinstated.

Source

Decision

24/CP.7,

Section XV, section 5.

Decision

24/CP.7,

Section XV, section 1.
Decision

24/CP.7,

Section XV, section 4.

It is important to note that in a case of non-compliance, the Enforcement Branch must
apply the prescribed consequences because of the use of the word ‘shall’ in Section
XV of Decision 24/CP.7 of the Marrakesh Accords. According to this wording, once
the Enforcement Branch decides that a Party is in non-compliance, it is required to
apply the relevant consequences automatically.
However, Decision 24/CP.7 does provide that the consequences shall be applied
‘taking into account the cause, type, degree and frequency of the non-compliance of
that Party’. Thus, the Enforcement Branch has discretion to ‘design the designated
consequences to the case at hand.’50 Moreover, the Enforcement Branch may ‘at any

50

Ulfstein and Werksman, above n 41, 55.
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time, refer a question of implementation to the Facilitative Branch for consideration’.
This indicates that the Enforcement Branch has considerable discretion in dealing with
matters of non-compliance.
4. Potential for legal disputes
(a) Legal disputes within the Kyoto Protocol compliance system
It is possible for any Party to raise a (euphemistically phrased) ‘question of
implementation’ with regard to the compliance of any Annex I Party with its QELRO
target. The phrase ‘question of implementation’ is used in Article 6.4 and ‘questions
of implementation’ in Article 8 although no definition is provided. It is anticipated that
most compliance matters will be raised by an ERT.51 In contrast to ICJ matters, the
Kyoto Protocol’s compliance system is non-adversarial and instead is led by the
Enforcement Branch itself as interlocutor.
A number of questions of implementation have been considered by the Enforcement
Branch52 and one question of implementation has been considered by the Facilitative
Branch.53 All of the matters before the Enforcement Branch arose out of compliance
matters raised by Expert Review Teams (ERTs). However, the case of Croatia is
unusual because Croatia brought an appeal of a decision by the Enforcement Branch
to the COP. This case provides an insight into the potential for appeals by Parties over
questions of implementation concerning their QELROs.

51

Ibid, 52.
These matters concern Greece, Canada, Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine and Lithuania. See
UNFCCC, Questions of Implementation
<http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/compliance/questions_of_implementation/items/5451.php>
accessed 27 May 2012.
53
This matter concerned several Parties included in Annex I. See UNFCCC, Question of
Implementation – Several Parties included in Annex I <http://unfccc.int/playground/items/5516.php>
accessed 27 May 2012.
52
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In 2009, Croatia was found to be non-compliant for failing to maintain its commitment
reserve and for incorrectly calculating its Assigned Amount.54 The two questions of
implementation were related to firstly Croatia’s calculation of its Assigned Amount
and its compliance with Article 3, paragraphs 7 and 8 and the modalities for calculating
the Assigned Amount established under Article 7, paragraph 4 (Decision 13/CMP.1).
The ERT considered the addition of 3.5 million tons CO2 equivalent by Croatia to its
base year following decision 7/CP.12 was not in accordance with these requirements.
The second matter was Croatia’s calculation of its commitment period reserve and its
compliance with the modalities for accounting of Assigned Amounts under Article 7,
paragraph 4 (Decision 13/CMP.1). The ERT considered that Croatia’s calculation of
its commitment period reserve was non-compliant as it was based on decision
7/CP.12.55
Decision 7/CP.12 was a decision of the COP made in 2006 with regard to Croatia’s
base year greenhouse gas emissions under Article 4, paragraph 6, of the UNFCCC.
Article 4.6 allows flexibility to choose a base year other than 1990 in order to take
account of the economic circumstances of States undergoing the transition to a market
economy. In decision 7/CP.12, the COP decided to allow Croatia to add 3.5 Mt CO2
equivalent to its 1990 level of greenhouse gas emissions to establish its base year for
implementation of its commitments under Article 4.6 of the UNFCCC. The COP
adopted similar decisions for Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Hungary and Slovenia.

54

UNFCCC, Enforcement Branch of the Compliance Committee, Comments from Croatia on the Final
Decision (CC-2009-1-8/Croatia/EB) (CC-2009-1-9/Croatia/EB, 4 January 2010).
55
UNFCCC, Enforcement Branch of the Compliance Committee, Decision on Preliminary
Examination. Party concerned: Croatia (CC-2009-1-2/Croatia/EB, 8 September 2009), [4], [5].
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At both the preliminary and final determinations, the Enforcement Branch decided that
decision 7/CP.12 was not applicable to Croatia’s baseline for its QELRO commitment
under the Kyoto Protocol. At the preliminary and subsequent hearings, Croatia argued
that the approach of the Enforcement Branch was in violation of the principle of equal
treatment, though it was not clear on what basis.56 However, the Enforcement Branch
found that securing equal treatment of Parties was not within its mandate.57
The Enforcement Branch suspended Croatia’s eligibility to participate in the flexibility
mechanisms and directed Croatia to submit a Compliance Action Plan. Croatia
announced in January 2010 that it intended to appeal the decision on the basis that the
decision-making process was groundless, inappropriate, inequitable and influenced by
a conflict of interest.58 Again, Croatia did not explain the reasoning behind these views.
The appeal by Croatia against the decision of the Enforcement Branch was heard at
COP/MOP-6 at Cancun in December 2010. Croatia submitted that main reason for its
appeal was the Enforcement Branch had itself noted that it was not competent to
address all matters relating to its compliance and had proposed that the issue be
referred to the COP/MOP. Croatia argued that the Enforcement Branch’s decision was
in breach of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT);59 however, it was

56

Statement of position CC-2009-1-7/Croatia/EB, dated 12 November 2009, as well as in its address
to the EBCC at its 8th meeting held 23 – 24 November 2009, in Bonn, Germany.
57
CC-2009-1-8/Croatia/EB.
58
COP/MOP, Note by the secretariat: Appeal by Croatia against a Final Decision of the Enforcement
Branch of the Compliance Committee. Annex: Appeal of the Republic of Croatia against Final Decision
CC-2009-1-8/Croatia/EB) of the Enforcement Branch of the Compliance Committee
(FCCC/KP/CMP/2010/2, 19 February 2011).
59
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS
331(entered in force 27 January 1980) [hereinafter ‘VCLT’].
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not clear how this was the case.60 In its submission to the COP/MOP, Croatia stated
that:
a favourable outcome of this initiative resulting in recognition of COP decision 7/CP.12 shall,
in Croatia’s case, under no circumstance result in surplus emission allowance, but provide
Croatia with a realistic opportunity to implement its commitments under the Kyoto Protocol,
which otherwise shall prove impossible. 61

The main issue in the Enforcement Branch’s decision was whether decision 7/CP.12,
relating to the level of emissions for the base year of Croatia, could be applied to
Croatia’s QELRO target. In the appeal, Croatia stated that it did not want to deal with
the issue through the Enforcement Branch and instead called for a COP/MOP decision
finding that decision 7/CP.12 applies fully to Croatia’s QELRO target.
However, the key issue at the appeal was that the mandate of the COP/MOP as an
appellate body had been specifically limited to grounds of due process. Individual
Parties expressed their views about Croatia’s appeal as part of the COP decision
making process. The EU argued that in order to protect the integrity of the compliance
system’s appellate procedures, the COP/MOP had to confine itself to these due process
grounds.62 Further, the EU emphasised that if the COP/MOP decided to overturn the
Enforcement Branch’s decision, it must then refer the case back to the Enforcement

60

COP/MOP, Note by the secretariat: Appeal by Croatia against a Final Decision of the Enforcement
Branch of the Compliance Committee. Annex: Appeal of the Republic of Croatia against Final Decision
CC-2009-1-8/Croatia/EB) of the Enforcement Branch of the Compliance Committee
(FCCC/KP/CMP/2010/2, 19 February 2011).
61
COP/MOP, Note by the secretariat: Appeal by Croatia against a Final Decision of the Enforcement
Branch of the Compliance Committee. Annex: Appeal of the Republic of Croatia against Final Decision
CC-2009-1-8/Croatia/EB) of the Enforcement Branch of the Compliance Committee
(FCCC/KP/CMP/2010/2, 19 February 2011), 4.
62
COP/MOP, Note by the secretariat: Appeal by Croatia against a Final Decision of the Enforcement
Branch of the Compliance Committee. Annex: Appeal of the Republic of Croatia against Final Decision
CC-2009-1-8/Croatia/EB) of the Enforcement Branch of the Compliance Committee
(FCCC/KP/CMP/2010/2, 19 February 2011), 4.
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Branch.63 In contrast, Canada argued that the COP/MOP can adopt a comprehensive
approach and address the substantive issue of base-year emission levels.64 At the
COP/MOP hearing, co-Chair Tarasofsky suggested that two COP/MOP decisions
could be adopted, one on the appeal and the other on the broader issues related to
Croatia.65
The COP/MOP adopted a decision on the Compliance Committee’s report and
conclusions on Croatia’s appeal on 10 December 2010. Ultimately, the COP/MOP
decision noted that: it initiated consideration of the appeal; was unable to complete
consideration of the appeal at the session; and that the item would be included on the
provisional agenda for COP/MOP 7.66 It also requested that the Secretariat prepare:
…a technical paper outlining the procedural requirements and the scope and content of
applicable law for the consideration of appeals under decision 27/CMP.1 and other relevant
CMP decisions, as well as the approach taken by bodies constituted under other multilateral
environmental agreements and other international bodies in relation to provisions for the
consideration of denial of due process.67

However, Croatia withdrew its appeal to the COP and the matter ultimately did not
progress any further.68 Nonetheless, Croatia’s appeal provides an important insight
into the potential for legal disputes over compliance with Kyoto Protocol
commitments. In particular, the appeal mechanism that allows cases to go from the
Enforcement Branch to the COP/MOP is designed to ensure that Parties are accorded

63

Ibid.
Ibid.
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Ibid.
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COP/MOP, Appeal by Croatia against a Final Decision of the Enforcement Branch of the Compliance
Committee in relation to the Implementation of Decision 7/CP.12. Draft conclusions proposed by the
President (FCCC/KP/CMP/2010/L.7, 9 December 2010), [2].
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due process in their cases, yet this same appeal mechanism may be used to move the
matter to the political forum that is the COP/MOP. The Parties in the COP/MOP have
a vested interest in how matters of non-compliance are dealt with and do not offer an
independent appellate body. Therefore, a Party seeking to avoid compliance measures
from the Enforcement Branch with their QELRO may utilise the option of appeal to
the COP as a method of politicising their question of implementation.
There will be no cases of non-compliance in relation to the QELRO targets at the
Enforcement Branch until at least 2015. Although it is difficult to predict how such
cases will proceed, there are some key issues that are likely to arise. Firstly, the Kyoto
Protocol’s compliance system is notable for its ‘strict liability’ approach whereby it
does not provide graded sanctions to address varying types of non-compliance.69
Durrant identifies this aspect of the compliance system as potentially ‘a major point of
contention for non-compliant Parties’ because the strict liability approach does not
import considerations of fairness and reasonableness. Durrant argues that:
Non-compliance may vary from deliberate and reckless non-compliance to inadvertent noncompliance resulting from, for example, natural disasters (Acts of God) and other force
majeure events that may themselves be caused by the impacts of climate change.

Where Parties are non-compliant with the QELRO target due to matters beyond their
control, the Enforcement Branch has no discretion and technically must apply the same
enforcement consequences. In such a case, a non-compliant Party may follow the
example of Croatia and seek the intervention of the COP/MOP through an appeal.

Durrant, above n 18. Also see Edith Brown Weiss, ‘Conclusions: Understanding Compliance with
Soft Law’ in Dinah Shelton (ed), Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the
International Legal System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 544. Weiss emphasises the
importance of graded sanctions.
69
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However, there is some discretion held by the Enforcement Branch due to uncertainty
around the calculations of greenhouse gas emissions. For example, high uncertainty
tends to exist around emissions or removals resulting from direct human-induced land
use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF).70 Uncertainty around the total produced
inventories varies from around 5 to 20%, and most estimates range from 10 to 20%.71
Durrant identifies this uncertainty as a key barrier for the Enforcement Branch to
determine non-compliance ‘given that the required emissions reductions are
themselves only 6 to 8 per cent below reported 1990 baseline emissions.’72 This second
issue is likely to be raised by a non-compliant Party attempting to evade enforcement
consequences.
The third issue relates to the development of the Kyoto Protocol itself. One of the
enforcement consequences provided for non-compliance with Article 3.1 is the
deduction from the Party’s assigned amount for the second commitment period of a
number of tonnes equal to 1.3 times the amount in tonnes of excess emissions.
Although Article 3.9 of the Kyoto Protocol provides for the negotiation of subsequent
commitment periods, the Parties have to date failed to reach agreement (see Chapter
2). This means that there is no second commitment period to which the enforcement
consequence can be applied. If this remains the case, then the potential effectiveness
of this compliance system is substantially weakened.
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See Daniel Lieberman, Matthias Jonas and Zbigniew, Accounting for Climate Change: Uncertainty
in Greenhouse Gas Inventories – Verification, Compliance and Trading (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007).
71
J Gupta, X Olstoorn and E Rotenberg, ‘The Role of Scientific Uncertainty in Compliance with the
Kyoto Protocol to the Climate Change Convention’ (2003) 6(6) Environmental Science and Policy 477.
LULUCF was not included in the inventories reviewed by the authors. Inclusion of LULUCF is likely
to increase uncertainty values.
72
Durrant further notes that there is uncertainty around the calculation of the baselines themselves.
Durrant, above n 18, 73.
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Fourthly, it is possible for a non-compliant Party to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol
(as well as the UNFCCC) after providing one year notice without incurring any
penalty.73 This ultimately means that even if a second commitment period is
negotiated, a non-compliant Party may evade the enforcement consequences simply
by withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol. Indeed, Canada failed to meet its QELRO
and in December 2011 withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol.74
Finally, the Kyoto Protocol’s compliance system does not foresee remedies for States
claiming unlawful behaviour has damaged the climate system and their territory. This
means that the physical consequences of delay in emission reductions are not
addressed within the compliance system. Although an affected Party may refer the
matter to the Enforcement Branch, there is no scope for such Parties to receive
compensation or other remedies.
(b) Legal disputes outside of the Kyoto Protocol compliance system
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol may take legal actions outside of the climate regime that
are relevant to these commitments. For instance, Micronesia recently brought a
transnational legal challenge to the approval of a coal fired power station in the Czech
Republic.75 However, the Kyoto Protocol compliance system may have implications
for the ability of Parties to bring disputes outside of this system. Parties to the Kyoto
Protocol have agreed to bring matters of compliance with the commitments through
this system which is evidenced by their agreement in establishing the compliance
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Kyoto Protocol, Article 27; UNFCCC, Article 25. If a party withdraws from the UNFCCC, they
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BBC News, Canada to withdraw from Kyoto Protocol (13 December 2011)
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-16151310> accessed 28 May 2012.
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system. Furthermore, matters of non-compliance have been dealt with through the
Compliance Committee and on the whole States have submitted to this process.
As a result, Kyoto Protocol Parties may be shielded from legal challenges outside of
the compliance system. It could be argued that the Kyoto Protocol’s non-compliance
procedures need to be exhausted before alternative avenues are pursued. In particular,
Article 18 of the Kyoto Protocol provides that the Parties shall ‘approve appropriate
and effective procedures and mechanisms to determine and address cases of noncompliance with the provisions of this Protocol’. On the other hand, the Kyoto
Protocol does not specifically exclude the settlement of disputes outside of the
compliance system. The compliance system is designed to re-establish compliance
through the application of specific consequences. None of these consequences include
the recovery of reparations for Parties injured by another’s non-compliance. Therefore,
such injured Parties may be able to seek remedies outside of the Kyoto Protocol’s
compliance system.
Nevertheless, the scope and procedure for bringing legal disputes through the ICJ
remain unclear. Both the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol provide that, at the time of
ratification, Parties may declare their recognition of the ICJ and/or arbitration in
accordance with procedures adopted by the COP.76 None of the instruments of
ratification to either the UNFCCC or Kyoto Protocol provided such a declaration (see
also Chapter 3). Although the COP and MOP have not developed procedures for
arbitration, some Parties have recognised that they will be developed. 77 It is feasible
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UNFCCC, art 14; Kyoto Protocol, art 19.
Declarations by the Governments of the Cook Islands, Niue, Nauru. See Kyoto Protocol, status of
ratification < http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/5424.php> accessed 2 March
2011.
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that legal disputes related to commitments under the Kyoto Protocol may be referred
to the ICJ, but only where the Parties have submitted to the ICJ’s jurisdiction in relation
to the matter (see Chapter 3).78
The greatest scope for an interstate dispute relates to situations where an Annex I Party
has failed to meet its QELRO target. Such a matter could provide a source of exposure
to legal risk for climate change damage. This raises the issue of how the compliance
procedures of the Kyoto Protocol relate to the rules of State responsibility (examined
in Chapter 6). For instance, what legal consequence would arise if a Kyoto Protocol
compliance procedure and a dispute settlement procedure were to take place at the
same time involving a particular Party and the same subject matter.79 It is not entirely
clear how the Kyoto Protocol compliance system will interact with the law of State
responsibility in the event of breach of the treaty.80Although the Kyoto Protocol
compliance system is very close to a traditional judicial process, it does have some key
differences to State responsibility. For example, there is no provision for
‘circumstances precluding wrongfulness’ or defences.
The question is whether the Kyoto Protocol compliance system operates as lex
specialis and thus precludes application of the rules of State responsibility. The basis
of such an argument would be that the Kyoto Protocol involves elements of State
responsibility but provides special rules meaning that the general rules no longer apply.
However, the rules of the Kyoto Protocol compliance system are only to be applied by
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institutions established through the climate regime. Therefore, if a dispute arose in an
international court or tribunal relating to an alleged breach of the Kyoto Protocol, the
applicable rules are those of State responsibility.81
Finally, the recent case of FSM v. Prunerov82 provides an insight into the potential for
disputes over emissions reductions may cross into multiple areas of law, including
transnational law. In this case, the Federated States of Micronesia brought a
transnational legal challenge to plans to extend the Prunerov coal-fired power plant in
the Czech Republic. Micronesia cited the principle of transboundary harm. The dispute
resulted in the undertaking of an environmental impact assessment of the plant. It is
possible that disputes over QELRO targets may also arise through such transnational
mechanisms simultaneous with matters being heard within the international dispute
mechanisms.
The findings of this section in relation to legal exposure from the dispute settlement
procedures for the Kyoto Protocol are summarised in Table 4-5 below.
Table 4-5: Exposure to legal risk from Kyoto Protocol dispute settlement procedures
Avenue
Facilitative Branch of the
Compliance Committee
Enforcement Branch of the
Compliance Committee

Authority
Marrakesh Accords

COP/MOP

Marrakesh Accords

Marrakesh Accords

81

Conclusion
No exposure. Does not allow
for contentious matters.
Low exposure. Other States can
refer
matters
to
the
Enforcement
Branch
and
compliance with QELROs will
be determinable from 2015.
However, there is no scope for
climate change damage to be
considered.
No exposure. There is no scope
for climate change damage to
be
considered
by
the
COP/MOP in an appeal from
the Enforcement Branch.

Loibl, above n 79, 216. See Part II, Draft Articles.
For a summary of the claim in English, see <http://www.pohodecez.cz/press/english-summary-ofthe-prunerov-case-53> accessed 14 June 2012.
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Submission to the ICJ through
UNFCCC provisions
Submission to the ICJ by
mutual agreement

See Chapter 3

Submission to the ICJ where
States
have
accepted
jurisdiction under the option
clause

Article 36.2, ICJ Statute
(see Chapter 3)

Submission to the ICJ where
the
treaty
concerned
specifically provides for ICJ
jurisdiction

Article 36.1, ICJ Statute
(see Chapter 3)

Article 26.1, ICJ Statute
(see Chapter 3)

No exposure. No States have
provided such a declaration.
No exposure. It is unlikely that
a respondent State would agree
to referral.
Some exposure. Reservations
could prevent jurisdiction (e.g.
disputes to which the Parties
have agreed to settle by other
means of peaceful settlement).
Some exposure. The Parties
may have agreed to ICJ
jurisdiction through some other
arrangement.

D. Conclusion
This chapter has examined the Kyoto Protocol as a possible source of legal risk
regarding climate change damage. Article 3.2 requires that Parties make demonstrable
progress in achieving their commitments by 2005. However, this obligation provides
low exposure because it is not clear what ‘demonstrable progress’ means. Article 12.8
of the Kyoto Protocol places an obligation to ensure that a share of proceeds from
certified project activities is used to assist developing States Parties that are
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate. This obligation provides low
exposure to legal risk because the Bonn Agreement provides that 2% of certified
emissions reductions issues shall be the share of proceeds. Funding is expected to grow
to US$353 million by the end of 2012 as a result of these proceeds. This is arguably
sufficient to meet the obligation in Article 12.8.
The QELRO targets contained in Article 3.1 provide a potentially high level of
exposure to legal risk for Annex I Parties because they include a specific target to be
achieved in the period 2008 to 2012. A Party breaching its QELRO target could be the
subject of an interstate dispute. There is no scope for an interstate dispute to be brought
through the Kyoto Protocol compliance system. Although matters of non-compliance
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with the QELROs (and other obligations) may be heard by the Enforcement Branch,
such matters do not provide for an injured Party to seek remedies in this forum.
However, there is considerable potential for an interstate dispute to be brought through
the ICJ where an Annex I Party has failed to meet its QELRO target, provided that the
jurisdiction of the ICJ could be established. The Kyoto Protocol compliance system
varies in some respects to the rules of State responsibility. This opens up the possibility
that this system operates as lex specialis and precludes application of the rules of State
responsibility. However, the rules of the Kyoto Protocol compliance system are only
to be applied by institutions established through the climate regime. Therefore, if a
dispute arose in an international court or tribunal relating to an alleged breach of the
Kyoto Protocol, the applicable rules are those of State responsibility.
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LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION
A. Overview
In this chapter, the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) 1 is analysed
for its possible application in international climate change litigation. Anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions pose a significant threat to the marine environment in a
variety of ways, including acidification of the oceans, rising sea levels and loss of
marine habitat.2 The LOSC is the key international instrument designed to protect the
marine environment from pollution.3 Outside of the climate change regime, this is the
key international legal instrument examined within this thesis as a potential source of
international litigation. However, there are a number of issues that have not been
examined by other commentators in the context of climate change damage, including
the impact of the ‘due regard’ obligation found in a number of LOSC articles. This
chapter provides analysis of this and other issues, such as the difficulties that are likely
to arise in establishing jurisdiction for the contentious cases.
Part B describes and analyses the due regard provisions of the LOSC. Part C considers
the definition of ‘pollution of the marine environment’ provided in Article 1 of the
LOSC and its possible application to climate change and greenhouse gas emissions.
Part D examines the relevant commitments under the LOSC, focusing upon both the
general obligations and obligations relating to specific types of sources of marine

1

United Nations Law of the Sea Convention, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 397
(entered into force 16 November 1994) [herein ‘LOSC’].
2
See Duncan E J Currie and Kateryna Wowk, ‘Climate Change and CO 2 in the Oceans and Global
Oceans Governance: Improving Governance of the World’s Oceans (2009) Carbon and Climate Law
Review 387.
3
Donald Rothwell, ‘The Contribution of ITLOS to Oceans Governance through Marine Environmental
Dispute Resolution’ in Tafsir Ndiaye and Rüdiger Wolfrum, Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and
Settlement of Disputes, 1007-24 (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2007).
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pollution. Part E explains the compliance and enforcement mechanisms of the LOSC
and seeks to identify the key features of these mechanisms that are likely to support
international climate change litigation. It examines the matter of establishing
jurisdiction under the LOSC dispute settlement procedures. This section assesses two
LOSC cases that may influence any future climate litigation under the LOSC. Finally,
Section F summarises the findings of the chapter.
This chapter seeks to analyse a number of issues likely to arise in such litigation,
including possible problems with establishing jurisdiction; balancing commitments
with the due regard obligation; and the overriding principle of State sovereignty. It
also considers whether greenhouse gas emissions can be captured by the specific
commitments related to marine pollution from land-based sources and from
atmospheric sources. The analysis contained in this chapter is complemented by that
found in Chapter 7 which considers these issues in further depth through the use of a
case study.
B. Law of the Sea Convention
The LOSC was a groundbreaking agreement which established for the first time a
‘comprehensive framework for the protection and preservation of the marine
environment.’4 In fact, this was one of the main objectives of the LOSC. 5 The LOSC
is also noted for its complexity, with 320 articles and nine annexes.6 Part XII of the

J I Charney, ‘The Marine Environment and 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’
(1994) 28 International Law 879, 884. Also see T A Mensah (ed), Ocean Governance: Strategies and
Approaches for the 21st Century (Honolulu: The Law of the Sea Institute, University of Hawaii, 1995);
Robin Churchill and Alan Lowe, The Law of the Sea (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988);
Yoshifumi Tanaka, The International Law of the Sea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
Also Douglas Johnston, The Environmental Law of the Sea (Gland: IUCN, 1981); Donald R Rothwell
and Tim Stephens, The International Law of the Sea (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2010).
5
LOSC, pmbl, para 4.
6
Edith Brown Weiss et al, International Environmental Law: Basic Instruments and References
(Ardsley: Transnational Publishers, 1992), 332.
4
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LOSC sets out the general provisions and specific provisions for types of marine
pollution.7 The LOSC is supplemented by more detailed agreements and regimes
including those regulating dumping at sea and land8 and atmospheric source marine
pollution.9 These additional instruments may apply to the ocean effects of climate
change.10 However, they are beyond the scope of this thesis.
The links between the LOSC and climate change are not entirely clear11 and require
careful examination. In May 2009, the World Ocean Conference adopted the Manado
Ocean Declaration12 which was an agreement to establish a number of initiatives
including for ocean adaptation to climate change.13 A significant question is the nature
of the relationship between the LOSC and the climate regime. On the whole, the
relationship between the marine and environmental law regimes is fragmented and
under explored.14 Environmental law regimes operate independently and sometimes
inconsistently.15 Article 4.1(d) of the United Nations Framework Convention on

7

LOSC, arts 192-237.
Convention of the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other Matter, opened
for signature 29 December, 1972, 1046 UNTS 120 (entered into force 30 August 1975); Protocol to the
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter of 29
December 1972, opened for signature 7 November 1996, ATS 11 (entered into force 24 March 2006).
9
Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-Based
Activities. However, note that this instrument is soft law and would be of little assistance in relation to
liability. Also see David VanderZwaag and Ann Powers, ‘The Protection of the Marine Environment
from Land-Based Pollution and Activities: Gauging the Tides of Global and Regional Governance’
(2008) 23 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 423.
10
See Rachel Baird, Meredith Simons and Tim Stephens, ‘Ocean Acidification: A Litmus Test for
International Law’ (2009) Carbon and Climate Law Review 459.
11
Cinnamon P Carlane, ‘Climate Change, Cultural Heritage and the Oceans: Rethinking Regulatory
Approaches to Climate Change’ (2008-2009) 17 Southeastern Environmental Law Journal 271, 279.
12
Manado Ocean Declaration, adopted in Manado, Indonesia on 14 May 2009
<www.cep.unep.org/news-and-events/manado-ocean-declaration>.
13
For a discussion of recommendations for international oceans governance responding to climate
change, see Duncan E J Currie and Kateryna Wowk, ‘Climate Change and CO2 in the Oceans and
Global Oceans Governance: Improving Governance of the World’s Oceans’ (2009) Carbon and Climate
Law Review 387.
14
Christopher Joyner, ‘Rethinking International Environmental Law Regimes: What Role for
Partnership Coalitions?’ (2005) 1 Journal of International Law and International Relations 89, 104105; Tim Stephens, ‘Multiple International Courts and the ‘Fragmentation’ of International
Environmental Law’ (2006) 25 Australian Year Book of International Law 227.
15
See Rudiger Wolfrum and Nele Matz, Conflicts in International Environmental Law (Berlin:
Springer, 2003).
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Climate Change (UNFCCC)16 actually encourages the ‘active’ ocean sequestration of
CO2 as the enhancement of a greenhouse gas sink.17 Therefore, the UNFCCC presents
the uptake of CO2 by the oceans as part of the solution to climate change, rather than
a problem in itself.18 Equally problematic, the Kyoto Protocol19 does not differentiate
between types of greenhouse gas emissions, thus allowing States to increase CO2
emissions provided that the other greenhouse gases are decreased sufficiently.20
Therefore, there is considerable scope for inconsistency and, potentially, conflict
between the LOSC and the climate change regime. The implications of this conflict
are considered further in this chapter in relation to establishing jurisdiction.
The key obligations contained in the LOSC relevant to the purposes of this thesis are
presented in Table 5-1. Note that there are additional obligations considered in the
chapter not presented in Table 5-1.
Table 5-1 Obligations in the LOSC that may provide exposure to legal risk
Article
Due regard obligations
Article 56

Article 58

Article 87
General obligations
Article 192

Description
Coastal States shall give due regard to the rights
and duties of other States in the exclusive
economic zone.
Other States shall have due regard to the rights
and duties of the coast State in the exclusive
economic zone.
States shall provide due regard for the interests
of other States in their activities on the high seas.
Parties are obliged to protect and preserve the
marine environment.

16

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 9 May 1992, 1771
UNTS 107, 165 (entered into force 21 March 1994) [hereinafter ‘UNFCCC’].
17
UNFCCC, art 4.1(d):
‘Promote sustainable management, and promote and cooperate in the conservation and enhancement,
as appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol,
including biomass, forests and oceans as well as other terrestrial, coastal and marine ecosystems’.
18
Baird, Simons and Stephens, above n 10, 464.
19
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 15 March
1998, 37 ILM 22 (entered into force 16 February 2005) [hereinafter ‘Kyoto Protocol’].
20
Ibid.
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Article 194

Parties shall take all measures to prevent, reduce
and control pollution of the marine environment
from any source.
Parties shall act so as not to transfer, directly or
indirectly, damage or hazards or to transform one
type of pollution into another.

Article 195

Marine pollution from land-based sources
Article 207

Marine pollution from atmospheric sources
Article 212

Parties shall adopt laws and regulations to
prevent, reduce and control pollution of the
marine environment from land-based sources.
Parties shall adopt laws and regulations to
prevent, reduce and control pollution of the
marine environment from or through the
atmosphere.

C. Due regard provisions
One approach to greenhouse gas emissions would be to consider the competing
interests of emitting and damaged States through the lens of the obligation of due
regard provided in a number of LOSC provisions. For instance, the LOSC contains a
broad obligation requiring due regard of users to the coastal State’s rights and duties,
and for coastal States to have due regard to the other users in the exercise of their rights
and duties.21 These due regard obligations seek to balance the interests of both coastal
and maritime States within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).22 This need to
balance the competing interests of States is a core element of the LOSC.23 Under
Article 56, coastal States ‘shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other States’
in the EEZ.24 According to Article 58, other States are obliged to have ‘due regard to

21

See Natalie Klein, Dispute Settlement in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 139.
22
See discussion in George Galdorisi and Kevin R. Vienna, Beyond the Law of the Sea: New Directions
for US Oceans Policy (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1997), 151.
23
For an early recognition by the ICJ of the need to achieve such balance, see ICJ Reports 1996, 241242: the ‘general obligation of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect
the environment of other States or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of
international law relating to the environment.’
24
Article 56: Rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal State in the exclusive economic zone:
‘1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural
resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and
its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone,
such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds;
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard to:
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the rights and duties of the coast State’ and to comply with regulations established
pursuant to the LOSC.25 These articles could provide one avenue for establishing a
case around greenhouse gas emissions caused by maritime States in the EEZ for
example in shipping.
According to Article 87, all ships and aircraft possess freedom of movement and
operation on, under, and over the high seas.26 However, such activities must be
conducted with ‘due regard’ for the interests of other states considering the
circumstances.27 This means that a State must be aware of the interests of others in

(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures;
(ii) marine scientific research;
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment;
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention.
2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in the exclusive economic
zone, the coast State shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other States and shall act in a
manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention.
3. The rights set out in this article with respect to the seabed and subsoil shall be exercised in accordance
with Part VI.’
25
Article 58: Rights and duties of other States in the exclusive economic zone:
‘In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, subject to the relevant
provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and overflight and of
the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to
these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and
pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention.
2. Articles 88 and 115 and other pertinent rules of international law apply to the exclusive economic
zone in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part.
3. In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention in the exclusive economic
zone, States shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State and shall comply with the
laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance with the provisions of this Convention
and other rules of international law in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part.’
26
Article 87: Freedom of the high seas:
‘1. The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. Freedom of the high seas is
exercised under the conditions laid down by this Convention and by other rules of international law. It
comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and land-locked States:
(a) freedom of navigation;
(b) freedom of overflight;
(c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part VI;
(d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted under international law,
subject to Part VI;
(e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in section 2;
(f) freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII.
2. These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of other States in
their exercise of the freedom of the high seas, and also with due regard for the rights under this
Convention with respect to activities in the Area.’
27
The shift from the laissez-faire system to the due regard obligation can also be seen in the Fisheries
Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom and Ireland) [1974] ICJ Reports 1, 31: ‘the former laissez-faire
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using a high seas area, and balance those interests with its own. It must also refrain
from any activities that unreasonably interfere with the exercise of other States’ high
seas freedoms in light of that balance of interests.28 Again, this obligation could be
used in a case concerning greenhouse gas emissions from shipping but in this case in
relation to shipping using the high seas.
It appears that the balanced duties held by coastal and other States with regard to the
EEZ would provide one approach to resolving the competing uses found in the
example of greenhouse gas emissions. Importantly, these obligations are mutually
applicable. Thus, a tribunal or court would need to look at the interests of all Parties to
determine the content and application of the due regard obligation.29 The advantage of
these obligations is that they encompass a wide range of interests and do not
necessarily require proof that the activities have caused pollution of the marine
environment. The findings of this section on the due regard obligations are presented
in Table 5-2 below.
Table 5-2 Sources of legal risk from due regard obligations in the LOSC
Obligation
Coastal States shall give due
regard to the rights and duties of
other States in the exclusive
economic zone.
Other States shall have due
regard to the rights and duties of
the coast State in the exclusive
economic zone.

Article
Article 56

States shall provide due regard
for the interests of other States
in their activities on the high
seas.

Article 87

Conclusion
A claimant State would need to
give due regard to the rights and
duties of other states in the
exclusive economic zone.
Limited exposure. Could be
used to establish a case around
greenhouse gas emissions by
maritime states in the exclusive
economic zone.
Limited exposure. Could be
used to establish a case around
greenhouse gas emissions by
maritime states on the high
seas.

Article 58

treatment of the living resources of the sea in the high seas has been replaced by a recognition of a duty
to have due regard to the rights of other states and the need of conservation for the benefit of all.’
Also see Yoshifumi Tanaka, The International Law of the Sea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2012), 251.
28
Galdorisi and Vienna, above n 22, 153.
29
See generally Klein, above n 21, 139.
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D. Pollution of the marine environment
Application of other LOSC obligations would require climate change damage to fall
within the definition of ‘pollution of the marine environment’ as provided in Article
1(4):30
"pollution of the marine environment" means the introduction by man, directly or indirectly,
of substances or energy into the marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is
likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards
to human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other legitimate uses of
the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of amenities;

Article 1 of the LOSC provides a broad definition of the ‘pollution of the marine
environment’.31Although greenhouse gas emissions were not recognised as a pollutant
at the time that the LOSC was drafted,32 this is not necessarily a reason to preclude
application of the definition to greenhouse gas emissions.33
One significant element to this definition is the wording ‘results or is likely to result
in’. This is important because it encompasses substances that have not actually caused

On marine pollution see generally Douglas Johnston, ‘Systemic Environmental Damage: The
Challenge to International Law and Organisation’ (1985-1986) 12 Syracuse Journal of International
Law and Commerce 255.
31
‘Article 1: Uses of terms and scope
For the purposes of this Convention … “pollution of the marine environment” means the introduction
by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine environment, including estuaries,
which results or is likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life,
hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other legitimate uses of
the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of amenities.’ (emphasis added).
See discussion in William Burns, ‘Potential Causes of Action for Climate Change Damages in
International Fora: The Law of the Sea Convention’ (2006) 2:1 International Journal of Sustainable
Development Law and Policy 27.
32
See Meinhard Doelle, ‘Climate Change and the Use of the Dispute Settlement Regime of the Law of
the Sea Convention’ (2006) 37:3 Ocean Development and International Law 319.
33
A similar definition of marine pollution is provided in the Montreal Guidelines (‘the introduction by
man indirectly or directly of substances or energy’). The definition was expanded to take into account
diffuse-source pollution via the atmosphere as knowledge of pollutants became more sophisticated.
Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources
(26 March 1986). See discussion in Rachel Zajacek, ‘The Development of Measures to Protect the
Marine Environment from Land-Based Pollution: The Effectiveness of the Great Barrier Reef Marine
Park Authority in Managing the Effects of Tourism on the Marine Environment’ (1996) 3 James Cook
University Law Review 64, 90.
30
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harm but based upon the available scientific evidence are likely to do so.34 This
prospective (as opposed to remedial) focus supports application of Article 1 to
greenhouse gas emissions, which although may not have caused harm as yet are
certainly likely to based upon the available science.
A threshold is provided in the definition by its reference to ‘deleterious effects’. The
definition provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of ‘deleterious effects’; namely
harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine
activities, including fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality
for use of sea water and reduction of amenities. Arguably, the impacts of greenhouse
gas emissions on the marine environment potentially fall into all of these examples.
For instance, ocean acidification is causing and will cause damage to coral reefs and
the marine life that depends upon them; thereby threatening fish stocks and food
security.
The substance or energy can be introduced by man into the marine environment either
‘directly or indirectly’.35 The term ‘indirectly’ refers to the introduction of pollution
through rivers, estuaries and the atmosphere. Greenhouse gas emissions are a pollutant
introduced via the atmosphere. These emissions potentially fall into both the categories
of ‘substance’ and ‘energy’. CO2 is ‘is a colourless, odourless, incombustible gas’36
but it also traps energy in the atmosphere by altering the Earth’s radiative balance.
Although there is no mention of greenhouse gases as a pollutant in the LOSC, there is

Michael M’Gonigle, ‘“Developing Sustainability” and the Emerging Norms of International
Environmental Law: The Case of Land-Based Marine Pollution Control’ (1990) 28 Canadian Yearbook
of International Law 169, 193.
35
See discussion in Lindy Johnson, Coastal State Regulation of International Shipping (2004); M
Tomczak, ‘Defining Marine Pollution: A Comparison of Definitions used by International
Convention’ (1984) 8 Marine Policy 311.
36
Macquarie Australian Encyclopedic Dictionary (Macquarie University, 2006), 185.
34
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evidence to suggest that the negotiators considered the potential impact of temperature
changes to marine ecosystems as a source of marine pollution.37 While their
consideration of such impacts may have related to more local sources of pollution, it
is evident that the negotiators identified temperature changes in the marine
environment as a potential threat.38
Article 1 does not provide a definition of the ‘marine environment’ and its meaning is
‘somewhat unclear given the circular nature of the definition of “pollution of the
marine environment”’.39 However, further clarity can be gained through examining the
provisions of later articles. Article 194(5) indicates subsets of the marine environment
include ‘rare or fragile ecosystems,’ ‘habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered
species,’ and ‘other forms of marine life.’40 Article 211(6) shows that it includes
oceanographic conditions, ecological conditions and their resources.41 Articles 145
and 196 support the position that the marine environment includes its ‘ecological
balance’.42 Article 145 indicates that the marine environment includes the coastline
and marine natural resources.

37

See IMCO/FAO/UNESCO/WMO/WHO/IAEA/UN/UNEP Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific
Aspects of Marine Pollution (GESAMP), Interchange of Pollutants Between the Atmosphere and the
Oceans, no. 13 Reports and Studies (Geneva: World Meteorological Organisation, 1980), and
IMO/FAO/UNESCO/WMO/WHO/IAEA/UN/UNEP Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects
of Marine Pollution (GESAMP), Thermal Discharges in the Marine Environment, no. 24 Reports and
Studies (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, 1984). For information on
how these issues were considered in the context of project based environmental assessments at that time,
see IMCO/FAO/UNESCO/WMO/WHO/IAEA/UN/UNEP Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific
Aspects of Marine Pollution (GESAMP), Environmental Capacity: An Approach to Marine Pollution
Prevention, no. 80 Reports and Studies (Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme, 1986).
38
Doelle, above n 32, 322. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May
1969, 1155 UNTS 331(entered in force 27 January 1980) [hereinafter ‘VCLT’], art 32.
39
Jeremy Firestone and Christina Jarvis (2007) ‘Response and Responsibility: Regulating Noise
Pollution in the Marine Environment’ 10 Journal of International Wildlife Law and Policy 109, 125.
40
Article 194 obliges states to take measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine
environment. See discussion of this article below.
41
Article 211 concerns measures to minimise the threat of pollution from vessels.
42
Article 145 relates to the protection of the marine environment and measures by the International
Seabed Authority. Article 196 concerns the use of technologies or the introduction of alien or new
species.
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The International Seabed Authority (ISA) has adopted the following definition of
‘marine environment’ for the purposes of Part XI of LOSC (which includes Article
145):

“Marine environment” includes the physical, chemical, geological and biological
components, conditions and factors which interact and determine the productivity,
state, condition and quality of the marine ecosystem, the waters of the seas and oceans,
and the airspace above those waters, as well as the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil
thereof.43

This definition is certainly wide enough to capture the effects of climate change,
including the effects upon ocean circulation and stratification, ocean temperatures, sea
ice, fish species, and pH levels. Its inclusion of the ‘airspace above … waters’ suggests
that the atmosphere itself is part of the marine environment. This definition is an
appropriate one because the atmosphere interacts with the oceans, affecting its
productivity, state, condition and quality of the marine ecosystem.
Fourthly, Article 293 of the LOSC provides that other sources of international law not
inconsistent with the LOSC are to be used in the interpretation of its provisions. This
article is consistent with the ordinary rules of treaty interpretation 44 and would allow
reliance upon the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol. As discussed in Chapters 2, 3 and 4,
these instruments deal with greenhouse gas emissions as a type of pollutant, thus
supporting the view that the LOSC should also view these gases as pollutants.

43

International Seabed Authority (ISA), Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic
Nodules in the Area, at reg. 1.3(c), ISBA/6/A/18 (4 October 2000) available at
<http://www.isa.org.jm/en/documents/OFFICIAL_DOCUMENTS/DOC_2000/ISBA_6_A_18_E.pdf
> accessed 5 February 2012.
44
VCLT, art 32.
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In conclusion, the definition of ‘pollution of the marine environment’ contained in
Article 1 of the LOSC is sufficiently broad to encompass greenhouse gas emissions
and their effects upon the oceans. The prospective focus of this definition (‘results or
is likely to result in’) aids this interpretation because the harms associated with
greenhouse gas emissions have not yet materialised but have been predicted with a
high degree of scientific certainty. Greenhouse gas emissions are predicted to cause a
range of ‘deleterious effects’ to the ‘marine environment’, including ocean
acidification, disruption of ocean circulation, loss of sea ice, sea level rise and shifts
in the ranges of fish species.45
E. Commitments under the Law of the Sea Convention
1. General obligations
Part XII ‘Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment’ of the LOSC
provides the key commitments relevant to environmental protection.46 Section 5
‘International Rules and National Legislation to Prevent, Reduce and Control Pollution
of the Marine Environment’ contains general provisions and specific provisions
relating to types of marine pollution.
Article 192 sets out a general obligation for States to ‘protect and preserve the marine
environment’.47 The commitment contained in Article 192 is not restricted to any
particular source of marine pollution. This broad commitment would appear to

See e.g. C Langdon and M J Atkinson, ‘Effect of elevated pCO2 on photosynthesis and calcification
of corals and interactions with seasonal change in temperature/irradiance and nutrient enrichment’
(2005) 110 Journal of Geophysical Research; Australian Bureau of Metereology and CSIRO, Climate
Change in the Pacific: Scientific Assessment and New Research. Volume I: Regional Overview. Volume
II: Country Reports (2011).
46
See generally Douglas Brubaker, Marine Pollution and International Law: Principles and Practice
(London: Belhaven Press, 1993).
47
Article 192: General Obligation provides ‘States have the obligation to protect and preserve the
marine environment.’
45
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encompass protecting and preserving the marine environment from the impacts of
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. Yet, Article 192 is so general that it would
be difficult to prove a breach in relation to greenhouse gas emissions or any other
pollutant.48
Furthermore, Article 192 must be balanced with Article 193 which provides that States
have the sovereign right to exploit their natural resources.49 The tension between the
objectives of the LOSC and State sovereignty is also recognised in the preamble.50
Although the LOSC does not specifically refer to the principle of sustainable
development, it appears that the juxtaposition of the obligation to protect and preserve
the marine environment with State sovereignty and the desire to exploit the sea reflects
the role of this principle in implementation.51
The assertion of a sovereign right to exploit resources is a common feature of
international environmental agreements. However, without further elaboration Article
193 does not resolve the tensions between balancing economic, social and
environmental interests in terms of the marine environment.52 Thus, Article 193 does
not shed light on how this balance between the obligation to protect and preserve the
marine environment with the principle of State sovereignty may be struck. Many
declarations by States Parties to the LOSC assert sovereignty rights over marine

See generally Greg Rose, ‘Protection and Conservation of the Marine Environment’ in Martin
Tsamenyi, Sam Bateman and Jon Delaney (eds), The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea:
What it Means to Australia and Australia’s Marine Industries (Wollongong: Centre of Maritime Policy,
University of Wollongong, 1996), 152 (‘However, as expressed, the norm is devoid of content.’)
49
Article 193: Sovereign right of States to exploit their natural resources provides: ‘States have the
sovereign right to exploit their natural resources pursuant to their environmental policies and in
accordance with their duty to protect and preserve the marine environment.’
50
See generally Heidi R Lamirande, ‘From Sea to Carbon Cesspool: Preventing the World’s Marine
Ecosystems from Falling Victim to Ocean Acidification’ (2011) 34 Suffolk Transnational Law Review
183, 197.
51
Rose, above n 47, 152.
52
Carlane, above n 11, 285.
48
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resources.53 Although none of these declarations specifically cite Articles 192 or 193,
they are relevant due to their reliance upon the concept of sovereignty.54 Similarly, the
Seabed Disputes Chamber of ITLOS in the Deep Seabed Advisory Opinion stated that
the principle of due diligence has become a normative standard on States for
compliance with the ‘no harm’ rule.55 The principle of due diligence is one way in
which State sovereignty may be balanced with environmental protection. Overall, the
question of State sovereignty is likely to be a problematic issue in any climate litigation
that relies upon Article 192 or other obligations contained in the LOSC.
Article 194 provides that States are obliged to take all measures to prevent, reduce and
control pollution of the marine environment ‘from any source’.56 Under Article 194,

See e.g. Declaration by Brazil upon signature, 10 December 1982, ‘VI. Brazil exercises sovereignty
rights over the continental shelf, beyond the distance of two hundred nautical miles from the baselines,
up to the outer edge of the continental margin, as defined in article 76.’ Declaration of China upon
ratification, 7 June 1996: ‘1. In accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, the People's Republic of China shall enjoy sovereign rights and jurisdiction over an
exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles and the continental shelf.’
54
On the right to development, see e.g. Bonny Ibhawoh, ‘The Right to Development: The Politics and
Polemics of Power and Resistance’ (2011) 33(1) Human Rights Quarterly 76; Leon E Irish, ‘The Right
to Development versus a Rights-Based Approach to Development’ (2005) 3(3) International Journal
of Civil Society Law 6; Koen De Feyter, ‘Human Rights and Development Revisited’ (2008) 2(1)
Human Rights and International Legal Discourse 117; Shawkat Alam and Md. Saifal Karim, ‘Linkages
of Development and Environment: In Search of an Integrated Approach through Sustainable
Development’ (2011) 23(3) Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 345; Alain Pellet,
‘The Functions to the Right to Development: A Right to Self-Realisation’ (1984) Third World Legal
Studies 129; Roland Y Rich, ‘The Right to Development as an Emerging Human Right’ (1983) 23(2)
Virginia Journal of International Law 287.
55
Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities
in the Area (Advisory Opinion) [2011] ITLOS 17. Also see David Freestone, ‘Advisory Opinion of the
Seabed Disputes Chamber of International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea on “Responsibilities and
Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities With Respect to Activities in the Area” (2011)
15(7) ASIL Insights.
56
No States made comment on Article 194 in their declarations to the LOSC.
Article 194: Measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment provides: ‘1.
States shall take, individually or jointly as appropriate, all measures consistent with this Convention
that are necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from any source,
using for this purpose the best practicable means at their disposal and in accordance with their
capabilities, and shall endeavour to harmonise their policies in this connection.
2. States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction or control are
so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to other States and their environment, and that
pollution arising from incidents or activities under their jurisdiction or control does not spread beyond
the areas where they exercise sovereign rights in accordance with this Convention.
53
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damage can include chronic, low-level environmental degradation.57 The obligation
requires States to prevent, reduce and control pollution. In relation to greenhouse gas
emissions, there has arguably been some measure of control by States, particularly
those States that are Party to the Kyoto Protocol. It would be more difficult to show
that States had prevented or reduced greenhouse gas emissions.
Paragraph 1 of Article 194 provides that this obligation is to be met by States using
the ‘best practice means at their disposal’ and ‘in accordance with their capabilities’.58
These qualifications do not only apply to developing States, but developed States as
well.59 These qualifications provide wide discretion and considerable scope for States
to dilute the obligation contained in Article 194 through reference to their individual

3. The measures taken pursuant to this Part shall deal with all sources of pollution of the marine
environment. These measures shall include, inter alia, those designed to minimise to the fullest possible
extent:
a. the release of toxic, harmful or noxious substances, especially those which are persistent, from landbased sources, from or through the atmosphere or by dumping;
b. pollution from vessels, in particular measures for preventing accidents and dealing with emergencies,
ensuring the safety of operations at sea, preventing intentional and unintentional discharges, and
regulating the design, construction, equipment, operation and manning of vessels;
c. pollution from installations and devices used in exploration or exploitation of the natural resources
of the sea-bed and subsoil, in particular measures for preventing accidents and dealing with
emergencies, ensuring the safety of operations at sea, and regulating the design, construction,
equipment, operation and manning of such installations or devices;
d. pollution from other installations and devices operating in the marine environment, in particular
measures for preventing accidents and dealing with emergencies, ensuring the safety of operations at
sea, and regulating the design, construction, equipment, operation and manning of such installations or
devices.
4. In taking measures to prevent, reduce or control pollution of the marine environment, States shall
refrain from unjustifiable interference with activities carried out by other States in the exercise of their
rights and in pursuance of their duties in conformity with this Convention.
5. The measures taken in accordance with this Part shall include those necessary to protect and preserve
rare or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered species and other
forms of marine life.’ (emphasis added).
57
David Ring, ‘Sustainability Dynamics: Land-Based Marine Pollution and Development Priorities in
the Island States of the Commonwealth Caribbean’ (1997) 22 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law
65, 93.
58
On the need for differential treatment in the law of the sea, see e.g. Douglas Johnston, ‘Functionalism
in the Theory of International Law’ (1988) 26 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 3, 33.
59
Note that in the Deep Seabed Advisory Opinion, the Chamber also provided controversial opinion on
the treatment of developing States, holding that the principle of equality required that the same
obligations apply to developing and developed States. Responsibilities and Obligations of States
Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area (Advisory Opinion) [2011]
ITLOS 17.
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circumstances. Similarly, the qualification in paragraph 3 (‘fullest possible extent’)
significantly reduces the strength of the obligation. In essence, Article 194 is an
obligation of best effort.60
Paragraph 2 of Article 194 incorporates the no harm principle, stating that States are
obliged to take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction
or control do not cause damage by pollution to other States. The use of the term
‘necessary’ is stronger the word ‘appropriate’ and indicates that this part of Article 194
sets a relatively high standard.61 However, it does not appear that the obligation
contained here goes beyond what is required under customary international law.
Together, paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 194 act to moderate the conventional approach
to the concept of due diligence.62 The qualifications (‘best practice means at their
disposal’ and ‘in accordance with the capabilities’) particularly indicate that there is a
high degree of flexibility and discretion for States in fulfilling this obligation.63
Further, in the Deep Seabed Advisory Opinion the Chamber cited Article 194(2) in the
context of the ‘responsibility to ensure’ in international law. 64 This citation provides
support for the view that the principle of due diligence has become a normative
standard on States for compliance with the ‘no harm’ rule.65
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Article 195 provides that States have an obligation to not transfer, directly or
indirectly, damage or hazards or to transform one type of pollution into another.66 This
article reflects the ‘no harm rule’ which prohibits transboundary environmental
damage. The obligation to not cause transboundary harm as set out in Article 195 could
be applied to the problem of climate change damage, in which greenhouse gas
emissions from one State cause damage to the marine environment of another.67
Furthermore, it could be argued that the uptake of additional CO2 as a mitigation action
in order to reduce atmospheric concentrations would equate to the transformation of
one type of pollution into another. Thus, a claimant State could rely upon Article 195
in relation to the process of ocean acidification. The findings in relation to legal
exposure from these general obligations is summarised in Table 5-3 below.
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Table 5-3 Sources of legal exposure from general obligations in the LOSC
Obligation

Article

Conclusion

Parties are obliged to protect
and preserve the marine
environment.

Article 192

Limited exposure. While Article 192 could
encompass greenhouse gas emissions, it is so
general that it would be difficult to prove a breach.
Also, Article 192 must be balanced with the
sovereign right to exploit natural resources
(Article 193).

Parties shall take all measures
to prevent, reduce and control
pollution of the marine
environment from any source.

Article 194

Limited exposure. There has been some control of
greenhouse gas emissions but it would be difficult
for a respondent State to show prevention or
reduction. The qualifications provide a high
degree of flexibility and discretion.

Parties shall act so as not to
transfer, directly or indirectly,
damage or hazards or to
transform one type of pollution
into another.

Article 195

Moderate exposure. Greenhouse gas emissions
result in the transfer of damage to the marine
environment of other states. Uptake of CO2 in the
oceans to mitigate atmospheric concentrations
equates to the transformation of one type of
pollution into another.

2. Marine pollution from land-based sources
The specific article that deals with land-based sources of marine pollution is Article
207. In addition, Article 213 covers enforcement as it relates to land-based sources of
marine pollution. These land-based sources were given ‘prioritised treatment’ in the
LOSC because they are a major source of ocean degradation. 68 Article 207, which
deals with land-based pollutant conduits, and Article 213, which concerns enforcement
of controls for standards of land-based marine pollution, are both positioned first in
their respective sections.
Article 207 provides that States are obliged to adopt laws and regulations to prevent,
reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from land-based sources.
According to Article 207, States shall endeavour to establish global and regional rules
in these efforts, taking into account economic capacity and the need for economic

John Warren Kindt, ‘Solid Wastes and Marine Pollution’ (1984-1985) 34 Catholic University Law
Review 97. However, note that the provisions on vessel source pollution are more extensive. This is
because of the extensive jurisdictional questions related to vessel source pollution.
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development of developing States.69 Article 207 provides some examples of the landbased conduits of marine pollution, ‘including rivers, estuaries, pipelines and outfall
structures’. Paragraph 4 of this article creates a mandate for States to create ‘global
and regional rules, standards and recommended practices to prevent, reduce and
control pollution from the marine environment from land-based sources’.
A central question is whether CO2 emissions, for which the atmosphere is a conduit,
are captured by Article 207. The inclusion of airborne particles into agreements
relating to land-based sources of marine pollution has been controversial, especially in
relation to the LOSC because ‘marine pollution from or through the atmosphere’ is
dealt with in Article 212 separately from land-based sources.70 This context indicates
that extending the application of Article 207 to CO2 is likely to be problematic.
Even if Article 207 applies to CO2 emissions, there are weaknesses within its
provisions. The LOSC provisions on land-based pollution do not provide any progress
on customary international law and are the weakest LOSC environmental protection
provisions for a specific type of pollution.71 The reason for the weakness of Article

69

Article 207: Pollution from land-based sources:
‘1. States shall adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine
environment from land-based sources, including rivers, estuaries, pipelines and outfall structures, taking
into account internationally agreed rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures.
2. States shall take other measures as may be necessary to prevent, reduce and control such pollution.
3. States shall endeavour to harmonise their policies in this connection at the appropriate regional level.
4. States, acting especially through competent international organisations or diplomatic conference,
shall endeavour to establish global and regional rules, standards and recommended practices and
procedures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from land-based sources,
taking into account characteristic regional features, the economic capacity of developing States and their
need for economic development. Such rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures shall
be re-examined from time to time as necessary.
5. Laws, regulations, measures, rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures referred to
in paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 shall include those designed to minimise, to the fullest extent possible, the
release of toxic, harmful or noxious substances, especially those which are persistent, into the marine
environment.’ (emphasis added).
70
M’Gonigle, above n 34, 194.
71
Rose, above n 47, 155.

193

207 is that an effective response to land-based marine pollution would require a radical
restructuring of land based industry.72 Under Article 207, States must take into account
internationally agreed rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures.
Arguably, the internationally agreed rules and standards encompass those that make
up the climate regime, including the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. However, the
wording ‘take account of’ suggests that States do not actually need to adopt these
international rules and standards.73 In addition, Article 207 does not specify which
rules or standards States are to take into account. Nor does it provide criteria for
determining which rules of standards should be applied. In contrast, pollution from
ships, dumping or seabed installations require adherence to minimum international
standards established by international organisations.74
Boyle has argued that Article 207 gives States ‘in effect a power to set national
standards uncontrolled by any internationally agreed criteria’ and leaves ‘obedience to
the duty to regulate land-based … pollution to the good faith of individual states.’75
Boyle asks whether the provisions of the LOSC ‘have really provided machinery
capable of giving effect to the general obligation to protect and preserve the marine
environment.’76 The generality of Article 207 means that it does not offer meaningful
guidance to States on land-based marine pollution.77 It does not provide any specific
content to the underlying obligation of due diligence which is found in international
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customary law.78 Arguably, Article 207 is so general and imprecise that it is of little
practical effect.79
Article 207 also provides that State laws must minimise, to the greatest extent possible,
the release of toxic, harmful or noxious substances, especially those that are persistent
substances. Greenhouse gas emissions could fall within the category of ‘harmful’
substances. However, Article 207 provides a wide discretion for States to determine
which substances require regulation80 and it would be difficult to prove that CO2 must
be dealt with under this article. Therefore, applying Article 207 to CO2 emissions is
likely to be a difficult task. Even if Article 207 does apply to CO2 emissions, the article
is weakened by its generality and offers little recourse for climate litigation. The
findings in relation to legal exposure from Article 207 are summarised in Table 5-4
below.
Table 5-4 Sources of exposure to legal risk from LOSC obligations on marine
pollution from land-based sources
Obligation
Parties shall adopt laws and
regulations to prevent, reduce
and control pollution of the
marine environment from landbased sources.

Article
Article 207

Conclusion
Limited exposure. Even if it
applies, Article 207 is so
general and imprecise that it is
of little practice effect.

3. Marine pollution from atmospheric sources
Article 212 deals with marine pollution from atmospheric sources. Article 212
provides that States shall adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control
pollution of the marine environment from or through the atmosphere. Although this
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article was not drafted to deal with climate change, theoretically it could be applied to
greenhouse gas emissions.81 Carlane argued that Article 212 focuses upon atmospheric
sources of marine pollution caused by air navigation and that this focus may provide
little room to extend the obligation to other atmospheric sources of marine pollution82
However, there is nothing in the text of Article 212 to suggest that it is restricted only
to marine pollution caused by air navigation. Therefore, Article 212 could be relied
upon by a claimant State seeking to apply the LOSC to the problem of climate change
damage. A breach may be established where a State Party has failed to adopt laws and
regulations to prevent, reduce and control such pollution. The findings in relation legal
exposure from Article 212 are summarised in Table 5-5 below.
Table 5-5 Sources of exposure to legal risk from LOSC obligations on marine
pollution from atmospheric sources
Obligation
Parties shall adopt laws and
regulations to prevent, reduce
and control pollution of the
marine environment from or
through the atmosphere.

Article
Article 212

Conclusion
Moderate exposure. It appears
that the obligation could be
extended to greenhouse gas
emissions.

4. Obligations relating to enforcement
Articles 213 and 235 relate to enforcement of the LOSC. Article 213 provides that
States are obliged to ensure their laws and regulations adopted in accordance with
Article 207 (Pollution from land-based sources) and other international rules and
standards to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from
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land-based sources are enforced.83 Article 213 is essentially an obligation to enforce;
however, it relies upon the desire of each State to exert good faith regulatory efforts.84
Article 235 provides that States are responsible for the fulfilment of their commitments
concerning the protection and preservation of the marine environment.85 In Article
235, the LOSC effectively avoided the issue of State responsibility by providing that
States ‘shall be liable in accordance with international law.’86 However, Article 235
mandates cooperation in relation to the existing international law for the protection
and preservation of the marine environment. This provides a possible link between the
LOSC with the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol.87 Paragraph 2 of Article 235 deemphasises State liability in preference for liability of private actors.88
5. Other commitments
There are other commitments in the LOSC which could be applied to greenhouse gas
emissions. These include the obligation of States to provide notification of imminent
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or actual damage to the marine environment,89 the publication of reports on marine
pollution,90 and assessment of the potential effects of harmful activities.91 Article 237
provides that past and future agreements relating to the protection and preservation of
the marine environment should be implemented in a manner that is consistent with the
LOSC general principles and objectives.92 This could provide a basis for arguing that
the climate regime needs to be implemented in a manner that is consistent with the
LOSC.
F. Compliance and enforcement
The aim of this section is to describe and explain the compliance and enforcement
mechanisms of the LOSC applicable to climate change liability. The section examines
the process and key procedures involved in an interstate dispute through the LOSC.
The LOSC is unusual because of its compulsory jurisdiction,93 which may be an
attractive feature for potential claimant States in relation to climate change damage. In
addition, Parties can use other peaceful means of dispute settlement and not all matters
go to binding dispute procedures.
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1. Choices of forum
The LOSC provides four possible forums for the binding resolution of disputes. These
are the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) established under Annex
VI,94 the International Court of Justice (ICJ),95 an arbitral tribunal established under
Annex VII,96 or a special arbitral tribunal established under Annex VIII. 97 Each of
these forums has authority to determine whether it has jurisdiction to hear a particular
matter.98 The findings in a matter are binding on the Parties to the dispute and there is
no scope for appeal.99 However, the findings are not binding on any other Parties and
thus are not precedential.
The choices of forum are potentially significant in the context of prospective climate
change disputes, because the Parties can choose the forum best suited to their needs in
their particular dispute.100 Parties can predetermine their choice of forum upon
ratification or any time thereafter.101 If all States that are Parties to the dispute are
subject to the jurisdiction of a particular tribunal or court under Article 281 and the
matter concerns the interpretation or application of provisions of the LOSC regarding
the marine environment, that court or tribunal will be competent to deal with the
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matter.102 If there is no election of forum or the Parties have different choices, an
arbitral tribunal will hear the matter.103
The weighing up of these four forums will depend upon the individual circumstances
of the Parties and the particular dispute. However, it is clear that certain forums have
advantages over others. For instance, the ITLOS and ICJ are both permanent tribunals
that are more likely to provide rulings that are predictable and that take into account
the future implications of any case.104 The greater predictability of ITLOS and the ICJ
is likely to be an advantage to any Parties involved in climate litigation.105 On the other
hand, consideration of the future implications of a case may undermine the ability of
claimants to bring a politically controversial issue such as climate change damage.
Establishing an arbitral tribunal under Annex VII offers Parties the opportunity to have
more control over the membership of the tribunal that will hear the dispute. This is
likely to be a desirable feature for all Parties involved in climate litigation because
influencing the membership of the tribunal could aid either Party’s case.
The jurisdiction of the special arbitral panel is narrower than the other bodies because
it is limited to specific topics. One of topics is protection and preservation of the marine
environment, which could open up this choice to climate litigation. Setting up a special
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arbitral tribunal under Annex VIII provides Parties with the opportunity to ensure that
the members of the tribunal have specific expertise relevant to the dispute. This feature
could be a particularly desirable feature for States in climate litigation given the
scientific complexity of climate change and the effects of greenhouse gas emissions
on oceans. Overall, none of the choices of forum clearly stands out as particularly
desirable for either potential claimants or respondent States in climate litigation
although each option certainly provides distinct advantages.
As at 5 August 2012, 41 Parties to the LOSC had indicated a preference for method of
dispute resolution pursuant to Article 287.106 Most of these States elected ITLOS as
their preferred (or equally preferred) judicial body for dealing with LOSC disputes.
Table 5-6 below lists these declarations. However, most Parties to the LOSC have not
elected a preference for method of dispute resolution. In the event of non-election of
preferences, the matter may only be submitted to an Annex VII arbitral tribunal.107
This table aims to illustrate the scope of forums available for parties seeking remedies
for climate change damage under the LOSC.
Table 5-6 Preference(s) for method of dispute settlement under LOSC processes
State Party
Angola
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bangladesh
Belarus
Canada
Cape Verde
Chile
Croatia
Denmark
Egypt

Preferred Forum(s), in Order of Preference
(a) ITLOS
(a) ITLOS (b) Annex VIII Special Arbitration
(a) ITLOS/ICJ *
(a) ITLOS (b) Annex VIII Special Arbitration (c) ICJ
(a) ITLOS **
(a) Annex VII Arbitration (b) Annex VIII Special Arbitration
(a) ITLOS/Annex VII Arbitration
(a) ITLOS (b) ICJ
(a) ITLOS (b) Annex VIII Special Arbitration
(a) ITLOS (b) ICJ
(a) ICJ
(a) ICJ
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Estonia
Fiji
Finland
Germany
Greece
Honduras
Hungary
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Mexico
Montenegro
Netherlands
Nicaragua
Norway
Oman
Portugal ***

(a) ICJ/ITLOS
(a) ITLOS
(a) ICJ/ITLOS
(a) ICJ/ITLOS
(a) ITLOS
(a) ICJ
(a) ITLOS (b) ICJ (c) Annex VIII Special Arbitration
(a) ITLOS/ICJ
(a) ITLOS (b) ICJ
(a) ITLOS (b) ICJ
(a) ITLOS/ICJ/Annex VII Special Arbitration
(a) ITLOS (b) ICJ
(a) ICJ
(a) ICJ
(a) ICJ
(a) ITLOS/ICJ
(a) ITLOS (b) ICJ (c) Annex VII Arbitration (d) Annex VIII Special
Arbitration
(a) Annex VII Arbitration/Annex VIII Special Arbitration
(a) ITLOS

Russian Federation
St Vincent and
Gernadines
Slovenia
(a) Annex VII Arbitration
Spain
(a) ITLOS/ICJ
Sweden
(a) ICJ
Switzerland
(a) ITLOS
Trinidad
and (a) ITLOS (v) Annex VII Arbitration
Tobago
Tunisia
(a) ITLOS (b) Annex VII Arbitration
Ukraine
(a) Annex VII Arbitration/Annex VIII Special Arbitration
United Kingdom
(a) ICJ
United Republic of (a) ITLOS
Tanzania
Uruguay
(a) ITLOS
* ITLOS/ICJ indicates that the State chose both forums and did not elect any preference between
them.
** For the settlement of two specific disputes.
*** Although Portugal listed its preferences in this order, it does not appear that it has any order of
preference.

Finally, under Article 298, States may declare that they do not accept the LOSC’s
compulsory dispute settlement procedures in relation to certain disputes. This
exception applies to, among other things, disputes in which the UN Security Council
is exercising its functions under the UN Charter, unless the Security Council decides
to remove the matter from its agenda or calls upon the Parties to settle it by the means
provided for in the LOSC. It is possible that this exception could apply to the problem
of climate change because in 2009 the UN Secretary General identified climate change
as a ‘threat multiplier’ that exacerbates threats caused by other factors such as weak
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institutions.108 At this stage the Security Council is not dealing with climate change.
However, increased action by the Security Council on climate change could preclude
LOSC jurisdiction where States have entered such a reservation. Table 5-7 below
provides a listing of States that declared an exception in this regard. 109 These
declarations may limit the scope for litigation to be brought under the LOSC against
these parties in relation to climate change damage.
Table 5-7 Declarations under Article 298 of the LOSC in relation to Security Council
matters
State Party
Argentina
Belarus
Canada
Chile
China
Denmark (if brought before Annex VII Arbitration)
France
Nicaragua
Norway (if brought before Annex VII Arbitration
Portugal
Korea
Russian Federation
Slovenia (if brought before Annex VII Arbitration)
Tunisia
United Kingdom

2. Process and procedures
States have a number of options in the event of a dispute under the LOSC, including
peaceful negotiations and conciliation as compulsory non-binding processes. There are
three key steps in the LOSC compulsory binding dispute settlement process: firstly,
the Parties have an opportunity to agree upon a dispute settlement mechanism.110
Secondly, the LOSC provides rules for a Party to initiate a dispute settlement process
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in the absence of an agreement between the Parties. The Parties have an overriding
commitment to resolve disputes through peaceful means111 and they are expected to
reach agreement as to the dispute settlement mechanism. If no mechanism has been
selected, the arbitral tribunal procedure under Annex VII is chosen by default.112 By
way of contrast, the climate change regime only provides a binding dispute resolution
mechanism in relation to the quantitative emission limitation and reduction obligations
(QELROs) set out in the Kyoto Protocol. As discussed in Chapter 4, the Kyoto
Protocol’s compliance regime does not foresee remedies for States experiencing
climate change damage.
3. Preliminary or provisional measures
(a)

Southern Bluefin Tuna Case

The LOSC provides for preliminary or provisions measures to be granted where those
measures will prevent serious harm occurring to the marine environment or where they
will preserve the respective rights of the Parties to the dispute.113 In accordance with
Article 290(5) ITLOS may prescribe provisional measures ‘if it considers that prima
facie the tribunal which is to be constituted would have jurisdiction and that the
urgency of the situation so requires.’ In the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (also discussed
below in section F.4(a)), Australia and New Zealand were successful in their request
for provisional measures and obtained an order for Japan to cease catches in excess of
the total allowable catch provided for in the Convention for the Conservation of
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Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT),114 pending the final outcome of the dispute.115
Although the case provided an opportunity for ITLOS to establish criteria for
provisional measures, the obscure wording of the decision makes it difficult to
interpret ITLOS’s reasoning.116
New Zealand and Australia argued that the situation was urgent on the basis that the
Southern Bluefin tuna (SBT) stock was at historically low levels and that low
recruitment and declining parental biomass could exacerbate the situation.117 In
addition, Japan was conducting further ‘scientific’ fishing. Japan contested this issue
on a number of grounds and relied upon expert scientific evidence.118 Japan also
argued that the applicants needed to show irreparability of any damage on the basis
that the ‘concept is integral to both the notion of urgency and the need to preserve the
rights of the Parties.’119 Japan contended that Australia and New Zealand had failed to
demonstrate irreparability. Australia and New Zealand rejected that such irreparability
needed to be shown for the purposes of the LOSC.
ITLOS granted the provisional measures, stating that ‘measures should be taken as a
matter of urgency to preserve the rights of the Parties and to avert further deterioration
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Measures (6 August 1999), para 94, 95, 100, 105, 108 [hereinafter ‘Japan’s Response’].
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Japan’s Response, 109.
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of the [SBT] stock.’120 ITLOS did not refer to the concept of irreparability as a standard
and thus did not take a stance on this point.121 However, in a separate opinion, Judge
Laing stated his view was that ITLOS had decided not to use the irreparability standard
found in other jurisprudence on the basis that ‘that “grave standard” is inapt for
application in the wide and varied cases that, pursuant to [the LOSC], are likely to
come before this Tribunal.’122 It appears that ITLOS relied upon the concept of
appropriateness rather than irreparability which is found in ICJ jurisprudence.123
Although Article 290 of the LOSC is based upon Article 41 of the ICJ Statute, the use
of the word ‘appropriate’ seems to indicate that the granting of provisional measures
is more a discretionary matter for ITLOS.124
Although ITLOS did not expressly refer to the precautionary principle, it appears that
it indeed applied it to the dispute to prescribe the provisional measures.125 In particular,
lack of full scientific certainty about the status of the SBT was not a reason to refuse
to take action.126 However, ITLOS refused a request by Australia and New Zealand

Provisional Order, [80]. See LOSC, art 290(1): ‘prescribe any provisional measures which it
considers appropriate under the circumstances to preserve the respective rights of the parties to the
dispute or to prevent serious harm to the environment.’ ITLOS considered that Article 290(1) applied
to the case: Provisional Order, [67].
121
Hayashi, above n 113, 382.
122
Provisional Order, Separate Opinion of Judge Laing, para 3.
123
LOSC, art 290(1): ‘the tribunal may prescribe provisional measures which it considers appropriate
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Law 815, 817.
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for a provisional order that the Parties must act consistently with the precautionary
principle in fishing SBT pending the final outcome of the case.127
(b)

MOX Plant Case

In the MOX Plant Case (also discussed below), Ireland’s request for provisional
measures was less successful. The MOX Plant Case concerned pollution of the Irish
Sea by radioactive waste from the construction of a plant on the English coast. Ireland
alleged that such activities by the United Kingdom breached Article 123, 197, 207 and
213 of the LOSC. Ireland sought provisional measures under Article 290(5)
suspending construction of the proposed plant, which the UK opposed. ITLOS
determined that prima facie the conditions of Article 290(5) were met and on that basis
decided that under Annex VII the arbitral tribunal had jurisdiction to determine the
merits of the case.128 However, ITLOS rejected Ireland’s request on the basis that the
matter was not urgent. It ruled that the United Kingdom had a duty to cooperate as a
principle of marine pollution control under Part XII of the LOSC and general
international law.129
(c)

Application to potential climate change disputes

Thus, a claimant State seeking provisional measures as part of a climate dispute
brought under the LOSC would need to demonstrate that the matter was urgent. This
may be a difficult, if not impossible, task particularly in relation to impacts that are
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gradual, such as ocean acidification and sea level rise. Therefore, it is unlikely that a
State seeking provisional measures for a restriction on greenhouse gas emissions
would be successful under the LOSC dispute settlement mechanisms. However, in
order to issue provisional measures, ITLOS must consider whether there is prima facie
jurisdiction. In particular, ITLOS may prescribe such measures in accordance with
Article 290 ‘if it considers that prima facie the tribunal which is to be constituted would
have jurisdiction and that the urgency of the situation so requires.’ The next section
considers the question of jurisdiction, both in relation to preliminary and final
proceedings.
4. Jurisdiction
Whether or not a claimant State seeks provisional measures, it will need to establish
jurisdiction for the matter.130 The key issue facing climate litigation through the LOSC
machinery is whether the possible application of other international law (especially the
climate regime) precludes a finding of jurisdiction. Establishing jurisdiction under the
LOSC dispute settlement processes requires consideration of past cases. Although
these cases are not binding on future determinations, they are likely to be influential.
There have been two cases that have dealt with this issue and again the applicant States
have had mixed success. These cases are the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case and the MOX
Plant Case.
(a) Southern Bluefin Tuna Case

See generally A E Boyle, ‘Dispute Settlement and the Law of the Sea Convention: Problem of
Fragmentation and Jurisdiction’ (1997) 46 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 37. Another
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Although it is rare for tribunals to decline jurisdiction, the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case
provides a prominent example of such a declination.131 There were two rulings as to
jurisdiction in this case, firstly by the ITLOS (‘Provisional Order’)132 and secondly by
the Arbitral Tribunal established under Annex VII (‘Final Order’). 133 The case
concerned the CCSBT and Japan’s unilateral declaration of an ‘experimental fishing
program’, which involved catches of Southern Bluefin Tuna beyond its national quota
decided by the Commission of Southern Bluefin Tuna.134 The members of the
Commission were Japan, Australia and New Zealand.135 New Zealand and Australia
initiated proceedings under the LOSC dispute resolution procedures, 136 and (as
discussed in Section E) pending the constitution of the Arbitral Panel, sought
provisional measures from ITLOS.137 New Zealand and Australia alleged that Japan
had breached its commitments under the LOSC to conserve and manage SBT,
specifically Articles 64 (highly migratory species), 116 (right to fish on the high seas)
and 119 (conservation of the living resources of the high seas).138

See Dean Bialek, ‘Australia and New Zealand v Japan: Southern Bluefin Tuna Case’ (2000) 1
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(i) ITLOS
Japan raised the issue of jurisdiction before ITLOS and took the position that the
dispute arose under the CCSBT and not the LOSC.139 Japan argued that the dispute
was a matter of science, not of law140 whereas Australia and New Zealand argued that
the matter was at least partly a dispute over the interpretation and application of the
LOSC commitments, and that they had both sought to reach agreement in good faith.
Japan further argued that the applicants had not met the procedural requirements,
provided in Article 286, for establishing jurisdiction under Part XV, section 2, of the
LOSC, because they had not fully exhausted opportunities for amicable settlement
procedures provided for in section 1 of that Part.141
In its Provisional Order, ITLOS rejected Japan’s argument that the dispute was not a
matter of law. ITLOS found that there was a legal dispute between the Parties on the
basis that Australia and New Zealand alleged Japan was in violation of LOSC
commitments and Japan denied this allegation.142 ITLOS considered that the conduct
of the Parties to the CCSBT was a relevant factor to determine whether the Parties
were meeting their LOSC obligations.143 ITLOS found a link between the conservation
of fish stocks and the protection and preservation of the marine environment.144

breach of its obligations under international law, specifically articles 64 and 116-119 of UNCLOS, and
in relation thereto article 300 and the precautionary principle which, under international law, must direct
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ITLOS further found that the general commitments under Articles 64 and 116-199 of
the LOSC appear to ‘afford a basis on which the jurisdiction of the arbitral panel might
be founded.’145 ITLOS found that the commitments set out in the CSBT Convention
did not exclude the rights and commitments provided in the LOSC,146 and that the
CSBT Convention ‘does not preclude recourse to the procedures in Part XV, Section
2’ of the LOSC.147
In relation to Japan’s argument that the applicants had not exhausted the amicable
dispute settlement procedures under Part XV, section 1, of the LOSC, ITLOS was
satisfied that Australia and New Zealand had engaged in negotiations and
consultations with Japan.148 Furthermore, ITLOS held that ‘a State Party is not obliged
to pursue procedures under Part XV, section 1, of the [LOSC] when it concludes that
the possibilities of settlement have been exhausted.’149 Therefore, ITLOS found that
the Annex VI ‘arbitral tribunal would prima facie have jurisdiction over the
disputes.’150
While ITLOS did not explicitly refer to the precautionary principle, it stated that ‘the
Parties should … act with prudence and caution to ensure that effective conservation
measures are taken to prevent serious harm to the stock of southern bluefin tuna.’151
Arguably, it would have been inappropriate and unnecessary for ITLOS to make any

Provisional Order, [52]. Article 290(5) provides that ITLOS ‘may prescribe … provisional measures
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finding as to the status of the precautionary principle in international law because it
could not make any finding on the merits.152
The provisional orders were imposed on all three Parties, not just Japan. The three
orders were to cap the respective annual catches, a call for renewed and closer
cooperation between the Parties and a call for improved relation with third States
involved in order to join them in conservation efforts.153 It appears that the reason for
ITLOS imposing the provisional orders on all three Parties was that, in response to a
question by ITLOS, all three had stated their intention to open their respective fishing
seasons on 1 September 1999 on the usual basis.154
In accordance with Article 282, a later Arbitral Tribunal decision is acceptable if the
Parties have agreed to another binding process. However, the ITLOS decision was
criticised because the CCSBT does not provide for a binding decision.155 Furthermore,
it may not always be clear whether a dispute settlement procedure is binding. For
example, in the Qatar v Bahrain Case, the ICJ found a binding dispute settlement
procedure on very little evidence.156
(ii) Arbitral Tribunal
In the hearing on jurisdiction before the Arbitral Tribunal, the arguments centred on
the interpretation and interaction of the dispute settlement procedures of the LOSC and
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the CCSBT, particularly Article 281 of LOSC and Article 16 of the CCSBT.157 Japan
was required to submit to arbitration under Article 287(3) of the LOSC as none of the
Parties had accepted any specific dispute resolution procedure.
Japan argued that the dispute did not concern the interpretation or application of the
LOSC and that the CCSBT was lex specialis:
In accordance with generally accepted principles, the provisions of a lex specialis not
only specify and implement the principles of [LOSC]; they exhaust and supplant those
principles as long as the implementing agreement remains in force.158

The lex specialis rule provides that where two treaties govern the same factual
situation, the treaty governing a specific subject matter (lex specialis) overrides the
treaty which only governs general matters (lex generalis). Japan argued that lex
specialis prevails ‘substantively and procedurally’, and that on that basis only Article
16 of the CCSBT should determine jurisdiction. In the alternative, Japan further argued
that Australia and New Zealand had failed to exhaust the dispute settlement procedures
provided in Article 16 of the CCSBT.159
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Australia and New Zealand submitted that the LOSC dispute resolution procedures
should apply alongside the CCSBT’s procedures on the basis that the dispute also
concerned key commitments under the LOSC.160 Australia and New Zealand argued
that the LOSC establishes an ‘overarching, mandatory regime for the regulation of,
and resolution of disputes concerning, the law of the sea, which itself includes
conservation and management of fisheries’.161 The applicants submitted that the
CCSBT should not be held to have ‘exhausted and eclipsed the obligations’ of the
LOSC162 and that the principle of lex specialis only applies where two applicable
treaties appear to conflict. They further submitted that Article 311 of LOSC ‘asserts
the primacy of [LOSC] over other treaties.’163 The applicants argued that they had
exhausted the dispute settlement procedures of the CCSBT and that any exclusion of
alternative dispute settlement procedures by the CCSBT had to be express rather than
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implied. Australia and New Zealand argued that Article 16 of the CCSBT did not
exclude any dispute settlement procedures.164
The decision of the Arbitral Panel identified one key issue at the centre of the dispute,
that being ‘whether the dispute arises solely under the [CCSBT] or whether it also
arises under the [LOSC]’.165 The Arbitral Panel rejected Japan’s argument that the lex
specialis principle should act to exclude the application of the LOSC, stating that there
is ‘frequently a parallelism of treaties’ and that it is a ‘commonplace of international
law and State practice for more than one treaty to bear upon a particular dispute.’166
However, the Arbitral Tribunal held that wording of Article 16 of the CSBT (‘with the
consent in each case of all Parties to the dispute’) acted to exclude further dispute
settlement procedures on the basis that:
The intent of Article 16 is to remove dispute settlement proceedings under [the
CCSBT] from the reach of the compulsory procedures of section 2 of Part XV of
[LOSC], that is, to exclude the application to a specific dispute of any procedure of
dispute resolution that is not accepted by all parties to the dispute.167

As there was no explicit exclusion of the LOSC dispute settlement procedures, the
Arbitral Tribunal’s interpretation of the Parties’ intent was by implication. In contrast,
Sir Kenneth Keith provided a separate opinion in the Arbitral Tribunal’s decision and
did not find that Article 16 of the CCSBT included intention to exclude the compulsory
dispute resolution procedures of the LOSC. Sir Kenneth Keith found that the LOSC
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dispute resolution procedures exist ‘along with and distinct from the provisions of
article 16’.168 Sir Keith’s opinion centred upon the wording of Article 16.1 which
provides that it applies to disputes ‘concerning the interpretation or implementation of
this Convention’ (emphasis added). Sir Keith argued that Article 16 does not ‘exclude
means to which the parties have separately agreed in respect of disputes concerning
the interpretation and application of other treaties.’169 He stated that an exclusion of
the LOSC dispute resolution procedures required an express wording and could not be
found by implication only. Sir Keith’s reasoning offers a more restrictive interpretation
of Article 16.
The decision of the Arbitral Panel has received substantial criticism.170 For example,
Rothwell and Stephens argue that it is difficult to reconcile the object and purpose of
Part XV (to establish a compulsory dispute settlement system) and the Arbitral Panel’s
interpretation of Article 281 of the LOSC.171 Arguably, clear wording is required to
exclude the LOSC procedures172 yet the CCSBT does not expressly provide for the
exclusion of the LOSC procedures.
(b) MOX Plant Case

As discussed in Section E, the MOX Plant Case concerned a dispute between Ireland
and the United Kingdom. Ireland had been concerned about radioactive discharges
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from the MOX Plant located in Sellafield, United Kingdom, being released into the
Irish Sea.173 Ireland sought, unsuccessfully, to obtain information from the United
Kingdom about the discharges. It then instituted proceedings against the United
Kingdom under the LOSC.174 Ireland sought to obtain all information relating to the
discharges by relying upon Article 9 of the Convention for the Protection of the Marine
Environment of the North-East Atlantic (‘OSPAR Convention’).175 Article 9.2
provides that the Parties are to make available information ‘on the state of the maritime
area, on activities or measures adversely affecting or likely to affect it.’ Further, Ireland
alleged that the discharges contaminated its waters and therefore breached the LOSC.
Ireland sought an award for the disclosure of information on the basis of the OSPAR
Convention and a declaration that the United Kingdom had violated its LOSC
obligations. Ireland also invoked the precautionary principle, arguing that the United
Kingdom had the burden to show that no harm would eventuate from the discharges.
Ireland and the United Kingdom agreed to establish arbitral tribunals under both the
LOSC and OSPAR Convention to resolve the dispute.176 The dispute also concerned
European law, potentially triggering Article 292 of the EC Treaty and causing an
overlap in jurisdiction between the two arbitral tribunals and the ECJ.177
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In terms of the LOSC, the matter had to be submitted to an arbitration procedure in
accordance with Annex VII Article 287.5 because the Parties had not commonly
designated a specific dispute settlement forum. Pending the establishment of the
arbitral tribunal, Ireland sought provisional measures from ITLOS under Article 290.5.
As discussed in Section E, Ireland requested that the United Kingdom be ordered to
suspend the authorisation of the MOX Plant or immediately take all measures to stop
the operation of the MOX Plant.
(i) ITLOS
ITLOS considered jurisdiction provided under the LOSC compulsory provisional
measures relating to an international dispute also covered by another international
agreement (Part XV LOSC, Article 282 LOSC). It found that its jurisdiction was not
prevented by Article 282 on the basis that Article 282 only applied to a dispute
concerning interpretation or application of the LOSC itself, and not another
agreement.178 ITLOS stated that:
…even if the OSPAR Convention, the EC Treaty or the Euratom Treaty contain rights or
obligations similar to or identical with the rights and obligations set out in the Convention, the
rights and obligations under those agreements have a separate existence from those under the
Convention on the Law of the Sea.179

Article 282 of the LOSC provides that where the Parties to a dispute concerning the
LOSC are also Parties to another agreement under which they have access to binding
dispute settlement procedure, that procedure shall apply, unless the Parties have agreed
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otherwise.180 ITLOS held that Article 282 did not apply to that dispute on the basis
that it required that the dispute concerned the interpretation or application of the
LOSC. ITLOS commented that ‘the dispute settlement procedures under the OSPAR
Convention, the EC Treaty and the Euratom Treaty deal with disputes concerning the
interpretation or application of those agreements, and not with disputes arising under
the Convention’.181 Arguably, this more restrictive interpretation of a provision that
could exclude jurisdiction is more consistent with the approach of Sir Keith than the
Arbitral Tribunal’s majority decision in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case. ITLOS made
no finding regarding the precautionary principle, but stated that ‘prudence and caution
require that Ireland and the United Kingdom cooperate in exchanging information
concerning risks or effects of the operation of the MOX Plan…’182
(ii) Arbitral Tribunal
The Arbitral Tribunal confirmed the finding of ITLOS that it had prima facie
jurisdiction.183 However, the Arbitral Tribunal then considered whether it indeed had
definite jurisdiction to solve the dispute, in the context of the United Kingdom’s
objection that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) had jurisdiction in the case citing
Article 292 of the EC Treaty. The Arbitral Tribunal accepted the United Kingdom’s
objection and stayed the proceedings. Further, the Arbitral Tribunal requested that the
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Parties find out whether or not the ECJ had jurisdiction before the Arbitral Tribunal
would proceed with a decision on the merits.184 At about the same time, the European
Commission (supported by the United Kingdom) initiated an Article 226 EC Treaty
infringement procedure against Ireland for violating Article 292 of the EC Treaty and
Article 193 of the Euratom Treaty.185 As a result, the LOSC proceedings of the MOX
Plant Case came to an end.
a) Application to potential climate change disputes

Overall, the decisions in the MOX Plant Case and Southern Bluefin Tuna Case create
uncertainty around the interpretation of Articles 281 and 282 of the LOSC. This
indicates that there is a high chance of future problems for the interaction of other
dispute settlement procedures and that of the LOSC.186 There are a number of ways in
which these prior cases may impact determinations on jurisdiction in future climate
litigation.187 Article 282 is unlikely to prevent jurisdiction. Firstly, the reasoning
adopted in the MOX Plant Case suggests that Article 282 will only exclude jurisdiction
if the climate regime provided for disputes concerning the interpretation or application
of the LOSC.188 Secondly, the dispute settlement procedures in the climate regime are
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not binding and so arguably Article 282 does not apply. It is likely that a respondent
State would object that another institution had jurisdiction in the case citing articles of
the UNFCCC or Kyoto Protocol. However, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, neither
of these instruments provide compulsory jurisdiction of an international tribunal or
court. A respondent State would not face the same opportunity that the United
Kingdom had in citing the ECJ’s jurisdiction over the matter. On the other hand, if a
reasonable objection could be made out, it is possible that even after prima facie
jurisdiction is established in any preliminary proceedings, that the matter could be later
stayed in a similar manner that occurred in the MOX Plant Case.
It is possible that if a claim was made under the LOSC process, a respondent Party
may argue that the Parties have agreed to resolve their disputes with respect to climate
change mitigation under the climate change regime’s dispute resolution processes.189
However, neither the UNFCCC nor the Kyoto Protocol contain commitments
specifically related to prevention of harm to the marine environment. On the contrary,
Article 4.1(d) of the UNFCCC encourages the uptake of CO2 by oceans on the basis
that they act as a greenhouse gas sink. Clearly, the UNFCCC fails to adequately deal
with the threats posed by greenhouse gas emissions to the marine environment so it
would be appropriate for the LOSC to apply.
Articles 13 and 14 of the UNFCCC set out the dispute resolution mechanisms for ‘the
resolution of questions regarding implementation of the [UNFCCC]’ and the
resolution of disputes ‘concerning the interpretation or application of the [UNFCCC]’
respectively. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, the multilateral consultative process
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See generally Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law
Relates to Other Rules of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
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described in Article 13 has not been established, none of the Parties to the UNFCCC
have accepted jurisdiction of the ICJ under Article 14 and the COP has not established
arbitration or conciliation procedures that were called for in Article 14. Therefore, it is
evident that the Parties to the UNFCCC have not established dispute resolution
mechanisms. On the other hand, it could be argued that the threat of damage to the
marine environment is caused by the lack of implementation of the UNFCCC and that
the UNFCCC remains lex specialis. On this basis, the overlap between the lack of
implementation of UNFCCC and associated damage to the marine environment will
provide a barrier to claimants in establishing jurisdiction.
Another issue is likely to be interpretation of Article 14 UNFCCC and its requirement
that ‘Parties shall seek a settlement of the dispute by negotiation or any other peaceful
means of their own choice’ (emphasis added). In particular, the LOSC dispute
settlement mechanism provides for Parties to unilaterally initiate proceedings in a
forum of their choosing, but not necessarily the choosing of all Parties to the dispute.
However, the use of the word ‘their’ in Article 14 of the UNFCCC suggests that
agreement is needed between the Parties if any other peaceful means of dispute
resolution are to be utilised. Therefore, a unilateral initiation of proceedings in the
LOSC would be inconsistent with Article 14 of the UNFCCC.
It is on this issue that the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Southern Bluefin Tuna
Case could come to bear. There is a similarity between Article 14 of the UNFCCC and
Article 16 of the CCSBT. Neither of these articles explicitly excludes the LOSC
dispute settlement procedures but arguably does so by implication. The majority’s
view in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case was that this implicit exclusion was sufficient
to prevent jurisdiction, whereas in his separate opinion Sir Keith found that such
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exclusion required express wording. There is no certainty as to which way a tribunal
would decide on this issue. However, it is likely that jurisdiction would be refused on
this basis.
A tribunal would need to consider whether the principle of lex specialis applied. If a
tribunal accepted that the principle of lex specialis applies to the climate change
regime, this may mean that it supplants and exhausts the principles of the LOSC. On
this issue, Article 237 (discussed in Section D) provides that past and future
agreements relating to the protection and preservation of the marine environment
should be implemented in a manner that is consistent with the LOSC general principles
and objectives.190 This means that the LOSC and climate regime should apply in
parallel and conflict should be avoided.
However, it must be determined whether there is a conflict between the LOSC and the
climate regime, either in terms of substance or procedure. A conflict refers to the
incompatibility of two legal norms, whereby the fulfilment of one results in the breach
of another.191 On one hand, the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the LOSC are all
designed to protect the environment from damage. Arguably, if the UNFCCC and
Kyoto Protocol were fully implemented, damage to the marine environment would be
reduced. Yet as was previously discussed, there is also an apparent conflict in the
substance of the UNFCCC and the LOSC in so far as the UNFCCC classifies the
oceans as carbon sinks that should be utilised to uptake greenhouse gas emissions (CO2
in particular). This issue provides one basis upon which to argue that there is in fact a
conflict between the LOSC and the UNFCCC and that the lex specialis rule must
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Carlane, above n 11, 288.
See Wolfrum and Matz, above n 15, 6.
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apply. However, if the wording of obligations is vague, as is the case with the
UNFCCC, a conflict is less likely because it is not clear whether the two legal norms
are incompatible.192 Vagueness could allow the tribunal or court to interpret the
UNFCCC in a way that ensures harmonisation. There is vagueness in Article 4.1(d) of
the UNFCCC because it places an obligation upon States Parties to promote and
cooperate in the conservation and enhancement of oceans as sinks ‘as appropriate’.
This wording provides some scope for a tribunal or court to find that appropriateness
would require harmonisation between the UNFCCC and LOSC. However, it is not
clear that this would resolve the substantive conflict because the classification of the
oceans in the UNFCCC would remain as ‘sinks’.
In addition, there is clearly a conflict between the procedures provided in the climate
regime and the LOSC. As discussed above, Article 14 of the UNFCCC requires Parties
to reach agreement as to what peaceful means of dispute resolution are to be utilised.
In contrast, the LOSC provides compulsory binding dispute processes that can be
utilised at the initiation of one Party only. This again creates a need to apply the lex
specialis rule.
Nonetheless, there is some scope for a claimant to utilise the lex specialis rule to their
advantage. In particular, a claimant State could focus upon the discrete issue of ocean
acidification and frame this problem as primarily a problem of marine pollution. From
this perspective, the LOSC is the more specialised treaty, through its general
commitments and specific commitments dealing with the various sources of marine
pollution. It may be argued that the UNFCCC is concerned with greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere and not with the problem of ocean acidification. This
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approach, which is further considered in Chapter 7, may provide one way for claimants
to establish jurisdiction under the LOSC dispute settlement procedures. However, such
a matter is still likely to face exclusion due to the lex specialis rule and the problem
that the UNFCCC classifies the oceans as a sink. The findings of Sections E and F in
relation to legal exposure from the dispute settlement procedures of the LOSC are
summarised in Table 5-8 below.
Table 5-8 Exposure to legal risk from dispute settlement procedures for the LOSC
Avenue
ITLOS

Authority
Annex VI

ICJ

Section 2, Part XV

Arbitral tribunal

Annex VII

Special arbitral tribunal

Annex VIII

Conclusion
Moderate exposure. Jurisdiction may be
established prima facie for provisional measures.
However, definite jurisdiction would be more
difficult to establish because of the lex specialis
rule and the substantive and procedural conflicts
between the LOSC and climate regime.
Low exposure. Jurisdiction would be difficult to
establish because of the lex specialis rule and the
substantive and procedural conflicts between the
LOSC and climate regime.
Low exposure. Jurisdiction would be difficult to
establish because of the lex specialis rule and the
substantive and procedural conflicts between the
LOSC and climate regime.
Low exposure. Jurisdiction would be difficult to
establish because of the lex specialis rule and the
substantive and procedural conflicts between the
LOSC and climate regime.

G. Conclusion
There are advantages for potential claimant States in seeking to rely upon the
obligations to protect and preserve the marine environment under the LOSC. The due
regard provisions of the LOSC would allow a tribunal to look at the interests of all
Parties in the dispute, including the interests of the claimant State in protecting the
marine environment from greenhouse gas emissions. The obligations contained in the
LOSC are relevant to the threats posed to oceans from greenhouse gas emissions, both
in terms of the general obligations and the specific commitments related to marine
pollution from land-based sources and atmospheric sources.
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However, there are weaknesses in the LOSC commitments. The general obligation
contained in Article 194 of the LOSC is heavily qualified and provides a high degree
of flexibility and discretion for States in fulfilling it. The specific commitments
relating to land-based sources and atmospheric sources would require proof that
greenhouse gas emissions are somehow captured by these commitments. It is
reasonable to conclude that greenhouse gas emissions are captured by Article 207 as a
form of land-based pollution. However, the substance of Article 207 is undermined by
its generality and lack of precision. It is not clear what rules and standards should be
applied to land-based pollution and States are only required to ‘take account of’ these
rules and standards. It appears that Article 212 could be extended to apply to
greenhouse gas emissions as a form of pollution of the marine environment from or
through the atmosphere. This article requires State Parties to adopt laws and
regulations to prevent, reduce and control such pollution.
Finally, it will be difficult to establish jurisdiction in any litigation brought under the
LOSC dispute settlement procedures. There are a number of conflicts between the
LOSC and the climate regime, both in terms of substance and procedure. Respondent
States will be able to rely upon the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case and the lex specialis
rule to argue that the climate regime excludes application of the LOSC. There may be
some scope for rebutting these arguments by focusing upon the discrete issue of ocean
acidification which concerns the uptake of CO2 by the oceans on the basis that ocean
acidification falls outside of the scope of the UNFCCC. The prospects of such an
approach are considered further in Chapter 7.

226

STATE RESPONSIBILITY
A. Overview
The previous chapters examined three treaties under which a claim for climate change
damage may be brought, namely the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the LOSC.
These are the ‘primary’ standards of duty related to climate change under international
treaty law. This chapter will analyse the secondary rules of attribution and
responsibility under international law. These rules, which set out the legal
consequences for breaches of international law, are the ‘secondary’ rules that flow
from a breach responsibility relevant to climate change.1
State responsibility was originally established in the 1925 Spanish Zone of Morocco
Case where it was held that rights necessarily attract responsibility, and that all
international rights involve international responsibility.2 Responsibility refers to the
establishment of answerability of a State for the breach of international law.3 Although

1

Stephen Hall, International Law (2nd edition, Chatswood: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2006), 162. Also
see U Linderfalk, ‘State Responsibility and the Primary-Secondary Rules Terminology – The Role of
Language for an Understanding of the International Legal System’ (2009) 78 Nordic Journal of
International Law 53; E David, ‘Primary and Secondary Rules’ in J. Crawford et al, The Law of
International Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
The ILC provides the following explanation for this distinction: ‘The emphasis is on the secondary
rules of State Responsibility: that is to say the general conditions under international law for the State
to be considered responsible for wrongful actions or omissions, and the legal consequences which
flow therefrom. The Articles do not attempt to define the content of the international obligations, the
breach of which gives rise to responsibility. This is the function of primary rules, whose codification
would involve restating most of the substantive customary and conventional international law.’
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, with Commentaries, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [herein ‘ILC Draft Articles’], 31.
2
Spanish Zone of Morocco Claims (United Kingdom v Spain) (1925) 2 RIAA 615, 641:
‘Responsibility is the necessary corollary of a right. All rights of an international character involve
international responsibility. If the obligation is not met, responsibility entails the duty to make
reparations.’
3
See generally Marcel Szabó, State Responsibility and the Law of Treaties (The Hague: Eleven
International Publishing, 2010); Edith Brown Weiss, ‘Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-First
Century’ (2002) 96(4) The American Journal of International Law 792; R Doak, ‘Theories of State
Repsonsibility in International Law: Expropriation and Fair and Equitable Treatment’ 58 Proceedings
of the Institute on Oil and Gas Law 203; Pierre-Hugues Verdier, ‘Cooperative States: International
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international organisations and individuals have a limited amount of legal personality
under international law, it is States who bear the primary responsibility for breaches
of international legal rules.4 States are unable to act without the actions of individuals,
such as politicians, military officers, police and judges. Thus, there are international
legal rules for attributing the behaviour of individuals to the State.
States generally do not wish to bring cases against other States; as a result there are
few cases that involve State responsibility.5 However, there are a number of prominent
cases in which States have sought reparation or compensation for the breach of
international law.6 Although this area of international law is particularly underdeveloped, the ICJ has repeatedly stated that the notion of State responsibility is
integral to international law itself.7
The key questions that this chapter seeks to examine in relation to legal exposure for
climate change damage under international law are presented in Table 6-1 below.

Relations, State Responsibility and the Problem of Custom’ (2002) 42(3) Virginia Journal of
International Law 839; John A Perkins, ‘The Changing Foundations of International Law: From State
Consent to State Responsibility’ (1997) 15(2) Boston University International Law Journal 433;
Sompong Sucharitkul, ‘State Responsibility and International Liability under International Law’ (1996)
18(4) Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal 335; Pierre-Marie Dupuy,
‘The International Law of State Responsibility: Revolution or Evolution?’ (1989) 11(1) Michigan
Journal of International Law 105; Philip Allott, ‘State Responsibility and the Unmaking of International
Law’ (1988) 29(1) Harvard International Law Journal 1; Riccardo Pisillo Mazzareschi, ‘Forms of
Interational Responsibility for Environmental Harm’ in Francesco Francioni and Tullio Scovazzi,
International Responsibility for Environmental Harm (London: Graham & Trotman, 1991).
4
Ibid. States have conferred this legal personality upon international insitutions and individuals. This
primary responsibility that is placed upon States is even the case for rules that are imposed directly
upon individuals (e.g. international criminal law and acts of privacy jure gentium). In such cases, the
State will be responsible for an individual’s breach of international law if the acts or omissions can be
attributed to the State.
5
J Brunnée, ‘Of Sense and Sensibility: Reflections on International Liability Regimes as Tools for
Environmental Protection’ (2004) 53 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 351, 352 ff.
6
See e.g. ICJ cases Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) [1997] ICJ Rep 7; La
Grand, Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon and Nigeria) [1998] ICJ Rep 275; Aerial Incident of
10 Aug 1999 (Pakistan v India) [2000] ICJ Rep 1038.
7
Case concerning the Barcelona Traction Case, Light and Power Company (Belgium v Spain) [1970]
ICJ Rep 4, 33, and Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v Albania) [1949] ICJ 4.
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Table 6-1 Key questions to determine legal exposure under the rules of attribution
and responsibility
Topic area
Standing
Attribution

Causation
Allocation of
responsibility
Defences
Remedies

Questions
Is there scope to establish standing in international climate litigation?
Can the acts of private corporations and individuals be attributed to a
respondent State?
Can individual States be allocated attribution for climate change damage
when there is a responsibility for a collective failure?
Can factual causation be established for climate damage?
Can legal causation be established for climate damage?
On what basis can responsibility for climate change damage be allocated
where there are multiple wrongdoers?
Are there any defences that may preclude liability?
If a case is successful, what remedies may be available for a claimant State?

Part B of this chapter provides a definition and introduction of State responsibility.
Part C examines international law as it pertains to standing. Part D considers the rules
of attribution and imputability in international law and how these rules can be applied
to the problem of climate change damage. Part E examines causation and considers
how the two parts of causation could be applied to climate change damage (causation
in fact and legal causation). Part F examines the standard of proof that should apply to
international climate change cases. Part G assesses the various approaches to allocating
responsibility when there are multiple wrongdoers. Part H examines possible defences
and Part I assesses available remedies. Part J concludes and summarises the chapter.
The issues of attribution (Part D) and responsibility (Part G) are conceptually separate
but remain linked. Attribution is concerned with the physical pathway or factual
questions of State responsibility, whereas responsibility or liability is concerned with
questions of legal allocation of responsibility to provide a remedy. Thus, these two
linked topics are dealt with separately in this chapter.
B. State responsibility
The breach of an international legal obligation will generally lead to the establishment
of State responsibility. State responsibility is a term of art which is equivalent to
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international tort law.8 A prerequisite for bringing a claim based upon State
responsibility is access to an international court or tribunal with compulsory
jurisdiction,9 the prospects of which were discussed in Chapters 2 to 5. States have not
developed the area of State responsibility,10 particularly in relation to international
environmental law. The reason behind this appears to be because of the need of States
to protect sovereign interests. It is impossible to avoid all transboundary impacts and
States do not want to create precedents that will work against them.11
However, the International Law Commission (ILC)12 has developed Draft Articles on
State Responsibility (‘ILC Draft Articles’).13 While these are not binding14 the
authority of the ILC Draft Articles has been confirmed by the ICJ.15 These secondary
rules are only triggered once breach and harm have occurred.16 Draft Article 1 provides
the key principle of State responsibility which arises in the event of an internationally
wrongful act.17 The principle in Draft Article 1 is both a rule of customary international

Lakshman Guruswamy, ‘State Responsibility in Environmental Corporate Accountability’ (2010) 21
Fordham Environmental Law Review 209, 210. Also see Riccardo Pisillo Mazzeschi, ‘Forms of
International Responsibility for Environmental Harm’ in Francesco Francioni and Tullio Scovazzi (eds),
International Responsibility for Environmental Harm (London: Graham and Trotman, 1991).
9
Guruswamy, above n 8, 211. See also F V Garcia-Amador et al, Recent Codification of the Law of
State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens (New York: Oceana Publications, 1974), 81.
10
Much of the law of State responsibility originated in disputes concerning the treatment of States to
the nationals of other States. As a result, many of the rules require a bond of nationality. However the
emergence of international human rights law has diminished the importance of nationality. Hall,
above n 1, 164.
11
Guruswamy, above n 8, 835.
12
For a history of the ILC work on international environmental law see Roda Verheyen, Climate
Change Damage and International Law: Prevention Duties and State Responsibility (Leiden:
Martinus Nijhoff, 2005), 228 ff.
13
ILC Draft Articles.
14
See generally Ian Brownlie, System of the Law of Nations: State Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1983).
15
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia
and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) [2007] ICJ Rep 91, 233-35. The ICJ found that Draft
Articles 4 and 8 were a codification of customary international law (at 283-84, 287).
16
Guruswamy, above n 8, 837.
17
ILC Draft Articles, art 1 (Responsibility of a State for its internationally wrongful acts):
‘Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State.’
8
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law and a general principle of law.18 States are responsible for breach of treaty or
customary international law.19 Brownlie states that one can regard responsibility ‘as a
general principle … a concomitant of substantive rules and of the supposition that acts
and omissions may be categorised as illegal by reference to the rules establishing rights
and duties.’20 In the 1980 Rainbow Warrior Case, the Arbitral Tribunal noted that ‘any
violation by a State of any obligation, of whatever origin, gives rise to State
responsibility.’21
The phrase ‘internationally wrongful act’ refers to the breach of international law.
Draft Article 2 defines the concept of internationally wrongful act as an action or
omission that is attributable to the State under international law; and constitutes a
breach of an international obligation of the State.22 There is no need to prove damage
in the definition of an internationally wrongful act.23 Thus, the establishment of an
internationally wrongful act requires two elements to be present. First, the conduct
must be attributable to the State and second, there must be a breach of an international
obligation. Draft Article 12 provides that ‘[t]here is a breach of an international
obligation by a State when an act of that State is not in conformity with what is required
of it by that obligation, regardless of its origin or character.’

18

Hall, above n 1, 165.
See generally Hanqin Xue, Transboundary Damage in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003); Tulio Scovazzi, ‘State Responsibility for Environmental Harm’ (2001) 12
Yearbook of International Environmental Law 43; R Lefeber, Transboundary Environment Inferference
and the Origin of State Liability (The Hague: Kluwer, 1996); Brian D Smith, State Responsibility and
the Marine Environment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).
20
Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (7th edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2008), 436.
21
Rainbow Warrior Case (New Zealand v France) (1990) 20 RIAA 217.
22
ILC Draft Articles, art 2 (Elements of an internationally wrongful act of a State):
‘There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or omission:
(a) Is attributable to the State under international law; and
(b) Constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.’
23
Verdier, above n 3, 858.
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The two elements of an internationally wrongful act are also identified in customary
international law and the decisions of international tribunals. For example, in United
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran,24 the ICJ stated that to establish State
responsibility in the case:
First, it must determine how far, legally, the acts in question may be regarded as imputable to
the Iranian State. Secondly, it must consider their compatibility with the obligations of Iran
under treaties in force or under any other rules of international law that may be applicable. 25

International courts and tribunals generally do not look at questions of intent by
States.26 The ILC Draft Articles do not contain anything on the question of fault. There
is some support for the idea that fault (intention or negligence) is required.27 The
element of fault is especially found in cases relating to a failure to protect the interests
of foreign States from the acts of private persons.28 It has been argued that the ICJ’s
inquiry into Albania’s knowledge of the laying of mines in the Corfu Channel Case
provides authority for the requirement of fault.29 Indeed, the dissenting judgments of
Krylov and Ečer in this case clearly provide that there is a need to prove intention or
negligence.30
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United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v Iran) [1980] ICJ 3, 3.
At para 56.
26
Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, above n 20, 251.
27
See The Home Frontier and Foreign Ministry Society Case (United States v United Kingdom) (1920)
6 RIAA 42, 44 (‘It is a well established principle of international law that no Government can be held
responsible for the act of rebellious bodies of men committed in violation of its authority, where it is
itself guilty of no breach of good faith, or of negligence in suppressing the insurrection.’
28
See e.g. the Iloilo Claims (United Kingdom v United States) (1925) 6 RIAA 158. Also see Mecham
Case (United States v Mexico) (1929) 4 RIAA 440, 443; Neer Case (United States v Mexico) (1926) 4
RIAA 60, 61.
29
See e.g. M Garcia-Mora, International Responsibility for Hostile Acts of Private Persons Against
Foreign States (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), 22.
30
Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v Albania) [1949] ICJ 4, 72 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Krylov); 128 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ečer).
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However, the dominant view is that there is no need to prove intention or negligence
unless this is required by the primary rule.31 In the Corfu Channel Case knowledge by
Albania was required to determine the primary rule (that is, the duty to notify States
of the existence of the mines).32 Similarly, Crawford has commented that ‘[i]f the
primary rules require fault (of a particular character) or damage (of a particular kind)
then they do; if not then not.’33 Thus, the need to examine knowledge is derived from
the primary rule, not any secondary rule of State responsibility. Fault (intent or
negligence) is not required unless the primary rule specifically requires fault.34
In sum, the establishment of State responsibility requires proof of an internationally
wrongful act. There are two elements to be established. First, that the conduct is an act
or omission attributable to the respondent State under international law. Second, that
the act or omission constitutes a breach of an international obligation. The second
element requires consideration of the primary standards of duty, as are provided in the
UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and the LOSC.
C. Standing
The establishment of standing is a necessary element of international litigation.35 The
International Law Commission (ILC) has suggested that there are five categories of

Smith, above n 19, 16; Ian Brownlie, ‘State Responsibility and the International Court of Justice’ in
Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Dan Sarooshi (eds), Issues of State Responsibility Before International
Judicial Institutions (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2004), 12; Lucas Bergkamp, Liability and
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International Context (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001), 156.
32
Brownlie, System of the Law of Nations, above n 14, 12.
33
James Crawford, ‘Revising the Draft Articles on State Responsibility’ (1999) 10(2) European Journal
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Jan Arno Hessbruegge, ‘The Historical Development of the Doctrines of Attribution and Due
Diligence in International Law’ (2003-2004) 36 New York University Journal of International Law and
Politics 265, 270.
35
See generally, René Lefeber, Transboundary Environmental Interference and the Origin of State
Liability (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996); Kathy Leigh, ‘Liability for Damage to the Global
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Africa Cases (Ethiopia v South Africa; Liberia v South Africa) [1966] ICJ 6 (although the League of
31
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standing.36 Firstly, an injured State has standing (i.e., when an obligation owed to a
State is breached).37 Secondly, a specially affected State has standing where the
obligation is owed to either to all States or a group of States including that State.38
Thirdly, a State has standing where it has been injured and the breach affects all States
concerned.39 In all three of these categories, the complaining State is an injured State.
The injured State must show that it has suffered a violation of its rights under
international law40 and that it has an individualised interest in the matter such that it
can bring its own case.41
There are two other categories of standing recognised by the ILC, which are in essence
forms of public interest standing.42 These are where the obligation concerns the
protection of the collective interests of a group of States, including the claimant,43 or
where the obligation is owed to all States (erga omnes). 44 These final two categories

Nations had standing in this case the individual members Liberia and Ethiopia did not); see generally,
Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, above n 20; see e.g., Icelandic Fisheries Cases (UK
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Adjudicating Climate Change (2009), 347.
42
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Maurizio Ragazzi, The Concept of International
Obligation Erga Omnes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).

234

are essentially forms of public interest standing. They allow any State to bring a case
actio popularis or actio pro societate.45 It could be argued that in such cases, the
claimant acts for both itself and States Parties to the subject instrument.46
However, the ICJ was not open to allowing an actio popularis in the Nuclear Tests
Cases47 for enforcement of high seas freedom.48 More recently the Seabed Disputes
Chamber of ITLOS found that the obligations to protect the environment of the high
seas are erga omnes or obligations held by all and owed to the whole world.49 The
Chamber cited Article 48 of the Draft Articles and provided support for essentially an
action popularis in international environmental law. This finding by the Seabed
Disputes Chamber conflicts with the ICJ’s ruling in the Nuclear Tests Case, but is
consistent with the ILC categories. The ILC has recognised these public interest
categories may not be recognised by customary international law.50 Yet even if these
categories exist under international law, standing established under one of the public
interest categories would provide the claimant State with only limited access to
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remedies.51 It would be able to claim cessation52 but to have access to reparations the
claimant State would need to show damage to its interests.53 States must also be injured
in order to apply countermeasures.54
D. Attribution and imputability in international law
According to the principle of sole responsibility, a State is only responsible for its own
acts or omissions; it is not responsible for the acts or omissions of private persons.55
The rationale behind this rule is that the vast majority of private persons are not
expressly or implicitly authorised to act on their State’s behalf56 and that States should
not be responsible for the acts of other actors (e.g. other States). However, imputability
in international law refers to the attribution of a particular act by a physical person, or
a group of physical persons, to a State whereby that act is considered its own.57
There are two principal aspects of attribution in the allocation of State responsibility
in the context of climate change damage. First, can the acts of private corporations and
individuals be attributed to a respondent State? Second, can individual States be
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allocated attribution for climate change damage when there is a responsibility for a
collective failure?
1. Attribution of the acts of private corporations and individuals to States
Generally, international law does not attribute the acts of non-State actors to a State.58
Draft Article 4 provides that only the acts or omissions of State organs or agents are
attributable to the State. Draft Article 5 refers to the conduct of persons or entities
exercising elements of government authority. There are some State owned entities (e.g.
power companies, coal companies) that could fall within Draft Article 4. Some of these
public entities may be primarily governed by private law with some public functions
governed by public law.59 A functional assessment is required to determine whether
the conduct of such entities is attributable to the State.60
The issue for cases concerning climate change damage is that most of the acts are those
of private corporations and individuals. Climate change is not the result of a deliberate
act to cause harm, but is the cumulative effect of routine social and economic activities
such as burning coal, having livestock and driving cars. It is a side effect of activities
that are essential to modern life. None of those acts are international or domestic
crimes.61 There is no prohibition on driving vehicles or operating factors and power
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plants. Generally these acts are not attributable to States. Further, it is virtually
impossible to attribute the conduct of a transnational corporation to a State.62
ILC Draft Article 8 provides that for an act to be attributed to a State, it must be shown
that the State has exercised ‘effective control’ over the activities conducted by the
private persons.63 Draft Article 8 implies that once an activity has been licensed, it is
deemed to be under that State’s control. However, proving attribution under Draft
Article 8 is difficult because it requires a direct agency relationship between the State
and the private person.64 For instance, the ILC provided the example of a State owned
and controlled enterprise and explained that prima facie the conduct would not be
attributable unless the enterprise was exercising elements of government authority
within the meaning of Draft Article 5.65 Therefore, exceptional circumstances would
be required for the conduct of a private corporation to be attributed to a State under
Draft Article 8. It would be necessary to show explicit control and direction exercised
by the State.66
The Trail Smelter Arbitration is sometimes cited as a decision in which attribution was
established for a private corporation to a State. In the Trail Smelter Arbitration, the
matter concerned a company owning the smelters that had its place of business and
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was registered in Canada.67 The dispute was governed by a treaty between the US and
Canada.68 The Tribunal ruled that the:
Dominion of Canada is responsible in international law for the conduct of the Trail Smelter.
Apart from the undertakings in the Convention, it is therefore, the duty of the Government of
the Dominion of Canada to see to it that this conduct should be in conformity with the
obligation of the Dominion under international law as herein determined. 69

One interpretation of this ruling is that the Tribunal found attribution both through the
Convention and under customary international law. However, it appears that the
Tribunal’s reference to ‘undertakings in the Convention’ is in fact a reference to the
undertakings relating to payment of certain sums of money and obligation to
implement the Tribunal’s order.70 Thus, the Trail Smelter Arbitration does not provide
support for the attribution of a private corporation’s conduct to a State.
Another approach is to examine whether the acts of private entities can be attributed
to the State by its failure to exercise due diligence to prevent their commission of an
internationally wrongful act.71 The law of State responsibility recognises that a State
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has a duty to exercise due diligence in the control of private persons.72 If a State fails
to exercise such due diligence, it will be responsible for the resulting acts.73
Furthermore, ILC Draft Article 11 provides that if a State acknowledges or adopts the
conduct of private persons, those acts will be attributed to it.74
While the ILC Draft Articles are not binding, Draft Articles 8 and 11 are reflective of
international case law. The ICJ has considered attribution by omission in a number of
cases, including the Corfu Channel Case,75 the Tehran Hostages Case76 and the
Nicaragua Case. 77 Furthermore, Judge Shahabuddeen (dissenting opinion) applied the
principle of due diligence implicitly in the Nauru Case 1992. The Nauru Case
concerned the exploitation of phosphate mines and the resulting destruction of Nauru’s
land. The phosphor was exploited under the administration of Australia, the UK and
New Zealand under the 1919 Nauru Island Agreement. 78 The Nauru Island Agreement
provided that the phosphate mines were to be exploited without government
intervention or regulation. Judge Shahabuddeen argued that State responsibility should
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arise on the basis that it was not possible to imagine a major industry operating beyond
the competence of the administrative and legislative powers of the State.79
The Seabed Disputes Chamber of ITLOS also provided support due diligence in the
Deep Seabed Advisory Opinion.80 The main question considered by the Chamber was
what obligations a sponsoring State had to ensure that a sponsored contractor meets its
own commitments in relation to activities in the Area. The Chamber noted that the
‘responsibility to ensure’ is relied upon in international law as a compromise between
the two extremes of not attributing any State responsibility for private behavior and
holding a State responsible for all violations by private actors.81 While the Chamber
acknowledged that there was not a precise definition of due diligence under
international law, it provided guidance on the rule.82
The Chamber identified a number of elements of the obligation of due diligence. First,
it noted that ‘measures considered sufficiently diligent at a certain moment may
become not diligent enough in light … of new scientific or technological
knowledge.’83 Thus, the level of due diligence changes as the general state of
knowledge changes. Upon this basis, an obligation of due diligence may have
materialised over time as the science of climate change became clearer and more
certain. Second, the nature of the obligation of due diligence also depends upon the
nature of the risks and the nature of the activities undertaken.84 Thus, the very serious
risks of climate change indicate that the standard of due diligence may be particularly
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high for States. This element is consistent with the precautionary principle, which the
Chamber stated ‘is an integral part of the due diligence of sponsoring states which is
applicable even outside the scope of the regulations.’85
Due diligence requires that the State prevent conduct which, if the State was the actor,
would breach an international obligation it holds.86 ILC Special Rapporteur Rao noted
that while it is not always possible to prohibit risky activities that are important for
economic development, ‘States are under an obligation to authorise them only under
controlled conditions and under strict monitoring while discharging their duty of
prevention of transboundary harm.’87 It is possible to look at several acts or omissions
and view this conduct collectively as composite conduct.88
The standard for due diligence is a subjective one, whereas the standard for positive
acts is generally objective.89 The omission of the State must be willful and linked to
the injury (a subjective standard).90 In the Trail Smelter Arbitration, strict liability was
applied (an objective standard).91 Some commentators have argued for strict liability
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to be applied to environmental harm.92 However, this is not accepted in international
law.93 There is nothing to suggest that there is strict liability for environmental
damage.94
Importantly, under this approach the substance of the duty is left to the primary rules
of international law. Furthermore, it is difficult to understand the concept of an
omission without the primary rules.95 The primary rules cover many subjects and
issues, including environmental law, the law of neutrality, security of foreign States
and their representatives and the international protection of human rights.96 Due
diligence is sometimes expressed as a principle97 but also as a standard. But through
either formulation, due diligence establishes a general normative framework through
which States are required to adopt affirmative measures to prevent and punish
internationally wrongful conduct.98
The success of attribution of an omission depends upon an explicit international
obligation to act.99 States are required to implement laws and policies to meet their
international obligations. However, there is no liability for conduct that complies with
these obligations. In order to determine whether omission is attributable to a State, it
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is necessary to ask: ‘Have those in control of the State objectively failed to take action
required to meet an international obligation?’100
In the Deep Seabed Advisory Opinion, the Chamber of ITLOS considered the question
of legal responsibilities and obligations of a state sponsoring seabed exploration and
mining in accordance with Article 139(1) and Article 4(4) of the LOSC. The text of
this obligation contained the word ‘obligation to ensure’. The Chamber held that this
is an obligation of conduct rather than result, meaning that States Parties are not
required to obtain the contractor’s compliance in every case. The Chamber’s
interpretation of this obligation is similar to the obligation of due diligence and conduct
found by the ICJ in the Pulp Mills Case.101 The Chamber noted that although it is
difficult to describe due diligence in precise terms there are a number of key elements.
The Chamber noted that ‘measures considered sufficiently diligent at a certain moment
may become not diligent enough in light … of new scientific or technological
knowledge.’102 Thus, the level of due diligence changes as the general state of
knowledge changes. This is important in the context of climate change damage
because the state of knowledge of the process and its associated affects have increased
over time.
As was argued in Chapter 3, the UNFCCC does not provide any primary rules that
could be relied upon by a claimant State. The obligations are too vague to provide the
basis of a claim. Similarly, Chapter 5 argued that there is little scope for relying upon
the obligations contained in the LOSC because of difficulties in applying these primary
rules to greenhouse gas emissions. On the other hand, Chapter 4 found that the Kyoto
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Protocol provides specific and clear obligations for Annex B Parties to reduce their
greenhouse gas emissions in the period 2008-2012 (QELROs). Thus, the QELROs
provide a primary rule requiring positive action by Annex B Parties that would be
subject to due diligence. If emissions of a State exceed its specific QELRO target, it
may be held liable for those additional emissions, even if they have been sourced from
private persons. 103
There are a range of factors for tribunals and courts to consider in such matters. First,
the feasibility of effective State action needs to be determined. If no reasonable degree
of diligence could have prevented the event, the State will not be responsible.104
However, if effective action could have been undertaken the State will be held
responsible.105 This element could be a potential barrier for claimant States because
arguably the occurrence of climate change damage could not have been prevented by
one State reducing its emissions. On the other hand, it is within the control of a State
to reduce its own emissions through regulation. Many of these activities are subject to
government regulation and licensing, including the transport and electricity industries.
Presumably, it is within the scope of Annex B Parties to reduce their greenhouse gas
emissions to meet their QELRO targets.
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The second factor is the foreseeability of conduct by private persons.106 The test
involves a hybrid of subjective and objective considerations.107 In the context of
climate change damage, the conduct of private persons would generally be foreseeable
through an understanding of economic projections and development approvals which
are core government activities. Third, an examination of the interests at stake should
be undertaken. The response needs to be proportional to the nature of the threat.108 The
threat of climate damage is very high, with a high degree of scientific certainty of
irreversible and catastrophic impacts predicted. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude
that a State that fails to meet its QELRO target could be held responsible for a failure
of due diligence.
2. Attribution to individual States with responsibility for a collective failure
The principle of sovereignty implies that a State is not responsible for the acts of
another State.109 An act is generally only attributed to one actor at a time.110 The
Commentary to the ILC Draft Articles provides that in principle attribution is
determined on an individual basis and is an exclusive operation.111 However, there are
a number of scenarios in which a form of shared attribution could arise. In Ago’s Third
Report, he gave the example of where the acts of the organ of a State have been put to
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the disposal of another State.112 Ago stated that such a situation would require the
tribunal or court to ‘ascertain in each particular instance on whose behalf and by whose
authority a specific act or omission has been committed.’113 Thus, in Ago’s opinion
the determination of individual attribution remains paramount.
On the other hand, the ILC explained that if two States set up a common organ then
the conduct of that organ can be attributed to both of the States concurrently. 114 The
ILC has also recognised that two separate acts, attributable to different actors, can
result in a single injury.115 Conduct can be attributed to two or more actors
simultaneously.116 It is also possible for separate conduct to result in a single injury.117
In the Behrami Case,118 the European Court of Human Rights considered issues of
multiple attribution and plural responsibility. However, it seemed to rule out the
possibility of attribution to more than one entity.119 In this case, the responsible States
were Parties to the European Convention on Human Rights120 and had human rights
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obligations for the peace operation of the United Nations in Kosovo. 121 The court
found that the troops’ actions and omissions were attributable to the UN, not the
respondent States.122 It stated that the UN Security Council ‘retained ultimate authority
and control and that effective command of the relevant operational matters were
retained by NATO.’123 Therefore, the court struck out the Behrami Case for
incompatibility ratione personae, finding a lack of person jurisdiction over the UN
because it was not a Party to the European Convention on Human Rights. The court’s
decision seemed to ‘imply that those same acts and omissions [were] not attributable
to the member States themselves.’124
It is difficult to reconcile the Behrami Case with the ILC Draft Articles on
Responsibility of International Organisations which provides for findings of multiple
attibution.125 However, the case occurred before Draft Article 47 of the ILC Draft
Articles on Responsibility of International Organisations was drafted and there may
have been a different result if the court had the opportunity to consider Draft Article
47. Draft Article 47 explicitly allows for plurality of responsibility.126 Draft Article 6
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reparation may have against the other responsible States or internaitonal organisations.’
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leaves open the possibility of multiple attribution.127 Furthermore, the ILC’s
Commentary on Draft Articles 5 to 8 provides further recognition that multiple
attribution may be found:
Although it may not frequently occur in practice, dual or even multiple attribution of conduct
cannot be excluded. Thus, attribution of a certain conduct to an international organisation does
not imply that the same conduct cannot be attributed to a State, nor does vice versa attribution
of conduct to a State rule out attribution of the same conduct to an international organisation.128

In addition, the European Court of Human Rights distinguished the Al-Jedda Case129
from the Behrami Case when faced with similar questions of attribution. In the AlJedda Case, Mr Al-Jedda alleged that he was detailed by British troops in Iraq in
breach of Article 5.1 of the European Convention on Human Rights.130 The court
found that the acts were attributable to the United Kingdom and distinguished the case
on the basis that the United Kingdom had entered Iraq without a UN Security Council
mandate whereas the international security presence in Kosovo had been established
by UNSC Resolution 1244.131 The court held that the authorisations provided in UNSC
Resolutions after the invasion by the United Kingdom did not preclude attribution.132
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ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organisations, art 6 (Conduct of organs or
agents placed at the disposal of an international organisation by a State or another international
organisation):
‘The conduct of an organ of a state or an organ or agent of another international organisation shall be
considered under international law an act of the latter organisation if the organisation exercises effective
control over that conduct.’
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Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Sixth Sesion, UN GAOR 59th
Sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc 8/59/10 (2004), 101.
129
Al-Jedda v United Kingdom [2011] ECHR 1092 (7 July 2011). See also Al-Skeini & Ors v United
Kingdom [2011] ECHR 1093 (7 July 2011) where the United Kingdom was estopped from relying upon
arguments of attribution because it did not raise these before the national court.
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Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 4
November 1950, ETS No 5, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953).
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Al-Jedda v United Kingdom [2011] ECHR 1092 (7 July 2011), paras 23-24.
132
For an earlier analysis of this case and the Behrami Case, see Damien van der Toorn, ‘Attribution of
Conduct by State Armed Forces Participating in UN-authorised Operations: The Impact of Behrami and
Al-Jedda’ (2008) 15 Australian International Law Journal 9.
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Thus, the status of the Behrami Case is not entirely clear and it may not be relied upon
to prevent a finding of attribution where there are multiple actors.
While there is scope for multiple attribution to be found under international law, the
most difficult scenario to establish attribution is where different conduct results in the
commission of the same internationally wrongful act. 133 This is the case for climate
change damage whereby greenhouse gas emissions from across the world contribute
to the occurrence or risk of climate change. The multilateral nature of climate change
makes the pinpointing of States almost impossible.134 Furthermore, plaintiffs who
bring cases with a multiplicity of wrongdoing actors are at risk of being unable to
identify the specific acts of the States to establish attribution, as occurred in the
Saddam Hussein Case.135 In this case, Hussein brought a case against 21 EU member
States over the invasion of Iraq yet he was unable to identify the specific acts of the
States to establish attribution (also discussed in Section G.1 below).
The problem of multiple attribution is likely to be a formidable barrier for any claims
seeking to rely upon obligations of a shared nature in the UNFCCC and LOSC. For
example, if a claimant State sought to rely upon Article 4.2 of the UNFCCC, arguing
that the respondent State had failed to modify long term trends of greenhouse gas
emissions, it would be virtually impossible to pinpoint individual State conduct that
resulted in a breach. A similar problem relates to many of the LOSC commitments
which in the context of climate change damage would be generic in application.
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Nollkaemper and Jacobs, above n 115, 73.
See generally Guruswamy, above n 8, 834.
135
See e.g. Hussein v Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine and the United Kingdom (dec), no. 23276/04. ECHR 2006.
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On the other hand, a case alleging a breach by the respondent State of its QELRO
target would likely be able to distinguish sufficiently the State’s relevant omission that
has resulted in the excess emissions. Although Article 3.1 of the Kyoto Protocol is
based upon collective action it also differentiates individual State responsibility which
could form the basis of attribution in a case. Therefore, the problem of multiple
attribution is dependent upon whether the primary rule provides scope for such
attribution. The highest legal exposure in this regard is found in Article 3.1 of the
Kyoto Protocol, which allocates individual State obligations as part of collective
action. However, it is possible that the problems of multiple attribution may be
overcome if an appropriate method of apportioning responsibility is identified and
applied (see Section G below)
E. Causation
Causation is required for claims seeking reparations. Establishing causation under
international law is a complex task.136 Causation requires the establishment of a causal
link, which means that the injury results from and is ascribable to the wrongful act.137
Causation may be categorised into general and specific causation.138 General causation
refers to the establishment of a causal link between an activity (i.e., GHG emissions)
and a general outcome (i.e., climate change). In contrast, specific causation refers to
establishing a causal link between a specific activity and a specific outcome.139

See e.g. Michelle Foster, ‘Causation in Context: Interpreting the Nexus Clause in the Refugee
Convention’ (2002) 23 Michigan Journal of International Law 265.
137
Ibid.
138
See generally David Grossman, ‘Warming Up to a Not-so-radical Idea: Tort-based Climate Change
Litigation’ (2003) 28 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 1, 22.
139
See generally, Tom Christoffel & Stephen P Teret, ‘Epidemiology & the Law: Courts & Confidence
Intervals’ (1991) 81 American Journal of Public Health 1661 (in relation to toxic tort cases); James
Henderson and Aaron Twerski, Products Liability: Problems and Process (Aspen Law & Business, 3rd
edition, 1997), 143; Heckman v. Federal Press Co., 587 F.2d 612, 617 (3d Cir. 1978) (‘Expectancy or
statistical data about a group do not establish concrete facts about an individual.’).
136
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Claimant States will face considerable obstacles in attempting to prove causation for
climate change damage.140 Climate change is a complex process that is associated with
both historical and current or recent factors. These factors include natural climate
change processes, the general contribution of multiple actors (not all of which may be
Party to the litigation) and the specific contribution of the respondent State.
Furthermore, the process of climate change and its relationship to the resulting damage
is generally not clearly understood. Although the science of climate change on a global
scale is fairly certain, drawing conclusions about specific or even regional impacts is
a more difficult task. Nonetheless, scientific models are less useful for establishing
specific causation. These challenges manifest both in relation to causation in fact and
legal causation.141
a) Causation in fact

Causation in fact refers to determining whether a defendant’s wrongful act is an actual
cause of the plaintiff’s damage.142 There are two main approaches to factual causation:
the deterministic approach143 (including the ‘but for’ test or sine qua non test144) and
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Joseph Smith and David Shearman, Climate Change Litigation: Analysis of the law, scientific
evidence and impacts on the environment, health and property (Adelaide: Presidian Legal Publications,
2006), 107 (‘Establishing legal causation in climate change actions – that is, proving that a defendant’s
actions caused the harm suffered by the plaintiff – will pose the greatest obstacle for a majority of
plaintiffs.’).
141
Ibid; Peter Cashman and Ross Abbs, ‘Liability in Tort for Damage Arising from Human-Induced
Climate Change’ in Rosemary Lyster (ed), In the Wilds of Climate Law (Bowen Hills: Australian
Academic Press, 2010).
142
David Bederman, ‘Contributory Fault and State Responsibility’ (1990) 30 Vanderbilt Journal of
International Law 335, 349 (Factual causation ‘requires a determination of whether the state’s wrongful
act or omission constituted a necessary link in the chain of circumstances leading to the claimant’s
injuries.’)
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F V Garcia-Amador, Sixth Report on State Responsibility, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/134(Jan. 26,
1961); Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, Second Report on State responsibility, at 33, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/425
(June 9 and 22, 1989); Gray, above n 37, 169.
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The act is an indispensable condition for the damage to have occurred (conditio sine qua non).
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probabilistic approach. Both approaches require proof of general and specific
causation.
1. Deterministic approach
The ‘but for’ test or sine qua non test is a deterministic approach to factual causation
commonly used by both domestic courts and international tribunals.145 This test
emerges from common law tort jurisprudence.146 The ‘but for’ test asks ‘but for the
defendant’s act, would the harm have occurred?’ Or alternatively: the act is an
indispensable condition for the damage to have occurred (conditio sine qua non). The
‘but for’ test is best applied when all the facts relevant to the dispute are available and
easily assessed.147
Many authors have argued that it is virtually impossible to establish causation for
climate change damage when the ‘but for’ test is applied particularly in relation to
specific causation.148 Climate science has a reasonably high degree of certainty that
global sea level rise and certain other impacts can be attributed to climate change.
Similarly, there is strong evidence that anthropogenic CO2 is driving global ocean
acidification.149 Furthermore, climate change litigation at the national level indicates
that courts are becoming increasingly receptive towards climate change science.150
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F V Garcia-Amador, Sixth report on State responsibility, 6th report, Yearbook ILC 1961-II, UN
Doc A/CN.4/134, 6; G. Arangio-Ruiz, Second Report on State responsibility, Yearbook ILC 1989 Vol
II, Part I, A/CN.4/426, 33; Gray, above n 37, 169.
In NSW, it must be determined whether the negligence was a ‘necessary condition of the occurrence of
the harm’: Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), sec 5D(1)(a).
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James D Fry, ‘Coercion, Causation and the Fictional Elements of Indirect State Responsibility’
(2007) 40(3) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 611, 632.
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Ibid, 634.
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See e.g. Grossman, above n 138, 24.
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R P Kelly, et al, ‘Mitigating Local Causes of Ocean Acidification with Existing Laws’ (2011) 332
Science 1036.
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See e.g., Massachussets v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 521 (2007). For example, the Court rejected the
unscientific idea that other environmental pollutants do not share common ground with greenhouse gas
emissions. Lisa Heinzerling, ‘Thrower Keynote Address: The Role of Science in Massachusetts v. EPA’
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Establishing specific causation would be a more difficult task. However, it is possible
that the problems associated with establishing specific causation may be overcome by
the fact that, in international law before international tribunals, it would be States
bringing the litigation rather than individuals. States have longer lifespan than
individuals and their interests may cover large areas.151 This increased scope of time
and space should allow the aggregation of effects and make the process of establishing
causation easier. Specifically, it should be easier for a State to establish causation for
a large number of extreme weather events over an extended period that have caused
widespread damage to the State, rather than one farmer attempting to establish
causation for a single extreme weather event that caused damage to his or her land.
However, the ‘but for’ test would also require proof that without the respondent State’s
emissions, the damage that the claimant State suffered would not have occurred. This
test is poorly suited to climate change because the processes are cumulative.152 No one
State is responsible for the phenomenon. Thus, it would be difficult to satisfy a
deterministic approach to causation for specific causation.153 In such situations it is
generally necessary to consider an alternative test of factual causation to the ‘but for’
or the sine qua non test.

(2008) 58 Emory Law Journal 411, 419. See generally Richard Lord et al., Climate Change Liability:
Transnational Law and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
151
Grossman, above n 138, 25.
152
See generally, Anthony M Honoré, ‘Causation and Remoteness of Damage’ in André Tunc (ed),
International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck,1983).
153
E M Peñalver, ‘Acts of God or Toxic Torts? Applying Tort Principles to the Problem of Climate
Change’ (1998) 38 Natural Resources Journal 563, 592. See Sindell v Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d
924, 937 (Cal. 1980); Hymowitz v. Ely Lilly & Co., 539 N.E. 2d 1069, 1076 (N.Y. 1989). CF
Verheyen, above n 12, 254.
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2. Probabilistic approach
The ‘but for’ test is often replaced with more flexible tests in national courts for matters
that concern mixed sources of causation.154 For example, in Fairchild v Glenhaven
(2002)155 the House of Lords held that if damage has been caused by one of two
defendants and both have breached the duty of care owed to the plaintiff, but that the
science was not sufficient to determine which defendant’s breach had caused the harm,
both of the defendants will be liable. Such an approach requires consideration of
whether the defendant’s conduct has caused a ‘material increase in risk’156 or made a
‘material contribution’ to the harm.157 Therefore, one approach to causation in
international climate change litigation could be to consider whether the respondent
State’s conduct has caused a material increase in risk for the occurrence of harm.158
This probabilistic approach to causation would be better suited to the problem of
climate change because no one State’s greenhouse gas emissions are the cause.159
There is also some support for such a probablistic approach in international case law.
Specifically, the Nuclear Tests Cases concerned alleged damage caused to Australia

See Erik Knutsen, ‘Ambiguous Cause-in-Fact and Structured Causation: A Multi-Jurisdictional
Approach’ (2003) 38 Texas International Law Journal 249, 253-254; Robert V Percival, ‘Liability for
Environmental Harm and Emerging Global Environmental Law’ (2010) 25 Maryland Journal of
International Law 37.
The Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) provides that in ‘determining an exceptional case, in accordance
with established principles, whether negligence that cannot be established as a necessary condition of
the occurrence of harm should be accepted as establishing factual causation, the court is to consider
(amongst other relevant things) whether or not and why responsibility for the harm should be imposed
on the negligent party.’: sec 5D(2).
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[2002] UKHL 22.
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Fairchild v Glenhaven [2002] UKHL 22. Also see McGee v National Coal Board [1972] 3 All ER
1008; [1973] 1 WLR 1; Wallaby Grip (BAE) Pty Ltd v Macleay Area Health Service (1998) 17
NSWCCR 355.
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Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] UKHL 1; [1956] AC 613. Also see Strong v Woolworths
Ltd [2012] HCA 5.
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Myles R Allen and Richard Lord, ‘The Blame Game: who will pay for the damaging consequences
of climate change?’ (2004) 432 Nature 551.
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Deliberation: The Precautionary Principle’s Contribution to the Uncertainties Surrounding Climate
Change Liability (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2011).
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and New Zealand by France’s testing of nuclear weapons in the South Pacific. 160 In
its pleadings, Australia contended that any additional exposure to radioactive
contamination, no matter how small, substantially contributed to the risk of radiationrelated injuries.161 Although the ICJ did not decide on this point in the case, Australia’s
reasoning is relevant to potential international climate litigation.162 According to this
approach, the appropriate question is ‘Did the respondent State’s contribution cause
additional exposure to the damage suffered?’163 This test could be adapted in light of
domestic tort law to ask whether the respondent State’s acts have caused a ‘material
increase in risk.’164
On the other hand, the move to a probabilistic model of causation may not resolve the
difficulties in proving causation for climate change. These probabilistic theories are
complex and are at risk of creating a ‘viciously circular’ approach to causality. 165
Furthermore, climate change has a multitude of contributing causes, rather than a
handful or less that is typical of tort cases decided in national courts. It may be that no
individual State’s conduct would meet a threshold of ‘material increase in risk’. For
example, the obligation of Annex B Parties to meet their QELRO targets (Article 3.1
of the Kyoto Protocol) has been previously identified as the possible basis of a claim.
However, the wrongful conduct in such a scenario would only be the excess emissions
of the State beyond their QELRO target. The increased risk of harm created by these
specific emissions is unlikely to be of a ‘material’ nature when viewed in the context
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Nuclear Tests Cases (Australia v France) [1974] ICJ 253; (New Zealand v. France) [1974] ICJ 457.
Nuclear Tests Cases (Australia v France) [1974] ICJ 253, 500 (Oral arguments on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility).
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of world emissions or even the historic emissions of the respondent State itself.
Therefore, while a probabilistic approach to causation is better suited to the problem
of climate change, such an approach is unlikely to resolve issues of causation. This
further reduces the legal exposure of respondent States to possible international
climate litigation.
3. Legal causation
Legal causation refers to the notion that a causal relationship can be established
between a particular wrongful act and a particular damage.166 Legal causation is
focused upon the question of whether a person should be held responsible for a
particular damage.167 In essence, legal causation asks ‘Is there any principle which
precludes the treatment of Y as the consequence of X for legal purposes?’168 It would
be absurd to be responsible for every factual causally linked consequence indefinitely.
In this sense, causation under the law is a social construct for attributing responsibility
and is used to limit liability.169
There is no explicit test for causation under the ILC Draft Articles. The Commentary
to Draft Article 31 observes that ‘[i]n international as in national law, the question of
remoteness of damage “is not a part of the law which can be satisfactorily solved by
search of a single verbal formula.”’170 However, the leading test of legal causation is
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the proximate cause or foreseeability test171 which has been applied by a number of
international tribunals.172 There are two elements in proximate causation, namely:
natural sequence and foreseeability.173
(a) Natural sequence
First, the consequences that flow from the wrongful conduct should be normal from
an objective standpoint.174 The proximate cause test requires an objective
consideration of whether there was a ‘natural sequence’ between the conduct and
damage.175 To determine what is the normal consequence of an act, tribunals may refer
to usage, customs and the laws of States. They may also look to science. 176
The current state of climate science would likely establish that the process of climate
change is a natural and normal consequence of anthropogenic GHG emissions. It may
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be more difficult to show that the specific damages suffered by a claimant State are
the natural and normal consequence of the respondent State’s greenhouse gas
emissions. However, the fact that all greenhouse gas emissions contribute to climate
change damage could be used to support a finding that there is a natural sequence
between the wrongful conduct and the specific damage suffered by a claimant State.
(b) Foreseeability
Second, the element of foreseeability has been applied in a number of international
cases. 177 For example, when the proximate cause test was applied by the EritreaEthiopia Claims Commission in relation to a conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia in
1999-2000,178 the Commission focused upon the element of foreseeability.179
Applying foreseeability, the Commission found that it was ‘or clearly should have
been foreseeable that these military operations would result in Ethiopian casualties and
damage to Ethiopian civil property.’180 Foreseeability has also been considered in a
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number of other international cases and arbitrations.181 This element is related to the
notion of whether the damage is too remote.182
Under this component of the test, a claimant State would need to demonstrate that it
was foreseeable to the respondent State that its wrongful conduct would result in the
damage incurred by the claimant State. There exists a body of scientific evidence of
the process of anthropogenic climate change. A brief history of climate change science
is presented in Table 6-2 below.183
Table 6-2 A brief history of climate change science
Year
1824
1896

1938

1958

1990
1995
2001

2007

Event
Joseph Fourier described a ‘greenhouse effect’ in a paper presented to Paris’
Académie Royale des Sciences.
Svante Arrhenius proposed the concept of a man-made greenhouse effect. Arrhenius
hypothesised that the increase in the burning of coal since the Industrial Revolution
could lead to an increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide and heat up the planet.
Guy Steward Callendar compiled temperature statistics and found that over the
previous century mean temperature and CO2 levels had risen markedly. He
concluded that the mean temperature rise was most likely caused by the increase in
CO2.
Charles Keeling began continuous monitoring of CO2 levels in the atmosphere. The
Keeling Curve was developed which continues to chart the year on year rise of CO2
concentrations.
The IPCC provided its First Assessment Report and predicted an increase of 0.3˚C
each decade in the 21st Century.
The IPCC provided its Second Assessment Report and reported that ‘the balance of
evidence suggests a discernible human influence on global climate’.
The IPCC provided its Third Assessment Report and found with 66-90% confidence
that most of the observed warming over the prior 50 years was likely to have been
due to the increase in greenhouse gas concentrations.
The IPCC released its Fourth Assessment Report and found that ‘warming of the
climate system is unequivocal’ and most of the increase in global average
temperatures since the mid 20th Century is the result of anthropogenic greenhouse
gas emissions (greater than 90% certainty). The IPCC further stated that the level
of temperature and sea rise in the 21 st Century would depende upon the extent or
limit of emissions in coming years.
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Scientists first began exploring the concept of climate change in the 1820s. These early
considerations of climate science could be relied upon to support the view that climate
change was a foreseeable consequence of greenhouse gas emissions. However, the
strongest evidence in this regard would be through reference to the work of the IPCC.
The IPCC reports are endorsed as decisions of the COP (as discussed in Chapter 2)
and provide a clear indication of foreseeability. Finally, at least from the time that the
UNFCCC was agreed to in 1992, climate change was a foreseeable consequence for
the Parties.
In addition, a determination of foreseeability will depend upon the primary rule relied
upon and the type of injury suffered by the claimant State. National courts have
generally held that it is not necessary for the specific injury to have been foreseen; it
is sufficient for the type or kind of injury to be reasonably foreseeable.184 Furthermore,
even if the claimant State is particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change,
this vulnerability should not reduce the potential liability of the respondent State.185
This could be an important factor given that a number of States are very vulnerable to
climate change due to their existing economic, social, political and environmental
circumstances. All of these steps required to establish causation for climate change
damage under international law are summarised in the following flowchart, Figure 61.
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Figure 6-1: Causation flow chart for climate change damage in international
litigation
F. Standard of proof
The standard of proof in transnational and international environmental cases is
ambiguous.186 In the Trail Smelter Arbitration, the tribunal required ‘clear and
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convincing’ evidence.187 In the Pulp Mills Case, Judge Greenwood stated that the
standard of proof was on the balance of probabilities (otherwise described as the
balance of the evidence).188
In common law States, the standard of proof generally applied in relation to civil
damages cases is on the balance of probabilities. Toxic tort and medical cases have
been won in these courts on the basis that the statistical evidence provided a greater
than a 51% likelihood that the act caused the injury. 189 In contrast, the German civil
law system and some other jurisdictions require proof beyond reasonable doubt.190
In relation to a serious allegation that a State had laid sea mines, the ICJ commented
that ‘a charge of such exceptional gravity against a State would require a high degree
of certainty’.191 However, in the same case (the Corfu Channel Case), the ICJ found
causation between the mines and damage on a standard that was much less than 100%.
The ICJ also allowed circumstantial evidence in this case. Cheng has assessed the case
law of international tribunals and found that these tribunals ‘arrive at the moral
conviction of the truth of the whole case’.192
The precautionary principle, which is contained in the UNFCCC, may be used to
influence the standard of proof.193 ITLOS has adopted the view that the precautionary
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principle may be used to lower the standard of proof of environmental harm.194
However, in Pulp Mills, the ICJ appeared to reject the idea of lowering the standard of
proof.195 Due to these conflicting approaches, it is not entirely clear how the
precautionary principle would be applied in an international climate change case. It
may be that ITLOS would adopt a more progressive application, allowing the standard
of proof to be lowered in such a case whereas the ICJ may not.196
Without adequate international action, climate change threatens to cause irreversible
harm to the atmosphere.197 While unlikely, international tribunals could use the
precautionary principle to find that States are liable for the climate change impacts of
their acts unless they are able to prove that their activities did not cause damage to the
claimant State.198 Although it is unclear exactly what standard of proof would be
applied in international climate litigation, the application of the precautionary principle
adds weight to the view that it should be on the balance of probabilities and certainly
less than 100%.
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G. Apportionment of responsibility
Multiple actors have contributed to the process of climate change and therefore to
climate change damage. Generally, States are only responsible for the outcomes that
can be attributed to their own actions (known as sole responsibility). As discussed
above, climate change is an example of several States engaging in conduct which
cumulatively results in damage to other States. There is no clear international law on
how to allocate responsibility when there are multiple wrongdoers 199 and there is a
lack of literature on multiple State responsibility. However, multiple State
responsibility appears to have no effect on determinations of remedies, except
pecuniary compensation.200 All other remedies can be determined irrespective of sole
responsibility. This section considers the possible approaches that international courts
and tribunals may use to allocate responsibility. These are sole responsibility, joint or
several responsibility, market share responsibility and common but differentiated
responsibility.
1. Sole responsibility
The ordinary rule of international law is that States are only individually
responsible.201 The ILC has stated a principle that if two States cause an injury, each
State is responsible for its own wrong.202 Much of the case law that has considered
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situations with multiple actors has been based upon the concept of sole
responsibility.203 An example of where shared responsibility could arise is where a
State has been directed or controlled by another State.204 However, Dominicé argued
that even in this scenario responsibility remains individual.205 The East Timor Case
indicates that there is some scope for plurality of responsibility under the doctrine of
sole responsibility.206 Therefore, there is some scope within the concept of sole
responsibility to address cases with a multiplicity of wrongdoing actors.
However, there are many limitations with applying sole responsibility to such
scenarios.207 It may be necessary to apportion responsibility where there is a
multiplicity of wrongdoing actors208 but sole responsibility does not provide a basis
for apportioning responsibility. Even the procedures of the ICJ assume and reinforce
sole responsibility.209 A further disadvantage of sole responsibility is that the victim
States would need to bring many individual cases at great expense. Sole responsibility
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requires that the injured State claim individually against each contributing State.210 As
argued by Rauschning, requiring claimant States to bring claims against each polluting
State would ‘make the concept of State responsibility a useless weapon against
unlawful transfrontier pollution’.211
A further problem is that international courts have simplified complex shared scenarios
into ‘binary categories’212 of States that are responsible and those that are not. The risk
with such simplifications is that too much or too little responsibility may be allocated
to one State or actor.213 One example of sole responsibility resulting in too little
responsibility is found in the Saddam Hussein Case.214 Hussein brought a case in the
European Court of Human Rights against 21 EU member States allegedly implicated
in the invasion of Iraq and his capture. The ECHR held that no responsibility could be
found provided Hussein could not identify the specific acts of the States.215
Such cases are also at risk of leading to blame-shifting games between actors.216 For
example, in the Srebrenica Cases, which concerned alleged acts and omissions of the
Netherlands and the UN in relation to the protection of Srebrenica, both denied
responsibility and shifted the blame to the other actor.217 Thus, there is a paradox in
international law because ‘as the responsibility for any given instance of conduct is
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scattered among more people, the discrete responsibility of every individual
diminishes proportionately.’218
On the other hand, sole responsibility can result in too much responsibility being
allocated to one State. For instance, in the Nauru Case which concerned concerted
action of Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, Ago considered that it
would be on ‘an extremely questionable basis if Australia was held fully
responsible.’219
Therefore, while there is some scope for sole responsibility to be applied to cases with
a multiplicity of wrongdoing States, as in the case of climate change damage, there are
a series of limitations that make such application inappropriate. It risks creating either
too much or too little responsibility for wrongdoing States and may ultimately mean
that no responsibility is found. Thus, it is necessary to consider alternative
formulations of responsibility and their applicability under international law.
2. Joint and several liability
One alternative approach to cases with a multiplicity of wrongdoing States is joint and
several liability. International tribunals do not generally consider the principle of joint
and several liability. Brownlie argues that joint and several liability is not yet a part of
international law on the basis that there is no State practice or literature to support it.220
As Okowa has commented, international law ‘has not developed sophisticated rules
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and procedures for adjudicating and apportioning responsibility between States in the
position of multiple tortfeasors’.221
International law recognises that two or more States may take identical wrongful acts
in concert or simultaneously. Draft Article 47 of the ILC Draft Articles states that
where more than one State is responsible ‘the same wrongful act’ ‘responsibility of
each State may be invoked in relation to that act’. The ILC provided no opinion of
whether responsibility may be joint or joint and several. 222 However, the ILC stated
that the principle in Draft Article 47 was similar to joint and several liability but that
it made that analogy ‘with care’.223 Furthermore, it should be noted that Draft Article
47 is in the section on implementation, not the section on breach of obligation and
reparation (which may lessen its relevance for determining responsibility).
Some international treaties specifically refer to the principle of joint and several
liability.224 Liability is ‘joint’ in the sense that two or more States are held responsible
for each other’s wrongful acts. Liability is ‘several’ to the extent that each State is held
separately liable. However, it is unlikely that these treaties reflect customary
international law.
On the other hand, joint and several liability could be applied by drawing upon past
international cases.225 There are a number of cases in which joint or several
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responsibility has been considered. In the Oil Platforms Case, Judge Simma argued
that joint and several liability is a general principle of law recognised by major
domestic legal systems.226 Simma called for the principle to be included in
international law.227 In the 1992 Nauru v Australia Case, the ICJ considered Nauru’s
request for compensation from Australia for damage caused by phosphate mining.228
Judge Shahbuddeen (dissenting opinion) considered that the concept of joint and
several liability exists in international law and that the principle should apply in the
case due to the nexus between Australia, New Zealand and the UK (the Joint
Authority).229 The International Seabed Authority has confirmed the possibility of
joint responsibility between States that sponsor an entity that engages in the
exploitation and exploration of the deep seabed.230
However, perhaps the most important example is found in the Corfu Channel Case.
Although no explicit reference was made to joint and several liability, the ICJ found
that the actor who laid the mines was unknown and that Albania’s breach was in
knowingly allowing its territory to be used to damage another State. This indicates that
the ICJ relied upon a form of joint liability for these independent wrongdoers for the
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entire amount of compensation.231 Furthermore, the Seabed Disputes Chamber of
ITLOS recently provided strong support in an Advisory Opinion for what essentially
amounted to actio popularis in international environmental law.232
Thus, it is possible that an international court or tribunal could apportion responsibility
for climate change damage on the basis of joint and several liability. One major
weakness with such an approach is that there is no treaty relating to rights of recourse
and there is nothing under customary international law to indicate a general right of
recourse.233 Thus, joint liability is also at risk of creating too much responsibility for
an individual State. However, if several liability is applied to the problem of climate
change damage this would entail a division of liability between wrongdoing States and
thus avoid imposing too much responsibility.
3. Market share liability
An alternative formulation is to adopt a market share liability approach which is found
in the US. Market share liability originated out of the US in the context of
diethylstilbestrol (DES) litigation.234 DES was a synthetic composite of estrogen used
during 1938 to 1971 to prevent miscarriages and pre-term births. It was later found to
cause vaginal and cervical cancer in females exposed in the womb.
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In Sindell v Abbot Laboratories235 the court held that where it was not possible to
identify the specific producer of a fungible product and the plaintiff was not at fault
for this failure of identification, liability should be based on the percentage of the
product that the defendant sold on the market.236 The court justified its modification
of the traditional tort rules on the basis of policy considerations, including the risk to
innocent victims, the ability of the defendants to absorb the costs of harm and
fairness.237 The court held that the defendant must contribute a ‘substantial percentage’
of the market but did not specify what percentage this would require.
Market share liability is generally applied as a form of several liability, meaning that
if not all possible defendants are joined to the dispute then a plaintiff is at risk of
recovering less than full compensation.238 However, a number of US courts rejected
market share liability, primarily due to policy concerns.239 Courts have also been
reluctant to expand market share liability to other types of cases.240 In fact, market
share liability has been rarely used since the 1980s and is perhaps a ‘defunct
doctrine’.241
Nonetheless, commentators have argued for its application to climate litigation in the
US context. For instance, Grimm argued that although no single product is responsible
for climate change, greenhouse gas emissions from numerous non-fungible industries
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‘combine to form a fungible cause of global warming.’242 Further, once released
greenhouse gas emissions are indivisible and so every greenhouse gas emitter
contributes to the occurrence of harm.243 One of the challenges of domestic climate
litigation is that there are absent causes.244 Even the US market is relatively limited
when seen within the context of global emissions.
However, if a market share approach was adopted for international climate litigation,
this could potentially encompass all or most of the ‘market’. Specifically, liability
could be apportioned amongst States on the basis of each State’s share of total
greenhouse gas emissions. 245 On the other hand, it is unlikely that an international
tribunal or court would adopt the market share approach to apportioning responsibility
given that it is not found in international law and has little support in domestic legal
systems. Furthermore, even if applied, the approach may be restricted to respondent
States that have contributed a substantial percentage of greenhouse gas emissions. This
restriction would severely limit application of the approach and may mean that only
the major emitters (e.g. US and EU) could be held liable.
4. Common but differentiated responsibility
An alternative and potentially innovative approach to the problem of allocating
responsibility would be to apply the principle of common but differentiated
responsibility.246 When obligations are of a collective nature, shared responsibility
may be implied if the obligation is breached.247 The climate regime provides the
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‘clearest attempt to transform common but differentiated responsibility from a legal
concept into a policy instrument.’248
The market share approach discussed above could be one possible application of
common but differentiated responsibility, although the principle would not necessary
require such application. However, the principle of common but differentiated
responsibility calls for a more considered approach that integrates questions of equity
and justice, rather than simply considering the gross emissions or market share of a
particular actor.
Applying common but differentiated responsibility, a court or tribunal could hold that
wrongdoing States are liable in common for their emissions, but that their liability is
differentiated by their historical contribution and their ability to act. This approach
could provide a basis for apportioning liability to developed States in accordance with
their contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions within the context of their ability
to adopt a lower emissions pathway. Although such an approach would be novel, it
would be grounded in the principles of the international climate change regime and
ensure that no one State is given too much or too little responsibility for the problem
of climate change damage. It also allows for the consideration of the wider context of
a State’s behaviour, including their economic circumstances, scientific knowledge and
understanding and other considerations relevant to its ability to act. However, it must
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be noted that the issue of culpability remains particularly contentious amongst
States.249
Another possible view is that the Kyoto Protocol represents an ex ante apportionment
of responsibility in line with this principle.250 As discussed in Chapter 4, the
differentiation of mitigation obligations both between developed and developing
States, and between developed States, is a clear application of the principle of common
but different responsibility. Therefore, the same approach could be used to apportion
responsibility for climate change damage. Such an approach would be particularly
justified in the context of a case brought under the climate regime and the Kyoto
Protocol QELRO targets in particular. However, the Kyoto Protocol is only applicable
to State Parties and would not encompass some of the larger emitters (most notably
the US). Thus, apportioning responsibility according to the QELRO targets may not
result in an appropriate application of the principle of common but differentiated
responsibility.
Finally, the principle could also be used to ensure that no one State is overwhelmed
with the responsibility to compensate victim States. In particular, joint liability without
a right of recourse would appear to be inconsistent with the principle of common but
differentiated responsibility. Such an approach would likely result in one State being
burdened with too much responsibility for the resulting damage and be entirely
inconsistent with common but differentiated responsibility.
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Overall, joint and several liability has been applied by international tribunals and
presents the most conservative approach to apportionment. However, the limitations
of this approach, particularly its inability to reflect the complexities of a global
problem such as climate change damage, may necessitate the adoption of novel
formulations such as market share liability and the principle of common but
differentiated responsibility. By apportioning libaility on the basis of market or share
of global greenhouse gases, an international tribunal may be able to provide an
equitable distribution of liability. Another advantage of this approach is that liability
could be calculated with certainty. The principle of common but differentiated
responsibility could be used to support apportionment by historical emissions but
would also require further refinement in the apportionment of liability to account for
ability to act, equity and justice. These considerations would give an international
tribunal or court greater scope to apportion liability in a manner that is fair and
reflective of the realities of international climate justice.
H. Defences
Assuming that a case for climate change damage could be made out, there are six
defences listed in the ILC Draft Articles 20-27, which are described as ‘circumstances
precluding wrongfulness’. These are: consent (Draft Article 20); self-defence (Draft
Article 21); countermeasures (Draft Article 22); force majeure (Draft Article 23);
distress (Draft Article 24) and necessity (Draft Article 25). This section considers two
of these defences which are most relevant to climate damage: consent and necessity.
1. Consent
Draft Article 20 provides that it is a defence if the victim State consented to the act or
omission, provided that the conduct would be within the limits of the consent. An issue
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that may arise is whether victim States have consented to the relevant breaches or
consented to having remedies provided through the climate regime. The question of
whether a claimant State has consented to the respondent State’s conduct would
dependent upon the individual circumstances of the case. For example, if the case
concerned emissions by the respondent State in excess of its QELRO target, it is clear
that consent has not been provided. On the other hand, a claim relying upon obligations
in the UNFCCC or LOSC would face the problem of possible consent to emission
levels set out in the Kyoto Protocol. In such a scenario, it would appear that the
claimant State may have consented to a level of climate damage.
However, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea and Tuvalu entered declarations
that their ratification of the UNFCCC shall not amount to a renunciation of any rights
under international law concerning State responsibility for the adverse effects of
climate change.251 Similar declarations were made by the Cook Islands, Kiribati,
Nauru and Niue upon ratification of the Kyoto Protocol.252 These declarations would
preclude application of the defence of consent in relation to these States.
2. Necessity
The defence of necessity has strict conditions and a negative formulation. ILC Draft
Article 25 sets out the requirements for a State to rely upon this defence. 253 The ICJ
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recognised an earlier but essentially identical version of this article as codifying
customary international law.254 The burden is upon the breaching State to demonstrate
that the defence applies.255 According to Draft Article 25, the defence of necessity can
be used to protect an ‘essential interest’ of the State. The ILC provided no examples.
However, examples were provided in a report by Ago that cited ‘political or economic
survival, the continued functioning of its essential services, the maintenance of internal
peace, the survival of a sector of its population, [and] the preservation of the
environment of its territory or a Party thereof.’256
There are a number of limitations placed upon this defence. The respondent State that
seeks to rely upon this defence must ensure that the act does not impair an essential
interest of another State or towards the international community. Draft Article 25
provides further limitations,257 specifically where the obligation is a peremptory
norm258 or nonderogable or where the State has contributed to the state of necessity.
An example of this defence in a case is the Gabčikovo Case. In this case, Hungary did
not comply with its treaty obligations to divert the Danube River on the basis that
diversion would cause considerable environmental damage.259 However, the ICJ held
that Hungary had not met the burden of establishing a state of necessity.260
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Nonetheless, the ICJ found that the threat of an ecological catastrophe would establish
a state of necessity and provide a defence.261The ICJ held that ‘“imminence” is
synonymous with “immediacy” or “proximity” and goes far beyond the concept of
“possibility”’.262 The ICJ’s interpretation of ‘peril’ was that it ‘evokes the idea of
“risk” rather than “material damage”’.263 Hungary failed in demonstrating that the
threat was imminent. In the Gabčikovo Case, the ICJ also held that cost was not a
factor to be used in determining whether other options could have been used.264
Respondent States could rely upon the defence of necessity to the extent that mitigation
action would cause damage to their economy, environment or human rights. As was
discussed in Chapter 4, Article 4.10 of the UNFCCC provides that in the process of
implementing their commitments under the UNFCCC, that the Parties shall give
‘consideration’ to Parties that are vulnerable to the ‘adverse effects of implementation
measures’, particularly those with economies that are highly dependent on fossil fuels.
Thus, such Parties could argue that they were unable to comply with their
commitments under the UNFCCC on the basis that this would cause considerable
economic damage and that the defence of necessity applies. A significant limitation of
this defence is that it is bilateral in nature and is generally poorly suited to global
problems.265 Nonetheless, it is clear that the defence of necessity could reduce legal
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exposure for climate damage, particularly for those States that are referred to in Article
4.10 of the UNFCCC.
On the other hand, utilisation of this defence would be limited by the requirement that
the act of the respondent State does not impair an essential interest of another State. It
is possible that this defence could apply to climate change damage, depending upon
the circumstances.
I. Remedies
This section considers the law of remedies that international tribunals may apply to
cases of climate change damage. The current international law of remedies is
especially under-developed in relation to environmental damage.266 However, the
Seabed Disputes Chamber of ITLOS strongly endorsed Draft Article 48 of the Articles
on State Responsibility and the obligation of reparation under Draft Article 34 of the
Articles on State Responsibility.
The ILC provides that the original obligation continues (Draft Article 29); that there
is an obligation to cease wrongful conduct (Draft Article 30) and that there is an
obligation to make full reparation for any injury caused (Draft Article 31).267 These
obligations are owed by wrongdoing States to one or several States or the international
community as a whole (Article 33.1). Legal consequences arise between the
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wrongdoing State and persons or entities other than States (Article 33.2). Draft Article
34 states that ‘[f]ull reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful
act shall take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in
combination.’
1. Cessation
Cessation is the mostly commonly sought remedy in international cases.268 Cessation,
or non-repetition, provides a vital role in ensuring the effectiveness of an international
ruling.269 The duty of cessation applies to both acts and omissions.270 In the case of
climate change, immediate or even a quick cessation of the acts or omissions are not
possible. In the Trail Smelter Arbitration, the cessation was gradual and was regulated
over a period of time by the arbitral order.271 This is comparable with what may be
applied in climate change cases. It is possible that claimant States could request an
order for future action to prevent climate change damage from continuing. Although
such an order would be a bold measure from an international tribunal, it would reflect
that the primary consequence of a breach of an international obligation is the duty to
mitigate or cease that breach.
It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between restitution (discussed below) and
cessation. It is important to note that restitution is subject to a test of proportionality
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whereas cessation is not.272 Furthermore, the remedy of cessation does not require
proof of causation.273 Thus, obtaining the remedy of cessation would be an easier task
than seeking reparations.
2. Reparation
States have an obligation to make reparation for the consequences of their
internationally wrongful acts.274 There has been disagreement among commentators
as to whether State liability actually exists on the basis that the lack of enforcement
provisions makes the system inoperable.275 Nonetheless, the obligation to make
reparations if an internationally wrongful act has been committed is found in case law,
customary international law and the ILC Draft Articles.276 In the Chorzów Factory
Case of 1928, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) stated that
‘reparation is the indispensable complement of a failure to apply a convention and
there is no necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself.’277 Similar statements
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have been made by the Mexican-US General Claims Commission (1923).278 The role
of reparation has also been recognised by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
and other arbitral tribunals as a fundamental customary law rule.279
Although the meaning of reparations is unsettled under international law,280 Draft
Article 31 of the ILC sets out the obligation for reparation. 281 The key obligation
contained in Draft Article 31 is to make ‘full reparation for the injury caused by the
internationally wrongful act’. No States objected to the ILC’s view that there is a
general obligation to make full reparation.282 The Draft Articles define injury as
‘including any damage, whether material or moral, caused by the internationally
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wrongful act’.283 The ILC Commentary provides that ‘material injury’ refers to
damage which is ‘assessable in financial terms’.284
The PCIJ formulated the principle of integral reparation, which refers to the concept
that for every unlawful act there is an obligation to make integral reparation to the
injured State so that the injured State may be ‘made whole again.’ 285 The PCIJ stated
in the Chorzów Factory Case that ‘reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the
consequences of the illegal act’.286 In terms of climate damage, it is likely that claimant
States will seek reparation for measures to prevent further damage (e.g. adaptation
costs) and compensation for existing damage (if applicable). The ILC recognises ‘costs
incurred in responding to pollution damage’ as a potential damage.287 Such costs are
clearly applicable to climate damage because victim States are undertaking adaptation
projects. Thus, the general definition of reparations under international law
encompasses a requirement for wrongdoers to return victims to the status quo ante or,
if not possible, provide compensation.288 Both of these forms of reparation are
considered here.
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(a) Restitution
Restitution is the primary form of reparation under international law. Draft Article 35
sets out the key components of restitution.289 There has been a lack of consensus
amongst publicists as to scope of the requirements of restitution.290 An example of
restitution is provided in the case of Temple of Preah Vihear.291 In this case, the ICJ
ordered Thailand to return to Cambodia artefacts which had been unlawfully taken
from a temple and its surrounds. Examples of methods of restitution in an
environmental context include clean up or repair of the environment.
Obviously, it is impossible to meet restitution if the object has ceased to exist. In the
context of climate change damage, restitution is impossible because the impacts are
generally irreversible.292 If this is the case, then international tribunals will consider
compensation. Furthermore, there is an exception to providing restitution where ‘grave
disproportionality between the burden which restitution would impose on the
responsible State and the benefit which would be gained.’293 As discussed above,
application of the principle of common but differentiated responsibility would require
that no one State should be overwhelmed with responsibility to remedy climate
damage. Whether or not this is a problem will depend upon what form of responsibility
has been applied in the case.
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(b) Compensation
Compensation is a form of reparation that may be payable if restitution is not available,
or is not sufficient to effect full reparation. Restitution is rarely sufficient to ‘wipe out
all the consequences’ of an illegal act.294 In practice, compensation is a much more
common remedy than restitution.295 Generally, if causation is proven, the wrongdoing
State is ‘held responsible for all consequences, not being too remote, of its wrongful
conduct.’296 Thus, compensation requires proof of causation.
Compensation is provided for in Draft Article 36.297 As Draft Article 36 provides,
compensation covers ‘any financially assessable damage’. The term ‘damage’ refers
to both material and moral damage.298 Compensation accrues interest from the date
when the principal sum should have been paid until the date that it has been fully
paid.299 However, the ILC noted that ‘tribunals have been reluctant to provide
compensation for claims with inherently speculative elements’.300 The uncertainty
around the current and future damage that climate change is or will be responsible for
may undermine efforts to obtain compensation. Environmental harm must cause
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‘financially assessable damage’301 rather than ‘economically assessable’ damage.302
American, Italian and Russian law recognise the valuation of depleted natural
resources as a form of financially assessable damage.303
The decisions of the UN Compensation Commission (UNCC) regarding
environmental damage caused by Iraq may provide important precedents for the
problem of climate change damage. The UNCC examined issues of valuation,
restoration and monitoring.304 The UN Security Council had previously determined
that Iraq was liable for ‘any direct loss, [or] damage, including environmental damage
and the depletion of natural resources … as a result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and
occupation of Kuwait.’305 The UNCC decided that this Security Council ruling
covered, inter alia, compensation for the clean up and restoration of the environment,
compensation for reasonable measures used to assess and monitor environmental
damage and damage to people, and finally reimbursement for the costs of clean up
assistance.306 The UNCC required clear evidence linking the environmental damage
to Iraq’s invasion.
To some extent, the UNCC provided for the reinstatement of the status quo ante
provided that the ‘primary emphasis must be placed on restoring the environment to
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pre-invasion conditions, in terms of its overall ecological functioning, rather than on
the removal of specific contaminants or restoration of the environmental to a particular
condition.’307 Where restoration was impossible or unreasonable, the UNCC ordered
the cost of making an equivalent provision.308 The UNCC did not exclude
environmental damage with no commercial value.309
However, the legal situation is unique as the UNCC’s mandate was provided by the
UN Security Council resolution holding Iraq liable. It would be more difficult for an
international court to adopt this approach to the problem of climate change damage.
Furthermore, international cases where compensation has been obtained are the
exceptions.310
Past cases of environmental damage indicate that particular aspects of environmental
damage are recoverable. For example, compensation for the costs of clean up and
restoration are recoverable as well as compensation for damage to private property and
people.311 However, environmental damage (and climate change damage in particular)
is broader that these categories. For example, climate change threatens to cause the
collapse of ecosystems and loss of wildlife and biodiversity.
There are certain universal requirements established under the principles of
compensable damage.312 Under these principles, the damage must be (1) certain and
specific; (2) proven and (3) quantifiable. The first two elements are questions of
causation. The third element is generally hard to fulfil in environmental cases because
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methods of assessing environmental damage are under-developed.313 However, a court
or tribunal could apply the tests developed by the UNCC to include the costs of clean
up and restoration of the environment, compensation for reasonable measures used to
assess and monitor environmental damage and damage to people.
As with restitution, there is risk that an order for compensation may place too much of
a burden upon a wrongdoing State and be contrary to the principle of common but
differentiated responsibility. However, if coupled with a fair form of apportionment of
responsibility, compensation may provide an appropriate form of reparation.
Furthermore, compensation could include insurance plans and technology transfers to
aid the victim State in improving scientific and research capacities, and building
infrastructure to adapt to climate damage.314
3. Satisfaction
A further possible remedy is satisfaction. Draft Article 37 sets out this obligation and
provides examples of satisfaction.315 As provided in Draft Article 37, satisfaction may
consist of a formal apology or some other acknowledgement of the breach. In practice,
satisfaction is only used as a remedy in situations where the damage is not financially
assessable and constitutes an affront to the dignity of the victim State.316 It is unlikely
that a claimant State would seek satisfaction as its first choice of remedy as restitution
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and/or compensation would provide a more useful outcome for remedying the
situation.
However, satisfaction could provide an appropriate remedy for climate change
damage. For instance, the wrongdoing State could provide an apology that fully
accepts responsibility for their excess emissions.317 As observed by Minow, ‘the
methods for offering and accepting an apology ... both reflect and help to constitute a
moral community. The apology reminds the wrongdoer of community norms because
the apology admits to violating them.’318 Furthermore, a tribunal or court could order
more creative forms of satisfaction. For instance, a wrongdoing State could be ordered
to raise public awareness of climate change and its impacts.319 The remedy of
satisfaction would not require any apportionment of responsibility and would not
overburden any wrongdoing State.
4. Counter measures
Articles 49-53 of the Draft Articles provide that the victim State is entitled to resort to
countermeasures to induce compliance or may request reparations.320 Counter
measures refer to measures that a State may utilise which are technically in breach of
an international obligation that the State holds in relation to the wrongdoing State, yet
are justified on the basis that the wrongdoing State is itself in breach of an international
obligation.321
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Although countermeasures can damage the international legal system,322 they provide
the only means of enforcing most of international environmental law.323 Enforcement
of international environmental law is difficult and orders of the ICJ have previously
been ignored by States.324 Furthermore, the UN has never taken enforcement action in
relation to international environmental law and is unlikely to do so.325
Countermeasures work best where there is a clear international obligation but effective
remedies are scarce.326
There are a number of requirements that States must satisfy to utilise countermeasures.
The State must have called upon the wrongdoing State to discontinue the wrongful
conduct or provide reparations prior to commencing countermeasures. Although this
requirement is not set out in the ILC Draft Articles it is implied in Draft Article 47.327
Furthermore, countermeasures be taken in response to an unlawful act; must be
proportionate (‘commensurate with the injury suffered taking into account the rights
in question’) and must have the purpose of inducing the ‘wrongdoing state to comply
with its obligations under international law, and … must therefore be reversible’.328
The meaning of proportionality has been debated by commentators. 329 However, it
appears that the countermeasures must be proportionate to the harm caused by the
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breach of international law; the obligation infringed; and the amount of effort required
to achieve the objectives of the countermeasures.330 It is conceivable that
countermeasures for climate change damage could meet the requirements of
proportionality provided that a clear obligation can be identified. As was discussed in
Chapters 4 to 6, it may be difficult to identify such an obligation.
One possible approach for victim States would be to use trade countermeasures to
enforce an obligation relevant to climate change damage. For example, the US placed
an embargo on imports of Tuna caught by Mexican fishers on the basis that Mexico
was obliged to reform its tuna fishing techniques to reflect customary international
law.331 Mexico took the matter to the dispute resolution panel of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)332 and the panel held that the US embargo
violated GATT.333 As a result, the US withdrew its embargo. Thus, it may be difficult
for a State to take trade countermeasures for the problem of climate change damage
given that such action may be in breach of international trade law.334
However, in this example Mexico had not breached international law but instead was
not meeting US best practice, which was not yet customary international law. If the
climate change damage was wrongful under international law, there is no legal rule to

‘Counterintuiting Countermeasures’ (2002) 96 The Americal Journal of International Law 81; Thomas
M Franck, ‘On Proportionality of Countermeasures in International Law’ (2008) 102 The American
Journal of International Law 715.
330
Sverrisson, above n 327, 4.
331
See O’Connell, ‘Using Trade to Enforce International Environmental Law’, above n 329.
332
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, annex 1A to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organisation, concluded at Marrakesh, 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995,
1867 UNTS 3, reprinted in 33 ILM 15 (1994). GATT provides that States can restrict trade for the
purpose of environmental protection: arts XX and XXI.
333
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Mexico v US) (Report of the GATT Panel) [1991] 30 ILM 1594.
334
But see critique of the GATT decision: O’Connell, ‘Using Trade to Enforce International
Environmental Law’, above n 309.
Also see Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘International Environmental Law as Special Field’ (1994) 25
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 181, 216.
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prevent

a

claimant

State from

taking

trade

countermeasures.

However,

countermeasures (and particularly those that are trade-based) are more available to rich
developed States as opposed to poor developing States.335 Therefore, the feasibility of
victim States with existing vulnerabilities using countermeasures in the context of
climate damage is doubtful.
J. Conclusion
This chapter has examined the rules of attribution and responsibility under
international law, otherwise known as the ‘secondary rules’ of responsibility. In order
to bring a case, the claimant State must establish standing, either as an injured State or
under one of the public interest categories. The establishment of State responsibility
requires proof of an internationally wrongful act. The first element is that the conduct
is an act or omission attributable to the respondent State under international law. The
second element is that the act or omission constitutes a breach of an international
obligation.
The greenhouse gas emissions of private corporations and individuals may be
attributed to a respondent State if it has failed to exercise due diligence to prevent the
commission of an internationally wrongful act. The obligations contained in the
UNFCCC and LOSC do not provide sufficiently clear positive obligations for such
action. However, Article 3.1 of the Kyoto Protocol established specific and clear
obligations for Annex B Parties336 to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions in the

O’Connell, ‘Using Trade to Enforce International Environmental Law’, above n 329, 275;
Sverrisson, above n 327, 6.
336
Note that the reference to Annex B Parties is intentional here and elsewhere despite it being common
practice by other authors to refer to the Annex I Parties in this context. The justification for this approach
is that it is only the Annex B Parties for whom Article 3.1 of the Kyoto Protocol is applicable. The
Annex I Parties of the UNFCCC are not bound by the Kyoto Protocol unless they are also Annex B
Parties.
335
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period 2008-2012 by their specific QELRO targets. A State that fails to meet its
QELRO target could be held responsible for a failure of due diligence.
A further challenge in establishing attribution is that there is a multiplicity of States
whose different conduct may result in the commission of the same internationally
wrongful act. The multilateral nature of climate change makes pinpointing individual
States virtually impossible. However, there is some scope for multiple attribution in
accordance with Article 3.1 of the Kyoto Protocol which differentiates individual State
obligations as part of collective mitigation action.
If a claimant State seeks reparations, it will face the difficult task of establishing
causation. The traditional ‘but for’ test would require proof that without the respondent
State’s emissions, the damage suffered would not have occurred. This will be a
virtually impossible task. Probabilistic methods of establishing factual causation are
better suited to the problem of climate change, but will not resolve all issues of
causation. Most importantly, it may be difficult to show that the respondent State’s
conduct has caused a ‘material’ increase in risk of the harm occurring.
Assuming that factual causation can be made out under the probabilistic approach, a
claimant State would also need to prove legal causation. The fact that all greenhouse
gas emissions contribute to climate change damage may support a finding that there is
a natural sequence between a State’s wrongful conduct and the specific damage
suffered by a claimant State. Given the long history of climate science and
international action taken since 1992, a claimant State should be able to establish
foreseeability.
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The task of apportioning responsibility for climate change damage will not be an easy
one. States are only responsible for the consequences that can be attributed to their
own actions (sole responsibility). There is no clear international law on how to allocate
responsibility when there are multiple wrongdoers. There is some case for allocating
responsibility on the basis of joint and several liability. However, the lack of a right to
recourse may prohibit such an approach.
Market share liability could be adopted by apportioning liability amongst States on the
basis of each State’s share of total greenhouse gas emissions. However, this approach
is not found in international law and has little support in domestic legal systems.
Therefore, it is unlikely to be applied by an international court or tribunal.
An alternative approach would be to use the principle of common but differentiated
responsibility by holding States liable in common for their emissions, but
differentiated on the basis of historical contributions and ability to act. This principle
could provide a persuasive basis to apportion liability to developed States in
accordance with their contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions. Alternatively,
the Kyoto Protocol may represent an ex ante apportionment of responsibility that could
be used to apportion responsibility for climate change damage, particularly if claims
are brought based on this instrument. However, the Kyoto Protocol is only applicable
to State Parties and does not apply to some major emitters.
The defence of consent may apply to international climate litigation, particularly as it
appears that State Parties to the Kyoto Protocol have consented to a level of climate
damage. However, States that exceed their QELRO target would not have the benefit
of this defence. Furthermore, this defence may not be applied where the claimant State
has entered a reservation to protect its recourse to the rules of State responsibility for
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the adverse effects of climate change. The defence of necessity would likely further
reduce legal exposure because there is some case to argue that Parties that are
dependent on fossil fuels could cite economic necessity.
There are a suite of possible remedies that could apply to climate change damage.
Cessation could be ordered as a gradual process regulated over a period of time.
However, such an order would be a bold measure from an international court or
tribunal. Restitution would be virtually impossible because the impacts of climate
change are generally irreversible. However, there may be some scope for clean up or
repair of the environment as part of restitution. Compensation, coupled with an
apportionment of responsibility, could provide an appropriate form of reparation.
Satisfaction could come in the form of an apology or more creative measures such as
orders for public awareness campaigns.
Finally, international law allows victim States to utilise countermeasures, provided
that specific requirements are met. Although trade embargoes could provide an
effective form of countermeasure, such initiatives are more available to rich developed
States and relatively inaccessible for poor developing States. As a result, the States
most vulnerable to climate damage are unlikely to use such countermeasures.
Overall, the analysis contained in this chapter has demonstrated that the rules of State
responsibility provide some scope for international climate litigation. There are
creative approaches that could be adopted in relation to attribution, causation and
apportionment of responsibility. The overarching difficulty is that State responsibility
is an under-developed area of international law that may not be able to adopt such
creative formulations. A summary of the key findings of this chapter is presented in
Table 6-3.
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Table 6-3 Key findings regarding legal exposure under the rules of attribution and
responsibility
Topic area
Standing

Questions
Is there scope to establish
standing in international climate
litigation?

Attribution

Can the acts of private
corporations and individuals be
attributed to a respondent State?

Can individual States be allocated
attribution for climate change
damage when there is a
responsibility for a collective
failure?

Causation

Can factual causation be
established for climate damage?

Can
legal
causation
be
established for climate damage?

Allocation of
responsibility

On what basis can responsibility
for climate change damage be
allocated where there are multiple
wrongdoers?

Defences

Are there any defences that may
preclude liability?
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Findings
An injured State would be able to establish
standing. The establishment of public
interest standing under international law is
more controversial.
The acts of private entities can be attributed
to the State by its failure to exercise due
diligence to prevent commission of an
internationally wrongful act (e.g. Annex B
Parties meeting their QELRO target under
Article 3.1 of the Kyoto Protoco).
Multiple attribution is difficult to establish
where different conduct of States results in
the commission of the same internationally
wrongful act. Attribution may be
established for Article 3.1 of the Kyoto
Protocol which allocates individual State
obligations as part of collective action.
Causation would be virtually impossible to
establish under the ‘but for’ test because no
one State is responsible for climate change.
Probabilistic approaches are more suitable
to climate change, but may not resolve
issues of causation.
Climate change is a normal consequence of
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.
All greenhouse gas emissions contribute to
climate change damage so there may also
be a natural sequence between a State’s
wrongful conduct and the specific damage
suffered.
From at least 1992, climate change was or
should have been foreseeable.
The ordinary rule is that States are only
individually
responsible.
Individual
responsibility would likely result in too
much or too little responsibility for
wrongdoing States.
Alternative formulations, such as joint and
several liability, market share liability and
common but differentiated responsibility,
could be applied to climate damage. The
principle of common but differentiated
responsibility could be used to apportion
liability to developed States in accordance
with their contribution to global greenhouse
gas emissions.
State Parties to the Kyoto Protocol have
consented to a level of climate damage.
However, States have not consented to
emissions beyond the QELRO targets and
some States have entered reservations.
Respondent States may rely upon the
defence of necessity, citing potential
economic damage.

Remedies

If a case is successful, what
remedies may be available for a
claimant State?
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Gradual cessation over a period of time
could be ordered.
Restitution is impossible because climate
damage is generally irreversible. However,
orders for clean up or repair of the
environment could be ordered.
Compensation,
coupled
with
an
apportionment of responsibility, could
provide an appropriate form of reparation.
Satisfaction could be ordered in the form of
an apology or creative forms such as public
awareness campaigns.

TUVALU V AUSTRALIA
This chapter seeks to consolidate and test the preliminary findings of the thesis through
their application in an illustrative hypothetical case study of Tuvalu v Australia. The
purpose of this chapter is to answer the second research question: ‘Would Tuvalu
succeed in a claim regarding climate change damage against Australia under the
UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and LOSC?’ This research question aims to investigate the
application of the law, which is often a contentious aspect of doctrinal research. The
aim of the chapter is to utilise a plausible and hypothetical case study to highlight the
realities of potential international climate litigation. The use of this hypothetical case
study provides an opportunity to evaluate the possible ‘real world’ application of the
principles and issues previously discussed.
Section A provides an introduction of Tuvalu and Australia as Parties in the
hypothetical case study. Section B contains the first scenario (Scenario 1) which
concerns a claim by Tuvalu alleging Australia has breached Article 4.2 of the
UNFCCC. This section examines Australia potential exposure to legal risk under
Article 4.2 through consideration of a range of elements, namely: standing,
jurisdiction, attribution, breach, causation, apportionment of responsibility, defences
and remedies. This scenario concerns sea level rise and the alleged contamination of
Tuvalu’s fresh water reserves. Section C discusses the option of Tuvalu bringing a case
against Australia under Article 3.1 of the Kyoto Protocol. However, a full scenario is
not developed in this section because Australia is on track to meet its obligation in
Article 3.1. Section D presents the second hypothetical scenario (Scenario 2) where
Tuvalu alleges that Australia has breached Article 194 of the LOSC. The same
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elements are considered in this scenario as in Scenario 1. However, in this case the
damage alleged concerns ocean acidification. Finally, Section E concludes the findings
of this chapter.
A. Tuvalu v Australia
As discussed in Chapter 1, Tuvalu is one of the small island developing States (SIDS)
in the South Pacific that is comprised of coral atolls. The name ‘Tuvalu’ is traditional
and roughly translates to ‘eight islands.’ This name reflects the fact that although
Tuvalu is made up of nine islands, only eight of these are inhabited. The islands are
located between 4˚36’S and 10˚45’S of the Equator and longitude 176˚8’E and
179˚52’E of Greenwich.1 Tuvalu’s total land area is 26km2 and its highest point about
sea level is about 4.5m.2
Most of the population is Polynesian (96%) and a small number are Micronesian
(4%).3 Indigenous people own about 90% of the land while the State owns the
remainder.4 There is a maxim in the South Pacific which says: ‘land is life, without
land there is no life.’5 Tuvaluans have utilised the land and sea using traditional
practices and knowledge handed down through generations. Tuvaluans have an
intricate relationship with the environment of Tuvalu, including its biodiversity. Their
traditional knowledge and practices are expressed through customary rites and dances

I M Madaleno, ‘Climate Change in the Pacific: Tuvalu Case-study’ in Y Villacampa Esteve and C. A.
Brebbia (eds), Ecosystems & Sustainable Development (Ashurst: WIT Press, 2011), 243.
2
Genevieve Sheehan, ‘Tuvalu Little, Tuvalu Late: A Country Goes Under’ (2002) 24 Harvard
International Review; H Yamano, et al, ‘Atoll Island Vulnerability to Flooding and Inundation Revealed
by Historical Reconstruction: Fongafale Islet, Funafuti Atoll, Tuvalu’ (2007) 57 Global & Planetary
Change 407.
3
Central
Intelligence
Agency,
The
World
Factbook:
Tuvalu
(https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tv.html).
4
Eric L Kwa, ‘Climate Change and Indigenous People in the South Pacific’, IUCN Academy of
Environmental Law Conference on “Climate Law in Developing Countries post-2012: North and South
Perspectives” (2008).
5
Ibid, 1.
1
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that celebrate their environment. The preamble of the Tuvalu Constitution provides
that custom and tradition are a guiding legal principle and source of law.6
Tuvalu could eventually become uninhabitable due to the effects of climate change.7
For Tuvaluans, climate change threatens their land, natural resources, livelihoods and
State.8 The loss of land and natural resources will affect their cultural and social
identity. If forced to migrate, Tuvaluans will need to adopt new and unfamiliar customs
and practices of their receiving States.9 It is likely that relocation would cause
substantial loss of traditional knowledge and customs. In 2002, Tuvalu announced its
intention to bring an interstate dispute against Australia and the U.S. over climate
change.10 To date, Tuvalu has not brought the threatened litigation but it remains a
possibility.
Australia has been selected as the respondent State because of its close geographical,
social, and political relationship with Tuvalu and its historical failure to mitigate
greenhouse gas emissions.11 International litigation could provide an important means

The Constitution of Tuvalu (1 October 1978) (‘WHEREAS the people of Tuvalu desire to constitute
themselves as an independent State based on Christian principles, the Rule of Law, and Tuvaluan
custom and tradition’).
7
N Mimura, ‘Vulnerability of South Pacific Island Nations to Sea-level Rise’ Journal of Coastal
Research, Special Issue 24; Françione Hampson, ‘Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Indigenous Peoples: Expanded working paper by Françione Hampson on the human rights situation of
indigenous peoples in States and other territories threatened with extinction for environmental reasons’,
UN Expanded Working Paper, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/28, 3.
8
See generally William C G Burns, ‘Global Warming – The United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change and the Future of Small Island States’ (1997) 6 Dickinson Journal of Environmental
Law and Policy 147, 175.
9
Kwa, above n 4, 7.
10
‘Tiny Pacific nation takes on Australia’, BBC News, 4 March 2002, at
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1854118.stm> accessed 5 February 2012.
11
N Bita, ‘Island Evacuation a Greenhouse Solution’ The Weekend Australian, 8 June 1996, 8; C
Farbotko, ‘Tuvalu & Climate Change: Construction of Environmental Displacement in the Sydney
Morning Herald’ (2005) 87B(4) Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography 279.
Canada is another possible defendant. Canada’s potential liability to SIDS has been previously
examined. See Phillip Barton, ‘State Responsibility and Climate Change: Could Canada be Liable to
Small Island States?’ (2002) 11 Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 63. However, this was before
Canada had failed to meet its Kyoto target and withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol so there could be a
case to re-examine its potential liability.
6
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for Tuvalu to seek redress for climate damage.12 A favourable ruling by an
international court or tribunal for Tuvalu could help to clarify the obligations of
greenhouse gas intensive States13 and may provide the impetus for a strong
international agreement on climate change.14
B. UNFCCC
In Scenario 1, Tuvalu files a case in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) alleging
that Australia has breached its obligations under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)15. The UNFCCC has been established by
the international community to respond to the threat of climate change16 and concerns
mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions. It entered into force on 21 March 1994.

See R Keoharie, A Moravcsik and A Slaughter, ‘Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and
Transnational’ (2000) 54 International Organisation 457.
13
Tribunals can consider the interpretation and application’ of treaties, including issues around breach
and non-compliance. See, Case concerning the factory at Chorzów (Germany v Poland) (Jurisdiction)
[1927] PCIJ (ser A) No 9, 20-25. See also, German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia Case (Germany v
Poland) [1925] PCIJ (ser A) No 6, 24-5; Interpretation of the Peace Treaties Case with Bulgaria,
Hungary and Romania (Advisory Opinion) [1950] ICJ 75; Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v US)
[1996] ICJ 803.
14
Christoph Schwarte, International Climate Change Litigation and the Negotiation Process (2010)
www.field.org.uk/files/FIELD_cclit_long_Oct.pdf. On the role of the International Court of Justice, see
Robert Y Jenning, ‘The United Nations at fifty: The International Court of Justice after Fifty Years’
(1995) 89 American Journal of International Law; Nagendra Singh, The Role & Record of the
International Court of Justice (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1989). See also, The Nuclear Tests (New
Zealand v. France) [1995] ICJ Rep 888, 345 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting) (commenting on the role of
the ICJ in Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court’s
Judgment of December 20, 1974).
15
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 9 May 1992, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107, 165 (entered into force 21 March 1994) [hereinafter ‘UNFCCC’].
Some commentators have argued that the UNFCCC does not contain any rights or obligations (see e.g.
Akiko Okamatsu, ‘Problems and Prospects of International Legal Disputes on Climate Change’, Berlin
Conference on the Human Rights Dimensions of Global Environmental Change (2005)). On the other
hand, the UNFCCC is a legally binding instrument and many commentators have argued that it created
substantive commitments (see e.g. Phillippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law
(Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2003)). See discussion in Chapters 2 and 3.
16
UNFCCC, preamble paragraphs 1 & 2.
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Tuvalu contends that Australia failed to reduce its emissions to 1990 levels by the year
2000 (Article 4.2 of the UNFCCC).17
In October 2011, Tuvalu declared an emergency due to a severe shortage of fresh
water.18 Tuvalu alleges that its fresh water crisis is partly due to the effects of climate
change. Tuvalu claims that although the low level of rainfall was due to the La Niña
weather pattern, underground reserves of fresh water have been contaminated by salt
water from rising sea levels as a result of climate change. Tuvalu seeks (1) an order of
cessation of the breach; and (2) an order for compensation for the costs of installing
additional water desalinisation plants.

UNFCCC, art 4.2 provides: ‘The developed country Parties and other Parties included in Annex I
commit themselves specifically as provided for in the following:
(a) Each of these Parties shall adopt national policies and take corresponding measures on the
mitigation of climate change, by limiting its anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and
protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs. These policies and measures will
demonstrate that developed countries are taking the lead in modifying longer-term trends in
anthropogenic emissions consistent with the objective of the Convention, recognising that the return by
the end of the present decade to earlier levels of anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol would contribute to such modification, and
taking into account the differences in these Parties’ starting points and approaches, economic structures
and resource bases, the need to maintain strong and sustainable economic growth, available technologies
and other individual circumstances, as well as the need for equitable and appropriate contributions by
each of these Parties to the global effort regarding that objective. These Parties may implement such
policies and measures jointly with other Parties and may assist other Parties in contributing to the
achievement of the objective of the Convention and, in particular, that of this subparagraph;
(b) In order to promote progress to this end, each of these Parties shall communicate, within six months
of the entry into force of the Convention for it and periodically thereafter, and in accordance with Article
12, detailed information on its policies and measures referred to in subparagraph (a) above, as well as
on its resulting projected anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse
gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol for the period referred to in subparagraph (a), with the
aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels these anthropogenic emissions of carbon
dioxide and other greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol. This information will be
reviewed by the Conference of the Parties, at its first session and periodically thereafter, in accordance
with Article 7.’ (emphasis added)
18
The Guardian, ‘South Pacific islands face water crisis after six months of low rainfall’, 4 October
2011
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/oct/04/south-pacific-water-crisis-rainfall>
accessed 1 July 2012.
17
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1. Standing
Tuvalu would need to show that it has standing to bring the case.19 As discussed in
Chapter 6, there are five categories of standing under international law. The categories
are summarised in Table 7-1 below.
Table 7-1 Categories of standing under international law
Interest
Injured State

Public interest standing

Description
(1) The obligation is owed to the injured State.
(2) The obligation is owed to either the international community or a
group of States including the injured State.
(3) The State has been injured and the breach affects all States
concerned.
(4) The obligation concerns the protection of the collective interests of
a group of States, including the claimant State.
(5) Where the obligation is owed to the international community as a
whole (erga omnes).

Tuvalu would likely contend that the matter falls within the second category because
the obligations are owed to the Parties to the UNFCCC, yet Tuvalu is specially
affected. Furthermore, Tuvalu should be able to establish an individualised interest on
the basis that it is extremely vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. 20 Tuvalu is
vulnerable due to its small size, geographical isolation, limited natural resources,
ecological uniqueness and fragility, small economy with little diversification, high
dependence on marine resources, susceptibility to sea level rise, economic openness,
and poorly developed infrastructure.21 In recognition of this vulnerability, SIDS
receive special consideration in the UNFCCC22 and have been recognised by the IPCC

19

See generally, René Lefeber, Transboundary Environmental Interference and the Origin of State
Liability (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1996); Kathy Leigh, ‘Liability for Damage to the Global
Commons’ (1992) 14 Australian Yearbook of International Law 129, 148-49. See e.g., South West
Africa Cases (Ethiopia v South Africa; Liberia v South Africa) [1966] ICJ Rep 6 (although the League
of Nations had standing in this case the individual members Liberia and Ethiopia did not); see generally,
Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 6th ed., 2003); see e.g.,
Icelandic Fisheries Cases (UK v Iceland) [1974] ICJ Rep 3 (regarding denial of high sea fishing rights).
20
See generally, Robert Watson et al., IPCC Special Report on the Regional Impact of Climate Change:
An Assessment of Vulnerability (1998).
21
Ibid.
22
UNFCCC, at Preamble; Art. 4(8).
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as more vulnerable to climate change than any other group of States. 23 Thus, Tuvalu
should be able to establish standing to bring its case.
Within the context of climate change, the atmosphere is the ‘common concern of
mankind.’24 This means that there is a common legal interest amongst all States to
protect and enforce the obligations for the protection of the atmosphere. 25 The
‘common concern’ language used in the UNFCCC reflects the notion that all States
have an individual and collective interest in its enforcement.26 Tuvalu could reason
that climate change damage is damage to the commons and so should be subject to
public interest claims.27
However, as was discussed in Chapter 6, the public interest categories of standing are
controversial under international law and conflict with the ICJ’s ruling in the Nuclear

23

Robert T Watson et al (eds), IPCC Special Report on the Regional Impacts of Climate Change: An
assessment of Vulnerability (1998).
24
UN G.A. Resolution 43/53; Noordwijk Declaration of the Conference on Atmospheric Pollution and
Climate Change; UNFCCC, pmbl; UNEP/GC 15/36 (1989).
See also the legal status of the ozone layer in the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone
Layer, opened for signature 22 March 1985, 1513 UNTS 324 (entered into force 22 September 1988)
[herein ‘Ozone Convention’] sec 3.2: (‘the layer of atmospheric ozone above the planetary boundary
layer’). This definition indicates that the entire stratospheric layer is one global unity, without
mentioning sovereignty, shared resources or common property.
CF the legal status of the atmosphere as a shared resource within the context of transboundary air
pollution. 1979 Geneva Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, opened for signature
13 November 1979, 18 ILM 1442 (entered into force 16 March 1983) [herein ‘Convention on
Transboundary Air Pollution’].
25
Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, 338. Also see the cases relating to atmospheric nuclear tests. These
indicate that states can only use the atmosphere with reasonable regard for the rights of other states.
However, this may only apply to nuclear testing and may not apply to the emission of greenhouse gas
emissions.
26
See generally Crawford, 1st Rep (1998) UN Doc A/CN 4/460, para 100. CF SS Wimbledon (UK v
Germany) [1923] PCIJ (ser A) No 1, 20 and Christine Gray, Judicial Remedies in International Law
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 211 ff. But compare D N Hutchinson, ‘Solidarity and Breaches of
Multilateral Treaties’ (1988) 59 British Yearbook of International Law 151 and Christine Chinkin, Third
Parties in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 282-3. Further note that Article
63 of the ICJ Statute provides that every state Party to a treaty has a right to intervene in proceedings
before the ICJ when the construction of the treaty is in question.
27
See generally Alan E Boyle, ‘Remedying harm to international common spaces and resources:
Compensation and other approaches’ in Peter Wetterstein (ed) Harm to the Environment: The Right to
Compensation and the Assessment of Damages (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 83; Tullio Scovazzi,
‘State responsibility for environmental harm’ (2001) 12 Yearbook of International Environmental Law
43.
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Tests Cases.28 Furthermore, even if Tuvalu established standing under one of the
public interest categories it would have only restricted access to remedies.29 Tuvalu
would be able to claim cessation30 but to have access to reparations it would need to
show damage to its interests.31 Therefore, it is in Tuvalu’s interest to establish standing
as an injured State, most likely in the second category.
2. Jurisdiction
In this scenario, Tuvalu seeks to bring its case before the ICJ.32 The ICJ has the
authority to decide treaty interpretation questions.33 The jurisdiction of the ICJ in
contentious matters is established through the consent of States that are Parties to the
dispute. There are a number of ways to establish ICJ jurisdiction, including: (a)
through special agreement between the Parties (Article 36.1 of the ICJ Statute); (b)
through treaties and conventions that specifically provide for the ICJ jurisdiction
(Article 36.1 of the ICJ Statute); or (c) where the Parties have accepted the jurisdiction
of the ICJ as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement (Article 36.2-5 of
the ICJ Statute).34

28

Nuclear Tests Cases (Australia v France; New Zealand v France) [1974] ICJ Rep 253.
J Charney, ‘Third State Remedies in International Law’ (1989) 10 Michigan Journal of International
Law 57. But CF Georges Abi-Saab, ‘The Concept of “International Crimes” and its Place in
Contemporary International Law’ in Joseph Weiler et al (eds), International Crimes of State: a Critical
Analysis of the ILC's Draft Article 19 on State Responsibility (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1989), 141.
30
ILC Draft Articles, art 48(2).
31
A Boyle, ‘Remedying Harm to International Common Spaces and Resources: Compensation and
Other Approaches’ in Peter Wetterstein (ed), Harm to the Environment: The Right to Compensation
and the Assessment of Damages (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); F Francione and T Scovazzi (eds),
International Responsibility for Environmental Harm (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1991).
32
Statute of the International Court of Justice, opened for signature 26 June 1945, 59 Stat. 1055 (entered
into force 24 October 1945) [hereinafter ‘ICJ Statute’].
33
ICJ Statute, art. 36(2)(a).
34
The Nauru Case was brought under the optional clause Art 36(1). Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru
(Nauru v Australia) [1992] ICJ Rep 240.
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It is unlikely that Australia would accept a special agreement for the ICJ to have
jurisdiction over the case (option (a)).35 Almost all of the cases in which the ICJ
jurisdiction has been mutually agreed under Article 36(1)36 have related to boundary
disputes in which both Parties sought an independent ruling.37 However, Tuvalu’s
claim does not relate to a boundary dispute and it would not be in Australia’s interest
to take the matter to the ICJ. The lack of viability of a special agreement is not unique
to Tuvalu’s scenario, but reflects a shortcoming of the whole process. Arguably, it
would not be in any potential respondent State’s national interest to accept jurisdiction
in a case concerning climate change damage and thus it is unlikely that jurisdiction
would be accepted.
In relation to option (b), Article 14 of the UNFCCC provides that States Parties may
accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ as compulsory ipso facto and without special
agreement, in relation to any Party accepting the same obligation. However, none of
the Parties to the UNFCCC have accepted the ICJ jurisdiction under Article 14. Thus,
neither of these options is currently viable for Tuvalu’s case.
In terms of option (c), Tuvalu has not accepted the jurisdiction of the ICJ as
compulsory under Article 36.2-5 of the ICJ Statute, whereas Australia has done so

Andrew Strauss, ‘Climate Change Litigation: Opening the Door to the ICJ’ in William C G Burns
and Hari M Osofsky (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, eds), Adjudicating Climate Change
(2009), 339.
36
Cases in which the parties have mutually agreed to the ICJ’s jurisdiction under Article 36(1) include:
Minquiers and Ecrehos (France v. United Kingdom) [1953] ICJ 47; Sovereignty over Certain Frontier
Land (Belgium v. Netherlands) 1959 ICJ 209; North Sea Continental Shelf (Germany v Netherlands)
[1969] ICJ 3; Continental Shelf (Libya v Malta) [1984] ICJ 3; Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v Mali)
[1986] ICJ 554; Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v Honduras, Nicaragua
intervening) [1992] ICJ 351; Territorial Dispute (Libya v Chad) [1994] ICJ 6; Grabčikovo-Nagymaros
Project (Hungary v Slovakia), [1997] ICJ 90.
37
See generally, Terry D Gill, Rosenne’s The World Court: What is it and How it Works (Martinus
Nijhoff, 2003); Todd L Allee and Paul K Huth, ‘Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal
Rulings as Domestic Political Cover’ (2006) 100 American Political Science Review 219, 220-21, 22932.
35
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(with reservation).38 Tuvalu would need to make a declaration accepting the ICJ’s
compulsory jurisdiction if it were to bring its case, but would also need to be mindful
of Australia’s reservation.
Australia’s reservation provides that ICJ jurisdiction does not apply to ‘any dispute in
regard to which the Parties have thereto agreed or shall agree to have recourse to some
other method of peaceful settlement.’ As was discussed in Chapter 3, the fact that
Article 14 of the UNFCCC has not been implemented may mean that it does not
provide an agreement constituting other means of peaceful settlement.39 On the other
hand, Article 14.1 also provides for negotiation as a means of peaceful settlement. This
may be sufficient to preclude jurisdiction.
The Kyoto Protocol compliance system could also constitute ‘some other means of
peaceful settlement.’ The Marrakesh Accords40 established a compliance system for
the Kyoto Protocol made up of a Compliance Committee with an Enforcement Branch
and Facilitative Branch to hear matters of non-compliance.41 However, the Kyoto

‘This declaration does not apply to: (a) any dispute in regard to which the parties thereto have agreed
or shall agree to have recourse to some other method of peaceful settlement;
(b) any dispute concerning or relating to the delimitation of maritime zones, including the territorial
sea, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf, or arising out of, concerning, or relating to
the exploitation of any disputed area of or adjacent to any such maritime zone pending its
delimitation;
(c) any dispute in respect of which any other Party to the dispute has accepted the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court only in relation to or for the purpose of the dispute; or where the acceptance
of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction on behalf of any other Party to the dispute was deposited less
than 12 months prior to the filing of the application bringing the dispute before the Court.’
See generally, Gary L Scott and Craig L Carr, ‘The ICJ & Compulsory Jurisdiction: the Case for Closing
the Clause’ (1987) 81 American Journal of International Law 57. Other Annex I Parties accepting ICJ
jurisdiction include Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. See Chapter 3.
39
Strauss, above n 35, 343. In support of this restrictive interpretation of ‘other means of peaceful
settlement’ see, Electricity Co. of Sofia and Bulgaria (Belgium v Bulgaria) [1939] PCIJ (ser A/B) No
77, 62. See also, Bernard Oxman, ‘Complementary Agreements & Compulsory Jurisdiction’ (2001) 95
American Journal of International Law 277.
40
UNFCCC Conference of the Parties, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session,
held at Marrakesh from 29 October to 10 November 2001, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1-Add.4 (2001).
41
See Jacob Werksman, ‘The Negotiation of a Kyoto Compliance System’ in Jon Hovi, Olav Stokke
and Geir Ulfstein (eds), Implementing the Climate Regime: International Compliance (London:
38
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Protocol compliance system is focused on compliance with the Kyoto Protocol
obligations rather than issues of dispute settlement concerning the UNFCCC
obligations.42 It does not appear to constitute another method of peaceful settlement
for Tuvalu’s complaint in Scenario 1.
Applying Australia’s next reservation, if Tuvalu made a declaration accepting the
ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction, it would need to wait at least 12 months before bringing
its case and it would need to show that it had not made the declaration ‘only in relation
to or for the purpose of the dispute.’43 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to consider
what other purposes Tuvalu may have for accepting the ICJ compulsory jurisdiction.
However, there would presumably be a range of other purposes for which Tuvalu
would accept the ICJ compulsory jurisdiction.
Finally, Australia’s reservation provides that it does not apply to any dispute
concerning or relating to the delimitation of the maritime zones.44 It could be argued
that Tuvalu’s case under the UNFCCC is a matter that concerns or relates to the
delimitation of maritime zones. In particular, it is not clear under the LOSC whether
sea level rise will cause loss of territory or whether baselines could be frozen to ensure
that States like Tuvalu will not lose territory.45 However, Tuvalu’s claim concerns

Earthscan, 2005); Nicola Durrant, Legal Responses to Climate Change (Sydney: The Federation Press,
2010); Farhana Yamin and Joanna Depledge, The International Climate Change Regime: A Guide to
Rules, Institutions and Procedures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
42
Strauss, above n 35, 343-344.
43
Spain unsuccessfully challenged Canada’s reservation regarding marine environmental pollution in
the Estai Case (Canada v Spain) [1998] ICJ Rep 431.
44
The reservation provides that Australia’s declaration does not apply to ‘any dispute concerning or
relating to the delimitation of maritime zones, including the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone
and the continental shelf, or arising out of, concerning, or relating to the exploitation of any disputed
area of or adjacent to any such maritime zone pending its delimitation.’
45
See Rosemary Rayfuse, ‘International Law & Disappearing States – Maritime Zones & the Criteria
for Statehood’ (2011) 41 Environmental Policy and Law 281; David Caron, ‘When Law Makes Climate
Change Worse: Rethinking the Law of Baselines in Light of a Rising Sea Level’ (1990) 17 Ecology
Law Quarterly 621; D Freestone, ‘International Law & Sea Level Rise’ in R. Churchill & D. Freestone
(eds), International Law & Global Climate Change (London: Graham and Trotman, 1991); D Caron,
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ocean acidification and the intrusion of salt water into its freshwater supplies.
Therefore, it does not concern or relate to the delimitation of maritime zones.
Therefore, it would be difficult although not impossible for Tuvalu to establish
jurisdiction in Scenario 1 through option (c), paying careful consideration to the
reservations that apply to Australia’s acceptance of ICJ jurisdiction.
However, a further challenge is that Australia is likely to contend that the interests of
other States will be affected by the outcome and that according to the indispensable
Party principle, jurisdiction must be refused. Australia could reason that the interests
of all other States would be the very subject matter of any decision as all States have
emitted greenhouse gas emissions and that they are all ‘indispensable Parties.’46 At a
minimum, Australia could argue that all of the major emitters should be included in
the dispute.
On the other hand, the indispensable Party principle represents the limits of the power
of international tribunals to refuse jurisdiction.47 The ICJ has taken decisions on
jurisdiction that demonstrate that it will generally accept jurisdiction even when the
interests of other States may be affected. For example, the ICJ accepted jurisdiction in
the Nauru Case against Australia even though Australia, the United Kingdom and New
Zealand were all members of the Administering Authority of Nauru whose actions

‘Climate Change, Sea Level Rise & the Continuing Uncertainty in Oceanic Boundaries: A Proposal to
Avoid Conflict’ in S Y Hong and J M Van Dyke, Maritime Boundary Disputes, Settlement Processes
& The Law of the Sea (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008); A H A Soons, ‘The Effects of a Rising Sea
Level on Maritime Limits & Boundaries’ (1998) 5 International Boundaries Research Unit Boundary
& Security Bulletin (1998).
46
Ibid.
47
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v United States) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility)
[1984] ICJ 392, 431. See also Case concerning Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El
Salvador v Honduras) [1990] ICJ 3, 122.
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were the subject of the dispute.48 On the other hand, the ICJ declined jurisdicion in the
East Timor Case on the basis that Australia’s alleged responsibility to Portugal over
agreements with Indonesia could not be determined in the absence of Indonesia.49 It
appears that the difference between these two cases is that an assessment of the legality
of Indonesia’s behaviour was a precondition to determining Australia’s responsibility
in the East Timor Case, whereas questions of Australia’s responsibility the Nauru Case
did not depend upon the legality of New Zealand the United Kingdom’s behaviour.50
In Tuvalu’s hypothetical case, establishing jurisdiction in a case that potentially affects
every State in the international community will present a significant hurdle. 51
Therefore, Tuvalu may choose to bring its case against a group of major emitters rather
than just Australia. However, this issue also depends upon the legal obligations under
consideration.
The UNFCCC has been almost universally adopted so there is a multitude of possible
respondent States. A particular difficulty with regard to Article 4.2 is that industrialised
States are obliged to ‘individually or jointly’ reduce their emissions to 1990s levels.
Although the ICJ could determine whether Australia has ‘individually’ met this target,
a determination of whether Annex I Parties have ‘jointly’ met the target would make
the acts of other Annex I Parties the subject matter of the court’s decision. This would

48

See e.g., Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v Australia) (Preliminary Objections) [1992] ICJ
Rep 240. For an analysis, see Antony Anghie, ‘The Heart of my Home: Colonialism, Environmental
Damage and the Nauru Case’ (1993) 34 Harvard International Law Journal 445.
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East Timor Case (Portugal v Australia) [1995] ICJ 90, 102.
50
Martin Dixon, Textbook on International Law (6th edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007),
290.
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CF Roda Verheyen, Climate Change Damage and International Law (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff,
2005), 276; J Chris Larson, Student Note, ‘Racing the Rising Tide: Legal Options for the Marshall
Islands’ (1999-2000) 21 Michigan Journal of International Law 495, 505.
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make it difficult for Tuvalu to establish jurisdiction at the ICJ unless the other Parties
are joined.
3. Attribution
If jurisdiction is established, Tuvalu must specify and attribute acts of Australia that
have allegedly breached Article 4.2 of the UNFCCC. As discussed in Chapter 6, there
are two major issues likely to arise. First, can the acts of private entities be attributed
to Australia? Second, can Australia be allocated attribution for climate change damage
when there is responsibility for collective failure?
(a) Attribution of the acts of private corporations and individuals to Australia
Tuvalu may seek to attribute the acts of private entities to Australia on the basis that
Australia has failed to exercise due diligence to prevent acts that breach Article 4.2 of
the UNFCCC. The success of such an approach depends upon the existence of an
explicit international obligation to act.52 Tuvalu claims that Article 4.2 of the UNFCCC
required Australia to reduce its emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. However,
in Chapter 3 it was found that Article 4.2 does not provide a concrete commitment for
Annex I Parties to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Although a timeline is provided
in Article 4.2(a) and a target is provided in Article 4.2(b), there is no justification for
reading these two elements together to create a commitment. Therefore, Article 4.2
does not provide a clear enough obligation to establish attribution by a failure to
exercise due diligence. If Article 4.2 had been more clearly worded, such attribution
may have been possible.

Gordon A Christenson, ‘Attributing Acts of Omission to the State’ (1990-1991) 12 Michigan Journal
of International Law 312, 360.
52
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An alternative for Tuvalu would be to seek attribution of acts by Australia’s Stateowned corporations that are high greenhouse gas producers or emitters. For example,
corporations owned by the state of Queensland have a stake of about 65% of that state’s
electricity generation capacity.53 ILC Draft Article 4 provides that the acts or
omissions of State organs or agents are attributable to the State.54 Tuvalu would need
to demonstrate that these State-owned corporations are exercising elements of
government authority. A functional assessment55 of these State-owned corporations
may ultimately preclude attribution of their conduct to Australia because the relevant
activities are not clearly within the scope of government authority. On the other hand,
it could be argued that the provision of electricity is a core government activity for
many States and that those acts should be attributed to the State. Overall, attribution
of emissions by private and public entities to Australia will be a difficult challenge for
Tuvalu.
(b) Allocation of attribution to Australia for a problem of collective failure
Attribution under international law is determined on an individual basis and is
generally an exclusive process. Nonetheless, there is scope for multiple attribution
where the primary rules provide scope for such attribution.56 Article 4.2 of the
UNFCCC is ambiguous in many respects, including the question of whether individual
conduct can be identified. Although paragraph (a) implies individual attribution (‘Each
of these Parties shall’), paragraph (b) provides for individual or joint attribution (‘aim
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Queensland
Government,
Electricity
Generation
<
http://www.business.qld.gov.au/industry/energy/electricity-industry/electricity-queensland/electricitygeneration> accessed 1 July 2012.
54
ILD Draft Articles, art 4.
55
See Michael Feit, ‘Responsibility of a State under International Law for the Breach of Contract
Committed by a State-Owned Entity’ (2010) 28 Berkeley Journal of International Law 142.
56
See e.g. Eurotunnel Arbitration (The Channel Tunnel Group Ltd and France –Machne S.A. v United
Kingdom and France) [2007] 132 ILR 1.
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of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels’). The combination of
individual and multiple attribution in Article 4.2 would make it difficult to determine
whether the obligation requires specific individual conduct by a State. However, the
challenges associated with attribution may be overcome if an appropriate method of
apportioning responsibility is applied (see Section B.6 below).
4. Breach
Assuming that Article 4.2 is applied individually, Australia failed to reduce its
emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. In fact, Australia’s greenhouse gas
emissions increased by 14.5% from 1990 to 1998.57 Even if Australia sought to rely
upon the joint reductions made by Annex I Parties, it would likely still be in breach of
this obligation.58 On the other hand, Article 4.2 provides differential treatment of
Annex I Parties on the basis of a variety of factors. These are their different ‘starting
points and approaches,’ their ‘economic structures and resource bases’, their need to
‘maintain strong and sustainable economic growth,’ the ‘available technologies’ and
‘other individual circumstances.’ Differential treatment is also provided for on the
basis of the ‘need for equitable and appropriate contributions’ by each of the Annex I
Parties.59 These differential elements create uncertainty regarding what is required by
States such as Australia.60 However, they do not mean that there is no obligation.
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See National Communications from Parties Included in Annex I to the Convention: Greenhouse Gas
Inventory Data from 1990 to 1998 FCCC/SBI/2000/11 (2000).
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Other States individual greenhouse gas emissions rose from 1990-8 as follows: Canada +13.2%; Japan
+9/7%; New Zealand +2.5%; and United States +11.2%.
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See generally, Friederich Soltau, Fairness in International Climate Change Law and Policy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
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Differential norms such as that found in Article 4.2 may be contrasted with the certainty found in
absolute norms which provide for identical treatment to all parties without variation. See e.g.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 6 December 1966, 999
UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) art 2(1): (‘[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction
the rights recognised in the present Covenant.’) See Daniel Barstow Magraw, ‘Legal Treatment of
Developing Countries: Differential, Contextual & Absolute Norms’ (1989) 1 Colorado Journal of
International Environmental Law and Policy 69, 76.
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Tuvalu could reason that the central obligation contained in Article 4.2 is not altered
by these differential elements but that only the process of implementation is varied.61
Australia would likely contend that its individual circumstances require a flexible
application of Article 4.2, particularly as its economy depends heavily on emissionsintensive export industries. Australia may claim that the international community has
recognised this reliance and that this is why it is one of the few Parties to the Kyoto
Protocol allowed to increase its emissions in the first commitment period.62 In
response, Tuvalu could argue that the first commitment period in the Kyoto Protocol
applies to 2008 to 2012 and should not be used to negate Australia’s individual
obligation under Article 4.2. Even so, the ambiguity and differential treatment allowed
in Article 4.2 is likely to further undermine Tuvalu’s case in Scenario 1.63 Furthermore,
Australia is likely to persuasively argue that its quantitative emission limitation and
reduction obligation (‘QELRO’) target in the Kyoto Protocol has superseded its
obligation to mitigate emissions under Article 4.2 (see Chapter 3).
5. Causation
In this scenario, Tuvalu alleges that greenhouse gas emissions by Australia have
caused climate change, resulting in sea level rise and the contamination of its
underground freshwater reserves. In order to prove causation, Tuvalu would need to
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See generally, Lavanya Rajamani, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 93.
62
Australia’s target for the first commitment period is 108%. The only other Parties allowed to increase
their emissions are Iceland (110%) and Norway (101%). The European Community accepted a target
of 92%. Kyoto Protocol, Annex B.
63
An alternative possible interpretation of Article 4.2 is that it creates an obligation for industrial States
to modify their long-term trends of greenhouse gas emissions. Verheyen, above n 51, 82. However, this
interpretation makes the obligation contained in Article 4.2 even more ambiguous and uncertain. See
Chapter 3.
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satisfy both factual and legal causation. For the purposes of this chapter, only the
questions of specific causation are considered (on general causation see Chapter 6).
(a) Factual causation
But for Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions, would Tuvalu’s climate damage
have occurred?
In order to prove specific factual causation, Tuvalu would need to demonstrate that its
underground water supplies have been contaminated by sea water. Tuvalu would also
need to show that this contamination has been as a result of sea level rise. Monthly
averaged sea level data is available from 1977 at Funafuti (1977-2001 and 1993present).64 Satellite data is available from 1993 and in situ sea level data is available
for 1950 to 2009 (reconstructed sea level).65 Satellite data reveals that Tuvalu has
experienced sea level rise of about 5mm per year since 1993, totalling 9cm.66 This rate
of sea level rise is higher than the global average of 2.8-3.6mm per year.67 The higher
rate may be partly due to natural sea level fluctuations caused by El Niño Southern
Oscillation (ENSO).68 This indicates that the sea level rise experienced by Tuvalu is
not solely due to climate change but also a result of ENSO.
Sea level rise threatens fresh water supplies because many islands rely upon freshwater
lenses for their water supplies. These freshwater lenses ‘float’ on seawater providing
drinking water and contributing to the agricultural productivity of the land above it.
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Australian Bureau of Meteorology and CSIRO, Climate Change in the Pacific: Scientific Assessment
and New Research. Volume I: Regional Overview. Volume II: Country Reports (2011), 232. Also see
John R Hunter, A Note on Relative Sea Level Change at Funafuti, Tuvalu (Antarctic Cooperative
Research Centre, 2002).
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Australian Bureau of Meteorology and CSIRO, Climate Change in the Pacific: Scientific Assessment
and New Research. Volume I: Regional Overview. Volume II: Country Reports (2011), 235.
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Figure 7-1 below portrays an idealised cross-section of a typical coral atoll and shows
the main features of a freshwater lens.69 As sea water contaminates the fresh water
lens, the quality and quantity of drinking water as well as agricultural output
deteriorate. The IPCC has concluded with very high confidence that there is strong
evidence that ‘under most climate change scenarios, water resources in small islands
are likely to be seriously compromised.’70 There is evidence that this process of
increased salinity is occurring in Tuvalu.71

Figure 7-1: Freshwater lens
The fact that Tuvalu may have experienced a higher rate of sea level rise due to ENSO
indicates that sea level rise and salt water intrusion may have occurred even without
the factor of anthropogenic climate change. Expert evidence would be required to
establish that the salt water contamination was as a result of this sea level rise and not

69

Intersectoral Platform on Small Island Developing States, <http://portal.unesco.org/fr/ev.phpURL_ID=13604&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html> 21 June 2011.
In most cases, the thickest part of the freshwater lens is displaced towards the lagoon side rather than in
the centre as shown in the image. This is attributed to the lower permability sediments on the lagoon
side slowing down the mixing of seawater and freshwater which enable a thicker freshwater zone to
develop.
70
Ibid.
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Arthur Webb, Tuvalu Technical Report: Assessment of Salinity of Groundwater in Swamp Taro
“Pulaka” Pits in Tuvalu (2007) <http://dev.sopac.org.fj/VirLib/ER0075.pdf> accessed 20 December
2011.
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due to ENSO or some other stressor (such as poor water management).72 It may be that
the ICJ would conclude that the added stress of ENSO means that the ‘but for’ test
cannot be satisfied in this scenario.
In addition, to satisfy the ‘but for’ test, Tuvalu must also establish that if it was not for
Australia’s wrongful emissions, the damage would not have occurred. Australia is the
world’s ninth largest emitter in absolute terms, producing about 1.8% of the world’s
greenhouse gas emissions.73 Climate change is a cumulative process and even if all of
Australia’s emissions were removed, climate change and associated sea level rise
would still occur. Thus, it would be difficult for Tuvalu to establish causation under
the deterministic approach because if it were not for Australia’s emissions, it would
likely still have suffered salt water intrusion as a result of other anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions.
Did Australia’s greenhouse gas emission cause a material increase in risk for
Tuvalu’s climate damage?
In such a context, it is possible that the ICJ may adopt a probabilistic approach to
factual causation. As discussed in Chapter 6, the probabilistic approach has been
adopted in many national jurisdictions and was argued for by Australia and New
Zealand in the Nuclear Tests Cases.74 In order to satisfy this test, Tuvalu would
probably need to show that Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions have caused a

See e.g. The Guardian, ‘Warming Oceans and Human Waste Hit Tuvalu’s Sustainable Way of Life’,
4 March 2011 < http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/mar/04/tuvalusustainable-way-of-life-disappears> accessed 1 July 2012.
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material increase in risk for the damage claimed.75 The first aspect of applying the test
would be to establish that anthropogenic emissions have caused a material increase in
risk for the salt water intrusion. As discussed above, there is recent evidence of sea
level rise in Tuvalu since 1993 as a result of anthropogenic climate change.
Furthermore, science has established a strong connection between sea level rise and
contamination of the fresh water lens of coral atolls. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude
that even if ENSO is a significant factor in the damage, anthropogenic greenhouse gas
emissions have caused a material increase in risk for the damage claimed.
However, Tuvalu would also need to prove that Australia’s emissions have caused a
material increase in risk for the salt water intrusion. As discussed above, Australia
produces about 1.8% of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions, with a multitude of
other States and other entities also contributing to the problem. This contrasts to tort
cases in national jurisdictions where only a handful of actors are typical. This may
prevent a court or tribunal from finding that Australia’s conduct meets the threshold
of a material increase in risk. However, if Australia’s conduct is seen as one part of
collective wrongful conduct by a group of emitting States, then the ICJ may conclude
that this behaviour has resulted in a material increase in risk for the salt water intrusion.
Tuvalu could also satisfy factual causation if the ICJ does not require a threshold for
the respondent State’s contribution. The arguments made by Australia and New
Zealand in the Nuclear Tests Cases did not rely upon a threshold and indeed indicated
that a threshold should not be applied. In its pleadings, Australia contended that any
additional exposure to radioactive contamination, no matter how small, substantially
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Fairchild v Glenhaven [2002] UKHL 22. Also see McGee v National Coal Board [1972] 3 All ER
1008; [1973] 1 WLR 1; Wallaby Grip (BAE) Pty Ltd v Macleay Area Health Service (1998) 17
NSWCCR 355.
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contributed to the risk of radiation-related injuries.76 It is uncertain whether the ICJ
would adopt such an approach because of the importance of thresholds in national
jurisprudence.
(c) Legal causation
From an objective standpoint, is Tuvalu’s climate damage a natural and
normal consequence of Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions?
The proximate cause test requires an objective consideration of whether there was a
‘natural sequence’ between the conduct and damage.77 It is by no means clear that the
alleged damage suffered by Tuvalu is the natural and normal consequence of
Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions. It could be argued that the relatively small
contribution by Australia indicates that a clear sequence cannot be established between
its specific emissions and Tuvalu’s damage. On the other hand, all past anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions have contributed to the sea level rise experienced by Tuvalu
because these emissions are indivisible. Thus, although Australia’s relative
contribution is small, it may be reasonable to conclude that there is a natural sequence
between its emissions and sea level rise suffered by Tuvalu. Tuvalu would also need
to show that there is a natural sequence between these emissions and the resulting
intrusion of salt water into its fresh water reserves.
Was it or should it have been foreseeable to Australia that its wrongful conduct
would result in the damage suffered?
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Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (Cambridge:
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One basis for determining foreseeability would be to consider the state of science over
the legally relevant period of time. In Australia’s case, there is a strong community of
scientists working on climate change. For example, Australia’s First National
Communication under the UNFCCC provides subjective evidence of foreseeability
and knowledge of climate change damage.78 Thus, at least from 1994, there is evidence
that it was or should have been foreseeable to Australia that its greenhouse gas
emissions would result in climate change. The strength of Australia’s scientific
community would support the view that foreseeability may be established from at least
1994. In addition, Australian scientists have taken a leading role in researching sea
level rise and evidence of the same in the Pacific region. 79 Thus, it is reasonable to
conclude that foreseeability would be proven.
However, the past 15 to 20 years form only around 10% of the past 150 years of
greenhouse gas emissions that have caused the damage. If the period of foreseeability
is limited to 1994 to 2000, then only 6 years of 150 years worth of emissions are legally
relevant.
6. Apportionment of responsibility
If causation can be made out, a further challenge for Tuvalu’s case would be the
question of how to apportion responsibility when there are multiple wrongdoers. As
was discussed in Chapter 6, sole responsibility is the ordinary rule under international
law.80 There is no clear method for apportionment. In these circumstances, it is likely

Australia’s First National Communication under the UNFCCC, 1994, 1 (‘Australia recognises that
while accurate scientific data on the potential regional impacts of climate change are not yet available,
there are particular vulnerabilities that warrant action in line with the precautionary principle.’)
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that Australia will seek to shift the blame for climate change damage to other, higher
emitting States, arguing that it has contributed too little to the problem to be held
responsible. Furthermore, if Australia was held fully responsible for the damage
suffered by Tuvalu, this would arguably be an unjust outcome and may be contrary to
the principle of common but differentiated responsibility (depending upon
interpretation).
It is difficult to determine whether joint and several liability is a part of international
law. There is no right of recourse in treaties or under customary international law.81
Thus, holding Australia liable under the principle of joint and several liability would
again risk placing too much responsibility upon the respondent and result in a situation
that is contrary to common but differentiated responsibility.
Under the approach of market share liability, Australia could be held liable for its share
of total greenhouse gas emissions.82 This would amount to 1.8% of the cost of the
damage suffered by Tuvalu. However, the approach of market share liability is not
found in international law and has little support in domestic jurisdictions.83 Thus, it is
unlikely that the ICJ would apportion responsibility under market share liability.
An alternative and creative method of apportioning responsibility would be to base it
upon the principle of common but differentiated responsibility.84 In particular, this
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principle could be used to allocate responsibility to Australia on the basis of its share
of global emissions (i.e. 1.8%). Such an approach would hold Australia and other
emitting States liable in common but differentiated on the basis of their historical
contributions to the occurrence of climate change damage. This approach offers the
fairest basis for allocating responsibility for climate change damage because it would
result in a level of responsibility that should not overwhelm any one State but would
result in reparations being available for victim States.
Another possible application of the principle of common but differentiated
responsibility would be to hold that the Kyoto Protocol amounts to an ex ante
apportionment of responsibility.85 However, the Kyoto Protocol actually allows
Australia to increase its emissions in the period 2008 to 2012, which suggests that
Australia’s liability should be little, if anything. Thus, apportioning responsibility for
climate change damage according to the Kyoto Protocol may result in too little
responsibility for Australia. Overall, the rules of apportioning responsibility are underdeveloped in international law and poorly suited to the complexity of climate change
damage. The greatest potential for allocating responsibility rests with a creative
application of the principle of common but differentiated responsibility.

‘The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of
humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the
lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.’ (emphasis added).
85
André Nollkaemper and Dov Jacobs, ‘Shared Responsibility in International Law: A Concept Paper’
(ACIL Research Paper No. 2011-07, (SHARES Series)), 21. Also see C Stone, ‘Common but
Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law’ (2004) 98 The American Journal of International
Law 276.
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7. Defences
Australia would likely rely upon the two defences of consent and necessity. The
defence of consent, set out in Draft Article 20, provides that it is a defence if the victim
State consented to the act or omission, provided that the conduct remains within the
limits of the consent. Tuvalu and Australia are both Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. This
may suggest that Tuvalu has consented to a level of climate damage, and has
specifically consented to Australia increasing its greenhouse gas emissions in the
period of 2008 to 2012. Tuvalu did not enter a reservation in its ratification of the
Kyoto Protocol.86 However, Tuvalu’s declaration to the UNFCCC provides that its
ratification does not amount to ‘a renunciation of any rights under international law
concerning State responsibility for the adverse effects of climate change’.87 Tuvalu’s
declaration to the UNFCCC may be sufficient to prevent the defence of consent being
applied to its claim against Australia.
The defence of necessity, as provided in Draft Article 25, could be relied upon by
Australia to preclude wrongfulness. In particular, Australia could cite Article 4.10 of
the UNFCCC and argue that it is vulnerable to the impacts of mitigation measures
because of its economy’s reliance upon fossil fuels. Thus, Australia could contend that
it did not reduce its emissions to 1990 levels by 2000 because of economic necessity.
On the other hand, this defence may not apply because Australia’s greenhouse gas
emissions threaten the continued habitability of Tuvalu and the preservation of its

UNFCCC, Declarations and Reservations by Parties – Kyoto Protocol <
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environment. There are essential interests held by Tuvalu threatened by Australia’s
emissions which may negate use of this defence.
8. Remedies
The first remedy sought by Tuvalu is cessation, or non-repetition, of the wrongful act.
In this scenario, the conduct relates to alleged behaviour by Australia prior to the year
2000. Thus, it is not clear whether cessation is possible. However, it could be alleged
that cessation requires Australia to reduce and keep its emissions at 1990 levels. It
would not be possible for cessation to occur immediately. However, the ICJ could
order gradual cessation and regulate it over time. The advantage of this remedy is that
it would not require proof of causation. However, it is unlikely that the ICJ would
make such an order, particularly given that there are ongoing negotiations through the
UNFCCC process to determine future mitigation action.
Compensation may be payable if restitution is not available, or insufficient to effect
full reparation. Sea level rise and the intrusion of salt water into Tuvalu’s fresh water
reserves appears to be an irreversible form of damage. Thus, restitution is not
applicable. To access causation, Tuvalu must have proven causation which, as
highlighted above, would be a difficult task. However, if causation is proven, the
damage must be quantifiable. Arguably, the damage caused by contamination of
Tuvalu’s fresh water reserves would be quantifiable (though quantification is beyond
the scope of this thesis). Furthermore, the cost of additional desalination plants could
be independently valued.
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9. Conclusion
Overall, this hypothetical scenario has shown that Australia’s exposure to legal risk
under the UNFCCC for climate change damage suffered by Tuvalu is low. Although
Australia failed to reduce its emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000, the obligation
in Article 4.2 is unclear because of the differential elements it incorporates.
Establishing causation would present a difficult task. However, recent advances in
scientific study of climate change damage in Tuvalu suggest that exposure to legal risk
has grown. A court or tribunal could apply the principle of common but differentiated
responsibility to allocate responsibility to Australia according to its share of global
emissions (1.8%). A summary of the findings is provided in Table 7-2 below.
Table 7-2 Summary of findings: Australia’s exposure to legal risk under the
UNFCCC
Element
Standing
Jurisdiction

Attribution

Breach

Factual
causation

Legal causation

Apportionment
of responsibility

Findings
Tuvalu would likely be able to establish standing for its case as an injured State.
Australia has accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ under Article 36.25 of the ICJ Statute (with reservation) which exposes it to international litigation.
However, a determination of Australia’s compliance with Article 4.2 of the
UNFCCC would require consideration of the acts of other Annex I Parties,
perhaps making them indispensable Parties to the litigation.
Attribution of conduct to Australia will be a formidable challenge, both because
the acts have primarily been made by private entities and it is unclear how
attribution can be allocated to Australia when the conduct of other States is also
implicated. Attribution may depend upon apportionment of responsibility.
Australia failed to reduce its emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. However,
the differential treatment allowed in Article 4.2 creates uncertainty as to what is
required. Furthermore, it appears that Australia’s QELRO target has superseded
its obligation to mitigate emissions under Article 4.2.
Satellite data reveals that Tuvalu has experienced sea level rise of about 5mm per
year since 1993, totalling 9cm. Tuvalu may be able to satisfy factual causation
under the probabilistic approach if Australia’s conduct is seen as one part of
collective wrongful conduct by a group of emitting States.
There appears to be a natural sequence between Australia’s greenhouse gas
emissions and the damage suffered by Tuvalu.
The strength of Australia’s scientific community and the long history of study of
climate change suggest that it was or should have been foreseeable to Australia
from at least 1994 that its wrongful conduct would result in the damage suffered.
Individual responsibility and joint and several responsibility would both result in
far too much responsibility being allocated to Australia, contrary to the principle
of common but differentiated responsibility. Application of the principle of
common but differentiated responsibility as a method of apportioning
responsibility offers an alternative and could result in Australia being held liable
for its share of global emissions (1.8%).
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Defences

Remedies

The defence of consent may apply because Tuvalu and Australia are both Parties
to the Kyoto Protocol. However, Tuvalu’s declaration to the UNFCCC may be
sufficient to prevent the defence of consent from applying.
Whether the defence of necessity applies is more uncertain. Australia could argue
that did not reduce its emissions due to economic necessity. However, this defence
does not apply where an essential interest (e.g. the continued habitability of
Tuvalu) is threatened.
An order of absolute or gradual cessation of wrongful conduct is an unlikely
remedy in this scenario because of the ongoing UNFCCC negotiations regarding
implementation in which both Tuvalu and Australia are participants. The damage
cited by Tuvalu appears to be quantifiable and thus amenable to compensation.

C. Kyoto Protocol
Under the Kyoto Protocol, the Annex I Parties accepted QELROs (see Chapter 4).
These commitments are meant to provide a 5% reduction in aggregate greenhouse gas
emissions compared with 1990 levels in the period 2008-2012 (the ‘first commitment
period’). Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol provides differentiated targets for the
individual States and regional economic organisations.

The Kyoto Protocol is

supported by a complex and thoroughly regulated compliance system.88
While the Kyoto Protocol provides a specific target for Australia’s emission
reductions, it appears unlikely that a claim concerning mitigation of emissions would
be brought under the Kyoto Protocol against Australia. Australia is on track to meet
its commitment under Article 3.1 (QELRO) to limit emissions to 108% of their level
in 1990 during the first commitment period 2008-2012.89
In Chapter 6, it was found that the Kyoto Protocol provided a stronger source of
exposure to legal risk because of the rules of State responsibility. In particular, if a
State has failed to meet its QELRO target, the acts of private entities may be attributed

Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Palau Mission to the United Nations (Sept.
22, 2011).
89
Australian Government Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, Fifth National
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (2010).
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to it by its failure to exercise due diligence to prevent commission of an internationally
wrongful act. A case brought under the Kyoto Protocol could also simplify the tasks
of allocating multiple attribution and multiple responsibility through its allocation of
individual State obligations as part of collective action on climate change. However,
an analysis of the ‘real world’ reveals that such litigation would be unfeasible against
Australia because it is on track to meet its QELRO target. A summary of these findings
is provided in Table 7-3 below.
Table 7-3 Summary of findings: Australia’s exposure to legal risk under the Kyoto
Protocol
Element
Breach

Findings
A breach cannot yet be made out because Australia may or may not meet its
commitment under Article 3.1 (QELRO) to limit its emissions to 108% of their
1990 levels during the commitment period 2008-2012. This question is not
determinable until sometime after 2012. However, Australia is on track to meet its
obligations at the time of writing.

D. LOSC
In Scenario 2, Tuvalu submits a complaint alleging that Australia has breached Article
194 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC).90 As discussed
in Chapter 5, the LOSC is the key international instrument designed to protect the
marine environment from pollution.91 The aim of the LOSC was to establish a
comprehensive regime for the law of the sea, with 320 articles and nine additional
annexes. Aside from issues of protection from pollution, the LOSC also establishes
rights and duties for coastal, flag and port States, the right of innocent passage and
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other matters.92 The LOSC is indirectly related to climate change damage to the extent
that these impacts affect the marine environment.
Tuvalu argues that under Article 194, Australia has an obligation to prevent, reduce,
and control pollution of the marine environment by taking all necessary measures to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions.93 Tuvalu claims that it will suffer future damage due
to the acidification of its ocean, with accompanying devastating impacts upon the
marine environment, its fishing industry and food security. Tuvalu seeks to have the
matter heard by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). Tuvalu
requests two remedies: (1) that a declaration is made that Australia is in breach of
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See generally Donald Rothwell and Tim Stephens, The International Law of the Sea (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 2010), 14ff.
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LOSC, art 194:
‘Measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment provides: ‘1. States shall
take, individually or jointly as appropriate, all measures consistent with this Convention that are
necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from any source, using
for this purpose the best practicable means at their disposal and in accordance with their capabilities,
and shall endeavour to harmonise their policies in this connection.
2. States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction or control are
so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to other States and their environment, and that
pollution arising from incidents or activities under their jurisdiction or control does not spread beyond
the areas where they exercise sovereign rights in accordance with this Convention.
3. The measures taken pursuant to this Part shall deal with all sources of pollution of the marine
environment. These measures shall include, inter alia, those designed to minimise to the fullest possible
extent:
a. the release of toxic, harmful or noxious substances, especially those which are persistent, from landbased sources, from or through the atmosphere or by dumping;
b. pollution from vessels, in particular measures for preventing accidents and dealing with emergencies,
ensuring the safety of operations at sea, preventing intentional and unintentional discharges, and
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c. pollution from installations and devices used in exploration or exploitation of the natural resources
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d. pollution from other installations and devices operating in the marine environment, in particular
measures for preventing accidents and dealing with emergencies, ensuring the safety of operations at
sea, and regulating the design, construction, equipment, operation and manning of such installations or
devices.
4. In taking measures to prevent, reduce or control pollution of the marine environment, States shall
refrain from unjustifiable interference with activities carried out by other States in the exercise of their
rights and in pursuance of their duties in conformity with this Convention.
5. The measures taken in accordance with this Part shall include those necessary to protect and preserve
rare or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered species and other
forms of marine life.’ (emphasis added).
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Article 194; and (2) that an insurance scheme is established whereby Australia would
compensate it for economic loss and ecological damage resulting from future ocean
acidification. Tuvalu’s existing assets and interests are to be valued and registered, as
well as the ‘option values’ of assets, or the potential value of an asset in the context of
future development.94
1. Standing
As in Scenario 1, Tuvalu would probably argue that the matter falls within the second
ILC category of standing. That is, Article 194 is owed to either the international
community or a group of States (i.e. Parties to the LOSC) including the injured State.
Tuvalu is vulnerable to climate change and ocean acidification because of a range of
factors, including its small size, geographic isolation and ecological fragility. It is less
clear whether Article 194 of the LOSC could be open to public interest claims (the
fourth and fifth categories set out by the ILC). Unlike the UNFCCC, the LOSC does
not rely upon ‘common concern’ language.
However, it is arguable that the protection of the marine environment is a common
legal interest of all LOSC Parties and perhaps the international community more
broadly. Particularly in light of the Deep Seabed Advisory Opinion, public interest
claims aare in principle possible for violations of Article 194 of the LOSC.95 The
Chamber found that the obligations for protection of the environment of the high seas
are erga omnes or obligations held by all and owed to the whole world. This finding
by the Chamber is notable because such a view has been very rarely stated in judicial

See AOSIS’s proposed International Insurance Pool discussed in Chapter 2.
Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities
in the Area (Advisory Opinion) [2011] ITLOS 17. The Deep Seabed Advisory Opinion was principally
focused upon governance of the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction (‘the Area’) but is of general
relevance for international environmental law and general international law.
94
95
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proceedings.96 Nonetheless, these public interest categories are controversial and such
standing would risk Tuvalu’s access to reparations.
2. Jurisdiction
The LOSC is unusual because of its compulsory jurisdiction,97 which provides access
to four possible forums for the binding resolution of disputes. These are the
International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) established under Annex VI,98
the International Court of Justice (ICJ),99 an arbitral tribunal established under Annex
VII,100 or a special arbitral tribunal established under Annex VIII.101 If all States that
are Parties to the dispute are subject to the jurisdiction of a particular tribunal or court
under Article 281 and the matter concerns the interpretation or application of
provisions of the LOSC regarding the marine environment, that court or tribunal will
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be competent to deal with the matter.102 If there is no election of forum or the Parties
have different choices, the Parties have the opportunity to agree on the dispute
resolution mechanism. If no mechanism has been selected, the arbitral tribunal
procedure under Annex VII is chosen by default.103
Australia has elected both ITLOS and the ICJ for disputes under the LOSC processes,
with no preference between these forums. Tuvalu has not elected any preference for
method of dispute resolution under the LOSC process. Thus, Tuvalu may seek to have
the matter heard by ITLOS, which is one of Australia’s preferred forums.
As with Scenario 1, Australia would probably maintain that all of the other Parties to
the LOSC are indispensable Parties. Article 194 provides that the obligation is held
‘individually or jointly as appropriate.’ Such language echoes that found in Article 4.2
of the UNFCCC and raises the same barrier to jurisdiction. In light of this barrier,
Tuvalu may need to include other respondents to establish jurisdiction. This may not
include every potential State in breach, but at least other States with a similar level of
culpability. Nonetheless, in light of the Deep Seabed Advisory Opinion, public interest
claims are in principle possible for violations of Article 194 of the LOSC. Although
the Deep Seabed Advisory Opinion was principally focused upon governance of the
deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction, the case is of general relevance for
international environmental law and general international law.104
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The LOSC claim in Scenario 2 presents further hurdles for Tuvalu in establishing
jurisdiction in ITLOS. As was discussed in Chapter 5, there are jurisdictional hurdles
specifically associated with the LOSC. Most importantly, the principle of lex specialis
may apply to the climate regime, meaning that it supplants and exhausts the principles
of the LOSC. The lex specialis rule provides that where two treaties govern the same
factual situation, the treaty governing a specific subject matter (lex specialis) overrides
the treaty which only governs general matters (lex generalis).
Although the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and LOSC all seek to protect the environment
from damage, there is an apparent conflict in the substance of the UNFCCC and the
LOSC in so far as the UNFCCC classifies the oceans as carbon sinks that should be
utilised to uptake greenhouse gas emissions.105 Such uptake will cause pollution of the
marine environment, in the form of ocean acidification. This is one ground to argue
that there is a conflict between the LOSC and the UNFCCC and that the lex specialis
rule must apply. However, the wording of Article 4.1(d) may not be sufficiently clear
to conclude that there are two incompatible legal norms.
In addition, there is a clear conflict between the procedures provided in the climate
regime and the LOSC. Article 14 of the UNFCCC requires Parties to reach agreement
as to what peaceful means of dispute resolution are to be utilised. In contrast, the LOSC
provides compulsory binding dispute processes that can be unilaterally initiated. This
again supports the view that the lex specialis rule should exclude ITLOS’s jurisdiction
in this scenario.

105

UNFCCC, art 4.1(d).

333

On the other hand, it could be argued that the LOSC is more applicable to the problem
of uptake of CO2 by the oceans and ocean acidification. The UNFCCC is focused upon
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases and is not specifically concerned with
marine pollution. Based upon this approach, the LOSC may be the more specialised
treaty, meaning that the lex specialis rule could act to secure its application to the
problem of ocean acidification rather than exclude it. On the other hand, it could be
argued that the oceans form part of the climate system and are thus within the
UNFCCC’s special focus. Therefore, the principle of lex specialis may act to prevent
jurisdiction of the LOSC dispute settlement forums and the ITLOS in particular.
3. Attribution
Tuvalu would face similar issues in establishing attribution in this scenario as it faced
in Scenario 1. These issues relate to whether the acts of private entities can be
attributed to Australia and whether attribution can be established when there are
multiple actors. A further issue arises in this scenario because Tuvalu’s claim relates
to future damage and thus seems to implicate future conduct by Australia. Projections
of ocean acidification that are likely to occur in the future not only depend upon
historical and current emissions of greenhouse gases but also include emissions by
Australia and other States that are yet to occur.
(a) Attribution of the acts of private corporations and individuals to Australia
Article 194 of the LOSC obliges Parties to take all measures to prevent, reduce and
control pollution of the marine environment from any source. Potentially, the acts of
private entities could be attributed to Australia on the basis that it has failed to exercise
due diligence to prevent acts that breach Article 194. However, paragraph 1 of Article
334

194 provides that this obligation is to be met by States using the ‘best practice means
at their disposal’ and ‘in accordance with their capabilities’.106 Paragraph 2 of Article
194 incorporates the no harm principle, providing that States are obliged to take all
measures necessary to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction or control do not
cause damage by pollution to other States. Together, paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 194
moderate the conventional approach to the concept of due diligence.107
The qualifications (‘best practice means at their disposal’ and ‘in accordance with the
capabilities’) particularly indicate that there is a high degree of flexibility and
discretion for States in fulfilling this obligation.108 Nonetheless, Article 194 appears to
provide a clearer example of a positive international obligation to act than does Article
4.2 of the UNFCCC. While it does not provide any target or timeline, it does require
positive regulatory action by the State. Therefore, there is greater scope for
establishing attribution for private actors under the LOSC than the UNFCCC.
Furthermore, Tuvalu could also seek to attribute the acts of State-owned corporations
that are high greenhouse gas producers or emitters (as discussed in Scenario 1).
(b) Allocation of attribution to Australia for a problem of collective failure
As with Article 4.2 of the UNFCCC, the obligation contained in Article 194 of the
LOSC provides for individual or joint attribution (‘individually or jointly as
appropriate’). As in Scenario 1, this combination of individual and multiple attribution
would make it difficult to determine whether the obligation requires specific individual
conduct by Australia. In a problem such as climate change, where the success of any
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mitigation is dependent upon global action being taken, it is arguable that attribution
to any one State cannot be established. However, a method of attribution may flow
from the identification of a method to apportion responsibility (see Section D.6
below).
(c) Attribution of future conduct by Australia
There is no method to attribute potential future conduct by a State for the purposes of
State responsibility. Despite the fact that scientists can make predictions about likely
future emissions based upon emissions trajectories, there are too many uncertainties to
attribute future conduct. Australia may have a change of policy, or suffer a strong
economic downturn, or have some other unforeseen factor arise that significantly
reduces its greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, projections of future conduct by
Australia cannot be attributed to it for the purposes of State responsibility.
4. Breach
Assuming that Article 194 is applied individually, Australia has taken some measures
to prevent and reduce anthropogenic CO2 emissions, especially in relation to land
clearing.109 However, these are certainly not ‘all’ of the measures that Australia has at
its disposal. A study by McKinsey & Company found that Australia has the capacity
to achieve a 30% reduction by 2020 on 1990 levels without major technological
breakthroughs or lifestyle changes.110 Until recently, Australia’s response to climate
change has focused on voluntary initiatives and policies based upon a ‘no regrets’
approach. These policies were measures that the Australian Government decided had
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no net costs.111 Australia’s ‘no regrets’ approach was ineffective in changing corporate
behaviour or achieving reductions in emissions.112
Australia’s policy shifted in 2008 toward a carbon tax, which culminated in 2011 with
the passing of the Clean Energy Legislative Package.113 As a result, a carbon price was
introduced in July 2012 and a cap on emissions will be introduced in 2015. However,
this recent action does not negate the absence of effective regulatory, market, and
liability mechanisms to control CO2 emissions. As mentioned above, Article 194
provides for differential and flexible treatment (‘best practice means at their disposal’
and ‘in accordance with their capabilities’). This flexibility may preclude finding a
breach by Australia because these differential elements may justify the ‘no regrets’
approach adopted by Australia. Despite these problems, there is some scope for a
breach by Australia to be found.
5. Causation
In order to establish causation, Tuvalu would first need to demonstrate that the damage
suffered is a form of damage captured by Article 194 of the LOSC. Article 194 refers
to the prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the marine environment. The
definition of ‘pollution of the marine environment’ provided in Article 1 of the LOSC
states that it includes the introduction of substances or energy that ‘results or is likely
to result in’ deleterious effects to the marine environment. Thus, the type of damage
captured by the LOSC includes substances or energy that have not actually caused
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harm but based upon the available scientific evidence are likely to do so.114 This means
that Article 194 may include the risk of ocean acidification as a form of damage.
Compensation for future damage is unusual under international law. However, Tuvalu
may rely upon the precautionary principle to argue that it is not necessary for damage
to have actually occurred. This argument was raised by Hungary in the Gabčikovo
Case where it argued that consideration of future damage caused by Slovakia’s
unilateral damming of the Danube River was a ‘logical application of the precautionary
principle.’115 The ICJ did not rule on this issue but instead asked the Parties to negotiate
the legal consequences of Slovakia’s breaches.
However, there is a difference between the Gabčikovo Case and Tuvalu’s claim. In the
Gabčikovo Case the damming had already occurred and it was only that the precise
ecological impacts of this wrongful conduct were uncertain. In contrast, the risk of
ocean acidification for Tuvalu is not only due to existing emissions but also due to
emissions that are yet to occur. Thus, not all of the potentially wrongful activity has
taken place. This distinguishing feature may preclude consideration of the risk of
future ocean acidification as a form of damage under international law.116
(a) Factual causation
But for Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions, would Tuvalu’s climate damage
have occurred?
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Factual causation in this scenario would require proof that Australia’s greenhouse gas
emissions are likely to result in ocean acidification to Tuvalu’s marine environment
with associated impacts upon the marine environment, its fishing industry and food
security. Recent research has revealed that there is evidence of ocean acidification in
Tuvalu. The aragonite saturation state117 in Tuvalu has fallen from approximately 4.5
in the late 18th Century to approximately 4.0 ±0.1 by 2000.118 Sea water aragonite
saturation states above 4 are optimal for coral growth and development of healthy coral
reef ecosystems while coral reef systems are not found if the aragonite saturation state
is below 3.119 It is predicted that ocean acidification in Tuvalu’s waters will continue
in the 21st Century with change being primarily due to the increasing uptake of CO2
by oceans (very high confidence).120 Projections show that the annual maximum
aragonite saturation state in Tuvalu’s waters will reach values below 3.5 by 2060 and
continue to decline thereafter.121 Thus, there is ample scientific evidence to prove that
Tuvalu is likely to suffer ocean acidification in the future as a result of anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions.
Nonetheless, Tuvalu would face the challenge of proving that without Australia’s
wrongful emissions, the risk of deleterious effects to its marine environment would
not have occurred. Ocean acidification is a cumulative process and even without
Australia’s emissions, the problem would still exist. The problem is that Australia is a
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relatively small emitter (1.8% of the world’s emissions). On the other hand, Australia’s
emissions have arguably increased the risk of ocean acidification and in light of the
Article 1 definition (‘likely to result in’) it may be possible for Tuvalu to satisfy
causation.
Did Australia’s greenhouse gas emission cause a material increase in risk for
Tuvalu’s climate damage?
As an alternative, the ITLOS may consider a probabilistic approach to factual
causation. A probabilistic approach would require proof that Australia’s greenhouse
gas emissions have caused a material increase in risk for the risk that Tuvalu will suffer
ocean acidification in the future. As with Scenario 1, Tuvalu may be able to establish
factual causation on the basis that the collective wrongful conduct of a group of
emitting States has resulted in a material increase in risk for ocean acidification.
(b) Legal causation
From an objective standpoint, is Tuvalu’s climate damage a natural and
normal consequence of Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions?
Arguably, the process of ocean acidification, or changes in the pH of the oceans, is
part of a natural sequence originating with anthropogenic CO2 emissions. Although
forming a small part of global emissions (1.8%), Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions
are indivisible from the emissions of other actors. Thus, there may be a natural
sequence between these emissions and the threat of ocean acidification.
Was it or should it have been foreseeable to Australia that its wrongful conduct
would result in the damage suffered?
The question of determining foreseeability for ocean acidification would again depend
upon the state of science. The problem of ocean acidification has only been studied by
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scientists over the last 10 years or so.122 Therefore, it was or should have been
foreseeable that Australia’s emissions would result in ocean acidification from about
2002. This means that the legally relevant period of time for causation would be from
2002 onwards. Given the strong role that Australian scientists have had in studying
ocean acidification, it is reasonable to conclude that ocean acidification was or should
have been a foreseeable consequence to Australia.123
Tuvalu would also need to establish foreseeability for the localised ocean acidification
it has suffered. Again, Australian scientists have taken a major role in the development
of science around ocean acidification. The most recent research on ocean acidification
in Tuvalu was an Australian Government and AusAID project.124 Therefore, it is
reasonable to conclude that the risk of harm posed to Tuvalu from ocean acidification
was or should have been foreseeable to Australia.
6. Apportionment of responsibility
The same problems of apportionment of responsibility would arise in this scenario as
in Scenario 1. It is clear that Australia should not be held fully liable for the damage
suffered by Tuvalu because this would result in an unjust outcome. The most
reasonable option for apportioning responsibility would be to apply the principle of
common but differentiated responsibility and hold Australia responsible for 1.8% of
the resulting damage.
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7. Defences
The defences of consent and necessity are again relevant. As with Scenario 1, the
defence of consent particularly reduces exposure to legal risk because it appears that
Tuvalu has consented to a level of damage through being Party to the Kyoto Protocol.
However, Tuvalu’s declaration to the UNFCCC may be sufficient to prevent the
application of the defence of consent to its case. The defence of necessity is unlikely
to apply due to the threat posed by Australia’s conduct to essential interests of Tuvalu.
8. Remedies
In this case, Tuvalu has requested two forms of compensation: one a declaration that
Australia is in breach of Article 194 and the other an insurance scheme for future
damage resulting from ocean acidification. As discussed above, compensation for
future damage is unusual under international law and generally would require that the
wrongful conduct has already occurred. This makes it unlikely that compensation will
be ordered. On the other hand, one option is that ITLOS could estimate Australia’s
contribution to the current level of risk faced by Tuvalu and award partial damages.
However, in the event that future damage is compensable and that causation can be
made out, the form of compensation requested is novel. As was discussed in Section 6
above, the most feasible option for apportioning responsibility would be to order
Australia to pay 1.8% of the total damage value. In addition, ITLOS could further order
that the Parties negotiate the consequences of the breach, which could include elements
suitable to both Parties.

342

9. Conclusion
This hypothetical scenario has revealed that Australia faces a low level of exposure to
legal risk under the LOSC for climate change damage. The differential treatment
available under Article 194 can be used to Australia’s advantage to avoid a finding of
a breach. The main challenges for Tuvalu are the lex specialis rule which may prevent
jurisdiction, the problem of multiple attribution, and apportioning responsibility where
there are multiple potential respondents. Tuvalu’s focus upon the risk of future ocean
acidification is of mixed consequence. There is scope within the LOSC to deal with
risk as a form of damage, which would aid the task of proving causation. However,
compensation would be difficult to obtain because not all of the wrongful conduct has
occurred. The findings of this section are summarised in Table 7-4 below.
Table 7-4 Summary of findings: Australia’s exposure to legal risk under the LOSC
Element
Standing
Jurisdiction

Attribution

Breach

Factual
causation

Legal causation

Apportionment
of responsibility

Findings
Tuvalu would likely be able to establish standing for its case as an injured State.
Australia has elected both ITLOS and the ICJ for disputes under the LOSC
processes. Tuvalu has not elected any preference. Tuvalu may seek to have the
matter heard by ITLOS. Other Parties to the LOSC would be indispensable Parties
to the dispute and must be joined. The lex specialis rule may act to prevent
jurisdiction because there are apparent conflicts in substance and procedure
between the UNFCCC and the LOSC.
There is some scope to attribute conduct of private entities to Australia on the
basis that it has failed to exercise due diligence to prevent acts that breach Article
194. However, attribution will be difficult because Article 194 calls for both
individual and joint action by States. Attribution may depend upon apportionment
of responsibility.
Projections of future conduct by Australia cannot be attributed to it.
Australia has not taken ‘all’ of the measures at its disposal to prevent, reduce and
control greenhouse gas emissions. However, Article 194 allows for differential
treatment and thus may preclude the finding of a breach.
Recent science reveals that there is evidence of ocean acidification in Tuvalu and
it is predicted that this process will continue in the 21 st century. Tuvalu may be
able to establish factual causation under the probabilistic approach on the basis
that the collective wrongful conduct has resulted in a material increase in risk for
ocean acidification.
It was or should have been foreseeable to Australia from about 2002 that its
emissions would result in ocean acidification because this is when scientists began
studying the problem.
Individual responsibility and joint and several responsibility would both result in
far too much responsibility being allocated to Australia, contrary to the principle
of common but differentiated responsibility. Application of the principle of
common but differentiated responsibility as a method of apportioning
responsibility offers an alternative and could be used to hold Australia liable for
its share of global emissions.
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Defences

Remedies

The defence of consent may be available because Tuvalu has consented to a level
of climate change damage by being Party to the Kyoto Protocol. However,
Tuvalu’s declaration to the UNFCCC may be sufficient to prevent its application.
Whether the defence of necessity applies is uncertain. There is an argument that
Australia did not reduce its emissions due to economic necessity. However, this
defence does not apply where an essential interest (e.g. the continued habitability
of Tuvalu) is threatened.
Compensation for future ocean acidification would be difficult to obtain because
generally international law would require that the wrongful conduct has already
occurred. A declaration of breach is a more feasible remedy.

E. Conclusion
This chapter has found that Australia has a mixed level of exposure to legal risk for
climate change damage suffered by Tuvalu. Tuvalu is one of the most vulnerable States
in the world to the impacts of climate change, and would thus establish standing as an
injured State. Overall, international law is poorly developed to provide access to
remedies for damage suffered. Part of the problem is that the legal instruments do not
provide any clear obligations for mitigation action. This is the case for the UNFCCC
and the LOSC, which only contain relatively vague obligations that incorporate
differential treatment making it difficult to establish a breach. While the Kyoto
Protocol provides a specific obligation for Australia to limit its greenhouse gas
emissions in the period 2008-2012, Australia is on track to meet its target. Thus, the
Kyoto Protocol QELRO target does not pose a source of legal risk for Australia
although may for other States.
But beyond the limitations of the primary rules, this chapter has found that the
secondary rules of State responsibility present insurmountable problems for Tuvalu’s
claims. Although the acts of private actors could theoretically be attributed to Australia
on the basis of due diligence, such attribution depends upon a clear primary obligation
to act. Such clarity is not found in either Article 4.2 of the UNFCCC nor Article 194
of the LOSC.
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A key issue is how responsibility for climate change damage can be apportioned.
Individual responsibility is the general rule under international law. However, if
applied, sole responsibility and its alternative joint and several liability would result in
too much responsibility being allocated to Australia. One novel approach would be to
apportion responsibility upon the basis of the principle of common but differentiated
responsibility. This approach could support the apportionment of responsibility to
Australia on the basis of its share of global greenhouse gas emissions.
As with climate litigation in national courts, the task of establishing causation would
be difficult. The problem is amplified under international law because the rules of
causation are undeveloped and relatively unclear. Nonetheless, recent advances in
scientific proof of sea level rise and ocean acidification in Tuvalu may support a
finding of legal causation, particularly if a probabilistic approach is adopted. It is also
conceivable that Tuvalu could satisfy the tests of legal causation, although the period
of foreseeability may be relatively short.
Another common theme is that the defence of consent may apply because Tuvalu is a
Party to the Kyoto Protocol. This suggests that Tuvalu has consented to a level of
climate damage, making access to remedies for such damage impossible. However,
Tuvalu’s declaration to the UNFCCC may prevent the application of this defence to
Australia’s case.
Finally, the law of remedies is markedly under-developed in international law (with
the exception of the law of remedies in international investment law). Again, this
makes creative remedies, such as compensation for future damage, a distant prospect.
However, financially assessable damage suffered by Tuvalu could be compensable.
Overall, there are many potential impediments to international climate litigation,
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particularly when a relatively small emitter such as Australia is targetted. Nonetheless,
even a Party such as Australia faces some exposure to legal risk for climate change
damage, particularly as the scientific proof of such damage advances.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis has sought to answer two research questions. The primary research question
was ‘What exposure is there to legal risk for climate change damage under the
UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and LOSC?’ The secondary research question was ‘Would
Tuvalu succeed in a claim regarding climate change damage against Australia under
the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and LOSC?’ Thus, the thesis has sought to provide a
doctrinal analysis of international law that could be relied upon by States suffering
climate damage.
Positivism and its associated doctrinal methodology are part of the accepted legal
research paradigm,1 or ‘unifying rationale’ that gives direction within the discipline of
law.2 Legal positivism refers to a body of theories that focus on understanding the law
as it is, with reference to formal criteria, independently of ethical or moral
considerations.3 The researcher’s task is to identify and interpret the rules that States
have agreed to be bound by, primarily through treaties and custom.4 These choices of
methodology and approach have shaped the thesis, both in terms of structure and
content.
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However, as was highlighted in Chapter 1, one of the problems with the positivist
approach is that pure doctrinal research in international law is at risk of reaching
outcomes that may seem irrelevant.5 The thesis has sought to overcome this risk by
utilising a hypothetical case study based upon the ‘real world’ circumstances of Tuvalu
and Australia. Nonetheless, the research has only sought to examine whether exposure
to legal risk arises for climate change damage. It has not sought to assess whether legal
risk ‘should’ arise which would require consideration of moral and ethical questions.
It has also not considered the political issues that surround international litigation.
Clearly, these are all matters that are important but beyond the scope of this work.
Bearing these restrictions in mind, the thesis has reached the following conclusions.
A. Exposure to legal risk for climate change damage under the climate regime
Overall, there is low exposure to legal risk for climate change damage under the
climate regime. Article 2 of the UNFCCC provides that its ultimate objective is to
stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Climate change damage is the
manifestation of dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, or any
deleterious effect or risk of deleterious effect to the environment caused by
anthropogenic climate change.
1. UNFCCC
While preventing such damage is the objective of the climate regime, Chapter 3
revealed that the UNFCCC lacks substantive obligations for Parties to mitigate
greenhouse gas emissions. The elastic commitment contained in Article 4.2 does not
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require Annex I Parties to return emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000 or for
Annex I Parties to modify their long-term trends of greenhouse gas emissions. It
simply requires Annex I Parties to take the lead in modifying long term trends of
greenhouse gas emissions.
This preliminary conclusion was further tested in Chapter 7 through the use of a
hypothetical case study. The case study involved a claim filed by Tuvalu in the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) claiming that Australia failed to reduce its
emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000 (Article 4.2 of the UNFCCC). For the
purposes of the case study, it was assumed that such an obligation could be made out
under the UNFCCC. Chapter 7 revealed that Australia failed to reduce its emissions to
1990 levels by the year 2000 (its emissions increased by 14.5% from 1990 to 1998).
However, Article 4.2 allows for differential treatment (their different ‘starting points
and approaches,’ their ‘economic structures and resource bases’, their need to
‘maintain strong and sustainable economic growth,’ the ‘available technologies’ and
‘other individual circumstances’) and creates uncertainty regarding what is required
by States such as Australia. Thus, it would be difficult to establish a breach of the
obligation contained in Article 4.2.
In terms of adaptation obligations, Article 4.3 establishes an obligation for Annex I
Parties to provide financial resources to meet the agreed full incremental cost of
preparing for adaptation. Article 4.3 provides some scope for a developing State to
bring a case to recover funds for adaptation costs. The establishment of ‘incremental
costs’ associated with a project would be a challenging but not insurmountable hurdle.
Article 4.4 requires Annex I Parties to assist in adaptation to the adverse effects of
climate change. It appears that a breach would only occur where no assistance has been
349

provided. Lastly, the vague commitment in Article 4.8 simply requires the COP to
provide ‘full consideration’ to the concerns of developing State Parties. This obligation
could not form the basis of a claim.
The thesis has also examined the dispute settlement procedures associated with these
obligations, which help inform potential exposure to legal risk. The only opportunity
for a case to be heard over the UNFCCC would be if jurisdiction of the ICJ can be
established under Article 36 of the ICJ Statute. There is some exposure under Article
36.2 for States that have accepted the ICJ’s jurisdiction under the optional clause.
However, if a State has entered a reservation (e.g. disputes to which the Parties have
agreed to settle by other means of peaceful settlement) this could prevent jurisdiction.
Another avenue would be through Article 36.1 where the Parties have accepted the
jurisdiction of the ICJ through some other arrangement.
The hypothetical case study confirmed that there is some scope for Tuvalu to establish
jurisdiction under the optional clause. Australia has entered reservations to its
acceptance of ICJ jurisdiction. One of its reservations is that the declaration does not
apply where the claimant State has made its own declaration accepting ICJ jurisdiction
less than 12 months before bringing its case or where the declaration was made ‘only
in relation to or for the purpose of the dispute.’ Tuvalu has not yet made a declaration
accepting ICJ jurisdiction under the optional clause and thus would need to wait at
least 12 months from acceptance and ensure that it has other purposes for such
acceptance.
The case study revealed additional difficulties with establishing the ICJ’s jurisdiction
for a matter on climate change damage. International law requires all of the
‘indispensable’ parties to a dispute are joined for a matter to be heard. A particular
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difficulty with regard to Article 4.2 is that industrialised States are obliged to
‘individually or jointly’ reduce their emissions to 1990s levels. Although the ICJ could
determine whether Australia has ‘individually’ met this target, a determination of
whether Annex I Parties have ‘jointly’ met the target would make the acts of other
Annex I Parties the subject matter of the court’s decision. Thus, difficulties around
establishing jurisdiction further reduce exposure to legal risk for climate change
damage under the UNFCCC.
2. Kyoto Protocol
Article 3.1 of the Kyoto Protocol provides potentially high exposure to legal risk for
climate change damage. Article 3.1 of the Kyoto Protocol provides that Annex B
Parties are bound by the QELRO targets which are specific limitations set for each
Party for the period 2008-2012. These are meant to add up to an aggregate reduction
of 5% compared to 1990 levels. A potentially high degree of exposure is attached to
this obligation because it is specific and bound by a particular timeline. Compliance
with 2008-2012 commitments will not be determinable until 2015.
However, the hypothetical case study revealed that Australia is not exposed to legal
risk under Article 3.1 of the Kyoto Protocol. Australia is on track to meet its
commitment under Article 3.1 to limit its emissions to 108% of their level in 1990
during the first commitment period 2008-2012. The potential exposure of other Annex
B States will depend upon whether they are also on track to meet their targets.
In terms of the question of whether an interstate claim could be brought alleging a
breach by an Annex B party of its QELRO target, it is not entirely clear how the Kyoto
Protocol compliance system will interact with the law of State responsibility in the
event of breach of the treaty. Although the Kyoto Protocol compliance system is very
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close to a traditional judicial process, it does have some key differences to State
responsibility. However, it does not appear that the Kyoto Protocol compliance system
operates as lex specialis because it only applies to entities established as part of this
system. Thus, it should not preclude application of the rules of State responsibility.
B. Exposure to legal risk for climate change damage under the LOSC
There is limited exposure to legal risk for climate change damage under the LOSC. A
general obligation to protect, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment
is found in Article 194. However, this obligation is heavily qualified and provides a
high degree of flexibility and discretion for States in fulfilling it. The hypothetical case
study confirmed that there would be low exposure under Article 194. Although
Australia has not taken ‘all’ measures at its disposal to prevent and reduce
anthropogenic CO2 emissions, the differential and flexible treatment (‘best practice
means at their disposal’ and ‘in accordance with their capabilities’) provided for in
Article 194 may prevent finding a breach by Australia.
Furthermore, the specific commitments contained in the LOSC that relate to landbased sources and atmospheric sources of marine pollution presents a mixture of
exposure. Greenhouse gases may be captured by Article 207 as a form of land-based
pollution of the marine environment. However, the substance of Article 207 is
undermined by its generality and lack of precision. It is not clear what rules and
standards should be applied to land-based pollution and States are only required to
‘take account of’ these rules and standards. Article 212 presents moderate exposure
because atmospheric sources of marine pollution could include greenhouse gas
emissions. A breach may be established where a State Party has failed to adopt laws
and regulations to prevent, reduce and control such pollution.
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Chapter 5 argued that it would be difficult to establish jurisdiction in any litigation
brought under the LOSC dispute settlement procedures. There are a number of
conflicts between the LOSC and the climate regime, both in terms of substance and
procedure. Respondent States will be able to rely upon the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case
and the lex specialis rule to argue that the climate regime excludes application of the
LOSC. This chapter identified the discrete issue of ocean acidification as a potential
focus point to attempt to overcome these jurisdictional difficulties.
The hypothetical case study explored this option of focusing upon ocean acidification.
Under this approach, it may be possible to contend that the LOSC is the more
specialised treaty, meaning that the lex specialis rule could act to secure its application
to the problem of ocean acidification rather than exclude it. However, it could also be
argued that the oceans form part of the climate system and are thus within the
UNFCCC’s special focus. Thus, focusing upon the problem of ocean acidification will
not necessarily resolve the problem of lex specialis.
C. Exposure to legal risk for climate change damage under the rules of state
responsibility
Chapter 6 examined the rules of attribution and responsibility under international law.
This chapter revealed that claimant States would face a number of challenges in
attempting to establish State responsibility for climate change damage. First, a
claimant must find some way to attribute the acts of private corporations and
individuals to a respondent State. One approach identified was if the respondent State
had failed to exercise due diligence to prevent the commission of an internationally
wrongful act. However, the obligations in the UNFCCC and LOSC may not be
sufficiently clear to require such action. On the other hand, a State that fails to meet its
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QELRO target under Article 3.1 of the Kyoto Protocol could be held responsible for a
failure of due diligence.
A further problem is that it is not clear how attribution can be established when there
is multiplicity of States whose different conducts may result in the commission of the
same internationally wrongful act. The hypothetical case study revealed that Article
4.2 of the UNFCCC and Article 194 of the LOSC both provide for action by States to
mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and to prevent, control and reduce marine pollution.
However, the UNFCCC and LOSC obligations are joint in nature and do not provide
any clear basis to differentiate obligations among States. This would make it difficult
to establish attribution of cause of harm. In contrast, there is some scope for multiple
attribution in accordance with Article 3.1 of the Kyoto Protocol which differentiates
individual State obligations as part of collective mitigation action. However, the
challenges of attribution may be resolved by the identification and application of an
appropriate method of apportioning responsibility.
Chapters 6 revealed that the rules of causation are under-developed in international
law and thus ill-suited to a complex problem such as climate change. The traditional
‘but for’ test would require proof that without the respondent State’s emissions, the
damage suffered would not have occurred. The probabilistic approach would be better
suited to climate change. Chapter 7 concluded that if Australia’s conduct is seen as
part of a collective failure, it may be possible to show that it has caused a material
increase in risk of the harm occurring.
Chapter 6 argued that foreseeability should be an easier task because of the long history
of climate science and international action since 1992. This finding was confirmed in
Chapter 7 where it was argued that the strength of Australia’s scientific community
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and the long history of climate science mean that it was or should have been
foreseeable to Australia that its wrongful conduct would result in the damage suffered.
However, the second hypothetical revealed that the period of foreseeability for ocean
acidification is fairly short because scientists have only studied the problem since
around 2002.
A major challenge was identified in relation to the task of apportioning responsibility.
States are only responsible for the consequences that can be attributed to their own
actions (individual responsibility). There is no clear international law on how to
allocate responsibility when there are multiple wrongdoers. Joint and several liability
could be applied. However, such apportionment would risk placing too much
responsibility upon a respondent State with no right to recourse. Such an outcome
would be contrary to the principle of common but differentiated responsibility.
Market share liability could be adopted by apportioning liability amongst States on the
basis of each State’s share of total greenhouse gas emissions. However, this approach
is not found in international law and has little support in domestic legal systems.
Therefore, it is unlikely to be applied by an international court or tribunal.
An alternative approach would be to use the principle of common but differentiated
responsibility. The principle of common but differentiated responsibility could be used
to apportion liability to developed States in accordance with their contribution to
global greenhouse gas emissions. In Australia’s case, this liability would amount to
1.8% of global emissions.
Chapters 6 and 7 both revealed that the defence of consent may apply to international
climate litigation. If the claimant State and respondent States are Parties to the Kyoto
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Protocol, then arguably the claimant State has consented to a level of climate change
damage. Provided that the respondent State complies with their QELRO target, they
may be protected from exposure to legal risk for climate damage. However, a number
of States, including Tuvalu, entered a reservation to the UNFCCC and/or Kyoto
Protocol to protect their rights under the law of State responsibility. These declarations
may act to prevent application of the defence of consent.
Finally, the law of remedies is also undeveloped in international law. Cessation could
be ordered as a gradual process regulated over a period of time. However, the case
study revealed that such an order is unlikely because of the ongoing UNFCCC
negotiations regarding implementation. Restitution would be virtually impossible
because the impacts of climate change are generally irreversible. Compensation,
coupled with an appropriate form of apportionment of responsibility, could provide an
appropriate form of reparation. In Chapter 7 it was argued that the contamination of
Tuvalu’s underground freshwater reserves by salt water as a result of sea level rise
would be quantifiable. In contrast, compensation for future ocean acidification would
be difficult to obtain because in general international law requires that the wrongful
conduct has already occurred. Thus, the secondary rules of State responsibility present
many challenges for potential claimant States seeking recourse for climate change
damage.
D. The way forward
There are three key problems facing international climate litigation. The first is that
the rules of international law are under-developed and poorly designed to respond to a
problem as complex as climate change damage. The lack of clarity around the rules of
attribution, causation and apportionment of responsibility act as a significant barrier
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for claimant States. Therefore, one avenue would be for States to seek an advisory
opinion from the ICJ clarifying these aspects of international law – an option being
explored by Palau and other States.6 Such guidance would not only help the
development of international law but it would also provide greater clarity to the
international community as to whether international law can respond to the problem
of climate change damage. However, it must be noted that it can be very challenging
for States to actually be successful in even obtaining an advisory opinion as the request
often must come from the General Assembly. The full extent of these challenges is
beyond the scope of this thesis.
The second problem is that climate science has primarily focused upon establishing
general and global trends of climate change. There has been very little work done on
the local manifestations of climate change, making the task of establishing causation
for specific impacts very difficult. Although the case study revealed that such evidence
has recently become available for Tuvalu, more research is needed. Over time the
impacts of climate change will worsen and presumably the science attributing such
impacts to climate change will become more prominent. Thus, it is likely that exposure
to legal risk for climate change damage under international law will gradually increase
over time as the impacts worsen and science develops.
The third problem is that the international community has failed to negotiate concrete
obligations for the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions, with the exception of the
QELROs. Thus, the international climate negotiations remain central to the future
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prospects of international climate litigation. The establishment of a clear positive
obligation for States to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions will be accompanied by a
duty to exercise due diligence to prevent the breach of that obligation.
However, beyond these problems it may be that the international community needs to
formulate alternative methods of responding to climate change damage. Additional
research could be done on the prospects of bilateral or multilateral negotiated solutions
between States. Such negotiated solutions could take account of the individual
concerns of States like Tuvalu, including maintaining sovereignty and territory even if
it is necessary to relocate. This thesis has revealed that there is very little exposure to
legal risk for climate change damage under international law. However, the problem
of climate change damage will only become increasingly prominent as time proceeds.
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GLOSSARY

Absolute norms – norms that provide identical treatment to all countries. These norms
do not require or permit the consideration of differential factors between States.
Actio popularis – action (actio) of the people (popularis). A legal action taken in the
name of the collective interest.
Actio pro societate – action (actio) for society (pro societate).
Adaptation – actions taken to reduce vulnerability to climate change.
Adverse effects of climate change – changes in the physical environment or biota
resulting from climate change which have significant deleterious effects on the
composition, resilience, or productivity of natural or managed ecosystems or on the
operation of socio-economic systems or on human health and welfare.
Air space – the spatial dimension subject to the sovereignty of the subjacent states.
Anthropogenic – originating in human activity.
Attribution – the establishment of a factual link between an actor and specific
conduct.
Bilateral – involving two States.
But for test – a deterministic approach to factual causation that asks ‘but for the
defendant’s act, would the harm have occurred?’ (also sine qua non test).
Carbon dioxide – colourless, odorless gas that is present in the atmosphere obtained
from a range of sources including the combustion of fossil fuels.

360

Carbon sink – a natural environment that is able to absorb carbon dioxide from the
atmosphere.
Causation – the establishment of a causal link, which means that the injury results
from and is ascribable to the wrongful act.
Cessation – non-repetition of the wrongful conduct.
Circumstances precluding wrongfulness – defences under international law.
Climate change – a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to
human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in
addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods.
Climate change damage – any deleterious effect or risk of deleterious effect to the
environment caused by anthropogenic climate change.

Commitment (or obligation) – rules under international law that may be binding or
not binding. Although some authors have suggested that commitments are specific to
treaties and that obligations arise through other means (e.g. through customary
international law),1 treaties use both the terms commitments and obligations to
describe rules to which the States have agreed. For example, Article 4 of the UNFCCC
contains ‘commitments’, whereas the LOSC uses the term ‘obligations’.2 To avoid
confusion, the terms commitment and obligation will be used inter-changeably within
this thesis.

1

F Yamin and J Depledge, The International Climate Change Regime: Guide to rules, institutions and
procedures, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 545.
2
See e.g. LOSC, arts 192, 237, 279, 282 and 283.
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Common but differentiated responsibility – a principle of international law that
provides that all States have responsibility but that greater responsibility is held by
developed States than developing States. There are two rationales for differentiation.
First, that the differentiation is based upon different levels of economic capacity not
on different contributions to climate change (and other global environmental
problems). Second, that the differentiation is based upon different contributions to
climate change and not on different levels of economic development.
Common concern of humankind (or common concern of mankind) – a principle
of international law that provides that States share the burden and responsibilities of
protecting certain areas or elements of the Earth.
Compensable damage – a loss that is or will be compensated.
Compensation – an amount or received as recompense for a loss suffered.
Compliance – the act of complying with rules or standards.
Compliance system – a body of rules and standards accompanied by institutions that
ensure compliance and impose consequences for non-compliance.
Contextual norms – norms that appear to provide identical treatment to all States but
the application of which requires or permits consideration of differential factors that
may vary from State to State.
Coral atolls – islands of corals that encircle a lagoon partially or completely.
Customary international law – rules that result from consistent and general practice
of States that follow them out of a sense of legal obligation.
Desalination – a process that removes salt from saline water for the purpose of
creating potable water.
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Deterministic approach – an approach to causation that is based upon identifying the
necessary conditions for a particular occurrence.

Differential norms - norms that explicitly provide for different, presumably more
advantages, standards for one group of States compared with another group.
Due diligence – reasonable steps taken by a person to satisfy a legal obligation.
Economies in transition – an economy that is changing from a centrally controlled
economy to a market economy.
Environmental damage – all of the adverse effects on human beings, property and
the environment caused by human activities.
Erga omnes – owed toward all.
Ex ante – before the event.
Factual causation – the question of whether a defendant’s wrongful conduct is the
factual cause of the plaintiff’s loss.
Forcing – the influence that a factor has on the atmosphere.
Foreseeability – the ability of a person to know in advance of the possible results of
that person’s wrongful behaviour.
Fossil fuels – hydrocarbons formed from the remains of dead plants and animals
(primarily coal, oil or natural gas).
Freshwater lenses – a convex layer of fresh groundwater found on coral atolls that
floats on denser seawater.
General causation – the establishment of a causal link between an activity and a
general outcome.
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Greenhouse gas – a gas in the atmosphere that absorbs infrared radiation and trap
heat.

Carbon

dioxide

(CO2),

Methane

(CH4),

Nitrous

oxide

(N20),

Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), Perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and Sulphur hexafluoride
(SF6) are the greenhouse gases which are listed in Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol.

International climate change regime – the body of international law that deals with
climate change.
Internationally wrongful act – a breach of international law.
Interpretative declarations – a declaration by a State concerning its understanding
or interpretation of a provision of a treaty. Interpretative declarations do not seek to
exclude or modify the legal effect of a treaty but instead attempt to clarify a State’s
position.
Ipso facto – by that very fact or act.
Isotopes – atoms of elements with different numbers of neutrons.
Joint responsibility – where liability is held by two or more persons responsible for
the injury of the plaintiff.
Legal causation – the question of whether the defendant should be held liable for the
loss.
Legally binding – rules which are of such a nature that their breach will lead to legal
responsibility and a duty to provide remedy through compensation or some other
measure. It may be compared with rules which are political in nature, for which there
is no legal responsibility to honour. International law does not contain an enforcement
system similar to that of domestic legal systems. However, States can and do seek
remedies for breaches of legally binding commitments.
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Lex generalis – a law that governs general matters only.
Lex specialis – a law governing a specific subject matter. Also a doctrine of treaty
interpretation that holds that a law governing a specific subject matter (les specialis)
will prevail over a law that only governs general matters (lex generalis).
Liability – the duty to pay compensation for damage caused by a wrongful act.
Market share responsibility – a rule that liability should be based on the percentage
of the product that the defendant sold on the market.
Mitigation – the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions especially by the international
community or a specific country.
No harm rule – a rule of customary international law that provides that a State has a
duty to prevent, reduce and control the risk of environmental harm to other States.
Non-derogable – a rule that cannot be suspended under any circumstances.
Objective – the reasons for why a treaty exists.
Ocean acidification – the continuing reduction in the pH and corresponding rise in
acidity of the world’s oceans caused by the absorption of carbon dioxide.
Parties – States that have signed up to a specific treaty and agreed to be bound by its
commitments, such as by ratification or accession. The commitments in treaties are
generally of a reciprocal nature thus it is important for States to explicitly provide their
agreement to be bound.

Peremptory norm – a norm of international law from which no derogation is
permitted.
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PgC – petagrams of carbon. 1 PgC equates to 1015 grams of carbon.
Preamble – an introductory statement upon which a treaty is based.
Precautionary principle – a principle that provides for persons to take precautionary
measures even where there is lack of full scientific certainty.
Prima facie – based on first impression.
Principles – provide general statements of law that must be taken into account and
guide the processes of interpretation and application of rules of law.
Probabilistic approach – an approach to causation that examines whether the
defendant’s wrongful conduct was a probable cause of the loss.
Ratione personae – personal immunity.
Reparation – the act or process of making amends.
Reservations – a statement by a State by which it seeks to exclude or alter the legal
effect of certain provisions of a treaty in their application.
Responsibility – encompasses liability but also includes other remedies (such as
cessation and satisfaction).
Restitution – the act of restoring the situation to that which existed before the
wrongful act was committed.
Satisfaction – a remedy that may consist of an acknowledgement of the breach, an
expression of regret, a formal apology or another appropriate modality.
Several responsibility – a form of liability which is distinct and separate to the
liability of others.
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Sine qua non – the act is an indispensable condition for the damage to have occurred
(also the but for test).
Sole responsibility – States are only responsible for the outcomes that can be
attributed to their own actions.
Specific causation – establishing a causal link between a specific activity and a
specific outcome.
Standing – the entitlement of a person to bring a case.
State – a sovereign country.
State responsibility – a term of art which is equivalent of international tort law.
State sovereignty – the supreme power held by a State which entitles it to noninterference in its domestic affairs.
Status quo ante – the way things were before.
Strict liability – liability for which it is not necessary to show intention or negligence.
Sustainable development – a level of economic development that meets the needs of
the present generation without comprising the needs of future generations.
Transboundary pollution – air pollution that travels from one jurisdiction to another.
Treaty – any instrument that is binding under international law that is reached between
two or more international juridical persons.
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APPENDIX A: UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE CHANGE

The Parties to this Convention,
Acknowledging that change in the Earth's climate and its adverse effects are a
common concern of humankind,
Concerned that human activities have been substantially increasing the atmospheric
concentrations of greenhouse gases, that these increases enhance the natural
greenhouse effect, and that this will result on average in an additional warming of the
Earth's surface and atmosphere and may adversely affect natural ecosystems and
humankind,
Noting that the largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse
gases has originated in developed countries, that per capita emissions in developing
countries are still relatively low and that the share of global emissions originating in
developing countries will grow to meet their social and development needs,
Aware of the role and importance in terrestrial and marine ecosystems of sinks and
reservoirs of greenhouse gases,
Noting that there are many uncertainties in predictions of climate change,
particularly with regard to the timing, magnitude and regional patterns thereof,
Acknowledging that the global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible
cooperation by all countries and their participation in an effective and appropriate
international response, in accordance with their common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and economic conditions,
Recalling the pertinent provisions of the Declaration of the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment, adopted at Stockholm on 16 June 1972,
Recalling also that States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own
resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies, and the
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction,
Reaffirming the principle of sovereignty of States in international cooperation to
address climate change,
Recognizing that States should enact effective environmental legislation, that
environmental standards, management objectives and priorities should reflect the
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environmental and developmental context to which they apply, and that standards
applied by some countries may be inappropriate and of unwarranted economic and
social cost to other countries, in particular developing countries,
Recalling the provisions of General Assembly resolution 44/228 of 22 December
1989 on the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, and
resolutions 43/53 of 6 December 1988, 44/207 of 22 December 1989, 45/212 of 21
December 1990 and 46/169 of 19 December 1991 on protection of global climate for
present and future generations of mankind,
Recalling also the provisions of General Assembly resolution 44/206 of 22
December 1989 on the possible adverse effects of sea-level rise on islands and
coastal areas, particularly low-lying coastal areas and the pertinent provisions of
General Assembly resolution 44/172 of 19 December 1989 on the implementation of
the Plan of Action to Combat Desertification,
Recalling further the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer,
1985, and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 1987,
as adjusted and amended on 29 June 1990,
Noting the Ministerial Declaration of the Second World Climate Conference adopted
on 7 November 1990,
Conscious of the valuable analytical work being conducted by many States on
climate change and of the important contributions of the World Meteorological
Organization, the United Nations Environment Programme and other organs,
organizations and bodies of the United Nations system, as well as other international
and intergovernmental bodies, to the exchange of results of scientific research and
the coordination of research,
Recognizing that steps required to understand and address climate change will be
environmentally, socially and economically most effective if they are based on
relevant scientific, technical and economic considerations and continually reevaluated in the light of new findings in these areas,
Recognizing that various actions to address climate change can be justified
economically in their own right and can also help in solving other environmental
problems,
Recognizing also the need for developed countries to take immediate action in a
flexible manner on the basis of clear priorities, as a first step towards comprehensive
response strategies at the global, national and, where agreed, regional levels that take
into account all greenhouse gases, with due consideration of their relative
contributions to the enhancement of the greenhouse effect,
Recognizing further that low-lying and other small island countries, countries with
low-lying coastal, arid and semi-arid areas or areas liable to floods, drought and
desertification, and developing countries with fragile mountainous ecosystems are
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change,
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Recognizing the special difficulties of those countries, especially developing
countries, whose economies are particularly dependent on fossil fuel production, use
and exportation, as a consequence of action taken on limiting greenhouse gas
emissions,
Affirming that responses to climate change should be coordinated with social and
economic development in an integrated manner with a view to avoiding adverse
impacts on the latter, taking into full account the legitimate priority needs of
developing countries for the achievement of sustained economic growth and the
eradication of poverty,
Recognizing that all countries, especially developing countries, need access to
resources required to achieve sustainable social and economic development and that,
in order for developing countries to progress towards that goal, their energy
consumption will need to grow taking into account the possibilities for achieving
greater energy efficiency and for controlling greenhouse gas emissions in general,
including through the application of new technologies on terms which make such an
application economically and socially beneficial,
Determined to protect the climate system for present and future generations,
Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1
DEFINITIONS*

For the purposes of this Convention:
1. "Adverse effects of climate change" means changes in the physical environment or
biota resulting from climate change which have significant deleterious effects on the
composition, resilience or productivity of natural and managed ecosystems or on the
operation of socio-economic systems or on human health and welfare.
2. "Climate change" means a change of climate which is attributed directly or
indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and
which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time
periods.
3. "Climate system" means the totality of the atmosphere, hydrosphere, biosphere
and geosphere and their interactions.
4. "Emissions" means the release of greenhouse gases and/or their precursors into the
atmosphere over a specified area and period of time.
5. "Greenhouse gases" means those gaseous constituents of the atmosphere, both
natural and anthropogenic, that absorb and re-emit infrared radiation.
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6. "Regional economic integration organization" means an organization constituted
by sovereign States of a given region which has competence in respect of matters
governed by this Convention or its protocols and has been duly authorized, in
accordance with its internal procedures, to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to
the instruments concerned.
7. "Reservoir" means a component or components of the climate system where a
greenhouse gas or a precursor of a greenhouse gas is stored.
8. "Sink" means any process, activity or mechanism which removes a greenhouse
gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere.
9. "Source" means any process or activity which releases a greenhouse gas, an
aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas into the atmosphere.
* Titles of articles are included solely to assist the reader.

ARTICLE 2
OBJECTIVE

The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the
Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant
provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with
the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to
allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production
is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable
manner.

ARTICLE 3
PRINCIPLES

In their actions to achieve the objective of the Convention and to implement its
provisions, the Parties shall be guided, INTER ALIA, by the following:
1. The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future
generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly,
the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and
the adverse effects thereof.
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2. The specific needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties,
especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate
change, and of those Parties, especially developing country Parties, that would have
to bear a disproportionate or abnormal burden under the Convention, should be given
full consideration.
3. The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize
the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats
of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used
as a reason for postponing such measures, taking into account that policies and
measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global
benefits at the lowest possible cost. To achieve this, such policies and measures
should take into account different socio-economic contexts, be comprehensive, cover
all relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases and adaptation, and
comprise all economic sectors. Efforts to address climate change may be carried out
cooperatively by interested Parties.
4. The Parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainable development. Policies
and measures to protect the climate system against human-induced change should be
appropriate for the specific conditions of each Party and should be integrated with
national development programmes, taking into account that economic development
is essential for adopting measures to address climate change.
5. The Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international
economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development
in all Parties, particularly developing country Parties, thus enabling them better to
address the problems of climate change. Measures taken to combat climate change,
including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.

ARTICLE 4
COMMITMENTS

1. All Parties, taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities
and their specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and
circumstances, shall:
(a) Develop, periodically update, publish and make available to the Conference of
the Parties, in accordance with Article 12, national inventories of anthropogenic
emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by
the Montreal Protocol, using comparable methodologies to be agreed upon by the
Conference of the Parties;
(b) Formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national and, where
appropriate, regional programmes containing measures to mitigate climate change by
addressing anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all
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greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, and measures to facilitate
adequate adaptation to climate change;
(c) Promote and cooperate in the development, application and diffusion, including
transfer, of technologies, practices and processes that control, reduce or prevent
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal
Protocol in all relevant sectors, including the energy, transport, industry, agriculture,
forestry and waste management sectors;
(d) Promote sustainable management, and promote and cooperate in the conservation
and enhancement, as appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs of all greenhouse gases not
controlled by the Montreal Protocol, including biomass, forests and oceans as well as
other terrestrial, coastal and marine ecosystems;
(e) Cooperate in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change; develop
and elaborate appropriate and integrated plans for coastal zone management, water
resources and agriculture, and for the protection and rehabilitation of areas,
particularly in Africa, affected by drought and desertification, as well as floods;
(f) Take climate change considerations into account, to the extent feasible, in their
relevant social, economic and environmental policies and actions, and employ
appropriate methods, for example impact assessments, formulated and determined
nationally, with a view to minimizing adverse effects on the economy, on public
health and on the quality of the environment, of projects or measures undertaken by
them to mitigate or adapt to climate change;
(g) Promote and cooperate in scientific, technological, technical, socio-economic and
other research, systematic observation and development of data archives related to
the climate system and intended to further the understanding and to reduce or
eliminate the remaining uncertainties regarding the causes, effects, magnitude and
timing of climate change and the economic and social consequences of various
response strategies;
(h) Promote and cooperate in the full, open and prompt exchange of relevant
scientific, technological, technical, socio-economic and legal information related to
the climate system and climate change, and to the economic and social consequences
of various response strategies;
(i) Promote and cooperate in education, training and public awareness related to
climate change and encourage the widest participation in this process, including that
of non- governmental organizations; and
(j) Communicate to the Conference of the Parties information related to
implementation, in accordance with Article 12.
2. The developed country Parties and other Parties included in Annex I commit
themselves specifically as provided for in the following:
(a) Each of these Parties shall adopt national1 policies and take corresponding
measures on the mitigation of climate change, by limiting its anthropogenic
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emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks
and reservoirs. These policies and measures will demonstrate that developed
countries are taking the lead in modifying longer-term trends in anthropogenic
emissions consistent with the objective of the Convention, recognizing that the return
by the end of the present decade to earlier levels of anthropogenic emissions of
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol
would contribute to such modification, and taking into account the differences in
these Parties' starting points and approaches, economic structures and resource bases,
the need to maintain strong and sustainable economic growth, available technologies
and other individual circumstances, as well as the need for equitable and appropriate
contributions by each of these Parties to the global effort regarding that objective.
These Parties may implement such policies and measures jointly with other Parties
and may assist other Parties in contributing to the achievement of the objective of the
Convention and, in particular, that of this subparagraph;
(b) In order to promote progress to this end, each of these Parties shall communicate,
within six months of the entry into force of the Convention for it and periodically
thereafter, and in accordance with Article 12, detailed information on its policies and
measures referred to in subparagraph (a) above, as well as on its resulting projected
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases not
controlled by the Montreal Protocol for the period referred to in subparagraph (a),
with the aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels these
anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases not
controlled by the Montreal Protocol. This information will be reviewed by the
Conference of the Parties, at its first session and periodically thereafter, in
accordance with Article 7;
(c) Calculations of emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases
for the purposes of subparagraph (b) above should take into account the best
available scientific knowledge, including of the effective capacity of sinks and the
respective contributions of such gases to climate change. The Conference of the
Parties shall consider and agree on methodologies for these calculations at its first
session and review them regularly thereafter;
(d) The Conference of the Parties shall, at its first session, review the adequacy of
subparagraphs (a) and (b) above. Such review shall be carried out in the light of the
best available scientific information and assessment on climate change and its
impacts, as well as relevant technical, social and economic information. Based on
this review, the Conference of the Parties shall take appropriate action, which may
include the adoption of amendments to the commitments in subparagraphs (a) and
(b) above. The Conference of the Parties, at its first session, shall also take decisions
regarding criteria for joint implementation as indicated in subparagraph (a) above. A
second review of subparagraphs (a) and (b) shall take place not later than 31
December 1998, and thereafter at regular intervals determined by the Conference of
the Parties, until the objective of the Convention is met;
(e) Each of these Parties shall :
i) Coordinate as appropriate with other such Parties, relevant economic and
administrative instruments developed to achieve the objective of the Convention; and
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(ii) Identify and periodically review its own policies and practices which encourage
activities that lead to greater levels of anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases
not controlled by the Montreal Protocol than would otherwise occur;
(f) The Conference of the Parties shall review, not later than 31 December 1998,
available information with a view to taking decisions regarding such amendments to
the lists in Annexes I and II as may be appropriate, with the approval of the Party
concerned;
(g) Any Party not included in Annex I may, in its instrument of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession, or at any time thereafter, notify the Depositary
that it intends to be bound by subparagraphs (a) and (b) above. The Depositary shall
inform the other signatories and Parties of any such notification.
3. The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II
shall provide new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full costs
incurred by developing country Parties in complying with their obligations under
Article 12, paragraph 1. They shall also provide such financial resources, including
for the transfer of technology, needed by the developing country Parties to meet the
agreed full incremental costs of implementing measures that are covered by
paragraph 1 of this Article and that are agreed between a developing country Party
and the international entity or entities referred to in Article 11, in accordance with
that Article. The implementation of these commitments shall take into account the
need for adequacy and predictability in the flow of funds and the importance of
appropriate burden sharing among the developed country Parties.
4. The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II
shall also assist the developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the
adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse
effects.
5. The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II
shall take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the
transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other
Parties, particularly developing country Parties, to enable them to implement the
provisions of the Convention. In this process, the developed country Parties shall
support the development and enhancement of endogenous capacities and
technologies of developing country Parties. Other Parties and organizations in a
position to do so may also assist in facilitating the transfer of such technologies.
6. In the implementation of their commitments under paragraph 2 above, a certain
degree of flexibility shall be allowed by the Conference of the Parties to the Parties
included in Annex I undergoing the process of transition to a market economy, in
order to enhance the ability of these Parties to address climate change, including with
regard to the historical level of anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases not
controlled by the Montreal Protocol chosen as a reference.
7. The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement their
commitments under the Convention will depend on the effective implementation by
developed country Parties of their commitments under the Convention related to
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financial resources and transfer of technology and will take fully into account that
economic and social development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding
priorities of the developing country Parties.
8. In the implementation of the commitments in this Article, the Parties shall give
full consideration to what actions are necessary under the Convention, including
actions related to funding, insurance and the transfer of technology, to meet the
specific needs and concerns of developing country Parties arising from the adverse
effects of climate change and/or the impact of the implementation of response
measures, especially on:
(a) Small island countries;
(b) Countries with low-lying coastal areas;
(c) Countries with arid and semi-arid areas, forested areas and areas liable to forest
decay;
(d) Countries with areas prone to natural disasters;
(e) Countries with areas liable to drought and desertification;
(f) Countries with areas of high urban atmospheric pollution;
(g) Countries with areas with fragile ecosystems, including mountainous ecosystems;
(h) Countries whose economies are highly dependent on income generated from the
production, processing and export, and/or on consumption of fossil fuels and
associated energy-intensive products; and
(i) Land-locked and transit countries.
Further, the Conference of the Parties may take actions, as appropriate, with respect
to this paragraph.
9. The Parties shall take full account of the specific needs and special situations of
the least developed countries in their actions with regard to funding and transfer of
technology.
10. The Parties shall, in accordance with Article 10, take into consideration in the
implementation of the commitments of the Convention the situation of Parties,
particularly developing country Parties, with economies that are vulnerable to the
adverse effects of the implementation of measures to respond to climate change. This
applies notably to Parties with economies that are highly dependent on income
generated from the production, processing and export, and/or consumption of fossil
fuels and associated energy-intensive products and/or the use of fossil fuels for
which such Parties have serious difficulties in switching to alternatives.

441

ARTICLE 5
RESEARCH AND SYSTEMATIC OBSERVATION

In carrying out their commitments under Article 4, paragraph 1(g), the Parties shall:
(a) Support and further develop, as appropriate, international and intergovernmental
programmes and networks or organizations aimed at defining, conducting, assessing
and financing research, data collection and systematic observation, taking into
account the need to minimize duplication of effort;
(b) Support international and intergovernmental efforts to strengthen systematic
observation and national scientific and technical research capacities and capabilities,
particularly in developing countries, and to promote access to, and the exchange of,
data and analyses thereof obtained from areas beyond national jurisdiction; and
(c) Take into account the particular concerns and needs of developing countries and
cooperate in improving their endogenous capacities and capabilities to participate in
the efforts referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above.

ARTICLE 6
EDUCATION, TRAINING AND PUBLIC AWARENESS

In carrying out their commitments under Article 4, paragraph 1(i), the Parties shall:
(a) Promote and facilitate at the national and, as appropriate, subregional and
regional levels, and in accordance with national laws and regulations, and within
their respective capacities:
(i) The development and implementation of educational and public awareness
programmes on climate change and its effects;
(ii) Public access to information on climate change and its effects;
(iii) Public participation in addressing climate change and its effects and developing
adequate responses; and
(iv) Training of scientific, technical and managerial personnel.
(b) Cooperate in and promote, at the international level, and, where appropriate,
using existing bodies:
(i) The development and exchange of educational and public awareness material on
climate change and its effects; and
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(ii) The development and implementation of education and training programmes,
including the strengthening of national institutions and the exchange or secondment
of personnel to train experts in this field, in particular for developing countries.

ARTICLE 7
CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES

1. A Conference of the Parties is hereby established.
2. The Conference of the Parties, as the supreme body of this Convention, shall keep
under regular review the implementation of the Convention and any related legal
instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt, and shall make, within its
mandate, the decisions necessary to promote the effective implementation of the
Convention. To this end, it shall:
(a) Periodically examine the obligations of the Parties and the institutional
arrangements under the Convention, in the light of the objective of the Convention,
the experience gained in its implementation and the evolution of scientific and
technological knowledge;
(b) Promote and facilitate the exchange of information on measures adopted by the
Parties to address climate change and its effects, taking into account the differing
circumstances, responsibilities and capabilities of the Parties and their respective
commitments under the Convention;
(c) Facilitate, at the request of two or more Parties, the coordination of measures
adopted by them to address climate change and its effects, taking into account the
differing circumstances, responsibilities and capabilities of the Parties and their
respective commitments under the Convention;
(d) Promote and guide, in accordance with the objective and provisions of the
Convention, the development and periodic refinement of comparable methodologies,
to be agreed on by the Conference of the Parties, inter alia, for preparing inventories
of greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks, and for evaluating
the effectiveness of measures to limit the emissions and enhance the removals of
these gases;
(e) Assess, on the basis of all information made available to it in accordance with the
provisions of the Convention, the implementation of the Convention by the Parties,
the overall effects of the measures taken pursuant to the Convention, in particular
environmental, economic and social effects as well as their cumulative impacts and
the extent to which progress towards the objective of the Convention is being
achieved;
(f) Consider and adopt regular reports on the implementation of the Convention and
ensure their publication;
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(g) Make recommendations on any matters necessary for the implementation of the
Convention;
(h) Seek to mobilize financial resources in accordance with Article 4, paragraphs 3, 4
and 5, and Article 11;
(i) Establish such subsidiary bodies as are deemed necessary for the implementation
of the Convention;
(j) Review reports submitted by its subsidiary bodies and provide guidance to them;
(k) Agree upon and adopt, by consensus, rules of procedure and financial rules for
itself and for any subsidiary bodies;
(l) Seek and utilize, where appropriate, the services and cooperation of, and
information provided by, competent international organizations and
intergovernmental and non-governmental bodies; and
(m) Exercise such other functions as are required for the achievement of the
objective of the Convention as well as all other functions assigned to it under the
Convention.
3. The Conference of the Parties shall, at its first session, adopt its own rules of
procedure as well as those of the subsidiary bodies established by the Convention,
which shall include decision-making procedures for matters not already covered by
decision- making procedures stipulated in the Convention. Such procedures may
include specified majorities required for the adoption of particular decisions.
4. The first session of the Conference of the Parties shall be convened by the interim
secretariat referred to in Article 21 and shall take place not later than one year after
the date of entry into force of the Convention. Thereafter, ordinary sessions of the
Conference of the Parties shall be held every year unless otherwise decided by the
Conference of the Parties.
5. Extraordinary sessions of the Conference of the Parties shall be held at such other
times as may be deemed necessary by the Conference, or at the written request of
any Party, provided that, within six months of the request being communicated to the
Parties by the secretariat, it is supported by at least one third of the Parties.
6. The United Nations, its specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy
Agency, as well as any State member thereof or observers thereto not Party to the
Convention, may be represented at sessions of the Conference of the Parties as
observers. Any body or agency, whether national or international, governmental or
non- governmental, which is qualified in matters covered by the Convention, and
which has informed the secretariat of its wish to be represented at a session of the
Conference of the Parties as an observer, may be so admitted unless at least one third
of the Parties present object. The admission and participation of observers shall be
subject to the rules of procedure adopted by the Conference of the Parties.
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ARTICLE 8
SECRETARIAT

1. A secretariat is hereby established.
2. The functions of the secretariat shall be:
(a) To make arrangements for sessions of the Conference of the Parties and its
subsidiary bodies established under the Convention and to provide them with
services as required;
(b) To compile and transmit reports submitted to it;
(c) To facilitate assistance to the Parties, particularly developing country Parties, on
request, in the compilation and communication of information required in accordance
with the provisions of the Convention;
(d) To prepare reports on its activities and present them to the Conference of the
Parties;
(e) To ensure the necessary coordination with the secretariats of other relevant
international bodies;
(f) To enter, under the overall guidance of the Conference of the Parties, into such
administrative and contractual arrangements as may be required for the effective
discharge of its functions; and
(g) To perform the other secretariat functions specified in the Convention and in any
of its protocols and such other functions as may be determined by the Conference of
the Parties.
3. The Conference of the Parties, at its first session, shall designate a permanent
secretariat and make arrangements for its functioning.

ARTICLE 9
SUBSIDIARY BODY FOR SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL ADVICE

1. A subsidiary body for scientific and technological advice is hereby established to
provide the Conference of the Parties and, as appropriate, its other subsidiary bodies
with timely information and advice on scientific and technological matters relating to
the Convention. This body shall be open to participation by all Parties and shall be
multidisciplinary. It shall comprise government representatives competent in the
relevant field of expertise. It shall report regularly to the Conference of the Parties on
all aspects of its work.
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2. Under the guidance of the Conference of the Parties, and drawing upon existing
competent international bodies, this body shall:
(a) Provide assessments of the state of scientific knowledge relating to climate
change and its effects;
(b) Prepare scientific assessments on the effects of measures taken in the
implementation of the Convention;
(c) Identify innovative, efficient and state-of-the-art technologies and know-how and
advise on the ways and means of promoting development and/or transferring such
technologies;
(d) Provide advice on scientific programmes, international cooperation in research
and development related to climate change, as well as on ways and means of
supporting endogenous capacity-building in developing countries; and
(e) Respond to scientific, technological and methodological questions that the
Conference of the Parties and its subsidiary bodies may put to the body.
3. The functions and terms of reference of this body may be further elaborated by the
Conference of the Parties.

ARTICLE 10
SUBSIDIARY BODY FOR IMPLEMENTATION

1. A subsidiary body for implementation is hereby established to assist the
Conference of the Parties in the assessment and review of the effective
implementation of the Convention. This body shall be open to participation by all
Parties and comprise government representatives who are experts on matters related
to climate change. It shall report regularly to the Conference of the Parties on all
aspects of its work.
2. Under the guidance of the Conference of the Parties, this body shall:
(a) Consider the information communicated in accordance with Article 12, paragraph
1, to assess the overall aggregated effect of the steps taken by the Parties in the light
of the latest scientific assessments concerning climate change;
(b) Consider the information communicated in accordance with Article 12, paragraph
2, in order to assist the Conference of the Parties in carrying out the reviews required
by Article 4, paragraph 2(d); and
(c) Assist the Conference of the Parties, as appropriate, in the preparation and
implementation of its decisions.
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ARTICLE 11
FINANCIAL MECHANISM

1. A mechanism for the provision of financial resources on a grant or concessional
basis, including for the transfer of technology, is hereby defined. It shall function
under the guidance of and be accountable to the Conference of the Parties, which
shall decide on its policies, programme priorities and eligibility criteria related to this
Convention. Its operation shall be entrusted to one or more existing international
entities.
2. The financial mechanism shall have an equitable and balanced representation of all
Parties within a transparent system of governance.
3. The Conference of the Parties and the entity or entities entrusted with the
operation of the financial mechanism shall agree upon arrangements to give effect to
the above paragraphs, which shall include the following:
(a) Modalities to ensure that the funded projects to address climate change are in
conformity with the policies, programme priorities and eligibility criteria established
by the Conference of the Parties;
(b) Modalities by which a particular funding decision may be reconsidered in light of
these policies, programme priorities and eligibility criteria;
(c) Provision by the entity or entities of regular reports to the Conference of the
Parties on its funding operations, which is consistent with the requirement for
accountability set out in paragraph 1 above; and
(d) Determination in a predictable and identifiable manner of the amount of funding
necessary and available for the implementation of this Convention and the conditions
under which that amount shall be periodically reviewed.
4. The Conference of the Parties shall make arrangements to implement the abovementioned provisions at its first session, reviewing and taking into account the
interim arrangements referred to in Article 21, paragraph 3, and shall decide whether
these interim arrangements shall be maintained. Within four years thereafter, the
Conference of the Parties shall review the financial mechanism and take appropriate
measures.
5. The developed country Parties may also provide and developing country Parties
avail themselves of, financial resources related to the implementation of the
Convention through bilateral, regional and other multilateral channels.
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ARTICLE 12
COMMUNICATION OF INFORMATION RELATED TO IMPLEMENTATION

1. In accordance with Article 4, paragraph 1, each Party shall communicate to the
Conference of the Parties, through the secretariat, the following elements of
information:
(a) A national inventory of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by
sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, to the extent
its capacities permit, using comparable methodologies to be promoted and agreed
upon by the Conference of the Parties;
(b) A general description of steps taken or envisaged by the Party to implement the
Convention; and
(c) Any other information that the Party considers relevant to the achievement of the
objective of the Convention and suitable for inclusion in its communication,
including, if feasible, material relevant for calculations of global emission trends.
2. Each developed country Party and each other Party included in Annex I shall
incorporate in its communication the following elements of information:
(a) A detailed description of the policies and measures that it has adopted to
implement its commitment under Article 4, paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b); and
(b) A specific estimate of the effects that the policies and measures referred to in
subparagraph (a) immediately above will have on anthropogenic emissions by its
sources and removals by its sinks of greenhouse gases during the period referred to
in Article 4, paragraph 2(a).
3. In addition, each developed country Party and each other developed Party included
in Annex II shall incorporate details of measures taken in accordance with Article 4,
paragraphs 3, 4 and 5.
4. Developing country Parties may, on a voluntary basis, propose projects for
financing, including specific technologies, materials, equipment, techniques or
practices that would be needed to implement such projects, along with, if possible, an
estimate of all incremental costs, of the reductions of emissions and increments of
removals of greenhouse gases, as well as an estimate of the consequent benefits.
5. Each developed country Party and each other Party included in Annex I shall make
its initial communication within six months of the entry into force of the Convention
for that Party. Each Party not so listed shall make its initial communication within
three years of the entry into force of the Convention for that Party, or of the
availability of financial resources in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 3. Parties
that are least developed countries may make their initial communication at their
discretion. The frequency of subsequent communications by all Parties shall be
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determined by the Conference of the Parties, taking into account the differentiated
timetable set by this paragraph.
6. Information communicated by Parties under this Article shall be transmitted by the
secretariat as soon as possible to the Conference of the Parties and to any subsidiary
bodies concerned. If necessary, the procedures for the communication of information
may be further considered by the Conference of the Parties.
7. From its first session, the Conference of the Parties shall arrange for the provision
to developing country Parties of technical and financial support, on request, in
compiling and communicating information under this Article, as well as in
identifying the technical and financial needs associated with proposed projects and
response measures under Article 4. Such support may be provided by other Parties,
by competent international organizations and by the secretariat, as appropriate.
8. Any group of Parties may, subject to guidelines adopted by the Conference of the
Parties, and to prior notification to the Conference of the Parties, make a joint
communication in fulfilment of their obligations under this Article, provided that
such a communication includes information on the fulfilment by each of these Parties
of its individual obligations under the Convention.
9. Information received by the secretariat that is designated by a Party as
confidential, in accordance with criteria to be established by the Conference of the
Parties, shall be aggregated by the secretariat to protect its confidentiality before
being made available to any of the bodies involved in the communication and review
of information.
10. Subject to paragraph 9 above, and without prejudice to the ability of any Party to
make public its communication at any time, the secretariat shall make
communications by Parties under this Article publicly available at the time they are
submitted to the Conference of the Parties.

ARTICLE 13
RESOLUTION OF QUESTIONS REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION

The Conference of the Parties shall, at its first session, consider the establishment of
a multilateral consultative process, available to Parties on their request, for the
resolution of questions regarding the implementation of the Convention.

ARTICLE 14
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
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1. In the event of a dispute between any two or more Parties concerning the
interpretation or application of the Convention, the Parties concerned shall seek a
settlement of the dispute through negotiation or any other peaceful means of their
own choice.
2. When ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to the Convention, or at any
time thereafter, a Party which is not a regional economic integration organization
may declare in a written instrument submitted to the Depositary that, in respect of
any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention, it
recognizes as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any
Party accepting the same obligation:
(a) Submission of the dispute to the International Court of Justice, and/or
(b) Arbitration in accordance with procedures to be adopted by the Conference of the
Parties as soon as practicable, in an annex on arbitration.
A Party which is a regional economic integration organization may make a
declaration with like effect in relation to arbitration in accordance with the
procedures referred to in subparagraph (b) above.
3. A declaration made under paragraph 2 above shall remain in force until it expires
in accordance with its terms or until three months after written notice of its
revocation has been deposited with the Depositary.
4. A new declaration, a notice of revocation or the expiry of a declaration shall not in
any way affect proceedings pending before the International Court of Justice or the
arbitral tribunal, unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree.
5. Subject to the operation of paragraph 2 above, if after twelve months following
notification by one Party to another that a dispute exists between them, the Parties
concerned have not been able to settle their dispute through the means mentioned in
paragraph 1 above, the dispute shall be submitted, at the request of any of the parties
to the dispute, to conciliation.
6. A conciliation commission shall be created upon the request of one of the parties
to the dispute. The commission shall be composed of an equal number of members
appointed by each party concerned and a chairman chosen jointly by the members
appointed by each party. The commission shall render a recommendatory award,
which the parties shall consider in good faith.
7. Additional procedures relating to conciliation shall be adopted by the Conference
of the Parties, as soon as practicable, in an annex on conciliation.
8. The provisions of this Article shall apply to any related legal instrument which the
Conference of the Parties may adopt, unless the instrument provides otherwise.
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ARTICLE 15
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONVENTION

1. Any Party may propose amendments to the Convention.
2. Amendments to the Convention shall be adopted at an ordinary session of the
Conference of the Parties. The text of any proposed amendment to the Convention
shall be communicated to the Parties by the secretariat at least six months before the
meeting at which it is proposed for adoption. The secretariat shall also communicate
proposed amendments to the signatories to the Convention and, for information, to
the Depositary.
3. The Parties shall make every effort to reach agreement on any proposed
amendment to the Convention by consensus. If all efforts at consensus have been
exhausted, and no agreement reached, the amendment shall as a last resort be
adopted by a three-fourths majority vote of the Parties present and voting at the
meeting. The adopted amendment shall be communicated by the secretariat to the
Depositary, who shall circulate it to all Parties for their acceptance.
4. Instruments of acceptance in respect of an amendment shall be deposited with the
Depositary. An amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 3 above shall
enter into force for those Parties having accepted it on the ninetieth day after the date
of receipt by the Depositary of an instrument of acceptance by at least three fourths
of the Parties to the Convention.
5. The amendment shall enter into force for any other Party on the ninetieth day after
the date on which that Party deposits with the Depositary its instrument of
acceptance of the said amendment.
6. For the purposes of this Article, "Parties present and voting" means Parties present
and casting an affirmative or negative vote.

ARTICLE 16
ADOPTION AND AMENDMENT OF ANNEXES TO THE CONVENTION

1. Annexes to the Convention shall form an integral part thereof and, unless
otherwise expressly provided, a reference to the Convention constitutes at the same
time a reference to any annexes thereto. Without prejudice to the provisions of
Article 14, paragraphs 2(b) and 7, such annexes shall be restricted to lists, forms and
any other material of a descriptive nature that is of a scientific, technical, procedural
or administrative character.
2. Annexes to the Convention shall be proposed and adopted in accordance with the
procedure set forth in Article 15, paragraphs 2, 3 and 4.
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3. An annex that has been adopted in accordance with paragraph 2 above shall enter
into force for all Parties to the Convention six months after the date of the
communication by the Depositary to such Parties of the adoption of the annex,
except for those Parties that have notified the Depositary, in writing, within that
period of their non-acceptance of the annex. The annex shall enter into force for
Parties which withdraw their notification of non-acceptance on the ninetieth day after
the date on which withdrawal of such notification has been received by the
Depositary.
4. The proposal, adoption and entry into force of amendments to annexes to the
Convention shall be subject to the same procedure as that for the proposal, adoption
and entry into force of annexes to the Convention in accordance with paragraphs 2
and 3 above.
5.If the adoption of an annex or an amendment to an annex involves an amendment
to the Convention, that annex or amendment to an annex shall not enter into force
until such time as the amendment to the Convention enters into force.

ARTICLE 17
PROTOCOLS

1. The Conference of the Parties may, at any ordinary session, adopt protocols to the
Convention.
2. The text of any proposed protocol shall be communicated to the Parties by the
secretariat at least six months before such a session.
3. The requirements for the entry into force of any protocol shall be established by
that instrument.
4. Only Parties to the Convention may be Parties to a protocol.
5. Decisions under any protocol shall be taken only by the Parties to the protocol
concerned.

ARTICLE 18
RIGHT TO VOTE

1. Each Party to the Convention shall have one vote, except as provided for in
paragraph 2 below.
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2. Regional economic integration organizations, in matters within their competence,
shall exercise their right to vote with a number of votes equal to the number of their
member States that are Parties to the Convention. Such an organization shall not
exercise its right to vote if any of its member States exercises its right, and vice
versa.

ARTICLE 19
DEPOSITARY

The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the Depositary of the
Convention and of protocols adopted in accordance with Article 17.

ARTICLE 20
SIGNATURE

This Convention shall be open for signature by States Members of the United
Nations or of any of its specialized agencies or that are Parties to the Statute of the
International Court of Justice and by regional economic integration organizations at
Rio de Janeiro, during the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development, and thereafter at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 20
June 1992 to 19 June 1993.

ARTICLE 21
INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS

1. The secretariat functions referred to in Article 8 will be carried out on an interim
basis by the secretariat established by the General Assembly of the United Nations in
its resolution 45/212 of 21 December 1990, until the completion of the first session
of the Conference of the Parties.
2. The head of the interim secretariat referred to in paragraph 1 above will cooperate
closely with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to ensure that the Panel
can respond to the need for objective scientific and technical advice. Other relevant
scientific bodies could also be consulted.
3. The Global Environment Facility of the United Nations Development Programme,
the United Nations Environment Programme and the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development shall be the international entity entrusted with the
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operation of the financial mechanism referred to in Article 11 on an interim basis. In
this connection, the Global Environment Facility should be appropriately
restructured and its membership made universal to enable it to fulfil the requirements
of Article 11.

ARTICLE 22
RATIFICATION, ACCEPTANCE, APPROVAL OR ACCESSION

1. The Convention shall be subject to ratification, acceptance, approval or accession
by States and by regional economic integration organizations. It shall be open for
accession from the day after the date on which the Convention is closed for
signature. Instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be
deposited with the Depositary.
2. Any regional economic integration organization which becomes a Party to the
Convention without any of its member States being a Party shall be bound by all the
obligations under the Convention. In the case of such organizations, one or more of
whose member States is a Party to the Convention, the organization and its member
States shall decide on their respective responsibilities for the performance of their
obligations under the Convention. In such cases, the organization and the member
States shall not be entitled to exercise rights under the Convention concurrently.
3. In their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, regional
economic integration organizations shall declare the extent of their competence with
respect to the matters governed by the Convention. These organizations shall also
inform the Depositary, who shall in turn inform the Parties, of any substantial
modification in the extent of their competence.

ARTICLE 23
ENTRY INTO FORCE

1. The Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of deposit
of the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
2. For each State or regional economic integration organization that ratifies, accepts
or approves the Convention or accedes thereto after the deposit of the fiftieth
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, the Convention shall
enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of deposit by such State or regional
economic integration organization of its instrument of ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession.
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3. For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2 above, any instrument deposited by a
regional economic integration organization shall not be counted as additional to those
deposited by States members of the organization.

ARTICLE 24
RESERVATIONS

No reservations may be made to the Convention.

ARTICLE 25
WITHDRAWAL

1. At any time after three years from the date on which the Convention has entered
into force for a Party, that Party may withdraw from the Convention by giving
written notification to the Depositary.
2. Any such withdrawal shall take effect upon expiry of one year from the date of
receipt by the Depositary of the notification of withdrawal, or on such later date as
may be specified in the notification of withdrawal.
3. Any Party that withdraws from the Convention shall be considered as also having
withdrawn from any protocol to which it is a Party.

ARTICLE 26
AUTHENTIC TEXTS

The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French,
Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the
Secretary- General of the United Nations.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized to that effect, have
signed this Convention.
DONE at New York this ninth day of May one thousand nine hundred and ninetytwo.
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ANNEX I AND ANNEX II COUNTRIES
Annex I





































Australia
Austria
Belarus*
Belgium
Bulgaria*
Canada
Czechoslovakia*
Denmark
European Economic Community
Estonia*
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary*
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Latvia*
Lithuania*
Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland*
Portugal
Romania*
Russian Federation*
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
Ukraine*
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
United States of America

*Countries that are undergoing the process of transition to a market economy.
Annex II






Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
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European Economic Community
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
United States of America

Publisher’s note: Turkey was deleted from Annex II by an amendment that entered
into force 28 June 2002, pursuant to decision 26/CP.7 adopted at COP.7.
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APPENDIX B: KYOTO PROTOCOL TO THE UNITED NATIONS
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE

The Parties to this Protocol,
Being Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
hereinafter referred to as "the Convention",
In pursuit of the ultimate objective of the Convention as stated in its Article 2,
Recalling the provisions of the Convention,
Being guided by Article 3 of the Convention,
Pursuant to the Berlin Mandate adopted by decision 1/CP.1 of the
Conference of the Parties to the Convention at its first session,
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
For the purposes of this Protocol, the definitions contained in Article 1 of the
Convention shall apply. In addition:
1. "Conference of the Parties" means the Conference of the Parties to the
Convention.
2. "Convention" means the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, adopted in New York on 9 May 1992.
3. "Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change" means the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change established in 1988 jointly by the World Meteorological
Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme.
4. "Montreal Protocol" means the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer, adopted in Montreal on 16 September 1987 and as subsequently
adjusted and amended.
5. "Parties present and voting" means Parties present and casting an affirmative or
negative vote.
6. "Party" means, unless the context otherwise indicates, a Party to this Protocol.
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7. "Party included in Annex I" means a Party included in Annex I to the Convention,
as may be amended, or a Party which has made a notification under Article 4,
paragraph 2(g), of the Convention.
Article 2
1. Each Party included in Annex I, in achieving its quantified emission limitation and
reduction commitments under Article 3, in order to promote sustainable
development, shall:
(a) Implement and/or further elaborate policies and measures in accordance with its
national circumstances, such as:
(i) Enhancement of energy efficiency in relevant sectors of the national economy;
(ii) Protection and enhancement of sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases not
controlled by the Montreal Protocol, taking into account its commitments under
relevant international environmental agreements; promotion of sustainable forest
management practices, afforestation and reforestation;
(iii) Promotion of sustainable forms of agriculture in light of climate change
considerations;
(iv) Research on, and promotion, development and increased use of, new and
renewable forms of energy, of carbon dioxide sequestration technologies and of
advanced and innovative environmentally sound technologies;
(v) Progressive reduction or phasing out of market imperfections, fiscal incentives,
tax and duty exemptions and subsidies in all greenhouse gas emitting sectors that run
counter to the objective of the Convention and application of market instruments;
(vi) Encouragement of appropriate reforms in relevant sectors aimed at promoting
policies and measures which limit or reduce emissions of greenhouse gases not
controlled by the Montreal Protocol;
(vii) Measures to limit and/or reduce emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled
by the Montreal Protocol in the transport sector;
(viii) Limitation and/or reduction of methane emissions through recovery and use in
waste management, as well as in the production, transport and distribution of energy;
(b) Cooperate with other such Parties to enhance the individual and combined
effectiveness of their policies and measures adopted under this Article, pursuant to
Article 4, paragraph 2(e)(i), of the Convention. To this end, these Parties shall take
steps to share their experience and exchange information on such policies and
measures, including developing ways of improving their comparability, transparency
and effectiveness. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties
to this Protocol shall, at its first session or as soon as practicable thereafter, consider
ways to facilitate such cooperation, taking into account all relevant information.
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2. The Parties included in Annex I shall pursue limitation or reduction of emissions
of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol from aviation and
marine bunker fuels, working through the International Civil Aviation Organization
and the International Maritime Organization, respectively.
3. The Parties included in Annex I shall strive to implement policies and measures
under this Article in such a way as to minimize adverse effects, including the adverse
effects of climate change, effects on international trade, and social, environmental
and economic impacts on other Parties, especially developing country Parties and in
particular those identified in Article 4, paragraphs 8 and 9, of the Convention, taking
into account Article 3 of the Convention. The Conference of the Parties serving as
the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol may take further action, as appropriate, to
promote the implementation of the provisions of this paragraph.
4. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this
Protocol, if it decides that it would be beneficial to coordinate any of the policies and
measures in paragraph 1(a) above, taking into account different national
circumstances and potential effects, shall consider ways and means to elaborate the
coordination of such policies and measures.
Article 3
1. The Parties included in Annex I shall, individually or jointly, ensure that their
aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse
gases listed in Annex A do not exceed their assigned amounts, calculated pursuant to
their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments inscribed in Annex
B and in accordance with the provisions of this Article, with a view to reducing their
overall emissions of such gases by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels in the
commitment period 2008 to 2012.
2. Each Party included in Annex I shall, by 2005, have made demonstrable progress
in achieving its commitments under this Protocol.
3. The net changes in greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks
resulting from direct human-induced land-use change and forestry activities, limited
to afforestation, reforestation and deforestation since 1990, measured as verifiable
changes in carbon stocks in each commitment period, shall be used to meet the
commitments under this Article of each Party included in Annex I. The greenhouse
gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks associated with those activities shall
be reported in a transparent and verifiable manner and reviewed in accordance with
Articles 7 and 8.
4. Prior to the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of
the Parties to this Protocol, each Party included in Annex I shall provide, for
consideration by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, data
to establish its level of carbon stocks in 1990 and to enable an estimate to be made of
its changes in carbon stocks in subsequent years. The Conference of the Parties
serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, at its first session or as
soon as practicable thereafter, decide upon modalities, rules and guidelines as to
how, and which, additional human-induced activities related to changes in
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greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks in the agricultural
soils and the land-use change and forestry categories shall be added to, or subtracted
from, the assigned amounts for Parties included in Annex I, taking into account
uncertainties, transparency in reporting, verifiability, the methodological work of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the advice provided by the Subsidiary
Body for Scientific and Technological Advice in accordance with Article 5 and the
decisions of the Conference of the Parties. Such a decision shall apply in the second
and subsequent commitment periods. A Party may choose to apply such a decision
on these additional human-induced activities for its first commitment period,
provided that these activities have taken place since 1990.
5. The Parties included in Annex I undergoing the process of transition to a market
economy whose base year or period was established pursuant to decision 9/CP.2 of
the Conference of the Parties at its second session shall use that base year or period
for the implementation of their commitments under this Article. Any other Party
included in Annex I undergoing the process of transition to a market economy which
has not yet submitted its first national communication under Article 12 of the
Convention may also notify the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of
the Parties to this Protocol that it intends to use an historical base year or period other
than 1990 for the implementation of its commitments under this Article. The
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall
decide on the acceptance of such notification.
6. Taking into account Article 4, paragraph 6, of the Convention, in the
implementation of their commitments under this Protocol other than those under this
Article, a certain degree of flexibility shall be allowed by the Conference of the
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol to the Parties included in
Annex I undergoing the process of transition to a market economy.
7. In the first quantified emission limitation and reduction commitment period, from
2008 to 2012, the assigned amount for each Party included in Annex I shall be equal
to the percentage inscribed for it in Annex B of its aggregate anthropogenic carbon
dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A in 1990, or
the base year or period determined in accordance with paragraph 5 above, multiplied
by five. Those Parties included in Annex I for whom land-use change and forestry
constituted a net source of greenhouse gas emissions in 1990 shall include in their
1990 emissions base year or period the aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide
equivalent emissions by sources minus removals by sinks in 1990 from land-use
change for the purposes of calculating their assigned amount.
8. Any Party included in Annex I may use 1995 as its base year for
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride, for the purposes of
the calculation referred to in paragraph 7 above.
9. Commitments for subsequent periods for Parties included in Annex I shall be
established in amendments to Annex B to this Protocol, which shall be adopted in
accordance with the provisions of Article 21, paragraph 7. The Conference of the
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall initiate the
consideration of such commitments at least seven years before the end of the first
commitment period referred to in paragraph 1 above.
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10. Any emission reduction units, or any part of an assigned amount, which a Party
acquires from another Party in accordance with the provisions of Article 6 or of
Article 17 shall be added to the assigned amount for the acquiring Party.
11. Any emission reduction units, or any part of an assigned amount, which a Party
transfers to another Party in accordance with the provisions of Article 6 or of Article
17 shall be subtracted from the assigned amount for the transferring Party.
12. Any certified emission reductions which a Party acquires from another Party in
accordance with the provisions of Article 12 shall be added to the assigned amount
for the acquiring Party.
13. If the emissions of a Party included in Annex I in a commitment period are less
than its assigned amount under this Article, this difference shall, on request of that
Party, be added to the assigned amount for that Party for subsequent commitment
periods.
14. Each Party included in Annex I shall strive to implement the commitments
mentioned in paragraph 1 above in such a way as to minimize adverse social,
environmental and economic impacts on developing country Parties, particularly
those identified in Article 4, paragraphs 8 and 9, of the Convention. In line with
relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties on the implementation of those
paragraphs, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this
Protocol shall, at its first session, consider what actions are necessary to minimize the
adverse effects of climate change and/or the impacts of response measures on Parties
referred to in those paragraphs. Among the issues to be considered shall be the
establishment of funding, insurance and transfer of technology.
Article 4
1. Any Parties included in Annex I that have reached an agreement to fulfil their
commitments under Article 3 jointly, shall be deemed to have met those
commitments provided that their total combined aggregate anthropogenic carbon
dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do not
exceed their assigned amounts calculated pursuant to their quantified emission
limitation and reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B and in accordance with
the provisions of Article 3. The respective emission level allocated to each of the
Parties to the agreement shall be set out in that agreement.
2. The Parties to any such agreement shall notify the secretariat of the terms of the
agreement on the date of deposit of their instruments of ratification, acceptance or
approval of this Protocol, or accession thereto. The secretariat shall in turn inform the
Parties and signatories to the Convention of the terms of the agreement.
3. Any such agreement shall remain in operation for the duration of the commitment
period specified in Article 3, paragraph 7.
4. If Parties acting jointly do so in the framework of, and together with, a regional
economic integration organization, any alteration in the composition of the
organization after adoption of this Protocol shall not affect existing commitments
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under this Protocol. Any alteration in the composition of the organization shall only
apply for the purposes of those commitments under Article 3 that are adopted
subsequent to that alteration.
5. In the event of failure by the Parties to such an agreement to achieve their total
combined level of emission reductions, each Party to that agreement shall be
responsible for its own level of emissions set out in the agreement.
6. If Parties acting jointly do so in the framework of, and together with, a regional
economic integration organization which is itself a Party to this Protocol, each
member State of that regional economic integration organization individually, and
together with the regional economic integration organization acting in accordance
with Article 24, shall, in the event of failure to achieve the total combined level of
emission reductions, be responsible for its level of emissions as notified in
accordance with this Article.
Article 5
1. Each Party included in Annex I shall have in place, no later than one year prior to
the start of the first commitment period, a national system for the estimation of
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases
not controlled by the Montreal Protocol. Guidelines for such national systems, which
shall incorporate the methodologies specified in paragraph 2 below, shall be decided
upon by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this
Protocol at its first session.
2. Methodologies for estimating anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals
by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol shall be
those accepted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and agreed upon
by the Conference of the Parties at its third session. Where such methodologies are
not used, appropriate adjustments shall be applied according to methodologies agreed
upon by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this
Protocol at its first session. Based on the work of, inter alia, the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change and advice provided by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific
and Technological Advice, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of
the Parties to this Protocol shall regularly review and, as appropriate, revise such
methodologies and adjustments, taking fully into account any relevant decisions by
the Conference of the Parties. Any revision to methodologies or adjustments shall be
used only for the purposes of ascertaining compliance with commitments under
Article 3 in respect of any commitment period adopted subsequent to that revision.
3. The global warming potentials used to calculate the carbon dioxide equivalence of
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases
listed in Annex A shall be those accepted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change and agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties at its third session. Based
on the work of, inter alia, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and
advice provided by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, the
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall
regularly review and, as appropriate, revise the global warming potential of each
such greenhouse gas, taking fully into account any relevant decisions by the
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Conference of the Parties. Any revision to a global warming potential shall apply
only to commitments under Article 3 in respect of any commitment period adopted
subsequent to that revision.
Article 6
1. For the purpose of meeting its commitments under Article 3, any Party included in
Annex I may transfer to, or acquire from, any other such Party emission reduction
units resulting from projects aimed at reducing anthropogenic emissions by sources
or enhancing anthropogenic removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in any sector of
the economy, provided that:
(a) Any such project has the approval of the Parties involved;
(b) Any such project provides a reduction in emissions by sources, or an
enhancement of removals by sinks, that is additional to any that would otherwise
occur;
(c) It does not acquire any emission reduction units if it is not in compliance with its
obligations under Articles 5 and 7; and
(d) The acquisition of emission reduction units shall be supplemental to domestic
actions for the purposes of meeting commitments under Article 3.
2. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol
may, at its first session or as soon as practicable thereafter, further elaborate
guidelines for the implementation of this Article, including for verification and
reporting.
3. A Party included in Annex I may authorize legal entities to participate, under its
responsibility, in actions leading to the generation, transfer or acquisition under this
Article of emission reduction units.
4. If a question of implementation by a Party included in Annex I of the requirements
referred to in this Article is identified in accordance with the relevant provisions of
Article 8, transfers and acquisitions of emission reduction units may continue to be
made after the question has been identified, provided that any such units may not be
used by a Party to meet its commitments under Article 3 until any issue of
compliance is resolved.
Article 7
1. Each Party included in Annex I shall incorporate in its annual inventory of
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases not
controlled by the Montreal Protocol, submitted in accordance with the relevant
decisions of the Conference of the Parties, the necessary supplementary information
for the purposes of ensuring compliance with Article 3, to be determined in
accordance with paragraph 4 below.
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2. Each Party included in Annex I shall incorporate in its national communication,
submitted under Article 12 of the Convention, the supplementary information
necessary to demonstrate compliance with its commitments under this Protocol, to be
determined in accordance with paragraph 4 below.
3. Each Party included in Annex I shall submit the information required under
paragraph 1 above annually, beginning with the first inventory due under the
Convention for the first year of the commitment period after this Protocol has entered
into force for that Party. Each such Party shall submit the information required under
paragraph 2 above as part of the first national communication due under the
Convention after this Protocol has entered into force for it and after the adoption of
guidelines as provided for in paragraph 4 below. The frequency of subsequent
submission of information required under this Article shall be determined by the
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, taking
into account any timetable for the submission of national communications decided
upon by the Conference of the Parties.
4. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol
shall adopt at its first session, and review periodically thereafter, guidelines for the
preparation of the information required under this Article, taking into account
guidelines for the preparation of national communications by Parties included in
Annex I adopted by the Conference of the Parties. The Conference of the Parties
serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall also, prior to the first
commitment period, decide upon modalities for the accounting of assigned amounts.
Article 8
1. The information submitted under Article 7 by each Party included in Annex I shall
be reviewed by expert review teams pursuant to the relevant decisions of the
Conference of the Parties and in accordance with guidelines adopted for this purpose
by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol
under paragraph 4 below. The information submitted under Article 7, paragraph 1, by
each Party included in Annex I shall be reviewed as part of the annual compilation
and accounting of emissions inventories and assigned amounts. Additionally, the
information submitted under Article 7, paragraph 2, by each Party included in Annex
I shall be reviewed as part of the review of communications.
2. Expert review teams shall be coordinated by the secretariat and shall be composed
of experts selected from those nominated by Parties to the Convention and, as
appropriate, by intergovernmental organizations, in accordance with guidance
provided for this purpose by the Conference of the Parties.
3. The review process shall provide a thorough and comprehensive technical
assessment of all aspects of the implementation by a Party of this Protocol. The
expert review teams shall prepare a report to the Conference of the Parties serving as
the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, assessing the implementation of the
commitments of the Party and identifying any potential problems in, and factors
influencing, the fulfilment of commitments. Such reports shall be circulated by the
secretariat to all Parties to the Convention. The secretariat shall list those questions
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of implementation indicated in such reports for further consideration by the
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol.
4. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol
shall adopt at its first session, and review periodically thereafter, guidelines for the
review of implementation of this Protocol by expert review teams taking into account
the relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties.
5. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol
shall, with the assistance of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation and, as
appropriate, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, consider:
(a) The information submitted by Parties under Article 7 and the reports of the expert
reviews thereon conducted under this Article; and
(b) Those questions of implementation listed by the secretariat under paragraph 3
above, as well as any questions raised by Parties.
6. Pursuant to its consideration of the information referred to in paragraph 5 above,
the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol
shall take decisions on any matter required for the implementation of this Protocol.
Article 9
1. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol
shall periodically review this Protocol in the light of the best available scientific
information and assessments on climate change and its impacts, as well as relevant
technical, social and economic information. Such reviews shall be coordinated with
pertinent reviews under the Convention, in particular those required by Article 4,
paragraph 2(d), and Article 7, paragraph 2(a), of the Convention. Based on these
reviews, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this
Protocol shall take appropriate action.
2. The first review shall take place at the second session of the Conference of the
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. Further reviews shall
take place at regular intervals and in a timely manner.
Article 10
All Parties, taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and
their specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and
circumstances, without introducing any new commitments for Parties not included in
Annex I, but reaffirming existing commitments under Article 4, paragraph 1, of the
Convention, and continuing to advance the implementation of these commitments in
order to achieve sustainable development, taking into account Article 4, paragraphs
3, 5 and 7, of the Convention, shall:
(a) Formulate, where relevant and to the extent possible, cost-effective national and,
where appropriate, regional programmes to improve the quality of local emission
factors, activity data and/or models which reflect the socio-economic conditions of
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each Party for the preparation and periodic updating of national inventories of
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases
not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, using comparable methodologies to be
agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties, and consistent with the guidelines for
the preparation of national communications adopted by the Conference of the Parties;
(b) Formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national and, where
appropriate, regional programmes containing measures to mitigate climate change
and measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change:
(i) Such programmes would, inter alia, concern the energy, transport and industry
sectors as well as agriculture, forestry and waste management. Furthermore,
adaptation technologies and methods for improving spatial planning would improve
adaptation to climate change; and
(ii) Parties included in Annex I shall submit information on action under this
Protocol, including national programmes, in accordance with Article 7; and other
Parties shall seek to include in their national communications, as appropriate,
information on programmes which contain measures that the Party believes
contribute to addressing climate change and its adverse impacts, including the
abatement of increases in greenhouse gas emissions, and enhancement of and
removals by sinks, capacity building and adaptation measures;
(c) Cooperate in the promotion of effective modalities for the development,
application and diffusion of, and take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and
finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound
technologies, know-how, practices and processes pertinent to climate change, in
particular to developing countries, including the formulation of policies and
programmes for the effective transfer of environmentally sound technologies that are
publicly owned or in the public domain and the creation of an enabling environment
for the private sector, to promote and enhance the transfer of, and access to,
environmentally sound technologies;
(d) Cooperate in scientific and technical research and promote the maintenance
and the development of systematic observation systems and development of data
archives to reduce uncertainties related to the climate system, the adverse impacts of
climate change and the economic and social consequences of various response
strategies, and promote the development and strengthening of endogenous capacities
and capabilities to participate in international and intergovernmental efforts,
programmes and networks on research and systematic observation, taking into
account Article 5 of the Convention;
(e) Cooperate in and promote at the international level, and, where appropriate, using
existing bodies, the development and implementation of education and training
programmes, including the strengthening of national capacity building, in particular
human and institutional capacities and the exchange or secondment of personnel to
train experts in this field, in particular for developing countries, and facilitate at the
national level public awareness of, and public access to information on, climate
change. Suitable modalities should be developed to implement these activities
467

through the relevant bodies of the Convention, taking into account Article 6 of the
Convention;
(f) Include in their national communications information on programmes and
activities undertaken pursuant to this Article in accordance with relevant decisions of
the Conference of the Parties; and
(g) Give full consideration, in implementing the commitments under this Article,
to Article 4, paragraph 8, of the Convention.
Article 11
1. In the implementation of Article 10, Parties shall take into account the provisions
of Article 4, paragraphs 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9, of the Convention.
2. In the context of the implementation of Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Convention,
in accordance with the provisions of Article 4, paragraph 3, and Article 11 of the
Convention, and through the entity or entities entrusted with the operation of the
financial mechanism of the Convention, the developed country Parties and other
developed Parties included in Annex II to the Convention shall:
(a) Provide new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full costs
incurred by developing country Parties in advancing the implementation of existing
commitments under Article 4, paragraph 1(a), of the Convention that are covered in
Article 10, subparagraph (a); and
(b) Also provide such financial resources, including for the transfer of technology,
needed by the developing country Parties to meet the agreed full incremental costs of
advancing the implementation of existing commitments under Article 4, paragraph 1,
of the Convention that are covered by Article 10 and that are agreed between a
developing country Party and the international entity or entities referred to in Article
11 of the Convention, in accordance with that Article.
The implementation of these existing commitments shall take into account the need
for adequacy and predictability in the flow of funds and the importance of
appropriate burden sharing among developed country Parties. The guidance to the
entity or entities entrusted with the operation of the financial mechanism of the
Convention in relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties, including those
agreed before the adoption of this Protocol, shall apply mutatis mutandis to the
provisions of this paragraph.
3. The developed country Parties and other developed Parties in Annex II to the
Convention may also provide, and developing country Parties avail themselves of,
financial resources for the implementation of Article 10, through bilateral, regional
and other multilateral channels.
Article 12
1. A clean development mechanism is hereby defined.
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2. The purpose of the clean development mechanism shall be to assist Parties not
included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development and in contributing to the
ultimate objective of the Convention, and to assist Parties included in Annex I in
achieving compliance with their quantified emission limitation and reduction
commitments under Article 3.
3. Under the clean development mechanism:
(a) Parties not included in Annex I will benefit from project activities resulting in
certified emission reductions; and
(b) Parties included in Annex I may use the certified emission reductions accruing
from such project activities to contribute to compliance with part of their quantified
emission limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3, as determined by the
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol.
4. The clean development mechanism shall be subject to the authority and guidance
of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol
and be supervised by an executive board of the clean development mechanism.
5. Emission reductions resulting from each project activity shall be certified by
operational entities to be designated by the Conference of the Parties serving as the
meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, on the basis of:
(a) Voluntary participation approved by each Party involved;
(b) Real, measurable, and long-term benefits related to the mitigation of climate
change; and
(c) Reductions in emissions that are additional to any that would occur in the absence
of the certified project activity.
6. The clean development mechanism shall assist in arranging funding of certified
project activities as necessary.
7. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol
shall, at its first session, elaborate modalities and procedures with the objective of
ensuring transparency, efficiency and accountability through independent auditing
and verification of project activities.
8. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol
shall ensure that a share of the proceeds from certified project activities is used to
cover administrative expenses as well as to assist developing country Parties that are
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to meet the costs of
adaptation.
9. Participation under the clean development mechanism, including in activities
mentioned in paragraph 3(a) above and in the acquisition of certified emission
reductions, may involve private and/or public entities, and is to be subject to
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whatever guidance may be provided by the executive board of the clean development
mechanism.
10. Certified emission reductions obtained during the period from the year 2000 up
to the beginning of the first commitment period can be used to assist in achieving
compliance in the first commitment period.
Article 13
1. The Conference of the Parties, the supreme body of the Convention, shall serve as
the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol.
2. Parties to the Convention that are not Parties to this Protocol may participate as
observers in the proceedings of any session of the Conference of the Parties serving
as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. When the Conference of the Parties
serves as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, decisions under this Protocol
shall be taken only by those that are Parties to this Protocol.
3. When the Conference of the Parties serves as the meeting of the Parties to this
Protocol, any member of the Bureau of the Conference of the Parties representing a
Party to the Convention but, at that time, not a Party to this Protocol, shall be
replaced by an additional member to be elected by and from amongst the Parties to
this Protocol.
4. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol
shall keep under regular review the implementation of this Protocol and shall make,
within its mandate, the decisions necessary to promote its effective implementation.
It shall perform the functions assigned to it by this Protocol and shall:
(a) Assess, on the basis of all information made available to it in accordance with the
provisions of this Protocol, the implementation of this Protocol by the Parties, the
overall effects of the measures taken pursuant to this Protocol, in particular
environmental, economic and social effects as well as their cumulative impacts and
the extent to which progress towards the objective of the Convention is being
achieved;
(b) Periodically examine the obligations of the Parties under this Protocol, giving due
consideration to any reviews required by Article 4, paragraph 2(d), and Article 7,
paragraph 2, of the Convention, in the light of the objective of the Convention, the
experience gained in its implementation and the evolution of scientific and
technological knowledge, and in this respect consider and adopt regular reports on
the implementation of this Protocol;
(c) Promote and facilitate the exchange of information on measures adopted by
the Parties to address climate change and its effects, taking into account the differing
circumstances, responsibilities and capabilities of the Parties and their respective
commitments under this Protocol;
(d) Facilitate, at the request of two or more Parties, the coordination of measures
adopted by them to address climate change and its effects, taking into account the
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differing circumstances, responsibilities and capabilities of the Parties and their
respective commitments under this Protocol;
(e) Promote and guide, in accordance with the objective of the Convention and the
provisions of this Protocol, and taking fully into account the relevant decisions by the
Conference of the Parties, the development and periodic refinement of comparable
methodologies for the effective implementation of this Protocol, to be agreed on by
the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol;
(f) Make recommendations on any matters necessary for the implementation of this
Protocol;
(g) Seek to mobilize additional financial resources in accordance with
Article 11, paragraph 2;
(h) Establish such subsidiary bodies as are deemed necessary for the implementation
of this Protocol;
(i) Seek and utilize, where appropriate, the services and cooperation of, and
information provided by, competent international organizations and
intergovernmental and non-governmental bodies; and
(j) Exercise such other functions as may be required for the implementation of
this Protocol, and consider any assignment resulting from a decision by the
Conference of the Parties.
5. The rules of procedure of the Conference of the Parties and financial procedures
applied under the Convention shall be applied mutatis mutandis under this Protocol,
except as may be otherwise decided by consensus by the Conference of the Parties
serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol.
6. The first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the
Parties to this Protocol shall be convened by the secretariat in conjunction with the
first session of the Conference of the Parties that is scheduled after the date of the
entry into force of this Protocol. Subsequent ordinary sessions of the Conference of
the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall be held every
year and in conjunction with ordinary sessions of the Conference of the Parties,
unless otherwise decided by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of
the Parties to this Protocol.
7. Extraordinary sessions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of
the Parties to this Protocol shall be held at such other times as may be deemed
necessary by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to
this Protocol, or at the written request of any Party, provided that, within six months
of the request being communicated to the Parties by the secretariat, it is supported by
at least one third of the Parties.
8. The United Nations, its specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy
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Agency, as well as any State member thereof or observers thereto not party to the
Convention, may be represented at sessions of the Conference of the Parties serving
as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol as observers. Any body or agency,
whether national or international, governmental or non-governmental, which is
qualified in matters covered by this Protocol and which has informed the secretariat
of its wish to be represented at a session of the Conference of the Parties serving as
the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol as an observer, may be so admitted unless
at least one third of the Parties present object. The admission and participation of
observers shall be subject to the rules of procedure, as referred to in paragraph 5
above.
Article 14
1. The secretariat established by Article 8 of the Convention shall serve as the
secretariat of this Protocol.
2. Article 8, paragraph 2, of the Convention on the functions of the secretariat, and
Article 8, paragraph 3, of the Convention on arrangements made for the functioning
of the secretariat, shall apply mutatis mutandis to this Protocol. The secretariat shall,
in addition, exercise the functions assigned to it under this Protocol.
Article 15
1. The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary
Body for Implementation established by Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention shall
serve as, respectively, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation of this Protocol. The provisions relating
to the functioning of these two bodies under the Convention shall apply mutatis
mutandis to this Protocol. Sessions of the meetings of the Subsidiary Body for
Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation of
this Protocol shall be held in conjunction with the meetings of, respectively, the
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body
for Implementation of the Convention.
2. Parties to the Convention that are not Parties to this Protocol may participate as
observers in the proceedings of any session of the subsidiary bodies. When the
subsidiary bodies serve as the subsidiary bodies of this Protocol, decisions under this
Protocol shall be taken only by those that are Parties to this Protocol.
3. When the subsidiary bodies established by Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention
exercise their functions with regard to matters concerning this Protocol, any member
of the Bureaux of those subsidiary bodies representing a Party to the Convention but,
at that time, not a party to this Protocol, shall be replaced by an additional member to
be elected by and from amongst the Parties to this Protocol.
Article 16
The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol
shall, as soon as practicable, consider the application to this Protocol of, and modify
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as appropriate, the multilateral consultative process referred to in Article 13 of the
Convention, in the light of any relevant decisions that may be taken by the
Conference of the Parties. Any multilateral consultative process that may be applied
to this Protocol shall operate without prejudice to the procedures and mechanisms
established in accordance with Article 18.
Article 17
The Conference of the Parties shall define the relevant principles, modalities, rules
and guidelines, in particular for verification, reporting and accountability for
emissions trading. The Parties included in Annex B may participate in emissions
trading for the purposes of fulfilling their commitments under Article 3. Any such
trading shall be supplemental to domestic actions for the purpose of meeting
quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under that Article.
Article 18
The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol
shall, at its first session, approve appropriate and effective procedures and
mechanisms to determine and to address cases of non-compliance with the provisions
of this Protocol, including through the development of an indicative list of
consequences, taking into account the cause, type, degree and frequency of noncompliance. Any procedures and mechanisms under this Article entailing binding
consequences shall be adopted by means of an amendment to this Protocol.
Article 19
The provisions of Article 14 of the Convention on settlement of disputes shall apply
mutatis mutandis to this Protocol.
Article 20
1. Any Party may propose amendments to this Protocol.
2. Amendments to this Protocol shall be adopted at an ordinary session of the
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. The
text of any proposed amendment to this Protocol shall be communicated to the
Parties by the secretariat at least six months before the meeting at which it is
proposed for adoption. The secretariat shall also communicate the text of any
proposed amendments to the Parties and signatories to the Convention and, for
information, to the Depositary.
3. The Parties shall make every effort to reach agreement on any proposed
amendment to this Protocol by consensus. If all efforts at consensus have been
exhausted, and no agreement reached, the amendment shall as a last resort be
adopted by a three-fourths majority vote of the Parties present and voting at the
meeting. The adopted amendment shall be communicated by the secretariat to the
Depositary, who shall circulate it to all Parties for their acceptance.
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4. Instruments of acceptance in respect of an amendment shall be deposited with the
Depositary. An amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 3 above shall
enter into force for those Parties having accepted it on the ninetieth day after the date
of receipt by the Depositary of an instrument of acceptance by at least three fourths
of the Parties to this Protocol.
5. The amendment shall enter into force for any other Party on the ninetieth day after
the date on which that Party deposits with the Depositary its instrument of
acceptance of the said amendment.
Article 21
1. Annexes to this Protocol shall form an integral part thereof and, unless otherwise
expressly provided, a reference to this Protocol constitutes at the same time a
reference to any annexes thereto. Any annexes adopted after the entry into force of
this Protocol shall be restricted to lists, forms and any other material of a descriptive
nature that is of a scientific, technical, procedural or administrative character.
2. Any Party may make proposals for an annex to this Protocol and may propose
amendments to annexes to this Protocol.
3. Annexes to this Protocol and amendments to annexes to this Protocol shall be
adopted at an ordinary session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the
meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. The text of any proposed annex or amendment
to an annex shall be communicated to the Parties by the secretariat at least six
months before the meeting at which it is proposed for adoption. The secretariat shall
also communicate the text of any proposed annex or amendment to an annex to the
Parties and signatories to the Convention and, for information, to the Depositary.
4. The Parties shall make every effort to reach agreement on any proposed annex or
amendment to an annex by consensus. If all efforts at consensus have been
exhausted, and no agreement reached, the annex or amendment to an annex shall as a
last resort be adopted by a three-fourths majority vote of the Parties present and
voting at the meeting. The adopted annex or amendment to an annex shall be
communicated by the secretariat to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all Parties
for their acceptance.
5. An annex, or amendment to an annex other than Annex A or B, that has been
adopted in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4 above shall enter into force for all
Parties to this Protocol six months after the date of the communication by the
Depositary to such Parties of the adoption of the annex or adoption of the
amendment to the annex, except for those Parties that have notified the Depositary,
in writing, within that period of their non-acceptance of the annex or amendment to
the annex. The annex or amendment to an annex shall enter into force for Parties
which withdraw their notification of non-acceptance on the ninetieth day after the
date on which withdrawal of such notification has been received by the Depositary.
6. If the adoption of an annex or an amendment to an annex involves an amendment
to this Protocol, that annex or amendment to an annex shall not enter into force until
such time as the amendment to this Protocol enters into force.
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7. Amendments to Annexes A and B to this Protocol shall be adopted and enter into
force in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 20, provided that any
amendment to Annex B shall be adopted only with the written consent of the Party
concerned.
Article 22
1. Each Party shall have one vote, except as provided for in paragraph 2 below.
2. Regional economic integration organizations, in matters within their competence,
shall exercise their right to vote with a number of votes equal to the number of their
member States that are Parties to this Protocol. Such an organization shall not
exercise its right to vote if any of its member States exercises its right, and vice
versa.
Article 23
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the Depositary of this Protocol.
Article 24
1. This Protocol shall be open for signature and subject to ratification, acceptance or
approval by States and regional economic integration organizations which are Parties
to the Convention. It shall be open for signature at United Nations Headquarters in
New York from
16 March 1998 to 15 March 1999. This Protocol shall be open for accession from the
day after the date on which it is closed for signature. Instruments of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.
2. Any regional economic integration organization which becomes a Party to this
Protocol without any of its member States being a Party shall be bound by all the
obligations under this Protocol. In the case of such organizations, one or more of
whose member States is a Party to this Protocol, the organization and its member
States shall decide on their respective responsibilities for the performance of their
obligations under this Protocol. In such cases, the organization and the member
States shall not be entitled to exercise rights under this Protocol concurrently.
3. In their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, regional
economic integration organizations shall declare the extent of their competence with
respect to the matters governed by this Protocol. These organizations shall also
inform the Depositary, who shall in turn inform the Parties, of any substantial
modification in the extent of their competence.
Article 25
1. This Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date on which not
less than 55 Parties to the Convention, incorporating Parties included in Annex I
which accounted in total for at least 55 per cent of the total carbon dioxide emissions
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for 1990 of the Parties included in Annex I, have deposited their instruments of
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
2. For the purposes of this Article, "the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990 of
the Parties included in Annex I" means the amount communicated on or before the
date of adoption of this Protocol by the Parties included in Annex I in their first
national communications submitted in accordance with Article 12 of the Convention.
3. For each State or regional economic integration organization that ratifies, accepts
or
approves this Protocol or accedes thereto after the conditions set out in paragraph 1
above for entry into force have been fulfilled, this Protocol shall enter into force on
the ninetieth day following the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession.
4. For the purposes of this Article, any instrument deposited by a regional economic
integration organization shall not be counted as additional to those deposited by
States members of the organization.
Article 26
No reservations may be made to this Protocol.
Article 27
1. At any time after three years from the date on which this Protocol has entered into
force for a Party, that Party may withdraw from this Protocol by giving written
notification to the Depositary.
2. Any such withdrawal shall take effect upon expiry of one year from the date of
receipt by the Depositary of the notification of withdrawal, or on such later date as
may be specified in the notification of withdrawal.
3. Any Party that withdraws from the Convention shall be considered as also having
withdrawn from this Protocol.
Article 28
The original of this Protocol, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian
and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations.
DONE at Kyoto this eleventh day of December one thousand nine hundred and
ninety-seven.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized to that effect,
have affixed their signatures to this Protocol on the dates indicated.
Annex A
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Greenhouse gases
Carbon dioxide (CO2)
Methane (CH4)
Nitrous oxide (N2O)
Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs)
Perfluorocarbons (PFCs)
Sulphur hexafluoride (SF6)
Sectors/source categories
Energy
Fuel combustion
Energy industries
Manufacturing industries and construction
Transport
Other sectors
Other
Fugitive emissions from fuels
Solid fuels
Oil and natural gas
Other
Industrial processes
Mineral products
Chemical industry
Metal production
Other production
Production of halocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride
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Consumption of halocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride
Other
Solvent and other product use
Agriculture
Enteric fermentation
Manure management
Rice cultivation
Agricultural soils
Prescribed burning of savannas
Field burning of agricultural residues
Other
Waste
Solid waste disposal on land
Wastewater handling
Waste incineration
Other
Annex B
Party Quantified emission limitation or
reduction commitment
(percentage of base year or period)
Australia 108
Austria 92
Belgium 92
Bulgaria* 92
Canada 94
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Croatia* 95
Czech Republic* 92
Denmark 92
Estonia* 92
European Community 92
Finland 92
France 92
Germany 92
Greece 92
Hungary* 94
Iceland 110
Ireland 92
Italy 92
Japan 94
Latvia* 92
Liechtenstein 92
Lithuania* 92
Luxembourg 92
Monaco 92
Netherlands 92
New Zealand 100
Norway 101
Poland* 94
Portugal 92
Romania* 92
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Russian Federation* 100
Slovakia* 92
Slovenia* 92
Spain 92
Sweden 92
Switzerland 92
Ukraine* 100
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 92
United States of America 93
* Countries that are undergoing the process of transition to a market economy.
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APPENDIX C: UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW
OF THE SEA
Selection of Articles

PREAMBLE

The States Parties to this Convention,
Prompted by the desire to settle, in a spirit of mutual understanding and
cooperation, all issues relating to the law of the sea and aware of the historic
significance of this Convention as an important contribution to the maintenance of
peace, justice and progress for all peoples of the world,
Noting that developments since the United Nations Conferences on the Law of the
Sea held at Geneva in 1958 and 1960 have accentuated the need for a new and
generally acceptable Convention on the law of the sea,
Conscious that the problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be
considered as a whole,
Recognizing the desirability of establishing through this Convention, with due
regard for the sovereignty of all States, a legal order for the seas and oceans which will
facilitate international communication, and will promote the peaceful uses of the seas
and oceans, the equitable and efficient utilization of their resources, the conservation
of their living resources, and the study, protection and preservation of the marine
environment,
Bearing in mind that the achievement of these goals will contribute to the
realization of a just and equitable international economic order which takes into
account the interests and needs of mankind as a whole and, in particular, the special
interests and needs of developing countries, whether coastal or land-locked,
Desiring by this Convention to develop the principles embodied in resolution 2749
(XXV) of 17 December 1970 in which the General Assembly of the United Nations
solemnly declared inter alia that the area of the seabed and ocean floor and the subsoil
thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, as well as its resources, are the
common heritage of mankind, the exploration and exploitation of which shall be
carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole, irrespective of the geographical
location of States,
Believing that the codification and progressive development of the law of the sea
achieved in this Convention will contribute to the strengthening of peace, security,
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cooperation and friendly relations among all nations in conformity with the principles
of justice and equal rights and will promote the economic and social advancement of
all peoples of the world, in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United
Nations as set forth in the Charter,
Affirming that matters not regulated by this Convention continue to be governed
by the rules and principles of general international law,
Have agreed as follows:

PART I
INTRODUCTION

Article 1
Use of terms and scope
1. For the purposes of this Convention:
(1) "Area" means the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction;
(2) "Authority" means the International Seabed Authority;
(3) "activities in the Area" means all activities of exploration for, and exploitation of,
the resources of the Area;
(4) "pollution of the marine environment" means the introduction by man, directly or
indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine environment, including estuaries,
which results or is likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources
and marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities, including
fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water
and reduction of amenities;
(5) (a) "dumping" means:
(i) any deliberate disposal of wastes or other matter from
vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea;
(ii) any deliberate disposal of vessels, aircraft, platforms or
other man-made structures at sea;
(b) "dumping" does not include:
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(i) the disposal of wastes or other matter incidental to, or derived
from the normal operations of vessels, aircraft, platforms or
other man-made structures at sea and their equipment, other
than wastes or other matter transported by or to vessels, aircraft,
platforms or other man-made structures at sea, operating for the
purpose of disposal of such matter or derived from the treatment
of such wastes or other matter on such vessels, aircraft,
platforms or structures;
(ii) placement of matter for a purpose other than the mere
disposal thereof, provided that such placement is not contrary
to the aims of this Convention.
2. (1) "States Parties" means States which have consented to be bound by this
Convention and for which this Convention is in force.
(2) This Convention applies mutatis mutandis to the entities referred to in article 305,
paragraph l(b), (c), (d), (e) and (f), which become Parties to this Convention in
accordance with the conditions relevant to each, and to that extent "States Parties"
refers to those entities.

PART V
EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE

Article55
Specific legal regime of the exclusive economic zone
The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea,
subject to the specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights and
jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States are
governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention.

Article56
Rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal State in the exclusive economic zone
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting,
conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living
or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the
seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the
483

economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the
production of energy from the water, currents and winds;
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this
Convention with regard to:
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands,
installations and structures;
(ii) marine scientific research;
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine
environment;
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention.
2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in the
exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and
duties of other States and shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions of this
Convention.
3. The rights set out in this article with respect to the seabed and subsoil shall be
exercised in accordance with Part VI.

Article57
Breadth of the exclusive economic zone
The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.

Article58
Rights and duties of other States in the exclusive economic zone
1. In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy,
subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in
article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and
pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms,
such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and
pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention.
2. Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law apply to the
exclusive economic zone in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part.
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3. In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention in the
exclusive economic zone, States shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the
coastal State and shall comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal
State in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and other rules of
international law in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part.

Article59
Basis for the resolution of conflicts
regarding the attribution of rights and jurisdiction
in the exclusive economic zone
In cases where this Convention does not attribute rights or jurisdiction to the coastal
State or to other States within the exclusive economic zone, and a conflict arises
between the interests of the coastal State and any other State or States, the conflict
should be resolved on the basis of equity and in the light of all the relevant
circumstances, taking into account the respective importance of the interests involved
to the parties as well as to the international community as a whole.

Article60
Artificial islands, installations and structures
in the exclusive economic zone
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have the exclusive right to
construct and to authorize and regulate the construction, operation and use of:
(a) artificial islands;
(b) installations and structures for the purposes provided for in
article 56 and other economic purposes;
(c) installations and structures which may interfere with the
exercise of the rights of the coastal State in the zone.
2. The coastal State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over such artificial islands,
installations and structures, including jurisdiction with regard to customs, fiscal,
health, safety and immigration laws and regulations.
3. Due notice must be given of the construction of such artificial islands, installations
or structures, and permanent means for giving warning of their presence must be
maintained. Any installations or structures which are abandoned or disused shall be
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removed to ensure safety of navigation, taking into account any generally accepted
international standards established in this regard by the competent international
organization. Such removal shall also have due regard to fishing, the protection of the
marine environment and the rights and duties of other States. Appropriate publicity
shall be given to the depth, position and dimensions of any installations or structures
not entirely removed.
4. The coastal State may, where necessary, establish reasonable safety zones around
such artificial islands, installations and structures in which it may take appropriate
measures to ensure the safety both of navigation and of the artificial islands,
installations and structures.
5. The breadth of the safety zones shall be determined by the coastal State, taking into
account applicable international standards. Such zones shall be designed to ensure that
they are reasonably related to the nature and function of the artificial islands,
installations or structures, and shall not exceed a distance of 500 metres around them,
measured from each point of their outer edge, except as authorized by generally
accepted international standards or as recommended by the competent international
organization. Due notice shall be given of the extent of safety zones.
6. All ships must respect these safety zones and shall comply with generally accepted
international standards regarding navigation in the vicinity of artificial islands,
installations, structures and safety zones.
7. Artificial islands, installations and structures and the safety zones around them may
not be established where interference may be caused to the use of recognized sea lanes
essential to international navigation.
8. Artificial islands, installations and structures do not possess the status of islands.
They have no territorial sea of their own, and their presence does not affect the
delimitation of the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf.

Article61
Conservation of the living resources
1. The coastal State shall determine the allowable catch of the living resources in its
exclusive economic zone.
2. The coastal State, taking into account the best scientific evidence available to it,
shall ensure through proper conservation and management measures that the
maintenance of the living resources in the exclusive economic zone is not endangered
by over-exploitation. As appropriate, the coastal State and competent international
organizations, whether subregional, regional or global, shall cooperate to this end.
3. Such measures shall also be designed to maintain or restore populations of harvested
species at levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by
relevant environmental and economic factors, including the economic needs of coastal
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fishing communities and the special requirements of developing States, and taking into
account fishing patterns, the interdependence of stocks and any generally
recommended international minimum standards, whether subregional, regional or
global.
4. In taking such measures the coastal State shall take into consideration the effects on
species associated with or dependent upon harvested species with a view to
maintaining or restoring populations of such associated or dependent species above
levels at which their reproduction may become seriously threatened.
5. Available scientific information, catch and fishing effort statistics, and other data
relevant to the conservation of fish stocks shall be contributed and exchanged on a
regular basis through competent international organizations, whether subregional,
regional or global, where appropriate and with participation by all States concerned,
including States whose nationals are allowed to fish in the exclusive economic zone.

Article62
Utilization of the living resources
1. The coastal State shall promote the objective of optimum utilization of the living
resources in the exclusive economic zone without prejudice to article 61.
2. The coastal State shall determine its capacity to harvest the living resources of the
exclusive economic zone. Where the coastal State does not have the capacity to harvest
the entire allowable catch, it shall, through agreements or other arrangements and
pursuant to the terms, conditions, laws and regulations referred to in paragraph 4, give
other States access to the surplus of the allowable catch, having particular regard to
the provisions of articles 69 and 70, especially in relation to the developing States
mentioned therein.
3. In giving access to other States to its exclusive economic zone under this article, the
coastal State shall take into account all relevant factors, including, inter alia, the
significance of the living resources of the area to the economy of the coastal State
concerned and its other national interests, the provisions of articles 69 and 70, the
requirements of developing States in the subregion or region in harvesting part of the
surplus and the need to minimize economic dislocation in States whose nationals have
habitually fished in the zone or which have made substantial efforts in research and
identification of stocks.
4. Nationals of other States fishing in the exclusive economic zone shall comply with
the conservation measures and with the other terms and conditions established in the
laws and regulations of the coastal State. These laws and regulations shall be consistent
with this Convention and may relate, inter alia, to the following:
(a) licensing of fishermen, fishing vessels and equipment,
including payment of fees and other forms of remuneration,
which, in the case of developing coastal States, may consist of
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adequate compensation in the field of financing, equipment and
technology relating to the fishing industry;
(b) determining the species which may be caught, and fixing
quotas of catch, whether in relation to particular stocks or
groups of stocks or catch per vessel over a period of time or to
the catch by nationals of any State during a specified period;
(c) regulating seasons and areas of fishing, the types, sizes and
amount of gear, and the types, sizes and number of fishing
vessels that may be used;
(d) fixing the age and size of fish and other species that may be
caught;
(e) specifying information required of fishing vessels, including
catch and effort statistics and vessel position reports;
(f) requiring, under the authorization and control of the coastal
State, the conduct of specified fisheries research programmes
and regulating the conduct of such research, including the
sampling of catches, disposition of samples and reporting of
associated scientific data;
(g) the placing of observers or trainees on board such vessels by
the coastal State;
(h) the landing of all or any part of the catch by such vessels in
the ports of the coastal State;
(i) terms and conditions relating to joint ventures or other
cooperative arrangements;
(j) requirements for the training of personnel and the transfer of
fisheries technology, including enhancement of the coastal
State's capability of undertaking fisheries research;
(k) enforcement procedures.
5. Coastal States shall give due notice of conservation and management laws and
regulations.

Article63
Stocks occurring within the exclusive economic zones of
two or more coastal States or both within the exclusive economic zone
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and in an area beyond and adjacent to it
1. Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur within the exclusive
economic zones of two or more coastal States, these States shall seek, either directly
or through appropriate subregional or regional organizations, to agree upon the
measures necessary to coordinate and ensure the conservation and development of
such stocks without prejudice to the other provisions of this Part.
2. Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur both within the exclusive
economic zone and in an area beyond and adjacent to the zone, the coastal State and
the States fishing for such stocks in the adjacent area shall seek, either directly or
through appropriate subregional or regional organizations, to agree upon the measures
necessary for the conservation of these stocks in the adjacent area.

Article64
Highly migratory species
1. The coastal State and other States whose nationals fish in the region for the highly
migratory species listed in Annex I shall cooperate directly or through appropriate
international organizations with a view to ensuring conservation and promoting the
objective of optimum utilization of such species throughout the region, both within
and beyond the exclusive economic zone. In regions for which no appropriate
international organization exists, the coastal State and other States whose nationals
harvest these species in the region shall cooperate to establish such an organization
and participate in its work.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 apply in addition to the other provisions of this Part.

Article65
Marine mammals
Nothing in this Part restricts the right of a coastal State or the competence of an
international organization, as appropriate, to prohibit, limit or regulate the exploitation
of marine mammals more strictly than provided for in this Part. States shall cooperate
with a view to the conservation of marine mammals and in the case of cetaceans shall
in particular work through the appropriate international organizations for their
conservation, management and study.

Article66
Anadromous stocks
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1. States in whose rivers anadromous stocks originate shall have the primary interest
in and responsibility for such stocks.
2. The State of origin of anadromous stocks shall ensure their conservation by the
establishment of appropriate regulatory measures for fishing in all waters landward of
the outer limits of its exclusive economic zone and for fishing provided for in
paragraph 3(b). The State of origin may, after consultations with the other States
referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 fishing these stocks, establish total allowable catches
for stocks originating in its rivers.
3. (a) Fisheries for anadromous stocks shall be conducted only
in waters landward of the outer limits of exclusive economic
zones, except in cases where this provision would result in
economic dislocation for a State other than the State of origin.
With respect to such fishing beyond the outer limits of the
exclusive economic zone, States concerned shall maintain
consultations with a view to achieving agreement on terms and
conditions of such fishing giving due regard to the conservation
requirements and the needs of the State of origin in respect of
these stocks.
(b) The State of origin shall cooperate in minimizing economic
dislocation in such other States fishing these stocks, taking into
account the normal catch and the mode of operations of such
States, and all the areas in which such fishing has occurred.
(c) States referred to in subparagraph (b), participating by
agreement with the State of origin in measures to renew
anadromous stocks, particularly by expenditures for that
purpose, shall be given special consideration by the State of
origin in the harvesting of stocks originating in its rivers.
(d) Enforcement of regulations regarding anadromous stocks
beyond the exclusive economic zone shall be by agreement
between the State of origin and the other States concerned.
4. In cases where anadromous stocks migrate into or through the waters landward of
the outer limits of the exclusive economic zone of a State other than the State of origin,
such State shall cooperate with the State of origin with regard to the conservation and
management of such stocks.
5. The State of origin of anadromous stocks and other States fishing these stocks shall
make arrangements for the implementation of the provisions of this article, where
appropriate, through regional organizations.

Article67
Catadromous species
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1. A coastal State in whose waters catadromous species spend the greater part of their
life cycle shall have responsibility for the management of these species and shall
ensure the ingress and egress of migrating fish.
2. Harvesting of catadromous species shall be conducted only in waters landward of
the outer limits of exclusive economic zones. When conducted in exclusive economic
zones, harvesting shall be subject to this article and the other provisions of this
Convention concerning fishing in these zones.
3. In cases where catadromous fish migrate through the exclusive economic zone of
another State, whether as juvenile or maturing fish, the management, including
harvesting, of such fish shall be regulated by agreement between the State mentioned
in paragraph 1 and the other State concerned. Such agreement shall ensure the rational
management of the species and take into account the responsibilities of the State
mentioned in paragraph 1 for the maintenance of these species.

Article68
Sedentary species
This Part does not apply to sedentary species as defined in article 77, paragraph 4.

Article69
Right of land-locked States
1. Land-locked States shall have the right to participate, on an equitable basis, in the
exploitation of an appropriate part of the surplus of the living resources of the exclusive
economic zones of coastal States of the same subregion or region, taking into account
the relevant economic and geographical circumstances of all the States concerned and
in conformity with the provisions of this article and of articles 61 and 62.
2. The terms and modalities of such participation shall be established by the States
concerned through bilateral, subregional or regional agreements taking into account,
inter alia:
(a) the need to avoid effects detrimental to fishing communities
or fishing industries of the coastal State;
(b) the extent to which the land-locked State, in accordance with
the provisions of this article, is participating or is entitled to
participate under existing bilateral, subregional or regional
agreements in the exploitation of living resources of the
exclusive economic zones of other coastal States;
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(c) the extent to which other land-locked States and
geographically disadvantaged States are participating in the
exploitation of the living resources of the exclusive economic
zone of the coastal State and the consequent need to avoid a
particular burden for any single coastal State or a part of it;
(d) the nutritional needs of the populations of the respective
States.
3. When the harvesting capacity of a coastal State approaches a point which would
enable it to harvest the entire allowable catch of the living resources in its exclusive
economic zone, the coastal State and other States concerned shall cooperate in the
establishment of equitable arrangements on a bilateral, subregional or regional basis
to allow for participation of developing land-locked States of the same subregion or
region in the exploitation of the living resources of the exclusive economic zones of
coastal States of the subregion or region, as may be appropriate in the circumstances
and on terms satisfactory to all parties. In the implementation of this provision the
factors mentioned in paragraph 2 shall also be taken into account.
4. Developed land-locked States shall, under the provisions of this article, be entitled
to participate in the exploitation of living resources only in the exclusive economic
zones of developed coastal States of the same subregion or region having regard to the
extent to which the coastal State, in giving access to other States to the living resources
of its exclusive economic zone, has taken into account the need to minimize
detrimental effects on fishing communities and economic dislocation in States whose
nationals have habitually fished in the zone.
5. The above provisions are without prejudice to arrangements agreed upon in
subregions or regions where the coastal States may grant to land-locked States of the
same subregion or region equal or preferential rights for the exploitation of the living
resources in the exclusive economic zones.

Article70
Right of geographically disadvantaged States
1. Geographically disadvantaged States shall have the right to participate, on an
equitable basis, in the exploitation of an appropriate part of the surplus of the living
resources of the exclusive economic zones of coastal States of the same subregion or
region, taking into account the relevant economic and geographical circumstances of
all the States concerned and in conformity with the provisions of this article and of
articles 61 and 62.
2. For the purposes of this Part, "geographically disadvantaged States" means coastal
States, including States bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas, whose geographical
situation makes them dependent upon the exploitation of the living resources of the
exclusive economic zones of other States in the subregion or region for adequate
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supplies of fish for the nutritional purposes of their populations or parts thereof, and
coastal States which can claim no exclusive economic zones of their own.
3. The terms and modalities of such participation shall be established by the States
concerned through bilateral, subregional or regional agreements taking into account,
inter alia:
(a) the need to avoid effects detrimental to fishing communities
or fishing industries of the coastal State;
(b) the extent to which the geographically disadvantaged State,
in accordance with the provisions of this article, is participating
or is entitled to participate under existing bilateral, subregional
or regional agreements in the exploitation of living resources of
the exclusive economic zones of other coastal States;
(c) the extent to which other geographically disadvantaged
States and land-locked States are participating in the
exploitation of the living resources of the exclusive economic
zone of the coastal State and the consequent need to avoid a
particular burden for any single coastal State or a part of it;
(d) the nutritional needs of the populations of the respective
States.
4. When the harvesting capacity of a coastal State approaches a point which would
enable it to harvest the entire allowable catch of the living resources in its exclusive
economic zone, the coastal State and other States concerned shall cooperate in the
establishment of equitable arrangements on a bilateral, subregional or regional basis
to allow for participation of developing geographically disadvantaged States of the
same subregion or region in the exploitation of the living resources of the exclusive
economic zones of coastal States of the subregion or region, as may be appropriate in
the circumstances and on terms satisfactory to all parties. In the implementation of this
provision the factors mentioned in paragraph 3 shall also be taken into account.
5. Developed geographically disadvantaged States shall, under the provisions of this
article, be entitled to participate in the exploitation of living resources only in the
exclusive economic zones of developed coastal States of the same subregion or region
having regard to the extent to which the coastal State, in giving access to other States
to the living resources of its exclusive economic zone, has taken into account the need
to minimize detrimental effects on fishing communities and economic dislocation in
States whose nationals have habitually fished in the zone.
6. The above provisions are without prejudice to arrangements agreed upon in
subregions or regions where the coastal States may grant to geographically
disadvantaged States of the same subregion or region equal or preferential rights for
the exploitation of the living resources in the exclusive economic zones.
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Article71
Non-applicability of articles 69 and 70
The provisions of articles 69 and 70 do not apply in the case of a coastal State whose
economy is overwhelmingly dependent on the exploitation of the living resources of
its exclusive economic zone.

Article72
Restrictions on transfer of rights
1. Rights provided under articles 69 and 70 to exploit living resources shall not be
directly or indirectly transferred to third States or their nationals by lease or licence,
by establishing joint ventures or in any other manner which has the effect of such
transfer unless otherwise agreed by the States concerned.
2. The foregoing provision does not preclude the States concerned from obtaining
technical or financial assistance from third States or international organizations in
order to facilitate the exercise of the rights pursuant to articles 69 and 70, provided that
it does not have the effect referred to in paragraph 1.

Article73
Enforcement of laws and regulations of the coastal State
1. The coastal State may, in the exercise of its sovereign rights to explore, exploit,
conserve and manage the living resources in the exclusive economic zone, take such
measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings, as may be
necessary to ensure compliance with the laws and regulations adopted by it in
conformity with this Convention.
2. Arrested vessels and their crews shall be promptly released upon the posting of
reasonable bond or other security.
3. Coastal State penalties for violations of fisheries laws and regulations in the
exclusive economic zone may not include imprisonment, in the absence of agreements
to the contrary by the States concerned, or any other form of corporal punishment.
4. In cases of arrest or detention of foreign vessels the coastal State shall promptly
notify the flag State, through appropriate channels, of the action taken and of any
penalties subsequently imposed.
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Article74
Delimitation of the exclusive economic zone
between States with opposite or adjacent coasts
1. The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between States with opposite or
adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as
referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to
achieve an equitable solution.
2. If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time, the States
concerned shall resort to the procedures provided for in Part XV.
3. Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the States concerned, in a spirit
of understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional
arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardize
or hamper the reaching of the final agreement. Such arrangements shall be without
prejudice to the final delimitation.
4. Where there is an agreement in force between the States concerned, questions
relating to the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone shall be determined in
accordance with the provisions of that agreement.

Article75
Charts and lists of geographical coordinates
1. Subject to this Part, the outer limit lines of the exclusive economic zone and the
lines of delimitation drawn in accordance with article 74 shall be shown on charts of a
scale or scales adequate for ascertaining their position. Where appropriate, lists of
geographical coordinates of points, specifying the geodetic datum, may be substituted
for such outer limit lines or lines of delimitation.
2. The coastal State shall give due publicity to such charts or lists of geographical
coordinates and shall deposit a copy of each such chart or list with the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations.

PART VII
HIGH SEAS

SECTION 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
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Article87
Freedom of the high seas
1. The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. Freedom of
the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this Convention and by
other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and landlocked States:
(a) freedom of navigation;
(b) freedom of overflight;
(c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to
Part VI;
(d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other
installations permitted under international law, subject to
Part VI;
(e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in
section 2;
(f) freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII.
2. These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of
other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas, and also with due
regard for the rights under this Convention with respect to activities in the Area.
PART XI
THE AREA

Article145
Protection of the marine environment
Necessary measures shall be taken in accordance with this Convention with respect
to activities in the Area to ensure effective protection for the marine environment
from harmful effects which may arise from such activities. To this end the Authority
shall adopt appropriate rules, regulations and procedures for inter alia:
(a) the prevention, reduction and control of pollution and other
hazards to the marine environment, including the coastline, and of
interference with the ecological balance of the marine environment,
particular attention being paid to the need for protection from harmful
effects of such activities as drilling, dredging, excavation, disposal of
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waste, construction and operation or maintenance of installations,
pipelines and other devices related to such activities;
(b) the protection and conservation of the natural resources of the
Area and the prevention of damage to the flora and fauna of the
marine environment.
SECTION 5. SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AND ADVISORY OPINIONS

Article186
Seabed Disputes Chamber of the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
The establishment of the Seabed Disputes Chamber and the manner in which it shall
exercise its jurisdiction shall be governed by the provisions of this section, of Part XV
and of Annex VI.

Article187
Jurisdiction of the Seabed Disputes Chamber
The Seabed Disputes Chamber shall have jurisdiction under this Part and the Annexes
relating thereto in disputes with respect to activities in the Area falling within the
following categories:
(a) disputes between States Parties concerning the interpretation or
application of this Part and the Annexes relating thereto;
(b) disputes between a State Party and the Authority concerning:
(i) acts or omissions of the Authority or of a State Party alleged
to be in violation of this Part or the Annexes relating thereto or
of rules, regulations and procedures of the Authority adopted in
accordance therewith; or
(ii) acts of the Authority alleged to be in excess of jurisdiction
or a misuse of power;
(c) disputes between parties to a contract, being States Parties, the
Authority or the Enterprise, state enterprises and natural or juridical
persons referred to in article 153, paragraph 2(b), concerning:
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(i) the interpretation or application of a relevant contract or a
plan of work; or
(ii) acts or omissions of a party to the contract relating to
activities in the Area and directed to the other party or directly
affecting its legitimate interests;
(d) disputes between the Authority and a prospective contractor who
has been sponsored by a State as provided in article 153,
paragraph 2(b), and has duly fulfilled the conditions referred to in
Annex III, article 4, paragraph 6, and article 13, paragraph 2,
concerning the refusal of a contract or a legal issue arising in the
negotiation of the contract;
(e) disputes between the Authority and a State Party, a state enterprise
or a natural or juridical person sponsored by a State Party as provided
for in article 153, paragraph 2(b), where it is alleged that the Authority
has incurred liability as provided in Annex III, article 22;
(f) any other disputes for which the jurisdiction of the Chamber is
specifically provided in this Convention.

Article188
Submission of disputes to a special chamber of the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
or an ad hoc chamber of the Seabed Disputes Chamber
or to binding commercial arbitration
1. Disputes between States Parties referred to in article 187, subparagraph (a), may be
submitted:
(a) at the request of the parties to the dispute, to a special
chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to
be formed in accordance with Annex VI, articles 15 and 17; or
(b) at the request of any party to the dispute, to an ad hoc
chamber of the Seabed Disputes Chamber to be formed in
accordance with Annex VI, article 36.
2. (a) Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of a
contract referred to in article 187, subparagraph (c)(i), shall be
submitted, at the request of any party to the dispute, to binding
commercial arbitration, unless the parties otherwise agree.
A commercial arbitral tribunal to which the dispute is submitted
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shall have no jurisdiction to decide any question of
interpretation of this Convention. When the dispute also
involves a question of the interpretation of Part XI and the
Annexes relating thereto, with respect to activities in the Area,
that question shall be referred to the Seabed Disputes Chamber
for a ruling.
(b) If, at the commencement of or in the course of such
arbitration, the arbitral tribunal determines, either at the request
of any party to the dispute or proprio motu, that its decision
depends upon a ruling of the Seabed Disputes Chamber, the
arbitral tribunal shall refer such question to the Seabed Disputes
Chamber for such ruling. The arbitral tribunal shall then
proceed to render its award in conformity with the ruling of the
Seabed Disputes Chamber.
(c) In the absence of a provision in the contract on the arbitration
procedure to be applied in the dispute, the arbitration shall be
conducted in accordance with the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules or such other arbitration rules as may be prescribed in the
rules, regulations and procedures of the Authority, unless the
parties to the dispute otherwise agree.

Article189
Limitation on jurisdiction
with regard to decisions of the Authority
The Seabed Disputes Chamber shall have no jurisdiction with regard to the exercise
by the Authority of its discretionary powers in accordance with this Part; in no case
shall it substitute its discretion for that of the Authority. Without prejudice to
article 191, in exercising its jurisdiction pursuant to article 187, the Seabed Disputes
Chamber shall not pronounce itself on the question of whether any rules, regulations
and procedures of the Authority are in conformity with this Convention, nor declare
invalid any such rules, regulations and procedures. Its jurisdiction in this regard shall
be confined to deciding claims that the application of any rules, regulations and
procedures of the Authority in individual cases would be in conflict with the
contractual obligations of the parties to the dispute or their obligations under this
Convention, claims concerning excess of jurisdiction or misuse of power, and to claims
for damages to be paid or other remedy to be given to the party concerned for the
failure of the other party to comply with its contractual obligations or its obligations
under this Convention.

Article190
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Participation and appearance
of sponsoring States Parties in proceedings
1. If a natural or juridical person is a party to a dispute referred to in article 187, the
sponsoring State shall be given notice thereof and shall have the right to participate in
the proceedings by submitting written or oral statements.
2. If an action is brought against a State Party by a natural or juridical person sponsored
by another State Party in a dispute referred to in article 187, subparagraph (c), the
respondent State may request the State sponsoring that person to appear in the
proceedings on behalf of that person. Failing such appearance, the respondent State
may arrange to be represented by a juridical person of its nationality.

Article191
Advisory opinions
The Seabed Disputes Chamber shall give advisory opinions at the request of the
Assembly or the Council on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities.
Such opinions shall be given as a matter of urgency.

PART XII
PROTECTION AND PRESERVATION
OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT

SECTION 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 192
General obligation
States have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment.

Article 193
Sovereign right of States to exploit their natural resources
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States have the sovereign right to exploit their natural resources pursuant to their
environmental policies and in accordance with their duty to protect and preserve the
marine environment.

Article 194
Measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution
of the marine environment
1. States shall take, individually or jointly as appropriate, all measures consistent with
this Convention that are necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the
marine environment from any source, using for this purpose the best practicable means
at their disposal and in accordance with their capabilities, and they shall endeavour to
harmonize their policies in this connection.
2. States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their
jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to other
States and their environment, and that pollution arising from incidents or activities
under their jurisdiction or control does not spread beyond the areas where they exercise
sovereign rights in accordance with this Convention.
3. The measures taken pursuant to this Part shall deal with all sources of pollution of
the marine environment. These measures shall include, inter alia, those designed to
minimize to the fullest possible extent:
(a) the release of toxic, harmful or noxious substances,
especially those which are persistent, from land-based sources,
from or through the atmosphere or by dumping;
(b) pollution from vessels, in particular measures for preventing
accidents and dealing with emergencies, ensuring the safety of
operations at sea, preventing intentional and unintentional
discharges, and regulating the design, construction, equipment,
operation and manning of vessels;
(c) pollution from installations and devices used in exploration
or exploitation of the natural resources of the seabed and
subsoil, in particular measures for preventing accidents and
dealing with emergencies, ensuring the safety of operations at
sea, and regulating the design, construction, equipment,
operation and manning of such installations or devices;
(d) pollution from other installations and devices operating in
the marine environment, in particular measures for preventing
accidents and dealing with emergencies, ensuring the safety of
operations at sea, and regulating the design, construction,
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equipment, operation and manning of such installations or
devices.
4. In taking measures to prevent, reduce or control pollution of the marine
environment, States shall refrain from unjustifiable interference with activities carried
out by other States in the exercise of their rights and in pursuance of their duties in
conformity with this Convention.
5. The measures taken in accordance with this Part shall include those necessary to
protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted,
threatened or endangered species and other forms of marine life.

Article 195
Duty not to transfer damage or hazards
or transform one type of pollution into another
In taking measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment,
States shall act so as not to transfer, directly or indirectly, damage or hazards from one
area to another or transform one type of pollution into another.

Article 196
Use of technologies or introduction of alien or new species
1. States shall take all measures necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of
the marine environment resulting from the use of technologies under their jurisdiction
or control, or the intentional or accidental introduction of species, alien or new, to a
particular part of the marine environment, which may cause significant and harmful
changes thereto.
2. This article does not affect the application of this Convention regarding the
prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the marine environment.
SECTION 2. GLOBAL AND REGIONAL COOPERATION

Article 197
Cooperation on a global or regional basis
States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly
or through competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating
502

international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent
with this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine environment,
taking into account characteristic regional features.

Article 198
Notification of imminent or actual damage
When a State becomes aware of cases in which the marine environment is in imminent
danger of being damaged or has been damaged by pollution, it shall immediately notify
other States it deems likely to be affected by such damage, as well as the competent
international organizations.

Article 199
Contingency plans against pollution
In the cases referred to in article 198, States in the area affected, in accordance with
their capabilities, and the competent international organizations shall cooperate, to the
extent possible, in eliminating the effects of pollution and preventing or minimizing
the damage. To this end, States shall jointly develop and promote contingency plans
for responding to pollution incidents in the marine environment.

Article 200
Studies, research programmes and exchange of information and data
States shall cooperate, directly or through competent international organizations, for
the purpose of promoting studies, undertaking programmes of scientific research and
encouraging the exchange of information and data acquired about pollution of the
marine environment. They shall endeavour to participate actively in regional and
global programmes to acquire knowledge for the assessment of the nature and extent
of pollution, exposure to it, and its pathways, risks and remedies.

Article 201
Scientific criteria for regulations
In the light of the information and data acquired pursuant to article 200, States shall
cooperate, directly or through competent international organizations, in establishing
appropriate scientific criteria for the formulation and elaboration of rules, standards
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and recommended practices and procedures for the prevention, reduction and control
of pollution of the marine environment.
SECTION 5. INTERNATIONAL RULES AND NATIONAL LEGISLATION
TO PREVENT, REDUCE AND CONTROL
POLLUTION OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT

Article 207
Pollution from land-based sources
1. States shall adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of
the marine environment from land-based sources, including rivers, estuaries, pipelines
and outfall structures, taking into account internationally agreed rules, standards and
recommended practices and procedures.
2. States shall take other measures as may be necessary to prevent, reduce and control
such pollution.
3. States shall endeavour to harmonize their policies in this connection at the
appropriate regional level.
4. States, acting especially through competent international organizations or
diplomatic conference, shall endeavour to establish global and regional rules,
standards and recommended practices and procedures to prevent, reduce and control
pollution of the marine environment from land-based sources, taking into account
characteristic regional features, the economic capacity of developing States and their
need for economic development. Such rules, standards and recommended practices
and procedures shall be re-examined from time to time as necessary.
5. Laws, regulations, measures, rules, standards and recommended practices and
procedures referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 shall include those designed to
minimize, to the fullest extent possible, the release of toxic, harmful or noxious
substances, especially those which are persistent, into the marine environment.

Article 212
Pollution from or through the atmosphere
1. States shall adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of
the marine environment from or through the atmosphere, applicable to the air space
under their sovereignty and to vessels flying their flag or vessels or aircraft of their
registry, taking into account internationally agreed rules, standards and recommended
practices and procedures and the safety of air navigation.
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2. States shall take other measures as may be necessary to prevent, reduce and control
such pollution.
3. States, acting especially through competent international organizations or
diplomatic conference, shall endeavour to establish global and regional rules,
standards and recommended practices and procedures to prevent, reduce and control
such pollution.
SECTION 6. ENFORCEMENT

Article 213
Enforcement with respect to pollution from land-based sources
States shall enforce their laws and regulations adopted in accordance with article 207
and shall adopt laws and regulations and take other measures necessary to implement
applicable international rules and standards established through competent
international organizations or diplomatic conference to prevent, reduce and control
pollution of the marine environment from land-based sources.
SECTION 9. RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY

Article 235
Responsibility and liability
1. States are responsible for the fulfilment of their international obligations concerning
the protection and preservation of the marine environment. They shall be liable in
accordance with international law.
2. States shall ensure that recourse is available in accordance with their legal systems
for prompt and adequate compensation or other relief in respect of damage caused by
pollution of the marine environment by natural or juridical persons under their
jurisdiction.
3. With the objective of assuring prompt and adequate compensation in respect of all
damage caused by pollution of the marine environment, States shall cooperate in the
implementation of existing international law and the further development of
international law relating to responsibility and liability for the assessment of and
compensation for damage and the settlement of related disputes, as well as, where
appropriate, development of criteria and procedures for payment of adequate
compensation, such as compulsory insurance or compensation funds.
SECTION 11. OBLIGATIONS UNDER OTHER CONVENTIONS
ON THE PROTECTION AND PRESERVATION
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OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT

Article 237
Obligations under other conventions on the
protection and preservation of the marine environment
1. The provisions of this Part are without prejudice to the specific obligations assumed
by States under special conventions and agreements concluded previously which relate
to the protection and preservation of the marine environment and to agreements which
may be concluded in furtherance of the general principles set forth in this Convention.
2. Specific obligations assumed by States under special conventions, with respect to
the protection and preservation of the marine environment, should be carried out in a
manner consistent with the general principles and objectives of this Convention.

PART XV
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

SECTION 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 279
Obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means
States Parties shall settle any dispute between them concerning the interpretation or
application of this Convention by peaceful means in accordance with Article 2,
paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United Nations and, to this end, shall seek a solution
by the means indicated in Article 33, paragraph 1, of the Charter.

Article 280
Settlement of disputes by any peaceful means chosen by the parties
Nothing in this Part impairs the right of any States Parties to agree at any time to settle
a dispute between them concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention
by any peaceful means of their own choice.
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Article 281
Procedure where no settlement has been reached by the parties
1. If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning the interpretation or
application of this Convention have agreed to seek settlement of the dispute by a
peaceful means of their own choice, the procedures provided for in this Part apply only
where no settlement has been reached by recourse to such means and the agreement
between the parties does not exclude any further procedure.
2. If the parties have also agreed on a time-limit, paragraph 1 applies only upon the
expiration of that time-limit.

Article 282
Obligations under general, regional or bilateral agreements
If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning the interpretation or
application of this Convention have agreed, through a general, regional or bilateral
agreement or otherwise, that such dispute shall, at the request of any party to the
dispute, be submitted to a procedure that entails a binding decision, that procedure
shall apply in lieu of the procedures provided for in this Part, unless the parties to the
dispute otherwise agree.

Article 283
Obligation to exchange views
1. When a dispute arises between States Parties concerning the interpretation or
application of this Convention, the parties to the dispute shall proceed expeditiously
to an exchange of views regarding its settlement by negotiation or other peaceful
means.
2. The parties shall also proceed expeditiously to an exchange of views where a
procedure for the settlement of such a dispute has been terminated without a settlement
or where a settlement has been reached and the circumstances require consultation
regarding the manner of implementing the settlement.

Article 284
Conciliation
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1. A State Party which is a party to a dispute concerning the interpretation or
application of this Convention may invite the other party or parties to submit the
dispute to conciliation in accordance with the procedure under Annex V, section 1, or
another conciliation procedure.
2. If the invitation is accepted and if the parties agree upon the conciliation procedure
to be applied, any party may submit the dispute to that procedure.
3. If the invitation is not accepted or the parties do not agree upon the procedure, the
conciliation proceedings shall be deemed to be terminated.
4. Unless the parties otherwise agree, when a dispute has been submitted to
conciliation, the proceedings may be terminated only in accordance with the agreed
conciliation procedure.

Article 285
Application of this section to disputes submitted pursuant to Part XI
This section applies to any dispute which pursuant to Part XI, section 5, is to be settled
in accordance with procedures provided for in this Part. If an entity other than a State
Party is a party to such a dispute, this section applies mutatis mutandis.
SECTION 2. COMPULSORY PROCEDURES ENTAILING BINDING
DECISIONS

Article 286
Application of procedures under this section
Subject to section 3, any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this
Convention shall, where no settlement has been reached by recourse to section 1, be
submitted at the request of any party to the dispute to the court or tribunal having
jurisdiction under this section.

Article 287
Choice of procedure
1. When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention or at any time thereafter, a
State shall be free to choose, by means of a written declaration, one or more of the
following means for the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation or
application of this Convention:
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(a) the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea established
in accordance with Annex VI;
(b) the International Court of Justice;
(c) an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with
Annex VII;
(d) a special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with
Annex VIII for one or more of the categories of disputes
specified therein.
2. A declaration made under paragraph 1 shall not affect or be affected by the
obligation of a State Party to accept the jurisdiction of the Seabed Disputes Chamber
of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to the extent and in the manner
provided for in Part XI, section 5.
3. A State Party, which is a party to a dispute not covered by a declaration in force,
shall be deemed to have accepted arbitration in accordance with Annex VII.
4. If the parties to a dispute have accepted the same procedure for the settlement of the
dispute, it may be submitted only to that procedure, unless the parties otherwise agree.
5. If the parties to a dispute have not accepted the same procedure for the settlement
of the dispute, it may be submitted only to arbitration in accordance with Annex VII,
unless the parties otherwise agree.
6. A declaration made under paragraph 1 shall remain in force until three months after
notice of revocation has been deposited with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations.
7. A new declaration, a notice of revocation or the expiry of a declaration does not in
any way affect proceedings pending before a court or tribunal having jurisdiction under
this article, unless the parties otherwise agree.
8. Declarations and notices referred to in this article shall be deposited with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof to the
States Parties.

Article 288
Jurisdiction
1. A court or tribunal referred to in article 287 shall have jurisdiction over any dispute
concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention which is submitted to
it in accordance with this Part.
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2. A court or tribunal referred to in article 287 shall also have jurisdiction over any
dispute concerning the interpretation or application of an international agreement
related to the purposes of this Convention, which is submitted to it in accordance with
the agreement.
3. The Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
established in accordance with Annex VI, and any other chamber or arbitral tribunal
referred to in Part XI, section 5, shall have jurisdiction in any matter which is submitted
to it in accordance therewith.
4. In the event of a dispute as to whether a court or tribunal has jurisdiction, the matter
shall be settled by decision of that court or tribunal.

Article 289
Experts
In any dispute involving scientific or technical matters, a court or tribunal exercising
jurisdiction under this section may, at the request of a party or proprio motu, select in
consultation with the parties no fewer than two scientific or technical experts chosen
preferably from the relevant list prepared in accordance with Annex VIII, article 2, to
sit with the court or tribunal but without the right to vote.

Article 290
Provisional measures
1. If a dispute has been duly submitted to a court or tribunal which considers that
prima facie it has jurisdiction under this Part or Part XI, section 5, the court or tribunal
may prescribe any provisional measures which it considers appropriate under the
circumstances to preserve the respective rights of the parties to the dispute or to prevent
serious harm to the marine environment, pending the final decision.
2. Provisional measures may be modified or revoked as soon as the circumstances
justifying them have changed or ceased to exist.
3. Provisional measures may be prescribed, modified or revoked under this article only
at the request of a party to the dispute and after the parties have been given an
opportunity to be heard.
4. The court or tribunal shall forthwith give notice to the parties to the dispute, and to
such other States Parties as it considers appropriate, of the prescription, modification
or revocation of provisional measures.
5. Pending the constitution of an arbitral tribunal to which a dispute is being submitted
under this section, any court or tribunal agreed upon by the parties or, failing such
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agreement within two weeks from the date of the request for provisional measures, the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea or, with respect to activities in the Area,
the Seabed Disputes Chamber, may prescribe, modify or revoke provisional measures
in accordance with this article if it considers that prima facie the tribunal which is to
be constituted would have jurisdiction and that the urgency of the situation so requires.
Once constituted, the tribunal to which the dispute has been submitted may modify,
revoke or affirm those provisional measures, acting in conformity with paragraphs 1
to 4.
6. The parties to the dispute shall comply promptly with any provisional measures
prescribed under this article.

Article 291
Access
1. All the dispute settlement procedures specified in this Part shall be open to States
Parties.
2. The dispute settlement procedures specified in this Part shall be open to entities
other than States Parties only as specifically provided for in this Convention.

Article 292
Prompt release of vessels and crews
1. Where the authorities of a State Party have detained a vessel flying the flag of
another State Party and it is alleged that the detaining State has not complied with the
provisions of this Convention for the prompt release of the vessel or its crew upon the
posting of a reasonable bond or other financial security, the question of release from
detention may be submitted to any court or tribunal agreed upon by the parties or,
failing such agreement within 10 days from the time of detention, to a court or tribunal
accepted by the detaining State under article 287 or to the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea, unless the parties otherwise agree.
2. The application for release may be made only by or on behalf of the flag State of
the vessel.
3. The court or tribunal shall deal without delay with the application for release and
shall deal only with the question of release, without prejudice to the merits of any case
before the appropriate domestic forum against the vessel, its owner or its crew. The
authorities of the detaining State remain competent to release the vessel or its crew at
any time.
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4. Upon the posting of the bond or other financial security determined by the court or
tribunal, the authorities of the detaining State shall comply promptly with the decision
of the court or tribunal concerning the release of the vessel or its crew.

Article 293
Applicable law
1. A court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section shall apply this Convention
and other rules of international law not incompatible with this Convention.
2. Paragraph l does not prejudice the power of the court or tribunal having jurisdiction
under this section to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties so agree.

Article 294
Preliminary proceedings
1. A court or tribunal provided for in article 287 to which an application is made in
respect of a dispute referred to in article 297 shall determine at the request of a party,
or may determine proprio motu, whether the claim constitutes an abuse of legal process
or whether prima facie it is well founded. If the court or tribunal determines that the
claim constitutes an abuse of legal process or is prima facie unfounded, it shall take
no further action in the case.
2. Upon receipt of the application, the court or tribunal shall immediately notify the
other party or parties of the application, and shall fix a reasonable time-limit within
which they may request it to make a determination in accordance with paragraph 1.
3. Nothing in this article affects the right of any party to a dispute to make preliminary
objections in accordance with the applicable rules of procedure.

Article 295
Exhaustion of local remedies
Any dispute between States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this
Convention may be submitted to the procedures provided for in this section only after
local remedies have been exhausted where this is required by international law.

Article 296
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Finality and binding force of decisions
1. Any decision rendered by a court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section
shall be final and shall be complied with by all the parties to the dispute.
2. Any such decision shall have no binding force except between the parties and in
respect of that particular dispute.
SECTION 3. LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS
TO APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 2

Article 297
Limitations on applicability of section 2
1. Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention with regard
to the exercise by a coastal State of its sovereign rights or jurisdiction provided for in
this Convention shall be subject to the procedures provided for in section 2 in the
following cases:
(a) when it is alleged that a coastal State has acted in
contravention of the provisions of this Convention in regard to
the freedoms and rights of navigation, overflight or the laying
of submarine cables and pipelines, or in regard to other
internationally lawful uses of the sea specified in article 58;
(b) when it is alleged that a State in exercising the
aforementioned freedoms, rights or uses has acted in
contravention of this Convention or of laws or regulations
adopted by the coastal State in conformity with this Convention
and other rules of international law not incompatible with this
Convention; or
(c) when it is alleged that a coastal State has acted in
contravention of specified international rules and standards for
the protection and preservation of the marine environment
which are applicable to the coastal State and which have been
established by this Convention or through a competent
international organization or diplomatic conference in
accordance with this Convention.
2. (a) Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of
the provisions of this Convention with regard to marine
scientific research shall be settled in accordance with section 2,
except that the coastal State shall not be obliged to accept the
submission to such settlement of any dispute arising out of:
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(i) the exercise by the coastal State of a right or
discretion in accordance with article 246; or
(ii) a decision by the coastal State to order suspension or
cessation of a research project in accordance with
article 253.
(b) A dispute arising from an allegation by the researching State
that with respect to a specific project the coastal State is not
exercising its rights under articles 246 and 253 in a manner
compatible with this Convention shall be submitted, at the
request of either party, to conciliation under Annex V, section 2,
provided that the conciliation commission shall not call in
question the exercise by the coastal State of its discretion to
designate specific areas as referred to in article 246,
paragraph 6, or of its discretion to withhold consent in
accordance with article 246, paragraph 5.
3. (a) Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of
the provisions of this Convention with regard to fisheries shall
be settled in accordance with section 2, except that the coastal
State shall not be obliged to accept the submission to such
settlement of any dispute relating to its sovereign rights with
respect to the living resources in the exclusive economic zone
or their exercise, including its discretionary powers for
determining the allowable catch, its harvesting capacity, the
allocation of surpluses to other States and the terms and
conditions established in its conservation and management laws
and regulations.
(b) Where no settlement has been reached by recourse to
section 1 of this Part, a dispute shall be submitted to conciliation
under Annex V, section 2, at the request of any party to the
dispute, when it is alleged that:
(i) a coastal State has manifestly failed to comply with
its obligations to ensure through proper conservation
and management measures that the maintenance of the
living resources in the exclusive economic zone is not
seriously endangered;
(ii) a coastal State has arbitrarily refused to determine,
at the request of another State, the allowable catch and
its capacity to harvest living resources with respect to
stocks which that other State is interested in fishing; or
(iii) a coastal State has arbitrarily refused to allocate to
any State, under articles 62, 69 and 70 and under the
terms and conditions established by the coastal State
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consistent with this Convention, the whole or part of the
surplus it has declared to exist.
(c) In no case shall the conciliation commission substitute its
discretion for that of the coastal State.
(d) The report of the conciliation commission shall be
communicated to the appropriate international organizations.
(e) In negotiating agreements pursuant to articles 69 and 70,
States Parties, unless they otherwise agree, shall include a
clause on measures which they shall take in order to minimize
the possibility of a disagreement concerning the interpretation
or application of the agreement, and on how they should
proceed if a disagreement nevertheless arises.

Article 298
Optional exceptions to applicability of section 2
1. When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention or at any time thereafter, a
State may, without prejudice to the obligations arising under section 1, declare in
writing that it does not accept any one or more of the procedures provided for in
section 2 with respect to one or more of the following categories of disputes:
(a) (i) disputes concerning the interpretation or
application of articles 15, 74 and 83 relating to sea
boundary delimitations, or those involving historic bays
or titles, provided that a State having made such a
declaration shall, when such a dispute arises subsequent
to the entry into force of this Convention and where no
agreement within a reasonable period of time is reached
in negotiations between the parties, at the request of any
party to the dispute, accept submission of the matter to
conciliation under Annex V, section 2; and provided
further that any dispute that necessarily involves the
concurrent consideration of any unsettled dispute
concerning sovereignty or other rights over continental
or insular land territory shall be excluded from such
submission;
(ii) after the conciliation commission has presented its
report, which shall state the reasons on which it is based,
the parties shall negotiate an agreement on the basis of
that report; if these negotiations do not result in an
agreement, the parties shall, by mutual consent, submit
the question to one of the procedures provided for in
section 2, unless the parties otherwise agree;
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(iii) this subparagraph does not apply to any sea
boundary dispute finally settled by an arrangement
between the parties, or to any such dispute which is to
be settled in accordance with a bilateral or multilateral
agreement binding upon those parties;
(b) disputes concerning military activities, including military
activities by government vessels and aircraft engaged in noncommercial service, and disputes concerning law enforcement
activities in regard to the exercise of sovereign rights or
jurisdiction excluded from the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal
under article 297, paragraph 2 or 3;
(c) disputes in respect of which the Security Council of the
United Nations is exercising the functions assigned to it by the
Charter of the United Nations, unless the Security Council
decides to remove the matter from its agenda or calls upon the
parties to settle it by the means provided for in this Convention.
2. A State Party which has made a declaration under paragraph 1 may at any time
withdraw it, or agree to submit a dispute excluded by such declaration to any procedure
specified in this Convention.
3. A State Party which has made a declaration under paragraph 1 shall not be entitled
to submit any dispute falling within the excepted category of disputes to any procedure
in this Convention as against another State Party, without the consent of that party.
4. If one of the States Parties has made a declaration under paragraph 1(a), any other
State Party may submit any dispute falling within an excepted category against the
declarant party to the procedure specified in such declaration.
5. A new declaration, or the withdrawal of a declaration, does not in any way affect
proceedings pending before a court or tribunal in accordance with this article, unless
the parties otherwise agree.
6. Declarations and notices of withdrawal of declarations under this article shall be
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit copies
thereof to the States Parties.

Article 299
Right of the parties to agree upon a procedure
1. A dispute excluded under article 297 or excepted by a declaration made under
article 298 from the dispute settlement procedures provided for in section 2 may be
submitted to such procedures only by agreement of the parties to the dispute.
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2. Nothing in this section impairs the right of the parties to the dispute to agree to some
other procedure for the settlement of such dispute or to reach an amicable settlement.

PART XVII
FINAL PROVISIONS

Article311
Relation to other conventions and international agreements
1. This Convention shall prevail, as between States Parties, over the Geneva
Conventions on the Law of the Sea of 29 April 1958.
2. This Convention shall not alter the rights and obligations of States Parties which
arise from other agreements compatible with this Convention and which do not affect
the enjoyment by other States Parties of their rights or the performance of their
obligations under this Convention.
3. Two or more States Parties may conclude agreements modifying or suspending the
operation of provisions of this Convention, applicable solely to the relations between
them, provided that such agreements do not relate to a provision derogation from
which is incompatible with the effective execution of the object and purpose of this
Convention, and provided further that such agreements shall not affect the application
of the basic principles embodied herein, and that the provisions of such agreements do
not affect the enjoyment by other States Parties of their rights or the performance of
their obligations under this Convention.
4. States Parties intending to conclude an agreement referred to in paragraph 3 shall
notify the other States Parties through the depositary of this Convention of their
intention to conclude the agreement and of the modification or suspension for which
it provides.
5. This article does not affect international agreements expressly permitted or
preserved by other articles of this Convention.
6. States Parties agree that there shall be no amendments to the basic principle relating
to the common heritage of mankind set forth in article 136 and that they shall not be
party to any agreement in derogation thereof.
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